

Police Operations and Data Analysis Report

Anniston, Alabama



Center For Public Safety Management, LLC

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Since its inception in 1914, ICMA has been dedicated to assisting local governments in providing services to their citizens in an efficient and effective manner. Our work spans all of the activities of local government — parks, libraries, recreation, public works, economic development, code enforcement, Brownfields, public safety, etc.

ICMA advances the knowledge of local government best practices across a wide range of platforms including publications, research, training, and technical assistance. Its work includes both domestic and international activities in partnership with local, state, and federal governments as well as private foundations. For example, it is involved in a major library research project funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and is providing community policing training in Panama working with the U.S. State Department. It has personnel in Afghanistan assisting with building wastewater treatment plants and has had teams in Central America providing training in disaster relief working with SOUTHCOM.

The **ICMA *Center for Public Safety Management (*ICMA/CPSM*)*** was one of four Centers within the Information and Assistance Division of ICMA providing support to local governments in the areas of police, fire, EMS, emergency management, and homeland security. In addition to providing technical assistance in these areas we also represent local governments at the federal level and are involved in numerous projects with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. In each of these Centers, ICMA has selected to partner with nationally recognized individuals or companies to provide services that ICMA has previously provided directly. Doing so will provide a higher level of services, greater flexibility, and reduced costs in meeting members’ needs as ICMA will be expanding the services that it can offer to local governments. For example, The Center for Productivity Management (CPM) is now working exclusively with SAS, one of the world’s leaders in data management and analysis. And the Center for Strategic Management (CSM) is now partnering with nationally recognized experts and academics in local government management and finance.

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CPSM’s local government technical assistance experience includes workload and deployment analysis using our unique methodology and subject matter experts to examine department organizational structure and culture, identify workload and staffing needs, and identify and disseminate industry best practices. We have conducted more than 269 such studies in 37 states and 204 communities ranging in size from 8,000 population (Boone, Iowa) to 800,000 population (Indianapolis, Ind.).

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# Section 1. Executive Summary

The Center for Public Safety Management, LLC (CPSM) was commissioned to review the operations of the Anniston Police Department (APD). While our analysis covered all aspects of the department’s operations, particular areas of focus of this study included identifying appropriate staffing of the department given the workload, community demographics, and crime levels; the effectiveness of the organizational structure; and efficiency of division/unit processes.

We analyzed the department workload using operations research methodology and compared that workload to staffing and deployment levels. We reviewed other performance indicators that enabled us to understand the implications of service demand on current staffing. Our study involved data collection, interviews with key police and administration personnel, focus groups with department personnel and volunteers/community members, on-site observations of the job environment, data analysis, comparative analysis, SWOT analysis, and the development of alternatives and recommendations.

Based on CPSM’s detailed review of the Anniston Police Department, it is our opinion that the department reflects a police agency that is responsive to the community’s needs. The staff is faced with some of the highest violent and property crime rates in the state of Alabama. The department members are dedicated to the mission of the department. The community members were very enthusiastic about the department and the quality of service provided by the department to the community.

Key recommendations follow and are discussed in detail throughout the report. These recommendations are offered to enhance the operation of the Anniston Police Department. The recommendations provided are intended to ensure that police resources are optimally deployed, operations are streamlined for efficiency, and the services that are delivered are cost-effective, all while maintaining the high level of police services currently being provided to the citizens of Anniston, Alabama.

CPSM staff would like to thank City Manager Brian Johnson, Chief Shane Denham, Captain Greg Feazell, and the entire staff of the Anniston Police Department for their gracious cooperation and assistance in completing this project.

## Key Recommendations

* CPSM recommends that the department collect data from exit interviews with sworn officers who leave the department in order to determine the reasons for the turnover in the department and devise a strategic plan for recruitment and retention.
* Focus recruitment efforts of sworn officers on minorities and women to better align the department with the demographics of the community.
* Implement an effective strategy for alarm reduction to reduce calls for service (CFS) to unnecessary alarms.
* Explore ways to minimize response to vehicle accidents involving less than $250.00 in property damage, such as by encouraging citizens to obtain a report form online and submit the documents by mail or electronically. Utilize volunteers or civilian community service officers to handle CFS that do not warrant the response of a sworn police officer.
* Explore ways to use civilian personnel, inclusive of volunteers, to respond to nonemergency CFS that are now occupying significant emergency resources, especially for miscellaneous CFS.
* Partner with social service organizations to reduce CFS in the category of disturbance, including for gambling and alcohol-related problems. Also, partner with organizations working to reduce domestic violence for referral services and counseling.
* Review the extent of domestic violence CFS and consider implementing a domestic violence unit to reduce repeat calls for service. This unit may consist of only one patrol officer or detective.
* If budgetary conditions can support this recommendation, change the policy for use of vacation time to allow for carrying over unused time from one fiscal year to the next to reduce the impact on staffing levels.
* Consider implementing a one-hour overlap of shifts by staggering deployment so as to increase communication among the shifts.
* A business watch program should be established for calls for service and crime “hot spots” and department members should be trained in crime prevention strategies and meet with business groups monthly. Adopt the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), provide security assessments to retail establishments for target hardening, and implement security training for retail employees in an effort to reduce crime.
* To combat the hot spots in residential areas, the department should focus on establishing active neighborhood watch programs with a strong focus on residential security and crime prevention
* The department should take the leadership role in establishing a crime reduction committee specifically aimed at reducing crime in housing subsidized by the Anniston Housing Authority. Currently, the Anniston Housing Authority contracts “off-duty” Anniston police officers to provide additional security in the public housing complexes. This strategy needs to be revised by having the Anniston Housing Authority consider contracting full-time officers to be assigned permanently to patrolling the public housing complexes. Use crime analysis data to construct tactical crime reduction strategies.
* In an effort to reduce overall response times, conduct a meeting with the dispatch center manager to determine why the dispatch hold times are high.
* Consider restructuring the geographical patrol areas to balance the CFS by area and reduce the average response time for Priority 1 CFS from 13 minutes to less than 5 minutes.
* A K-9 unit can be a productive and important resource for the department. A K-9 trained in narcotics detection could be a strong asset to the Patrol Division. The department should consider acquiring another dog and training another officer as a K-9 handler trained in narcotics detection for investigatory purposes in patrol, with the end goal of identifying and reducing narcotics-related crime.
* Create a crime analysis unit and hire an experienced civilian analyst.
* Purchase all technology and software needed to conduct crime analysis.
* Department leadership needs to institute an organizational culture change by adopting and implementing a form of the Compstat model.
* Have the captain who oversees the SRT track all call-outs and overtime for the SRT.
* Add a section in Administrative Order 20A-8-91 that governs the SRT to include greater detail on the authority to activate the team, responsibilities, selection process, and training governing the SRT to include crisis negotiators.
* Increase the monthly training hours for SRT to at least 16 hours to align with recommended training standards provided by the National Tactical Officers Association.
* Institute psychological testing for all new members as part of the selection process for SRT and Crisis Negotiation Units.
* The Special Operations sergeant should track all workload for the SRO Unit inclusive of CFS, arrest statistics, and clearance rates.
* The Special Operations sergeant should track all workload to determine if an additional SRO officer is needed to serve the three elementary schools.
* The SRO unit’s overtime should be tracked by the sergeant. Mechanisms should be put into place to track all payments by the school system to the SRO Unit.
* The SRO officers should be certified as D.A.R.E. officers and G.R.E.A.T. officers so they can deliver crime prevention programs to students in addition to their school safety responsibilities.
* In an effort to reduce recidivism, the SRO unit should implement an intelligence gathering program to identify students who are arrested during the school year and implement a program to follow-up during the summer months with the at-risk students who have criminal arrest records.
* Analyze dispatch practices to traffic accidents to determine if a police officer response is warranted at every traffic accident or if a policy change by the department could reduce the number of responses to traffic accident CFS.
* Implement an aggressive community education campaign to reduce the top three causes of accidents, as all three causes are preventable. Include a safe driving education campaign in the high school.
* The sergeant should implement a system for tracking statistics for the Animal Control Unit to monitor workload and determine if the scheduled work hours are conducive to the workload.
* Conduct an analysis of the types of animal control-related CFS to determine the specific nature of the CFS and determine if community education programs are warranted to reduce the number of these calls. Community education programs may be offered by the department or in partnership with other organizations such as the SPCA.
* The department should develop a detailed inventory records management system that captures not only year, make, and model, but also vehicle mileage and the technology installed in each car. The inventory sheet should include all in-car cameras, GPS, license plate readers, etc.
* The department needs to institute a vehicle fleet committee to examine the current and future needs of the vehicle fleet. This committee should examine the current state of the vehicle fleet, weigh the benefits of purchase versus lease options, examine new technology, and project the benefits of alternative fuel options. Additionally, the benefits versus the costs of a take-home car program should also play a role in the analysis.
* The department needs a sound five-year plan for the acquisition of new vehicles and new technology installed in the vehicles. This requires the department to strategically plan and project budget costs.
* All persons arrested by patrol should be debriefed by Investigative Unit personnel (being careful to avoid Miranda issues) during the operational hours of the unit. After hours, patrol officers should debrief their prisoners concerning their knowledge of criminal activity within the city of Anniston and the APD police jurisdiction. Investigative Division personnel, using crime patterns/trends, can provide the Uniform Division with the type of information that should be solicited from those they arrest.
* The APD should consider using patrol officers to a greater extent in warrant enforcement. During uncommitted time, patrol officers, led by a supervisor, can execute misdemeanor and nonviolent felony warrants within their patrol areas.
* The APD must provide training (to include legal process and tactical considerations) to these officers regarding warrant executions.
* The APD should reconsider its participation in the RFTF. It may be possible to reduce its commitment from a full-time officer to a part-time officer or to withdraw entirely. If this option is not feasible, the APD should consider adding a third officer to the Warrant Service Unit.
* The APD should supplement the efforts of the Department of Human Resources and recruit (both physically and virtually) where diverse candidate pools exist.
* Millennials do not receive information from sources used by prior generations. Therefore, the APD should leverage, to a greater extent, social media platforms (i.e., Twitter, Snapchat, etc.) to promote employment opportunities within the APD.
* The APD should consider recruitment initiatives at area houses of worship, faith-based institutions, community-based organizations, and two- and four-year colleges and technical schools. Also, the Anniston Police Citizen’s Advisory Committee should play a prominent role in the department’s recruitment efforts.
* The United States military is most diverse at its lower ranks. The APD recruitment strategy should consider pursuing noncommissioned officers and soldiers at military installations where uniformed military personnel who have completed their military service (and are returning to civilian life in the Calhoun County area) are processed out of the military.
* Collaborate with the Department of Human Resources to develop a recruitment campaign and recruitment materials that target females. In addition, the department should consider balancing current recruitment materials to reflect both “guardian” and “warrior” philosophies of policing.
* Leadership training is routinely provided to supervisors. However, too often, entry-level personnel are not considered for leadership training. Police officers supervise and direct the activities of members of the public (and at times their peers) during emergency/crisis events as well as in the normal course of their duties. The essence of leadership is the ability to influence an individual’s behavior to accomplish/achieve a goal. Police officers can benefit from basic instruction that develops leadership skills and abilities. Therefore, the APD should consider providing police officers with basic leadership training.
* Similar to the lack of consistent leadership training for police officers, too few departments include principles of followership in their supervisory training. Supervisors who are able to correctly ascertain a follower’s readiness level (i.e., ability and willingness) are better positioned to select and apply the most appropriate leadership practice to influence/motivate a subordinate’s performance. The APD should consider including followership training, as it relates to individual “readiness levels,” in the leadership training it provides to supervisors.
* Increase the frequency of compliance evaluations conducted by the Training and Inspections Unit. This type of assessment is not driven by misconduct or integrity concerns. The department should consider establishing a regular inspection cycle for specific aspects of its operations (for example, any unit that handles cash, property/evidence held and disposed of by the department, UCR Part I offense classifications, etc.).
* A comprehensive analysis should be conducted to determine which factors are causing or are correlated with the filing of citizen complaints (such as assignment of officer, category of complaint, officer years of service, whether or not it is associated with an arrest, etc.).
* Ensure that newly promoted supervisors receive instruction in conducting internal investigations and that instruction for veteran supervisors be refreshed as necessary. The Training and Inspections Unit could be helpful in the development/delivery of this training. This training should be beyond that which supervisors receive in promotional/first-line supervisory training.
* The APD should consider explaining the process to file a citizen complaint on its website to include the ways in which citizen complaints are accepted (i.e., walk-ins, telephone, mail, electronically via portal on website, etc.)
* Ensure that first-line supervisors receive formal training/guidance in the manner to conduct internal investigations. This training should be above that received in promotional/first-line supervisor courses of instruction. The Training and Inspections Unit could provide guidance in the steps necessary to conduct a comprehensive investigation (i.e., what reports must be prepared and by whom, what documents must be reviewed, what individuals must be interviewed, ensuring that findings are supported by the facts of the case, etc.)
* During the transition of data from ADSI to Spillman, internal affairs should conduct an audit of 100 randomly selected items held in the property and evidence room to ensure that property continues to be properly accounted for.
* Records Unit personnel should continue to familiarize themselves with the full functionality of the Spillman software, particularly its report function. It does not appear that the Spillman system is fully utilized in this regard.
* Convene a planning committee with department staff, the city manager, council members, and the city’s human resource manager to analyze the turnover rate of the police department over the last five years. If the turnover rate of personnel at the police department is significant, strategies to reduce the turnover rate that are in-line with the city’s budget capabilities should be implemented. Retention of personnel is extremely important for the city, not only from a budgetary perspective, but also since the stability of the department’s staff could increase community interaction and trust, thus enabling the department to enhance its intelligence gathering capabilities for crime reduction.
* Convene a dispatch committee with department members and members from the dispatch center to analyze the calls for service and determine a policy as to what types of calls will not be dispatched to the Anniston Police Department and what types of calls for service could be taken by a desk officer.
* Convene a technology committee to determine the need to replace outdated equipment and calculate a return on investment (ROI) for implementing newer technology such as license plate readers, in-car cameras, and GPS in cars, both to reduce crime and increase officer safety.
* Have council members ride with police officers to create a path for increased understanding of the job of a police officer and the challenges they face. Additionally, police officers would be exposed to council concerns and have an opportunity to understand the challenges faced in managing a city and balancing multiple concerns and political forces.
* Conduct a strategizing session with all social service organizations throughout the city to determine how they can contribute to reducing juvenile crime. Determine the feasibility of and funding for a Police Athletic League.
* The department’s leadership relies on informal strategic planning in managing the department, both operationally and administratively. CPSM observed that department members understand the daily mission of the department, but long-term strategic planning is not prevalent in the department. Strategic planning must be integrated throughout the department. The initial step taken by the department should be to formulate a three- to five-year strategic plan for the department. Leadership should create the broad goals and objectives for the entire department. Each component of the department should use these department-wide goals and objectives to formulate unit-level goals and objectives. The strategic plan should include goals and objectives, measurable outcomes, projected personnel and capital expenses, with the end goals of reducing crime and bettering the quality of life in Anniston. With the creation of a detailed strategic plan, APD can work with city leadership to determine priorities and funding possibilities.
* The department should consider hiring an experienced civilian crime analyst to help the department move toward greater use of problem-oriented policing, to help greater accountability through implementing a Compstat process, and to provide it the ability to implement intelligence-led policing. Furthermore, a data-driven approach to resource allocation is needed by the department and the first step toward this is creating a crime analysis unit. APD has been faced with a high crime rate for at least the past 10 years. A new approach, both strategically and tactically, needs to be adopted. The department has a good relationship with the community, according to our focus groups. However, a crime analysis unit could institute crime mapping capabilities that could be used to educate the public as to locations experiencing crime. Using crime location information the department could initiate active neighborhood watch and business watch programs designed to educate the public on how the public can assist in crime prevention. A holistic strategy for reducing crime is needed, with a focus on implementing technology for tactical and strategic planning, enhanced community partnerships, and community crime prevention education.
* Formalizing operational and administrative processes within a police department requires a shift in the organizational culture. Just as policing requires a proactive and not reactive approach to reduce crime, systems must be into place to enable the department to shift to a proactive philosophy. The implementation of a Compstat process designed to meet the needs and capabilities of APD is warranted. Current approaches to reduce the city’s high crime rate have achieved moderate results in reducing property crime, but in 2015, violent crime experienced a significant spike. A new approach is needed to combat crime. Implementing a Compstat system of police management will enable the department to focus on measuring outcomes with a concurrent goal of improving outcomes. Leadership will need to focus on reengineering the department to embrace performance-based benchmarking and the adoption of a data-driven decisionmaking model.
* A data dashboard system needs to be constructed by the department and which senior leadership can use regularly to actively manage daily operations. The data dashboard should initially be used to collect data related to operational performance indicators to support crime reduction efforts and strategically deploy personnel, and subsequently to collect data related to administrative issues.

# Section 2. Methodology

**Data Analysis**

CPSM used numerous sources of data to support our conclusions and recommendations for the Anniston Police Department (APD). Information was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, Part I offenses, along with numerous sources of APD internal information. UCR Part I crimes are defined as murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and larceny of a motor vehicle. Internal sources included data from the computer- aided dispatch (CAD) system for information on calls for service (CFS).

**Interviews**

This study relied extensively on intensive interviews with APD personnel. On-site and in-person interviews were conducted with all division commanders regarding their operations.

**Focus Groups/SWOT Analysis**

A focus group is an unstructured group interview in which the moderator actively encourages discussion among participants. Focus groups generally consist of eight to ten participants and are used to explore issues that are difficult to define. Group discussion permits greater exploration of topics. For the purposes of this study, focus groups were held with a representative cross-section of employees within the department. A SWOT analysis methodology was used to create an awareness of the organizational culture, strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.

**Document Review**

CPSM consultants were furnished with numerous reports and summary documents by the Anniston Police Department. Information on strategic plans, personnel staffing and deployment, monthly and annual reports, operations manuals, intelligence bulletins, evaluations, training records, and performance statistics were reviewed by project team staff. Follow-up phone calls were used to clarify information as needed.

**Operational/Administrative Observations**

Over the course of the evaluation period, numerous observations were conducted. These included observations of general patrol, special enforcement, investigations, and administrative functions. CPSM representatives engaged all facets of department operations from a “participant observation” perspective.

**Implementing the Report’s Recommendations**

CPSM’s conclusions and recommendations provide a blueprint for both the city and police administrations to move forward. The city administration should have periodic meetings with the APD to ensure that CPSM’s recommendations are implemented. It is strongly recommended that the Chief identify and task one individual with responsibility for implementing these recommendations. This person should establish a liaison with the Chief of Police and should be given the authority and responsibility to effectuate the recommended changes. This includes ensuring the recommendations are executed in a timely fashion and then evaluating the department’s progress every six months. If the city desires, CPSM can provide a service to review, monitor, and evaluate the department’s progress to help ensure that the recommendations are being implemented properly. If the police administration continues to have difficulty implementing the recommendations, CPSM can assist with implementation.

# Section 3. Community and Department Overview

Anniston is located in Calhoun County in Alabama and at the southernmost part of the Blue Ridge Mountains, part of the Appalachian Mountains. Anniston was chartered as a town in 1873. From the 1890s through the 1950s, Anniston was the fifth-largest city in the state of Alabama. Today, Anniston is the twenty-second largest city in Alabama.

The city has a total land area of 45.64 square miles and an estimated population (in 2015) of approximately 22,347, which is about 3.3 percent lower than in 2010. Anniston is governed by Alabama’s “weak mayor” form of city government, with the mayor elected at-large. The city council is composed of four council members, each which represents one of the city’s four wards. A city manager has the responsibility of managing the daily functions of the city. The city manager is appointed by the mayor and city council.

***Mission Statement of the Anniston Police Department***

***The Anniston Police Department provides efficient and effective law enforcement services on a daily basis to all citizens of Anniston and its police jurisdiction. Its functional objectives are as follows:***

***Protection of Life and Property Crime Prevention and Deterrence***

***Maintenance of Public Order Service to Public***

***Preventive Patrol Traffic Control/Direction & Accident & Investigation***

***Criminal Investigation Development of Good Public Relations***

***Apprehension of Offenders Recovery and Return of Property***

***It interfaces daily with the citizenry, organizations, community officials and other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. It responds to and deals with crisis and disasters.***

## Demographics

The city of Anniston is a heterogeneous community; its population is 51.5 percent African American, 44.7 percent white, 2.7 percent Latino, 0.8 percent Asian, 0.3 percent American Indian and Alaska Native, and 0.1 percent Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander.

The city has a slightly lower educational profile and a substantially lower economic profile compared to state averages. While 80.2 percent of the city’s population has a high school diploma, compared to 83.7 percent statewide, college graduates account for 20.9 percent of the city’s population age 25 and higher, compared to 23.1 percent for the state. The mean value of owner-occupied housing units is $98,600 for the city, compared to $123,800 for Alabama as a whole. The median household income is $31,399 for the city, compared to $43,511 percent for the state. Persons living in poverty make up 29.2 percent of the city’s population, compared to 19.3 percent for the state. Persons under 65 years of age without health insurance number 18.9 percent for the city, compared to 14.2 percent for the state.

These demographics reflect a community that is primarily African American and white, primarily high school educated, with one out of five persons being college graduates, and representative of a low socio-economic lifestyle and high poverty rate. Table 3-1 provides a demographic comparison between the city of Anniston and the state of Alabama.

TABLE 3-1: Demographics Comparison between City of Anniston and State of Alabama

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Demographics Category | Anniston | Alabama |
| Land area in square miles, 2010 | 45.64 | 50,645.33 |
| Persons per square mile, 2010 | 506.3 | 94.4 |
| 2015 population | 22,347 | 4,858,979 |
| 2010 population | 23,210 | 4,780,127 |
| Percent change from 2010 to 2015 | -3.3% | 1.6% |
| Persons under 5 years, percent, 2010 | 6.9% | 6.0% |
| Persons under 18 years, percent, 2010 | 21.7% | 22.7% |
| Persons 65 years and over, percent, 2010 | 17.7% | 15.7% |
| Female persons, percent, 2010 | 53.9% | 51.6% |
| White, percent, 2010 | 44.7% | 69.5% |
| Black or African American, percent 2010 | 51.5% | 26.8% |
| American Indian and Alaska Native, percent, 2010 | 0.3% | 0.7% |
| Asian, percent, 2010 | 0.8% | 1.4% |
| Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander, percent, 2010 | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Hispanic/Latino, percent, 2010 | 2.7% | 4.2% |
| Two or more races, percent, 2010 | 1.7% | 1.6% |
| Foreign born persons, percent, 2010-2014 | 2.0% | 3.5% |
| Language other than English spoken at home, age 5+, 2010-2014 | 5.1% | 5.2% |
| High school graduate, age 25+, 2010-2014 | 80.2% | 83.7% |
| Bachelor’s degree or higher, Age 25+, 2010-2014 | 20.9% | 23.1% |
| Veterans, 2010-2014 | 2,540 | 376,525 |
| Mean travel time to work in min., workers age 16+, 2010-2014 | 19.1 | 24.3 |
| Households, 2010-2014 | 9,415 | 1,842,174 |
| Persons per household, 2010-2014 | 2.33 | 2.55 |
| Housing units, 2010 | 11,599 | 2,218,287 |
| Homeownership rate, 2010-2014 | 55.7% | 69.2% |
| Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2010-2014 | $98,600 | $123,800 |
| Median gross rent | $615 | $715 |
| Civilian labor force, percent of pop. age 16 years +, 2010-2014 | 54.0% | 58.5% |
| Median household income, 2014 | $31,399 | $43,511 |
| Persons in poverty | 29.2% | 19.3% |
| Persons without health insurance, under age 65 years | 18.9% | 14.2% |

**Source**: U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved from http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045215/0101852

## Uniform Crime Report/Crime Trends

The FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program assembles data on crime from police departments in the United States; the reports are utilized to measure the extent, fluctuation, and distribution of crime. For reporting purposes, criminal offenses are divided into two categories: Part 1 offenses and Part 2 offenses. In Part 1 offenses, the UCR indexes incidents in two categories: violent crimes and property crimes. Violent crimes include murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes include burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.

While communities differ from one another in population, demographics, geographical landscape, and social-economic distinctions, comparisons to other jurisdictions can be helpful in illustrating how communities in Alabama compare to one another in terms of crime rates. As indicated in Table 3-2, in 2015, Anniston had a UCR Part I violent crime rate of 2,721 and a property crime rate of 7,375 per 100,000 residents.

In comparing Anniston with the other municipalities listed, it can be seen that Anniston had a substantially higher violent crime rate as compared to all similar size cities. Furthermore, Anniston also had a substantially higher property crime rate compared to all similar size cities.

Overall, combined crime rates for violent crimes and property crimes indicate that Anniston had a higher rate in comparison to all cities, and also saw a higher overall rate than both the state of Alabama and the nation.

TABLE 3-2: 2015 Comparison of Reported Crime Rates by Jurisdiction

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Agency | State | Population | Crime rates (per 100,000) | | |
| Violent | Property | Total |
| Anniston | AL | 22,306 | 2,721 | 7,375 | 10,096 |
| Albertville | AL | 21,534 | 139 | 3,357 | 3,497 |
| Athens | AL | 25,192 | 56 | 2,402 | 2,457 |
| Oxford | AL | 21,113 | 336 | 4,234 | 4,571 |
| Pelham | AL | 22,997 | 143 | 2,061 | 2.205 |
| Prichard | AL | 22,236 | 1,511 | 4,484 | 5,995 |
| Alabama | 4,858,979 | | 472 | 2,979 | 3,451 |
| National | 321,418,820 | | 373 | 2,487 | 2,860 |

Figure 3-1 displays the trends in violent crime and property crime rates per 100,000 for Anniston for the time period of 2006 to 2015. The figure shows that the violent crime rate has remained somewhat consistent, with the lowest rate of 1,523 in 2010, followed by a rate of 1,770 in 2011. Slight spikes in violent crime occurred in 2008 with a rate of 2,422; in 2009 with a rate of 2,479; in 2012 with a rate of 2,186; in 2014 with a rate of 2,375; and in 2015 with the highest rate for the 10-year period of 2,721.

Property crime showed an overall decrease from 2006 to 2015, with spikes in 2011 and 2012. In 2015, property crime decreased to its lowest rate for Anniston over this 10-year period. The reasons for the fluctuation in crime rates are beyond the scope of this study.

FIGURE 3-1: Trend in Crime Rates, 2006-2015, Anniston

Figure 3-2 compares crime rates between the City of Anniston and the state of Alabama during the time frame of 2006 through 2015. Over that period, the city of Anniston experienced a substantially higher overall crime rate as compared to the state of Alabama.

The city saw increases in the crime rate in 2006, 2011, and 2012 as compared to the statewide experience, for which crime rates remained somewhat consistent during that same period. Further analysis is needed to determine the factor(s) that contributed to these changes and differences between the city of Anniston and the state of Alabama; however, that analysis is beyond the scope of this study.

FIGURE 3-2: Trend in Overall Crime Rates, 2006-2015, Anniston and Alabama

Table 3-3 compares the city of Anniston crime rates to both the state and national rates year by year for the period 2006 through 2015. During that period, each year Anniston had a substantially higher total crime rate per 100,000 citizens in comparison to the state and national rates. For some years, the city of Anniston had a total crime rate more than 300 percent higher than both the state of Alabama and the nation.

TABLE 3-3: Reported City, State, and National Crime Rates, by Year (2006 to 2015)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Anniston | | | | Alabama | | | | National | | | |
| Population | Violent | Property | Total | Population | Violent | Property | Total | Population | Violent | Property | Total |
| 2006 | 23,956 | 2,175 | 12,707 | 14,881 | 4,616,525 | 333 | 3,049 | 3,382 | 304,567,337 | 448 | 3,103 | 3,551 |
| 2007 | 23,736 | 2,279 | 12,268 | 14,548 | 4,646,319 | 388 | 3,431 | 3,819 | 306,799,884 | 442 | 3,045 | 3,487 |
| 2008 | 23,620 | 2,422 | 10,284 | 12,705 | 4,684,189 | 422 | 3,813 | 4,235 | 309,327,055 | 438 | 3,055 | 3,493 |
| 2009 | 23,598 | 2,479 | 10,081 | 12,560 | 4,732,747 | 434 | 3,642 | 4,076 | 312,367,926 | 416 | 2,906 | 3,322 |
| 2010 | 23,106 | 1,523 | 8,820 | 10,344 | 4,792,630 | 329 | 3,085 | 3,414 | 314,170,775 | 393 | 2,833 | 3,225 |
| 2011 | 23,217 | 1,770 | 10,006 | 11,776 | 4,815,348 | 409 | 3,506 | 3,915 | 317,186,963 | 376 | 2,800 | 3,176 |
| 2012 | 23,051 | 2,186 | 10,776 | 12,963 | 4,834,334 | 438 | 3,392 | 3,830 | 319,697,368 | 377 | 2,758 | 3,135 |
| 2013 | 22,648 | 2,035 | 8,778 | 10,813 | 4,845,981 | 407 | 3,159 | 3,567 | 321,947,240 | 362 | 2,627 | 2,989 |
| 2014 | 22,567 | 2,375 | 7,582 | 9,957 | 4,861,676 | 403 | 2,991 | 3,394 | 324,699,246 | 357 | 2,464 | 2,821 |
| 2015 | 22,306 | 2,721 | 7,375 | 10,096 | 4,858,979 | 472 | 2,979 | 3,451 | 321,418,820 | 373 | 2,487 | 2,860 |

Clearance rates measure the effectiveness of the police department in investigating and successfully solving crimes. Solving crimes in this context of clearance rates is when an individual is charged with the crime. Clearance rates are calculated by dividing the number of solved crimes by the total number of crimes during a given time period. Clearance rates are one of many factors that can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a police department. However, there are many variables that affect crime. As a performance measurement tool, clearance rates are best used by the police department to evaluate the police department’s performance from year to year as an internal measurement. Table 3-4 is presented for informational purposes only; it shows the clearance rates for Part 1 crimes for the city of Anniston, the state of Alabama, and the nation.

TABLE 3-4: Reported Anniston Clearance Rates in 2015 Compared to State and National Rates

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crime | Anniston | | | Alabama | | | National | | |
| Crimes | Clearances | Rate | Crimes | Clearances | Rate | Crimes | Clearances | Rate |
| Aggravated Assault | 477 | 394 | 83% | 15,432 | 6,424 | 42% | 707,017 | 3,818 | 54% |
| Burglary | 602 | 138 | 23% | 34,159 | 5,045 | 15% | 1,450,074 | 1,871 | 13% |
| Larceny | 970 | 502 | 52% | 96,042 | 23,743 | 25% | 5,225,538 | 11,444 | 22% |
| Murder Manslaughter | 8 | 7 | 88% | 353 | 192 | 54% | 14,392 | 89 | 62% |
| Rape | 44 | 30 | 68% | 1,988 | 863 | 43% | 7,518 | 28 | 38% |
| Robbery | 79 | 41 | 52% | 4,506 | 1,635 | 36% | 299,232 | 877 | 29% |
| Vehicle Theft | 74 | 38 | 51% | 9,996 | 2,669 | 27% | 657,090 | 861 | 13% |

## Comparisons/Benchmarks

The Benchmark City Survey was begun in 1997 by a group of police chiefs from across the country to establish a measurement tool to determine if their departments were providing the best service possible to their communities in an efficient manner. The 2014 survey included 29 police departments; the average population of these cities was 164,560, with a median population of 147,220. While communities differ from one another, comparisons can be helpful in benchmarking the performance of a police department. The most recent available data from the Benchmark City Survey is for the year 2014.

The 2014 survey reports that the participating police departments’ budgets averaged 28.5 percent of their city’s total budget. In comparison, the 2015 Anniston Police Department budget was $7,424,273, inclusive of capital outlay, and the total city budget was $34,606,430. Thus, the Anniston Police Department budget is 21.45 percent of the total city budget, which is lower than the participating police departments’ average of 28.5 percent.

Another budget comparison that can be made from the 2014 Benchmark City Survey is the breakdown of the police department’s costs per citizen. In the 2014, the average police department budget equated to $233.10 per citizen. By comparison, the Anniston Police Department’s budget equated to $332.22 per citizen, which is 29.84 percent higher than the Benchmark City Survey average cost per citizen.[[1]](#footnote-1) Cost-effectiveness reduction strategies need to be reviewed by the department, as costs per citizen were higher compared to surveyed cities.

## Department’s Financial Sustainability

The department has experienced a reduction in budget funding and overtime costs. Table 3-5 shows the annual budget and overtime costs for the Anniston Police Department for fiscal years 2014 and 2015. The budget figures include personnel costs, operating budget, and capital outlay. The table shows a 4.92 percent decrease in budget funding over this two-year period. At the same time, overtime costs decreased 25.62 percent from 2014 to 2015.

TABLE 3-5: Annual Budget for Fiscal Years 2014-2015

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Fiscal Year | Overtime Costs | Total Budget |
| 2014 | $38,678 | $7,808,670 |
| 2015 | $28,770 | $7,424,273 |

## Department Authorized Staffing Levels

The department provided to CPSM the staffing level statistics for only 2015. Staffing level statistics from prior years were not available due to a change in records management software. Therefore, an analysis of staffing level changes over time was not possible. Staff verbally informed CPSM that in 2013 there were 96 sworn members in the department.

While the department’s authorized sworn staffing level is 87 positions, at the time of the site visit, there were six recruits in the academy and two sworn members injured and on worker’s compensation leave. Therefore, 79 positions are available for deployment for assignments requiring a sworn officer. Refer to Table 3-6 for authorized staffing levels for fiscal year 2015.

TABLE 3-6: Authorized Staffing Levels for Fiscal Year 2015

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Position | 2016 |
| Sworn Positions: |  |
| Chief of Police | 1 |
| Police Captain | 4 |
| Police Lieutenant | 6 |
| Police Sergeant | 12 |
| Senior Police Officer | 18 |
| Police Officer | 40 |
| Academy - Recruits | 6 |
| Total | 87 |
| Civilian Personnel: |  |
| Animal Control | 1 |
| Chief’s Secretary | 1 |
| Division Secretary | 1 |
| Inmate Supervisor | 2 |
| Records Clerk | 2 |
| Records Supervisor | 1 |
| Total | 8 |
| Total Personnel | 96 |

It is important to note that the department is experiencing a significant turnover of sworn police officers. Leadership staff from the department indicated that police officers receive good experience and training while working at the Anniston Police Department, but leave the department for other police departments offering better pay and fewer calls for service. This has resulted in a declining average tenure for police officers within the Anniston Police Department.

Department staff indicated that only 42.5 percent (n=37) of sworn officers have more than five years of experience. The remaining sworn staff tenure is as follows: five years of experience, 3.4 percent (n=3); four years of experience, 8.1 percent (n=7); three years of experience, 17.2 percent (n=15); two years of experience, 6.8 percent (n=6); one year of experience, 5.7 percent (n=5); and less than one year of experience, 16.2 percent (n=14). This is a relatively young cadre of police officers working at the department. CPSM recommends the department collect data from exit interviews with sworn officers who leave the department to determine the reasons for the turnover and devise a strategic plan for recruitment and retention.

TABLE 3-7: Terminated, Retired, and Resigned Sworn Officers for Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Terminated | Retired | Resigned | Total |
| 2015 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 7 |
| 2016 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 10 |

### Diversity in the Department in Comparison to the Community

It is important for a police department to reflect the diversity of the community it serves. In Anniston, the community is 44.7 percent white, and in sworn positions white males represent 81.7 percent of the department and white females represent 4.6 percent, for a combined total of 86.3 percent. African Americans represent 51.5 percent of the community, yet sworn African American males represent 11.5 percent of the department, and no African American females are sworn officers. Hispanics/Latinos represent 2.7 percent of the community, and 1.1 percent of sworn positions are held by Hispanics/Latinos. Asians represent 0.8 percent of the community, and 1.1 percent of sworn positions are held by Asian males. Recruitment efforts should focus on significantly increasing the number of African Americans both male and female, and increasing the number of Hispanic/Latino males and females and white females to more closely align the department’s demographics with community demographics.

Leadership staff from the department reported that local recruitment efforts have not been successful in increasing the number of minorities in the department. CPSM recommends trying to recruit from military bases throughout the region or even the country to enhance these recruitment efforts.

TABLE 3-7: Diversity of Filled Sworn Positions (Authorized=87)

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Rank | White Male | White Female | African American Male | African American Female | Hispanic/Latino Male | Hispanic/Latina Female | Asian Male | Asian Female |
| Chief | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Captain | 3 |  | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Lieutenant | 6 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sergeant | 10 | 1 | 1 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Senior Police Officer | 16 |  | 2 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Police Officer | 35 | 3 | 6 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| Total | 71 | 4 | 10 |  | 1 |  | 1 |  |
| Percentage | 81.7 | 4.6 | 11.5 |  | 1.1 |  | 1.1 |  |

## Other Aspects of the Department

### Grant Awards 2014-2015

The department reported grant funding for 2014 and 2015 as shown in Tables 3-8 and 3-9. These awards were provided to the department by various funding sources. There was a 29.03 percent decrease in grant funding from 2014 to 2015. Table 3-10 displays the state forfeiture funds received in 2014 and 2015. Information on federal forfeiture funds were not available.

TABLE 3-8: 2014 Grant Funding Summary

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Grant | Amount |
| JAG (FY2014) | $29,325.80 |
| BVP Vests | $3,771.68 |
| CTSP from ADECA through GSCC (Traffic-related) | $19,912.00 |
| Total | $53,009.48 |

TABLE 3-9: 2015 Grant Funding Summary

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Grant | Amount |
| JAG (FY 2015) | $26,761.00 |
| BVP Vests | $3,771.68 |
| CTSP from ADECA through GSCC | $7,085.00 |
| Total | $37,617.68 |

TABLE 3-10: State Forfeiture Funds, 2014-2015

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| 2014 | 2015 |
| $0 | $1,954.60 |

### Local, State, or Federal Task Forces

The department participates in and provides resources for the following task forces:

* 7th Judicial Major Crimes Unit (one position).
* United States Marshal Service Task Force.

### Mutual Aid Agreements

The department has mutual aid agreements with the following entities:

* Calhoun County Mutual Aid Agreement.
* Agency for Substance Abuse Prevention.
* Anniston Army Depot.
* Calhoun County Department of Human Resources.
* Emergency Action Plan for the Flint Group.
* Hazardous Waste Contingency Plan with M & H Valve Company.
* State of Alabama Department of Public Health.
* Department of the Army 310th CBRN Company.

### Sick Time Usage

The department reported sick time usage for sworn members for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 as shown in Table 3-11.

TABLE 3-11: Sick Time Usage for Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Hours | Cost |
| 2014 | 3,694.65 | $74,623.39 |
| 2015 | 3,195.00 | $66,572.73 |

Recommendations:

* CPSM recommends that the department collect data from exit interviews with sworn officers who leave the department to determine the reasons for the turnover in the department and devise a strategic plan for recruitment and retention.
* Focus recruitment efforts of sworn officers on minorities and women to better align the department with the demographics of the community.

# Section 4. Uniform Division

The Uniform Division is commanded by a captain who is responsible for the supervision of the patrol shifts and Special Operations Unit. Each patrol shift is commanded by a lieutenant. The Special Operations Unit is supervised by a sergeant. The captain of the Uniform Division is a 16-year veteran of the department and has been assigned as the commander of the Uniform Division for the past six months.

## Patrol

The Anniston Police Department provides the community with a range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service (CFS), performing directed activities, and solving problems. Essentially, every call for service from the public gets a police response and every criminal case gets investigated. The department embraces this approach and considers every request for service from the public important and deserving of a police response.

### Demand

UCR statistics for the city of Anniston indicate a high level of both violent and property crimes. Anniston’s crime rates are significantly higher in comparison to the state of Alabama and the Nation. These figures were discussed in Section 3, and depicted in Table 3-3: Reported City, State, and National Crime Rates, by Year (2006 to 2015). High crime rates have plagued the city for the past 10 years.

When examining options for the department’s direction, the city and the department face the choices of a) continue to police the community as they do now, or b) take steps to restructure how to respond to demand, still promote order and safety, but reduce the crime rate through proactive and strategic policing.

Table 4-1 presents information on the main categories of calls for service the department handled during the study period of September 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016. The communications center recorded approximately 40,400 events that were assigned call numbers and which included an adequate record of a responding patrol unit as either the primary or secondary unit. When measured daily, the department reported an average of 110 patrol-related events per day, approximately 4 percent of which (4.5 per day) had fewer than 30 seconds spent on the call. Some events were removed from the analysis due to incomplete data. For example, 4 percent of the events had the patrol unit spending zero time on scene and 17 percent of other-initiated calls lacked any recorded arrival time. Therefore, the analysis focused on the remaining 38,630 events.

TABLE 4-1: Calls per Day, by Category

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | No. of Calls | Calls per Day |
| Accidents | 2,007 | 5.5 |
| Alarm | 1,880 | 5.1 |
| Animal call | 839 | 2.3 |
| Assist other agency | 925 | 2.5 |
| Check/investigation | 3,091 | 8.4 |
| Crime–persons | 4,431 | 12.1 |
| Crime–property | 3,617 | 9.9 |
| Disturbance | 5,060 | 13.8 |
| Juvenile | 59 | 0.2 |
| Miscellaneous | 4,262 | 11.6 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 558 | 1.5 |
| Prisoner–transport | 471 | 1.3 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 3,346 | 9.1 |
| Traffic enforcement | 8,084 | 22.1 |
| Total | 38,630 | 105.5 |

**Note:** The focus here is on recorded calls rather than recorded events. We removed events with zero time on scene.

In total, department officers were dispatched to 38,630 calls during the 12-month study period, or approximately 105.5 calls per day, or 4.4 per hour. The top three categories of calls accounted for 69 percent of all calls: 26 percent of calls were traffic-related (traffic enforcement and traffic accidents), followed by 22 percent of calls for suspicious incidents, and 21 percent of calls for crimes.

Table 4-2 provides a more detailed breakdown of the CFS, showing police-initiated CFS in comparison to other-initiated (by citizens) CFS. The table also displays the average number of units involved in the CFS and the average amount of time spent on the CFS.

In general, CFS volume in Anniston is higher than acceptable bounds. To evaluate the workload demands placed on the department, it is useful to examine the number of CFS in relation to the population. With a population estimated to be approximately 22,567 in 2014, the total of 38,630 CFS translates to about 1,712 CFS per 1,000 residents. While there is no accepted standard ratio between calls for service and population, CPSM studies of other communities show a CFS-to-population ratio ranging between 400 and 1,000 CFS per 1,000 persons per year. Lower ratios typically suggest a well-managed approach to CFS. The value of 1,712 CFS/per thousand/year would suggest a lack of an appropriate policy is in place for triaging nonemergency calls. A well-managed dispatch system includes a system where CFS are screened and nuisance calls eliminated before they are dispatched.

TABLE 4-2: Calls for Service, Average Units per Call, and Average Time Spent

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Police-initiated | | | Other-initiated | | |
| Calls | Units per Call | Minutes | Calls | Units per Call | Minutes |
| Accidents | 48 | 1.4 | 30.5 | 1,958 | 1.5 | 38.8 |
| Alarm | 12 | 1.3 | 6.1 | 1,868 | 1.9 | 12.7 |
| Animal call | 16 | 1.1 | 19.2 | 823 | 1.2 | 25.3 |
| Assist other agency | 38 | 1.3 | 17.0 | 887 | 2.0 | 37.8 |
| Check/investigation | 155 | 1.5 | 16.4 | 2,936 | 1.8 | 23.9 |
| Crime–persons | 92 | 1.3 | 17.0 | 4,338 | 1.6 | 30.8 |
| Crime–property | 61 | 1.2 | 12.6 | 3,555 | 1.7 | 22.7 |
| Disturbance | 91 | 1.8 | 13.5 | 4,969 | 2.0 | 24.0 |
| Juvenile | 1 | 1.0 | 7.4 | 58 | 1.6 | 25.2 |
| Miscellaneous | 1,551 | 1.2 | 11.7 | 2,711 | 1.4 | 25.3 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 31 | 1.5 | 31.7 | 527 | 1.2 | 47.9 |
| Prisoner–transport | 28 | 1.4 | 80.0 | 442 | 1.4 | 73.1 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 947 | 1.4 | 13.1 | 2,399 | 1.8 | 18.9 |
| Traffic enforcement | 6,497 | 1.3 | 15.0 | 1,587 | 1.3 | 18.2 |
| Total | 9,568 | 1.3 | 14.6 | 29,058 | 1.7 | 26.1 |

**Note:** Excludes all events that showed zero time on scene.

### Strategies to Reduce Costs

#### Alarm Reduction Program

False alarms are a continuing source of inefficiency for police operations. The alarm industry is a strong advocate of developing ordinances and procedures to address police response to false alarms and will work closely with any agency exploring this issue. The 98 percent of alarm calls that are false are caused by user error, and this can be addressed by alarm management programs. During the study period the Anniston Police Department responded to 1,880 alarm calls, or 4.8 percent of both police-initiated and other-initiated CFS. The city of Anniston does not have an effective alarm reduction program. An effective alarm reduction program can reduce the CFS in this category and provide revenue for the department. An effective alarm reduction strategy is a benefit to both the community and the department because it would reduce unnecessary CFS. The city of Anniston needs to adopt a robust and well-designed set of alarm regulations to include fees for alarm registration and monetary penalties for repeated false alarms.

#### Automobile Accidents (Vehicle Crashes)

Automobile accidents (vehicle crashes) are another category of calls for service for which the response by a sworn officer can be questionable. In the period under observation the Anniston Police Department responded to 2,006 motor vehicle accidents, when combining police-initiated and other-initiated calls; thus, automobile accidents accounted for 5.2 percent of all CFS. The investigation of most motor vehicle accidents is administrative in nature and may not necessarily warrant the response of a sworn officer. CPSM recommends that the policy of response to, and investigation of, routine traffic accidents (property damage only, no criminality) be minimized or discontinued altogether. Most accidents involve only property damage to vehicles and the role of an officer is simply report preparation. When injuries occur or vehicles are inoperable and blocking traffic, however, police response is important.

Proper training of dispatchers and inquiries by dispatchers during the initial call-taking process can easily triage vehicle accident calls to determine which ones require a police response. Many police departments around the country have discontinued assigning police officers to handle property damage-only accidents. CPSM supports this development and contends that dispatching police officers to all vehicle crashes is a policy that could be revisited. Dispatching specialized traffic safety officers to all vehicle crashes is the least efficient use of their time and resources.

According to Alabama Code Title 32-7-5, Motor Vehicles and Traffic law, “the operator of every motor vehicle which is in any manner involved in an accident within this state, in which any person is killed or injured or in which damage to the property of any one person, including himself or herself, in excess of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) is sustained, shall within 30 days after the accident report the matter in writing to the director.”

Law enforcement agencies across the state have interpreted this regulation as a mandate to respond to every traffic crash and prepare a report. This results in numerous hours spent by patrol officers responding to and documenting traffic crashes. CPSM contends that this approach is not an efficient use of patrol officers’ time. CPSM recommends that only a limited number of vehicle crashes require a police response. When a motor vehicle is disabled or blocking the roadway, or there is a dispute between motorists, or one motorist is intoxicated, or other criminal activity is alleged, a police response is required. When the crash is routine and none of those factors are present, the motorists should be advised to prepare the required forms and submit them to the state of Alabama: no response by the police is necessary. Citizens can visit the police department’s headquarters to prepare the report, or they can obtain the report form online and submit the documents by mail or electronically. This process would spare the need for officers to respond to the scene and would keep them free to perform other, more critical functions. Command staff indicated that they currently respond to all accidents, regardless if the accident occurred on public or private property, and regardless if there is no damage to the vehicles or property.

Also, police departments across the country are utilizing nonsworn uniformed personnel to handle minor nonemergency calls for service. Often referred to as “Community Service Officers,” individuals in these positions can provide support to sworn officers on patrol. Properly trained and equipped civilian personnel can respond to accident scenes and other nonemergency CFS and handle the incidents without the need of a sworn officer. CPSM recommends the Anniston Police Department explore the use of civilian personnel or volunteers to respond to nonemergency CFS that are now occupying significant emergency resources.

Whether done through demand reduction or by deploying civilian personnel or volunteers, adopting a more aggressive stance toward limiting response to minor traffic accidents is necessary and will minimize the number of accidents dispatched to patrol officers. The combination of these approaches will result in a more efficient use of personnel resources and improve traffic safety in Anniston.

#### Review Miscellaneous Calls for Service

The category of miscellaneous had 4,262 calls for service during the period of examination, which represented 11 percent of all calls for the year. This category consisted of a variety of types of calls, including community support, miscellaneous building check, miscellaneous, missing property, ordinance violation, lost/found/recovered property, public relations, and school. This category of calls needs greater examination by the department staff to determine if a sworn officer needs to be dispatched, or if a civilian/community service officer could perform these duties, a report could be taken by an officer assigned to the desk, or if a response by the department is even necessary in some cases.

#### Review Disturbance Calls for Service

The category of disturbance had 5,060 calls for service during the period of examination, which represented 13 percent of all calls for the year. This category consisted of a variety of types of calls, including disorderly conduct, alcohol offense, domestic violence, and gambling. These types of calls reflect a deeper causation in which counseling plays a significant role in reducing recidivism. The department should create a partnership with all available counseling services in the area and create a referral program. This would require the department to serve as the lead for bringing all available social service organizations to the table to help address these types of problems occurring in the community. Organizations offering family services, domestic violence counseling, alcohol/narcotics anonymous, gambling addiction counseling, and other types of social services should be included in this committee. The department could provide brochures for the services after responding to a CFS involving these types of problems, and possibly, the social service agencies could provide follow-up services.

#### Review Domestic Violence Calls for Service

While domestic violence-related calls for service are included in the categories of disturbance calls for service and crime‒persons calls for service, the department should conduct an analysis of all domestic violence arrests to determine the extent of the problem. Additionally, child abuse crimes should also be analyzed to determine the frequency of the problem in the community. Domestic violence and child abuse many times are related crimes in a household and have long-term effects on the victims. Aggressive investigation is required but follow-up services are also important for the victims. Department staff should determine the feasibility of having a domestic violence unit to impact these types of crimes. The domestic violence unit would follow the case from the investigatory phase through the judicial phase, and coordinate with social service providers in an effort to reduce recidivism. Having a sworn officer trained specifically in domestic violence/child abuse investigations and interventions is important for quality investigations and for having an impact on these types of crimes. For the optimum coordination and communication the domestic violence unit should be a component of the Uniform Division.

#### Reducing Responses

CPSM recommends that from a policy perspective the responses to some categories of CFS be reduced by taking such actions as: implementing an alarm management program that seeks to reduce response to false alarms; encouraging other ways of reporting traffic accidents involving only property damage in excess of $250; undertaking an internal review of responses to miscellaneous CFS; and bringing social service agencies to the table in an effort to address crimes with underlying causations. Again, the CPSM recommendations presented here do not call for an immediate cessation of responding to these types of CFS. However, best practices in American policing indicate that by working in collaboration with stakeholders in the community a dialogue can begin, and a critical evaluation of appropriate responses to these types of calls can be started. With community input and buy-in, a decision can be made about the necessity of a police response to these types of CFS. If the community maintains that a police response is necessary, then the funds need to be committed to ensure sufficient police personnel are available to address current and future CFS, including the addition of civilian personnel or volunteers to perform CFS that do not necessitate a sworn officer. Good government and efficient management, however, require that scarce resources be committed only when and where they are absolutely necessary, and this is an area that is ripe for evaluation.

### CFS Efficiency

Further examination of various elements of the CFS and patrol response data also warrants discussion. Data from various tables and charts in the data analysis section of this report provide a wealth of information about demand, workload, and deployment in Anniston.

Several key pieces of information can be highlighted to demonstrate the use of patrol resources in the city. These statistics are found in this report in Section 10 in Figure 10-1, Percentage Events per Day by Initiator; Table 10-6, Primary Unit’s Average Occupied Time, by Category and Initiator; Table 10-7, Average Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category; and Table 10-14, Average Response Time Components, by Category. Taken together these statistics provide an excellent lens through which to view the efficiency of patrol operations.

According to the data in Table 4-3, Anniston patrol units on average take 26.1 minutes to handle a call for service initiated by the public. This time is slightly lower than the CPSM benchmark time of about 28.7 minutes for a CFS, based on our experience. However, the reduced time in handling a call for service could be attributed to efficiency or conversely, be attributed to spending less time building community relations. The reason is beyond the scope of this project. Also, according to Table 4-3, the department dispatches 1.7 officers per other-initiated CFS. The number of officers dispatched (like occupied time) varies by category of call, but is slightly higher than the policing norms of about 1.6 officers per CFS.**[[2]](#footnote-2)**

Similarly, according to Table 4-3, response times for CFS in Anniston average 18.3 minutes per call in the winter and 15.4 minutes per call during the summer. These response times are higher than many communities of similar size. CPSM recommends that the department review dispatch and travel times and seek to reduce response time to an accepted target response time of 15 minutes per call.

Response time to the “highest-priority” CFS (Priority 1), 13.0 minutes, is higher than the five-minute benchmark for this category of CFS. A major component of this high response time is lengthy travel time. The average travel time for Priority 1 calls was 7.2 minutes, and it took 5.8 minutes for dispatch to process the call. Priority 1 calls consisted of 6,374 CFS. For Priority 2 calls the average response time was 17.5 minutes, with 7.9 minutes for travel and 9.6 minutes for dispatch (n=3,309).

For patrol, the geographical area of Anniston is divided into eight zones. The department needs to conduct an analysis of the configuration of these zones to determine if restructuring the geographical zones would help to reduce response times. Additionally, the department needs to conduct a joint analysis with the Calhoun County 911 Dispatch Center to determine why the long dispatch hold times are occurring. Dispatch hold times can be reduced through effective and efficient practices by call takers and dispatchers and can result in a reduction of overall police response time for CFS.

TABLE 4-3: CFS Efficiency

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Variable Description | Mean | Minimum | Maximum | Anniston | APD  vs. CPSM  Comps  (Mean) |
| Population | 67,745.7 | 5,417.0 | 833,024.0 | 22,567 |  |
| Patrol Percent | 66.1 | 32.4 | 96.8 | 73.5 | HIGHER |
| Index Crime Rate, per 100,000 | 3,235.1 | 405.0 | 9,418.8 | 9,957 | HIGHER |
| Violent crime rate, per 100,000 | 349.3 | 12.5 | 1,415.4 | 2,375 | HIGHER |
| Property crime rate, per 100,000 | 2,885.9 | 379.7 | 8,111.6 | 7,582 | HIGHER |
| Avg. Service Time Police CFS | 17.7 | 8.1 | 47.3 | 14.6 | LOWER |
| Avg. Service Time Other CFS | 28.7 | 16.0 | 42.9 | 26.1 | LOWER |
| Avg. # of Responding Units Police CFS | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.6 | 1.3 | HIGHER |
| Avg. # of Responding Units Other CFS | 1.6 | 1.2 | 2.2 | 1.7 | HIGHER |
| Total Service Time Police CFS (officer-min.) | 22.1 | 9.7 | 75.7 | 18.98 | LOWER |
| Total Service Time Other CFS (officer-min.) | 48.0 | 23.6 | 84.0 | 44.37 | LOWER |
| Workload Percent, Weekdays, Winter | 26.6 | 5.0 | 65.0 | 46.0 | HIGHER |
| Workload Percent, Weekends, Winter | 28.4 | 4.0 | 68.0 | 45.0 | HIGHER |
| Workload Percent, Weekdays, Summer | 28.7 | 6.0 | 67.0 | 41.0 | HIGHER |
| Workload Percent, Weekends, Summer | 31.8 | 5.0 | 69.0 | 44.0 | HIGHER |
| Average Response Time, Winter, Minutes | 11.0 | 3.1 | 26.9 | 18.3 | HIGHER |
| Average Response Time, Summer, Minutes | 11.2 | 2.4 | 26.0 | 15.4 | HIGHER |
| High-Priority Response Time, Minutes | 5.0 | 3.2 | 13.1 | 13.0 | HIGHER |

### Patrol Deployment and Staffing

Uniformed patrol is considered the “backbone” of American policing. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that more than 95 percent of police departments in the U.S. in the same size category as the Anniston Police Department provide uniformed patrol. Officers assigned to this important function are the most visible members of the department and command the largest share of resources committed by the department. Proper allocation of these resources is critical in order to have officers available to respond to calls for service and provide law enforcement services to the public.

#### Deployment

Although some police administrators suggest that there are national standards for the number of officers per thousand residents that a department should employ, that is not the case. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) states that ready-made, universally applicable patrol staffing standards do not exist. Furthermore, ratios such as officers-per-thousand population are inappropriate to use as the basis for staffing decisions.

According to *Public Management* magazine, “A key resource is discretionary patrol time, or the time available for officers to make self-initiated stops, advise a victim in how to prevent the next crime, or call property owners, neighbors, or local agencies to report problems or request assistance. Understanding discretionary time, and how it is used, is vital. Yet most police departments do not compile such data effectively. To be sure, this is not easy to do and, in some departments may require improvements in management information systems.”**[[3]](#footnote-3)**

Essentially, “discretionary time” on patrol is the amount of time available each day where officers are not committed to handling CFS and workload demands from the public. It is “discretionary” and intended to be used at the discretion of the officer to address problems in the community and be available in the event of emergencies. When there is no discretionary time, officers are entirely committed to service demands, do not get the chance to address other community problems that do not arise through 911, and are not available in times of serious emergency. The lack of discretionary time indicates a department is understaffed. Conversely, when there is too much discretionary time, officers are idle. This is an indication that the department is overstaffed.

Staffing decisions, particularly for patrol, must be based on actual workload. Once the actual workload is determined the amount of discretionary time is determined and then staffing decisions can be made consistent with the department’s policing philosophy and the community’s ability to fund it. The Anniston Police Department is a full-service police department, and its philosophy is to address essentially all requests for service. With this in mind it is necessary to look at workload to understand the impact of this style of policing in the context of community demand.

To understand actual workload (the time required to complete certain activities) it is critical to review total reported events within the context of how the events originated, such as through directed patrol, administrative tasks, officer-initiated activities, and citizen-initiated activities. Analysis of this type allows for identification of activities that are really “calls” from those activities that are some other event.

Understanding the difference between the various types of police department events and the resulting staffing implications is critical to determining deployment needs. This portion of the study looks at the total deployed hours of the police department with a comparison to current time spent to provide services.

From an organizational standpoint, it is important to have uniformed patrol resources available at all times of the day to deal with issues such as proactive enforcement and community policing. Patrol is generally the most visible and most available resource in policing and the ability to harness this resource is critical for successful operations.

From an officer’s standpoint, once a certain level of CFS activity is reached, the officer’s focus shifts to a CFS-based reactionary mode. Once a threshold is reached, the patrol officer’s mindset begins to shift from one that looks for ways to deal with crime and quality-of-life conditions in the community to one that continually prepares for the next call. After saturation, officers cease proactive policing and engage in a reactionary style of policing. The outlook becomes “Why act proactively when my actions are only going to be interrupted by a call?” Any uncommitted time is spent waiting for the next call. Sixty percent of time spent responding to calls for service is believed to be the saturation threshold.

In general, a “Rule of 60” can be applied to evaluate patrol staffing. This rule has two parts. The first part states that 60 percent of the sworn officers in a department should be dedicated to the patrol function (patrol staffing) and the second part states that no more than 60 percent of their time should be committed to calls for service. This commitment of 60 percent of their time is referred to as the patrol saturation index.

The Rule of 60 is not a hard-and-fast rule, but rather a starting point for discussion on patrol deployment. Resource allocation decisions must be made from a policy and/or managerial perspective through which costs and benefits of competing demands are considered. The patrol saturation index indicates the percentage of time dedicated by police officers to public demands for service and administrative duties related to their jobs. Effective patrol deployment would exist at amounts where the saturation index was less than 60.

This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does not mean the remaining 40 percent of time is downtime or break time. It is a reflection of the extent that patrol officer time is saturated by calls for service. The time when police personnel are not responding to calls should be committed to management-directed operations. This is a more focused use of time and can include supervised allocation of patrol officer activities toward proactive enforcement, crime prevention, community policing, and citizen safety initiatives. It will also provide ready and available resources in the event of a large-scale emergency.

#### Rule of 60 – Part 1

According to the department personnel data available at the time of the site visit (October 19-21, 2016), the staff roster accounted for 87 sworn members. Of the 87 sworn members, 63 were assigned to uniformed patrol, with 6 of the 63 sworn members in the academy. The remaining 57 positions consisted of 4 lieutenants, 8 sergeants, 43 patrol officers, and 2 patrol officers assigned to the status of the injured/workers’ compensation. Not including the six positions in the academy, these 57 of the 87 sworn officers represent 65.5 percent of the sworn officers in the Anniston Police Department.

Accordingly, the department is slightly above the first component of the “Rule of 60,” that is, there is a small imbalance in the allocation of sworn officers in the department with approximately four officers too many assigned to patrol duty as a function of the total number of sworn personnel (or too many in patrol positions). However, due to the resignations in the department resulting in ongoing turnover of personnel coupled with a high crime rate in the city, having these four positions allocated to patrol may be beneficial to both the department and community.

#### Rule of 60 – Part 2

The second part of the “Rule of 60” examines workload and discretionary time and suggests that no more than 60 percent of time should be committed to calls for service. In other words, CPSM suggests that no more than 60 percent of available patrol officer time be spent responding to the service demands of the community. The remaining 40 percent of time is the “discretionary time” for officers to be available to address community problems and be available for serious emergencies. This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does not mean the remaining 40 percent of time is downtime or break time. It is simply a reflection of the point at which patrol officer time is “saturated” by CFS.

This ratio of dedicated time compared to discretionary time is referred to as the “Saturation Index” (SI). It is CPSM’s contention that patrol staffing is optimally deployed when the SI is in the 60 percent range. An SI greater than 60 percent indicates that the patrol manpower is largely reactive, and overburdened with CFS and workload demands. An SI of somewhat less than 60 percent indicates that patrol manpower is optimally staffed. SI levels much lower than 60 percent, however, indicate patrol resources that are underutilized, and signals an opportunity for a reduction in patrol resources or reallocation of police personnel.

Departments must be cautious in interpreting the SI too narrowly. For example, one should not conclude that SI can never exceed 60 percent at any time during the day, or that in any given hour no more than 60 percent of any officer’s time be committed to CFS. The SI at 60 percent is intended to be a benchmark to evaluate overall service demands on patrol staffing. When SI levels exceed 60 percent for substantial periods of a given shift, or at isolated and specific times during the day, then decisions should be made to reallocate or realign personnel to reduce the SI to levels below 60. Lastly, this is not a hard-and-fast rule, but a benchmark to be used in evaluating staffing decisions.

The CPSM data analysis in the last section of this report provides a rich overview of CFS and staffing demands experienced by the Anniston Police Department. The analysis here looks specifically at patrol deployment and how to maximize the personnel resources of the department to meet the demands of calls for service while also engaging in proactive policing to combat crime, disorder, and traffic issues in the community.

Figures 4-1 through 4-8 illustrate workload, staffing, and the “saturation” of patrol resources in the Anniston Police Department during the two months (seasons) on which we focused our workload analysis. By “saturation” we mean the amount of time officers spend on patrol handling service demands from the community. In other words, how much of the day is “saturated” with workload demands. This “saturation” is the comparison of workload with available manpower over the course of an average day during the months selected.

The figures represent the manpower and demand during weekdays and weekends during the months of March 2016 (winter) and August 2016 (summer). Examination of these figures permits exploration of the second part of the Rule of 60. Again, the Rule of 60 examines the relationship between total work and total patrol, and to comply with this rule, total work should be less than 60 percent of total patrol.

Figures 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, and 4-7 illustrate the deployment of patrol resources and added resources to handle the workload. Workload includes other-initiated CFS, police-initiated CFS, out-of-service activities, and directed patrol activities. In all four figures representing deployment and all workload for weekdays and weekends in both winter and summer it can be seen that sufficient patrol resources are allocated and available to handle the workload.

In Figures 4-2, 4-2 4-6, and 4-8, the patrol resources available are denoted by the dashed green line at the top. The 100 percent value indicates the total police officer hours available during the 24-hour period. This amount varies during the day consistent with the staffing of the shifts, but at any given hour the total amount of available manpower will equal 100.

The red dashed line fixed at the 60 percent level represents the saturation index (SI). As discussed above, this is the point at which patrol resources become largely reactive as CFS and workload demands consume a larger and larger portion of available time. The solid black line represents total workload experienced by the APD.

Looking at the comparisons of the green, red, and black lines in these four figures, and comparing workload to available staffing, shows that the APD deploys sufficient resources to meet the workload demands in Anniston.

FIGURE 4-1: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2016



**Note:** Figures 4-1, 4-3, 4-5, and 4-7 show deployment along with all workload from other-initiated calls, police-initiated calls, and out-of-service (noncall) activities.

FIGURE 4-2: Percentage Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2016



Workload v. Deployment – Weekdays, Winter

Avg. Workload: 4.4 officers per hour  
Avg. % Deployed (SI): 46 percent  
Peak SI: 62 percent  
Peak SI Time: 1:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.

Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in winter 2016. As the figures indicate, the SI threshold is reached or breached during the 24-hour period at noon (reached) and 1:30 p.m. (breached). The SI was at a low of approximately 30 percent during several time intervals (5:45 a.m., 6:15 a.m., 8:00 a.m. and 8:45 a.m.). The daily average SI for the 24-hour period is 46 percent with a high of 62 percent at 1:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m.

In evaluating the SI trend line throughout the 24-hour period, CPSM looks to see if the 60 percent threshold is breached during the day as well as the stability of the trend line. As Figure 4-2 illustrates, the ratio of the demand of police services with the supply of available police personnel remains somewhat steady from about 4:00 a.m. to 10:30 a.m., increases from 10:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m., and then increases and decreases throughout the day and night.

When we compare the deployment of personnel as displayed in Figure 4-1, the patrol and patrol added resources are sufficient to handle the workload throughout the 24-hour period. The average deployment was 9.7 officers per hour during weekdays in winter. Additionally, deployment varied from 8.3 to 14.2 officers per hour on weekdays. This signifies a sufficient balance of staffing throughout the 24-hour period and is a sign of a well-staffed patrol function.

FIGURE 4-3: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2016



FIGURE 4-4: Percentage Workload, Weekends, Winter 2016



Workload v. Deployment – Weekends, Winter

Avg. Workload: 4.2 officers per hour  
Avg. % Deployed (SI): 45 percent  
Peak SI: 62 percent  
Peak SI Time: 1:15 a.m. to 1:30 a.m., and 4:00 a.m. to 4:15 a.m.

Figures 4-3 and 4-4 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekends in winter 2016. The workload reaches and breaches the 60 percent threshold. The 60 percent threshold is reached at 2:00 p.m. and 11:59 p.m., while the breaches occurred at 1:15 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 23 percent at 6:15 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. to a high of 62 percent from 1:15 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. to 4:15 a.m., with a daily average of 45 percent.

When we compare the deployment of personnel as displayed in Figure 4-3, the patrol and patrol added resources are sufficient to handle the workload throughout the 24-hour period. The average deployment was 9.4 officers per hour during the weekends in winter. Additionally, deployment varied from 8.7 to 14.2 officers per hour on weekends. This signifies a sufficient balance of staffing throughout the 24-hour period and is a sign of a well-staffed patrol function.

FIGURE 4-5: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2016



FIGURE 4-6: Percentage Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2016



Workload v. Deployment – Weekdays, Summer

Avg. Workload: 3.8 officers per hour  
Avg. % Deployed (SI): 41 percent  
Peak SI: 58 percent  
Peak SI Time: 8:45 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.

Figures 4-5 and 4-6 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in summer 2016. The workload never breaches the 60 percent threshold. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 19 percent at 5:45 a.m. to a high of 58 percent at 8:45 p.m. to 9:00 p.m., with a daily average of 41 percent.

When we compare the deployment of personnel as displayed in Figure 4-5, the patrol and patrol added resources are sufficient to handle the workload throughout the 24-hour period. The average deployment was 9.2 officers per hour during weekdays in summer. Additionally, deployment varied from 7.5 to 12.6 officers per hour on weekdays. This signifies a sufficient balance of staffing throughout the 24-hour period and is a sign of a well-staffed patrol function.

FIGURE 4-7: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2016



FIGURE 4-8: Percentage Workload, Weekends, Summer 2016



Workload v. Deployment – Weekends, Summer

Avg. Workload: 4.0 officers per hour  
Avg. % Deployed (SI): 44 percent  
Peak SI: 58 percent  
Peak SI Time: 7:45 a.m. to 8:00 a.m., and 9:30 p.m. to 9:45 p.m.

Figures 4-7 and 4-8 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekends in summer 2016. The workload never exceeds the 60 percent threshold. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 28 percent at 6:00 a.m. to a high of 58 percent at 7:45 a.m. to 8:00 a.m. and 9:30 p.m. to 9:45 p.m., with a daily average of 44 percent.

When we compare the deployment of personnel as displayed in Figure 4-7, the patrol and patrol added resources are sufficient to handle the workload throughout the 24-hour period. The average deployment was 9.1 officers per hour during weekends in winter. Additionally, deployment varied from 8.0 to 12.8 officers per hour on weekends. This signifies a sufficient balance of staffing throughout the 24-hour period and is a sign of a well-staffed patrol function.

### Schedule and Staffing

General patrol operations in the department are staffed using two 12-hour shifts. This staffing model has been in effect since 2005. There are four platoons (which the department refers to as shifts) identified as A Shift, B Shift, C Shift, and D Shift. Shift A and Shift C work dayshift from 0700 to 1900 hours, and Shift B and Shift D work 1900 to 0700 hours. Shift A is relieved by Shift C, and Shift B is relieved by Shift D. Lieutenants and sergeants work the same hours as the police officers they supervise.

The schedule and staffing levels for patrol are shown in Table 4-4, as listed in the Uniform Division roster dated 10/20/16. The table does not include the two patrol officers injured and on workers compensation or the six recruits in the academy.

TABLE 4-4: Schedule and Staffing Levels for Patrol Operations

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Shift | Lieutenant | Sergeant | Police Officers | Percent of Officers Assigned to Patrol |
| A  0700-1900 | 1 | 2 | 11 | 25 |
| B  1900-0700 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 24 |
| C  0700-1900 | 1 | 2 | 12 | 27 |
| D  1900-0700 | 1 | 2 | 10 | 24 |
| Total | 4 | 8 | 43 | 100 |

All supervisors and police officers are assigned to their shifts by the captain and at the discretion of the Chief of Police. Considering the turnover in the department, this enables the captain to spread veteran officers over all shifts to mentor junior officers. The shifts rotate as a consistent group every four months. For example, Shift A will rotate to Shift B, and Shift C will rotate to Shift D. Shift C has the largest allocation of staffing at 27 percent, followed by Shift A with 25 percent, and both Shift B and Shift D with 24 percent. In terms of officers deployed, the minimum staffing level for Sunday through Thursday is seven officers, and for Friday and Saturday is eight officers. There are eight patrol zones in the city. One officer is assigned to each zone and the remaining serve as float cars throughout the city.

An issue that affects staffing levels is the departmental rule that all vacation time must be taken within the calendar year. Vacation time cannot be carried over to the next year. However, 80 hours of comp time can be carried over from one year to another. When comp time is coupled with training time, sick time, and workers’ comp time, it is unlikely that staffing levels can remain at full strength on many shifts.

Officers work a shift rotation combination of two days on with two days off, followed by three days on with two days off, and two days on with three days off. This cycle repeats every two weeks.

The 12-hour shift schedule offers both advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that the 12-hour shift separates the patrol function into four somewhat evenly staffed shifts. As the shifts rotate in and out of their schedule, the department has a uniform and predictable deployment of officers on patrol at all times. The 12-hour configuration also works evenly into the 24-hour day and there are not excessive overlaps in staffing. These benefits, however, are the extent of the advantages of the 12-hour shift as deployed by the department.

One of the potential disadvantages of the 12-hour shift schedule is the rotation from day to night. If a shift maintains consistent start and end times it is less disruptive on the lives of the officers working it. However, rotating start times from day to night and back on a regular basis has been found to be the most counterproductive arrangement and the one with the most negative personal side effects to the officers working the rotation. The damaging part of shift work, therefore, is not length of shift, but the rotation from night to day and vice versa. Anniston uses a four-month schedule for rotation, which is less disruptive on the lives of the officers as compared to a more frequent rotation of the shifts.

Each shift conducts roll call 15 minutes prior to the shift’s tour of duty. However, the shifts do not overlap. This overlapping of shifts ensures staffing is always available for calls for service. Furthermore, overlapping shifts provide an opportunity for greater interaction and communication between and among shifts. The current use of non-overlapping shifts can create a “silo” effect that inhibits communication and creates competition for scarce resources.

The available literature on shift length provides no definitive conclusions on an appropriate shift length. A study published by the Police Foundation examined 8-hour, 10-hour, and 12- hour shifts and found positive and negative characteristics associated with all three options.**[[4]](#footnote-4)** CPSM contends that the length of the shift is secondary to the application of shifts to meet service demands.

How many staff to assign to shifts should take into consideration the peak hours for calls for service, which are displayed in Table 4-5. However, there is no consistent pattern for peak times for summer and winter seasons, and weekdays and weekends. Therefore, the APD has limited opportunity to consider allocating staff according to peak times for calls for service.

TABLE 4-5: Peak Hours for Calls for Service, Summer 2015 and Winter 2016

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Winter weekdays  2016 | Winter weekends  2016 | Summer weekdays 2016 | Summer weekends  2016 |
| 1:30 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. | 1:15 a.m. to 1:30 a.m.  and  4:00 a.m. to 4:15 a.m. | 8:45 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. | 7:45 a.m. to 8:00 a.m.  and  9:30 p.m. to 9:45 p.m. |

## Spatial Representation of CFS Demand

The figures shown previously (Figures 4-1 through 4-8) provide a thorough examination of the service demands placed on the Anniston Police Department during different times of the day and week. In addition to these “temporal” demands, it is also possible to illustrate the “spatial” demands on the Anniston Police Department.

As can be seen in Figures 4-9 and 4-10, there are several distinct geographical “hot spots” in Anniston. These “hot spots” represent the geographical latitude and longitude locations of the most concentrated crimes and CFS. Generalized landmarks are constructed from Google Maps as a point of reference to describe the areas in addition to including primary roadways. It should be noted that 15 percent of the data could not be mapped to an accuracy/precision level needed for heat mapping, typically to the block level.


There are discernable hot spots for crimes in concentrated areas (Figure 4-9), as well as sizeable concentrations of other-initiated calls for service (Figure 4-10). In examining the hot spots for crimes illustrated in Figure 9, it is clear that these hot spots occur in business areas and are a result of retail and commercial property crimes, and other calls for service. There are also other hot spots in apartment complexes subsidized by the Anniston Housing Authority.

Each one of the “hot spots” in the community should be the focus of a specific and targeted strategy that aims to eliminate, or drastically reduce, the conditions present as those locations. Undoubtedly, these locations receive the lion’s share of attention from patrol officers in the department, and consideration should be given to formulating a deliberate plan to deal with these locations in a proactive methodology. For example, the department could work with private security at shopping centers to minimize theft through training, technology, and proactive strategies, which would minimize the demand placed on patrol resources. A business watch should be established for these “hot spots” and department members trained in crime prevention strategies could meet with these groups monthly. Adopting the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), providing security assessments to retail establishments for target hardening, and implementing security training for retail employees should be implemented to reduce crime. For the hot spots occurring in the residential areas, the department should focus on establishing active neighborhood watch programs with a strong focus on residential security and crime prevention.

The department should take a leadership role in establishing a crime reduction committee specifically aimed at reducing crime in housing subsidized by the Anniston Housing Authority. Currently, the Anniston Housing Authority contracts “off-duty” Anniston police officers to provide additional security in the public housing complexes. This strategy needs to be revised by having the Anniston Housing Authority consider contracting full-time officers to be assigned permanently to patrolling the public housing complexes. Similarly to the concept of community policing, having officers assigned to specific communities, having the same police officers assigned full-time, while coupled with the use of crime analysis, would result in more effective crime reduction tactics and strategies.


Conversely, many areas of the community have low levels of calls for service. Indeed, the areas of the community that are not along major arteries or part of commercial locations show low call volume. On the plus side, the argument can be made that there are no problems in these areas in general, thus a police presence is not required. However, citizen perception is important. Some citizens who do not see a police presence in their areas may have an increased perception that the police are not concerned about their community, thus affecting community relations. Crime may not be prevalent in these communities, but community collaboration and engagement should still be a central core philosophy for community policing.

FIGURE 4-9: Spatial Representation of Density of Crime Calls for Service (Red > 50 Calls for Service in a Geographical Area)



A look at Figure 4-10, which displays the hot spots for CFS from citizens and the accompanying list of locations with a high volume of crime calls, shows that police headquarters had 1,504 CFS, followed by Walmart with 445, and the Regional Medical Center with 333. The remaining locations were primarily residential and some business locations. Instead of waiting for the CFS at these locations, plans should be put into place in order to address the underlying conditions that create the CFS in the first place. Proper planning, using the community policing S.A.R.A. model (Scanning, Analysis, Response, and Assessment), or a performance management approach such as Compstat or D.D.A.C.T.S. (Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety), can aid in diagnosing and solving problems at these locations, thus preventing the calls to the police.

FIGURE 4-10: Spatial Representation of Density of Other-initiated Calls for Service (Red > 150 Calls for Service in a Geographical Area)



### Patrol Response Times and CFS Comparisons by Zone

Table 4-6 displays the average response time by zone, the number of CFS in each zone, and the size of the zones in square miles. It is important to note that the dispatch hold times for all zones appear high, ranging from 6.2 to 8.8 minutes for the eight zones, and with the “other” category at 9.2 minutes. The department needs to work with the dispatch center to determine why the dispatch hold times are high in an effort to significantly reduce overall response times.

Zones 1 and 8 had the highest travel times of all zones, at 9.9 and 9.6 minutes, respectively. In reviewing the zones for volume of CFS and excluding the “other” zone, it can be seen that zones 4 and 7 had the most calls for service. Combined, zones 4 and 7 saw 29.9 percent of all CFS.

TABLE 4-6: Average Response Time Components, by Zone

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Zone | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Calls | Area (Sq. Miles) |
| 1 | 7.5 | 9.9 | 17.4 | 1,429 | 10.2 |
| 2 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 12.7 | 2,181 | 2.3 |
| 3 | 7.1 | 6.2 | 13.3 | 2,866 | 11.9 |
| 4 | 8.8 | 6.5 | 15.4 | 3,793 | 9.1 |
| 5 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 13.4 | 2,086 | 2.2 |
| 6 | 7.3 | 6.7 | 14.0 | 1,710 | 4.9 |
| 7 | 8.0 | 7.4 | 15.4 | 3,377 | 7.4 |
| 8 | 7.9 | 9.6 | 17.5 | 3,036 | 12.8 |
| Other | 9.2 | 6.5 | 15.8 | 3,470 | - |
| Weighted Average/ Total | 7.8 | 7.2 | 15.1 | 23,948 | 60.8 |

Table 4-7 provides the average dispatch, travel, and response times by priority of the call. Priority 1, for the most serious of in-progress calls, had an average response time of 13.0 minutes. CPSM recommends a response time of five minutes for this category of CFS. The department should consider restructuring the geographical patrol areas so as to decrease response times and balance the distribution of CFS.

TABLE 4-7: Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by Priority

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Priority | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Calls |
| 1 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 13.0 | 6,374 |
| 2 | 9.6 | 7.9 | 17.5 | 3,309 |
| 3 | 13.3 | 8.2 | 21.4 | 1,996 |
| 4 | 12.4 | 6.8 | 19.2 | 1 |
| Unknown | 7.6 | 6.9 | 14.4 | 12,268 |
| Weighted Average/Total | 7.8 | 7.2 | 15.1 | 23,948 |
| Injury Accidents | 2.9 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 475 |

**Note:** The total average is weighted according to the number of calls within each priority level.

Recommendations for Patrol Operations:

* Implement an effective strategy for alarm reduction to reduce calls for service (CFS) to false alarms.
* Explore ways to minimize response to vehicle accidents involving less than $250.00 worth of property damage, such as by encouraging citizens to obtain a report form online and submit the documents by mail or electronically. Utilize volunteers or civilian community service officers to handle CFS that do not warrant the response of a sworn police officer.
* Explore ways to use civilian personnel, inclusive of volunteers, to respond to nonemergency CFS that are now occupying significant emergency resources, especially for miscellaneous CFS.
* Partner with social service organizations to reduce CFS in the category of disturbance, including for gambling and alcohol-related problems. Also, partner with organizations working to reduce domestic violence for referral services and counseling.
* Review the extent of domestic violence CFS and consider implementing a domestic violence unit to reduce repeat calls for service. This unit may consist of only one patrol officer or detective.
* If budgetary conditions can support this recommendation, change the policy for use of vacation time to allow for carrying over unused time from one fiscal year to the next to reduce the impact on staffing levels.
* Consider implementing a one-hour overlap of shifts by staggering deployment so as to increase communication among the shifts.
* A business watch program should be established for the “hot spots” in commercial areas and department members should be trained in crime prevention strategies and should meet with business watch groups monthly. Adopt the principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED), provide security assessments to retail establishments for target hardening, and implement security training for retail employees in an effort to reduce crime.
* To combat the hot spots in residential areas, the department should focus on establishing active neighborhood watch programs with a strong focus on residential security and crime prevention
* The department should take the leadership role in establishing a crime reduction committee specifically aimed at reducing crime in housing subsidized by the Anniston Housing Authority. Currently, the Anniston Housing Authority contracts “off-duty” Anniston police officers to provide additional security in the public housing complexes. This strategy needs to be revised by having the Anniston Housing Authority consider contracting full-time officers to be assigned permanently to patrolling the public housing complexes. Use crime analysis data to construct tactical crime reduction strategies.
* In an effort to reduce overall response times, conduct a meeting with the dispatch center manager to determine why the dispatch hold times are high.
* Consider restructuring the geographic patrol areas to balance the CFS by area and reduce the average response time for Priority 1 CFS from 13 minutes to 5 minutes or less.

### Patrol Support Units

#### K-9 Unit

The K-9 Unit was dissolved in May 2012 when the K-9 dog died. The unit had consisted of one officer and one dog. The K-9 dog was a certified narcotics dog. No replacement for an officer or dog is planned by the department. K-9 dogs can play a crucial role in high-crime areas as another tool for police to utilize in reducing the flow of drug trafficking, pursuing criminals, and assisting in dangerous tactical scenarios. Give Anniston’s high crime rate, the APD should consider reinstituting the K-9 Unit.

The Alabama Canine Law Enforcement Officer’s Training Center, Inc. has dogs available for purchase and provides narcotics, explosive, and accelerant detection training courses. Additionally, the National Police Dog Foundation has an assistance request program to help purchase, train, and provide medical assistance for a K-9 dog.

Recommendation:

* A K-9 unit can be a productive and important resource for the department. A K-9 trained in narcotics detection could be a strong asset to the Patrol Division. The department should consider acquiring another dog and training another officer as a K-9 handler trained in narcotics detection for investigatory purposes in patrol, with the end goal of identifying and reducing narcotics-related crime.

#### Crime Analysis Unit

The department faces one of the highest crime rates in the state of Alabama, exceeding both the state of Alabama’s and the nation’s crime rates. A review of several articles and websites identifies Anniston as one of the most dangerous cities in Alabama. However, the department does not have any crime analysis capabilities, and it is nearly impossible to strategize crime reduction activities and measures without a crime analysis unit.

CPSM recommends the creation of a Crime Analysis Unit. A civilian professional with experience in crime analysis could significantly and immediately change the direction of the department in reducing crime. The crime analyst could enhance the department’s criminal intelligence analysis, tactical crime analysis, and strategic crime analysis. Currently, the department has a detective serving as a criminal intelligence analyst, but this is an ancillary duty for the detective and the focus is on criminal intelligence. Administrative Order 62-02-02 governs the duties of this part-time position.

An analyst could generate information and maps on trends in hot spots, which could be utilized by patrol for strategic and targeted crime interventions. Deployment of personnel could be based on the “hot spot” locations rather than on officers making decisions on where to spend their patrol time through random patrol. The strategies of “hot spot” policing could be as simple as the officer spending more time in hot spots, as was demonstrated in the Minneapolis, Minn. Hot Spots Patrol Experiment,**[[5]](#footnote-5)** or could involve more problem-oriented strategies including discussing the problems with community members and developing tailored responses to reduce crime problems at hot spots, as was done in Jersey City, N.J.**[[6]](#footnote-6)** Additionally, the department could implement a long-term goal of expanding the capabilities of crime analysis by enabling department members to access GIS mapping online through a portal, and creating the ability for online mapping to include the capability to populate in real time.

The creation of a crime analysis unit must be married to a change in organizational culture. The department must implement a strong internal process of crime reduction and performance management. The department must establish clear goals, standards of measuring success, and ongoing evaluation and reassessment. The culture of the department must shift from a passive posture to a focus on outcomes. Interviews with staff throughout the department indicated that the staff’s perspectives described the department as a very reactive police department and not proactive. The department members linked lack of staffing to the reactive posture. However, without effective crime analysis capabilities, it is easy to see why the department members viewed themselves as reactive to crime.

The department needs to implement a form of the Compstat model, which promotes analysis, communication throughout the department, strategic use of resources, and accountability. Strategies to reduce crime should involve all components of the department. Command staff must provide the leadership for implementing a Compstat model. Highly structured meetings that focus on crime trends and crime reduction should be the initial thrust of the Compstat model. However, over time, this model can be used for performance management of not only operational issues but also administrative and budgetary issues. The crime analysis unit should participate in all Compstat meetings.

Recommendations:

* Create a crime analysis unit and hire an experienced civilian analyst.
* Purchase all technology and software needed to conduct crime analysis.
* Department leadership needs to institute an organizational culture change by adopting and implementing a form of the Compstat model

#### Special Response Team (SRT)/Crisis Negotiation Unit

The commander of the SRT and Crisis Negotiation Unit is the captain of the Uniform Division. The captain has supervised the SRT for the past six months. In the captain’s role of SRT commander he coordinates the selection, training, and evaluation of the team; plans, implements, executes, and manages all tactical intervention plans; evaluates the performance and readiness levels of all team members; coordinates all administrative affairs of the unit; and provides tactical leadership for all SRT activities.

The team has 12 tactical operators and four negotiators. There is also a paramedic assigned from the Anniston Fire Department. Helicopter support is provided by the Oxford Police Department or the state police. The tactical operators and negotiators all have other primary job duties and being a member of the team is an additional duty. There is no specialty or additional pay for being a member of the SRT or Crisis Negotiation Unit. The captain does not track the number of call-outs or the amount of overtime utilized by the team. No call-out data was available for 2014, 2015, or 2016.

Department policy governing the team is Administrative Order 20A-8-91. This policy outlines the chain of command, situations requiring SRT activation, authorized weapons and ammunition, and training. This policy states that the SRT will train once a month, marksman observers every other month, and negotiators will train with the SRT. The policy does not indicate the procedure for activating the team, the selection process for SRT members, or the number of hours SRT members will train each month.

The captain indicated that the team trains for 12 hours each month and in the future the department will require 16 hours each month. The 16 hours of training would align the department with the National Tactical Officers Association recommendation of 16 to 40 hours of critical skills maintenance based upon mission capabilities and current operational tempo.**[[7]](#footnote-7)** The SRT conducts two full scenario-based training exercises a year. The process for selecting team members begins with an application, followed by the captain talking to the applicant’s supervisors, state firearms qualification course, and physical fitness obstacle course. Selection of negotiators follows a similar process, but instead of firearms qualification and the obstacle course, there is a structured interview involving a scenario. There is no psychological testing specifically for SRT members. The National Tactical Officers Association notes most selection processes consist of an application, job-related physical proficiency test, oral interview, background investigation, and assessment of mental stability.**[[8]](#footnote-8)**

Recommendations:

* The captain who commands the SRT should track all call-outs and overtime for the SRT.
* Add a section in Administrative Order 20A-8-91 that governs the SRT to include greater detail on the authority to activate the team, responsibilities, selection process, and training governing the SRT to include crisis negotiators.
* Increase the monthly training hours for SRT to at least 16 hours to align with recommended training standards provided by the National Tactical Officers Association.
* Institute psychological testing for all new members as part of the selection process for SRT and Crisis Negotiation Units.

#### Special Operations Unit

The Special Operations Unit is a component of the Uniform Division. The unit is supervised by a sergeant who also oversees the SRO Unit, Accident Investigation Unit, and Animal Control Unit. The sergeant reports to the captain of the Uniform Division. The sergeant is an 11-year veteran of the department; his work hours are Monday through Friday, 0800 to 1600 hours.

School Resource Officers Unit

The SRO Unit has two police officers assigned to the unit. The work hours for the SROs are 0730 to 1530 hours, Monday through Friday. One SRO has eight years with the department, while the other SRO has two years with the department. One SRO is assigned to Anniston High School and the other SRO covers the middle school and three elementary schools. The department’s SRO program has been in effect for approximately 10 years, with the positions funded by the school system. The SRO officers do not teach the D.A.R.E. program or the G.R.E.A.T. program, and are not certified to teach these two programs. The SRO officers do attend the Alabama Association of School Resource Officers (TAASRO) Conference every June. The conference is 40 hours and is paid by the school system.

The sergeant indicated that there are two elementary schools located on the west side of the city which are populated primarily with students from lower socio-economic families. He indicated that there are many at-risk students and the students would benefit from more “face time” with an SRO. However, it is difficult for the one SRO to serve multiple schools. The sergeant does not maintain statistics for the SRO Unit. Any reports or arrests generated by the SRO unit are credited to patrol. The overtime for the unit is not tracked by the sergeant. The sergeant advised that the SRO unit generates little to no overtime. However, when a school requests that an SRO participate in a school event outside of the normal work hours, the school will directly pay the officer. The rate of pay is $100 for 4 hours.

The SRO unit does not initiate any intelligence files pertaining to crime or gang activity. The SRO unit could initiate intelligence files related to juvenile arrests and gang activity at the schools. Intelligence could be gathered throughout the school year and shared with patrol and criminal investigations. Furthermore, the SROs are reassigned to patrol for the summers. It would be beneficial during the summer for the SROs to contact students who had been arrested during the school year. This contact could include meeting with parents/guardians to determine and encourage the students to stay out of trouble, and refer them to summer programs or Job Corp Centers/Programs. Building a relationship with those at-risk students who have had contact with the criminal justice system could serve as a strategy to prevent recidivism.

Recommendations:

* The Special Operations sergeant should track all workload for the SRO Unit inclusive of CFS, arrest statistics, and clearance rates.
* The Special Operations sergeant should track all workload to determine if an additional SRO officer is needed to serve the three elementary schools.
* The SRO unit’s overtime should be tracked by the sergeant. Mechanisms should be put into place to track all payments by the school system to the SRO Unit.
* The SRO officers should be certified as D.A.R.E. officers and G.R.E.A.T. officers so they can deliver crime prevention programs to students in addition to their school safety responsibilities.
* In an effort to reduce recidivism, the SRO unit should implement an intelligence gathering program to identify students who are arrested during the school year and implement a program to follow-up during the summer months with the at-risk students who have criminal arrest records.

Accident Investigation Unit

This unit is comprised of the sergeant who supervises the Special Operations Unit and one police officer. The police officer works Monday through Friday, 1000 to 1800 hours. Both the sergeant and the police officer are on-call 24/7 for major accidents, specifically traffic homicide investigations. Both the sergeant and the police officer assigned to this unit have attended an 80-hour traffic homicide course but are not certified in accident reconstruction. The sergeant is responsible for reviewing the unit’s accident reports, tracking towed vehicles from accidents, abandoned cars sited by the city’s Code Enforcement Unit, and other duties related to the Special Operations Unit.

The sergeant reported that in 2015, the department worked 1,262 motor vehicle accidents, with 375 involving injuries and a total of three fatalities. Of the accidents, the police officer assigned to the Accident Investigation Unit worked 300 motor vehicle accidents and the sergeant worked 103 motor vehicle accidents. CPSM data analysis indicated that during the time period of September 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016, the entire department responded to 2,007 traffic accidents or 5.5 CFS per day and traffic enforcement consisted of 8,084 responses, or 22.1 CFS per day. When traffic accidents and traffic enforcement CFS are combined, traffic accident/enforcement CFS for the entire department accounted for 26.1 percent of the workload.

As previously discussed in the patrol section of this document, the department needs to determine whether it is necessary to dispatch resources to all 2,007 traffic accidents or decide if it can implement alternative responses to sending a police officer. Dispatch practices for determining if a police officer is needed to respond need to be reviewed by the department. Additionally, actions could be taken to address conditions at the top 10 intersections for traffic accidents and to address the top three causes for the traffic accidents occurring in the city of Anniston (see Table 4-8). The top three causes are: Following Too Closely, Failure to Yield Right of Way, and Distracted Driving. The Traffic Unit needs to implement a strong community education campaign to reduce the top three causes of traffic accidents, as all three causes are preventable. The Traffic Unit should engage the media in the community education campaign. Additionally, the SRO Unit could initiate a safe driving education campaign in the high school.

TABLE 4-8: Motor Vehicle Accidents: Top 10 Intersections and Top Three Causes (Reported by APD)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Motor Vehicle Accidents Top 10 Intersections | Top Three Causes |
| Highway 431/Highway 21 | Following Too Close |
| Greenbrier Dear and S. Quintard Avenue | Failure to Yield Right of Way |
| Summerall Gate and McClellan | Distracted Driving |
| 9th Street and Quintard Avenue |  |
| 16th Street and Quintard Avenue |  |
| 10th Street and Quintard Avenue |  |
| 18th Street and Noble Street |  |
| 19th Street and Quintard Avenue |  |
| Henry Road and Veteran’s Memorial Parkway |  |
| Baltzell Gate Road and McClellan Blvd |  |

Recommendations:

* Analyze dispatch practices to traffic accidents to determine if a police officer response is warranted at every traffic accident or if a policy change by the department could reduce the number of responses to traffic accident CFS.
* Implement an aggressive community education campaign to reduce the top three causes of accidents, as all three causes are preventable. Include a safe driving education campaign in the high school.

Animal Control Unit

This unit is comprised of one civilian; the position’s work hours are Monday through Friday from 0600 to 1400 hours. This civilian position is also on-call, but no statistics could be provided by the department as to the number of call-outs or overtime costs over the course of a year. The job responsibilities for this position are responding to CFS involving animals to include dogs, cats, snakes, and other wildlife. The CFS include rabid animals, nuisance wild animals, animal abuse, and animal bites. According to CPSM’s data analysis, the department responded to 839 animal calls during the period of September 1, 2015 to August 31, 2016, or 2.3 CFS per day. It is unknown if these animal CFS were handled by patrol staff or the Animal Control Unit, or more likely a combination of the two. The sergeant advised that Anniston Animal Control Unit serves the city and a surrounding geographical area outside of the city for a 3-mile radius.

The sergeant did not know what type of training the civilian position received for his job position. This position has not conducted any community training to reduce animal CFS.

Recommendations:

* The sergeant should implement a system for tracking statistics for the Animal Control Unit to monitor workload and determine if the scheduled work hours are conducive to the workload.
* Conduct an analysis of the types of animal CFS to determine the specific nature of the CFS and determine if community education programs are warranted to reduce the number of these calls. Community education programs may be offered by the department or in partnership with other organizations such as the SPCA.

### Vehicle Fleet

The department reports that maintenance and repair costs for the department vehicles totaled $100,312.44 in 2014 and $95,068.38 in 2015. The department provided two vehicle inventory sheets, one for the fleet assigned to the Investigative Division (Table 4-9) and another for the fleet assigned to all other components of APD labeled APD Fleet Vehicles (Table 4-10). Each inventory sheet provided the year, make, and model of the vehicle, however, no mileage figures were included. Most patrol vehicles are replaced when the vehicle reaches at least 100,000 to 150,000 miles. Therefore, limited specific recommendations can be made without knowing the mileage of the vehicles. However, in reviewing the age of the vehicles and combining the figures from the Investigative Division and APD Fleet vehicles, of the total fleet of 64 vehicles not including the 2 vehicles with unknown years, 46.7 percent of the fleet is at least eight years old. Projecting that the department drives each vehicle 50 miles per day, each vehicle would accumulate 18,250 miles a year. In eight years, a vehicle could be driven 146,000 miles. Tracking of vehicle mileage is essential for a vehicle fleet replacement program.

TABLE 4-9: Investigative Division Fleet (n=16)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Year of Vehicle | Number of Vehicles |
| 2015 | 1 |
| 2012 | 1 |
| 2010 | 1 |
| 2009 | 3 |
| 2008 | 6 |
| 2000 | 3 |
| 1999 | 1 |

TABLE 4-10: APD Fleet Vehicles (n=48)

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Year of Vehicle | Number of Vehicles |
| 2016 | 7 |
| 2014 | 4 |
| 2013 | 7 |
| 2012 | 3 |
| 2011 | 1 |
| 2009 | 5 |
| 2008 | 6 |
| 2007 | 1 |
| 2005 | 2 |
| 2004 | 1 |
| 2003 | 1 |
| 2001 | 2 |
| 2000 | 3 |
| 1993 | 1 |
| 1989 | 1 |
| 1986 | 1 |
| No Year Provided | 2 |

The department should develop a detailed inventory that captures not only year, make, and model but also vehicle mileage and the technology installed in each car. The inventory sheet should include in-car cameras, GPS, license plate readers, etc. The department needs to institute a vehicle fleet committee to examine the current and future needs of the vehicle fleet. Planning for the acquisition of new vehicles and technology is absolutely necessary to ensure a well-managed vehicle fleet that has the technology that enables officers to carry out their duties. This committee should examine the current state of the vehicle fleet, weigh the benefits of purchase versus lease options, examine new technology, and project the benefits of alternative fuel options (for example, some agencies have begun to acquire electric cars for their fleets). Additionally, the benefits versus the costs of a take-home car program should also play a role in the analysis. The department needs a sound five-year plan for the acquisition of new vehicles and new technology installed in the vehicles. This requires the department to strategically plan and project budget costs.

Recommendations:

* The department should develop a detailed inventory records management system that captures not only year, make, and model, but also vehicle mileage and the technology installed in each car. The inventory sheet should include all in-car cameras, GPS, license plate readers, etc.
* The department needs to institute a vehicle fleet committee to examine the current and future needs of the vehicle fleet. This committee should examine the current state of the vehicle fleet, weigh the benefits of purchase versus lease options, examine new technology, and project the benefits of alternative fuel options. Additionally, the benefits versus the costs of a take-home car program should also play a role in the analysis.
* The department needs a sound five-year plan for the acquisition of new vehicles and new technology installed in the vehicles. This requires the department to strategically plan and project budget costs.

# Section 5. Investigative Division

The Investigative Division is comprised of three core units: Investigations, Warrant Service, and Crime Lab. At the time of the site visit, the Division was staffed with one captain, two sergeants, six investigators, two warrant officers, three crime lab technicians, and one division secretary. The objective of the Investigative Division is to deter crime, conduct prompt, efficient and complete investigations, and present cases for prosecution.

### Investigations

Two sergeants supervise the six investigators assigned to the Investigations Unit. Investigators may be called to the scene of a serious crime by a patrol supervisor (and assume responsibility for the investigation of that case) but ordinarily the sergeant will assign to the investigators Incident Offense Reports requiring additional investigative action. There did not appear to be a formal procedure that guides a patrol supervisor’s decision making with respect to when Investigators should be called to the scene of an incident. Lastly, investigators may assume responsibility of a case based on a “walk-in” complaint at headquarters.

For purposes of Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) statistics, cases are cleared in one of two ways: arrest or exceptional clearance. A case is cleared by arrest when one person is arrested and charged with the commission of the offense and turned over to the court for prosecution. A case can be cleared by exceptional means when the offender is identified, enough evidence is gathered to support an arrest, make a charge and turn over the offender to the court for prosecution, the offender’s exact location is known so that the offender could be taken into custody immediately, yet a circumstance outside of the control of the law enforcement agency prohibits that agency from arresting, charging, and prosecuting the offender.

The Investigations Unit supervisor receives copies of Alabama Uniform Incident Offense Reports (Offense Reports) via the Spillman system. Depending on timing (i.e., Offense Reports prepared over the weekend, Uniform Division approval of report, etc.), it may be more than 24 hours after the incident occurrence before an investigator is assigned to a case. An Investigations Unit supervisor reviews Offense Reports and makes an assessment as to which felony cases will be assigned for follow-up action. The remaining cases (felonies and misdemeanors) are assigned to the Division Secretary for disposition. Investigators do not follow-up on cases closed by a patrol arrest. Investigators do not routinely debrief patrol arrestees for information/intelligence gathering purposes. This is a missed opportunity to gather information that could be helpful in APD’s crime reduction efforts.

Upon a supervisor’s assignment of a case to an investigator, that investigator is expected to contact the victim and submit a working supplement within five days of receipt of the case. Thereafter, a supplement for that case is required every ten days. This case management system is not strictly adhered to due to the large caseloads of investigators. For example, from January 1, 2016 to October 20, 2016, 1,998 felony cases were assigned to the six investigators, an average of 333 cases per Investigator. In 2015, the six investigators were assigned 1,878 cases, an average of 313 cases per investigator.

Notwithstanding the large caseloads of APD Investigators, the Investigations Unit maintains a high clearance rate for UCR Part I Offenses. In fact, the department’s overall clearance rates are routinely higher than the state average. For example, in 2014 the APD cleared 67 percent of UCR Part I Offenses while the state average was 26 percent. In 2015, APD cleared 45 percent to the state’s 25 percent. This suggests that the APD should focus its resources on crime prevention and proactive enforcement strategies.

Recommendation:

* All persons arrested by patrol should be debriefed by Investigations Unit personnel (being careful to avoid Miranda issues) during the operational hours of the Investigations Unit. After hours, patrol officers should debrief their prisoners concerning their knowledge of criminal activity within the city of Anniston and the APD police jurisdiction. Investigations Unit personnel, using crime patterns/trends, can provide Uniform Division personnel with the type of information that should be solicited from those they arrest.

### Warrant Service

The primary duty of officers assigned to the Warrant Service Unit “…is the service of all arrest warrants.” Department protocols direct members “…to coordinate, cooperate, and communicate with other units/divisions to ensure prompt action on warrants.”

Two sworn members are assigned to the Warrant Service Unit. One member is assigned full-time to the United States Marshal’s Regional Fugitive Task Force (RFTF). The RFTF targets persons warranted for “…violent crime against a person, weapons offenses, felony drug offenses, failure to register as a sex offender, and violent crimes committed by subjects who have a criminal history involving violent crimes, felony drug offenses, and/or weapons offenses.” (USMS RFTF – Memorandum of Understanding). Each agency participating in the RFTF can refer cases to the RFTF for consideration. The RFTF Chief Inspector determines which cases the task force will investigate. CPSM was informed that RFTF warrant enforcement within the city of Anniston is infrequent. As such, the vast majority of warrant enforcement is left to the one officer actually working in the Warrant Service Unit. This officer, however, has several administrative duties (e.g., preparation of 72-hour hearings, retrieving suspects held by area law enforcement agencies on Anniston warrants, etc.). As such, this officer may only get an opportunity to execute felony warrants one or two days a week. Unless specifically requested, misdemeanor warrants are not executed. Complicating this officer’s enforcement effort is the need to find an available sworn officer to partner with during warrant executions. When this officer is unable to partner with an available APD officer or a District Attorney’s investigator, prudence dictates that this officer not attempt to execute warrants and/or transport prisoners while alone.

It is clear that the staffing of the Warrant Service Unit is insufficient to fulfil its mission. The inability of the APD to proactively engage in warrant enforcement undermines its crime reduction efforts. Individuals wanted on warrants have displayed an inability or unwillingness to follow rules. There is little reason to believe that individuals who defy court orders (and are wanted on a warrant) will not reoffend while in the community.

Recommendations:

* The APD should consider using patrol officers to a greater extent in warrant enforcement. During uncommitted time, patrol officers, led by a supervisor, can execute misdemeanor and nonviolent felony warrants within their patrol areas.
* The APD must provide training (to include legal process and tactical considerations) to these officers regarding warrant executions
* The APD should reconsider its participation in the RFTF. It may be possible to reduce its commitment from a full-time officer to a part-time officer or to withdraw entirely. If this option is not feasible, the APD should consider adding a third officer to the Warrant Service Unit

### Crime Lab

The Crime Lab is staffed by three sworn officers. Two of the three officers are relatively new to their positions and ar4e not yet able to work independently. The primary responsibility of Crime Lab Unit personnel is to respond to crime (or other) scenes and document the scene (i.e., photographs, video, sketches, conduct measurements, etc.) and/or collect physical evidence or other items as circumstances dictate. Members of the Crime Lab Unit conduct fingerprint analysis and analyze suspected marijuana submitted to the Crime Lab Unit. When requested, they can provide these services to regional law enforcement agencies. When the APD requires complex or comprehensive analytical work, the evidence/article is sent to the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences (ADFS). ADFS is a full-service forensic laboratory. It is accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation Board (ASCLD/LAB) in the following areas: Drug Chemistry, Firearms/Tool Marks, Biology, Fire Debris (trace), Toxicology, and Breath Alcohol Measuring Instruments. Crime Lab Unit members also perform duties as directed by supervisors (such as fingerprinting sex offenders registering with the APD).

In 2014, Crime Lab Unit personnel processed 933 cases and in 2015 they processed 977 cases.

### 7th Judicial Major Crimes Unit

The 7th Judicial Major Crimes Unit is comprised of several law enforcement agencies located in Calhoun and Cleburne counties. Its mission is to improve the safety and quality of life for the citizens of these counties by reducing the availability of illegal drugs and violent crime associated with drug use. The consolidation of resources across two counties is a smart and economical approach to countering narcotics use and related violent crimes in Calhoun and Cleburne counties.

The 7th Judicial Major Crimes Unit is staffed with on one commander (APD captain), one assistant commander (DA’s office), five investigators (four from the DA’s office, one from Jacksonville), and two civilian administrators. During the 12-month period from July 2015 through June 2016, the unit conducted 573 investigations, which resulted in 349 cases and 151 arrests. The unit made significant narcotics seizures during this period. The city of Anniston is the focus of much of this unit’s work. The APD and citizens of the city of Anniston and the police jurisdiction benefit from APD’s participation in this unit. No recommendations are offered.

### Training and Inspections Unit

The Training and Inspections Unit oversees department training (including entry-level, in-service, roll call, specialized, advanced, and accreditation), inspection services, and internal affairs investigations. The Training and Inspections Unit reports to the Chief of Police, who determines the staffing of this office. Currently, one lieutenant (Commander) and one sergeant (Training Officer) are assigned to this office.

The primary objectives of the Training and Inspections Unit are to provide for:

* Training.
* Inspection services.
* Internal affairs investigations.
* Background investigations of applicants.
* Maintenance of department employee files.
* Maintenance of employee evaluation files.

#### Recruitment

The Training and Inspections officer is responsible for coordinating the department’s recruitment efforts with the city’s Department of Human Resources. Demographic data for 2013 for the city of Anniston was reviewed ([www.city-data.com/city/anniston-alabama.html](http://www.city-data.com/city/anniston-alabama.html)). This is the same data source that the APD used to compile its Demographics Report. These data do not include demographic data for the police jurisdiction. The APD estimates that the population within the police jurisdiction is double the city’s population and is largely Caucasian.

The demographic make-up for the city of Anniston is as follows:

* African-American 52.3% (11,953)
* Caucasian 43.6% (9,966)
* Hispanic 1.8% (418)
* Asian 1.3% (308)
* Native American .06% (13)
* Two or more races 1.3% (285)
* Males 47.7% (10,716)
* Females 52.3% (11,741)

The demographic make-up of the APD workforce as of 10/17/2016 is as follows:

* African-American 10 (11%)
* Caucasian 75 (86%)
* Hispanic 1 (1%)
* Other 1 (1%)
* Males 83 (95.4%)
* Females 04 (4.5%)

When the demographic make-up of the police jurisdiction outside of the city is considered (the APD estimate) the contrast between the demographic sets is not as stark. However, considering that 80 percent of the APD’s service calls are within the city of Anniston, the need for greater diversity within the APD is apparent. In addition to traditional recruitment activities, the APD relies on word-of-mouth recruiting. Current APD officers spread the word to family and friends about employment opportunities at the APD. These efforts have been successful in producing candidate pools from which to hire police officers. However, these candidate pools have been overwhelmingly male and mostly Caucasian. For example, in 2015, of the 34 applications for police officer received, 27 (79.4 percent) were from Caucasian males, 5 (14.7 percent) were from African-American males, 1 (2.9 percent) was from a Hispanic male, and only one application (2.9 percent) was received from a female (Caucasian). In 2016, as of 10/18/2016, of the 29 police officer applications received, 19 (65.5 percent) were from Caucasian males, 7 (24.1 percent) were from African-American males, 1 (3.4 percent) was from a Hispanic male, and only two (6.8 percent) applications were received from female candidates (Caucasians).

If the APD is to be a police department that more closely reflects the community it serves, it must revise its recruitment strategies to attract female applicants and people of color. There is a link on the department’s website to a 30-second recruitment video. This video contains a lot of imagery reflecting a “warrior” philosophy of policing (such as firearms training, physical tactics training, vehicle pursuit/felony car stop, crime scene processing, Special Response Team activities, etc.). The department should consider revising this video to appeal to a broader candidate pool.

Recommendations:

* The APD should supplement the efforts of the Department of Human Resources and recruit (both physically and virtually) where diverse candidate pools exist.
* Millennials do not receive information from sources used by prior generations. Therefore, the APD should leverage, to a greater extent, social media platforms (Twitter, Snapchat, etc.) to promote employment opportunities within the APD.
* The APD should consider recruitment initiatives at area houses of worship, faith-based institutions, community-based organizations, and two- and four-year colleges and technical schools. Also, the Anniston Police Citizen’s Advisory Committee should play a prominent role in the department’s recruitment efforts.
* The United States military is most diverse at its lower ranks. The APD recruitment strategy should consider pursuing noncommissioned officers and soldiers at military installations where uniformed military personnel who have completed their military service (and are returning to civilian life in the Calhoun County area) are processed out of the military.
* Collaborate with the Department of Human Resources to develop a recruitment campaign and recruitment materials that target females. In addition, the department should consider balancing current recruitment materials to reflect both “guardian” and “warrior” philosophies of policing.

#### Training

The majority of the in-service training for APD members is provided by the regional training academy, other law enforcement agencies, or commercial companies that specialize in law enforcement training. The APD provides training for field training officer certification, OC & Taser certification, patrol rifle qualification, and point and shoot instruction. A training sergeant coordinates the training needs of the department and requests for specialized or advanced training from members of the APD.

In July 2016, the US Department of Justices’ Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, published 2013 survey data concerning state and local law enforcement training academies. The average length of a basic law enforcement training program in a training academy (not including field training) was 840 hours or 21 weeks. Academies operated by state POST agencies averaged 650 hours.

Entry-level Training

The Alabama Peace Officers’ Standards and Training Commission (APOSTC) establishes certification and training standards for police officers in the state of Alabama. Presently, police officer candidates must complete 520 hours of basic training (13 weeks) at an approved academy. APD police recruits receive their entry-level training at the Northeastern Alabama Law Enforcement Academy (an approved regional law enforcement training academy) located on a satellite campus of Jacksonville State University in Calhoun County. After graduation from the police academy, APD officers must complete three 15-day phases with three different field training officers (540 hours) and one 10-day phase where the officer, while working alone, is “shadowed” by a field training officer (120 hours). The entry-level training that APD recruit officers receive meets APOSTC standards.

In-service Training

APOSTC requires 12 hours of annual in-service training. The department’s SOP directs Division Commanders and supervisory support staff to submit specific training needs or requests for training to the Chief of Police. Further, the SOP directs that annual training topics include legal updates, firearms requalification, reviews of, and/or changes to departmental policies, rules, regulations, and instruction in high liability areas (i.e., use of force, vehicle pursuits, etc.). Instruction considered in-service training is viewed broadly and includes departmental meetings, informal classroom, reviews during roll calls, range training, and remedial training. APOSTC required/approved in-service training is entered/submitted electronically to APOSTC. Paper files are maintained to document in-service training received in excess of the APOSTC minimum. The APD’s in-service training far exceeds the APOSTC minimum. For example, APD mandatory in-service training for 2016 is:

* Department of Human Resources training: 4 hours
* Advanced Roadside Interview Techniques: 8 hours
* Legal Updates/Use of Force: 4 hours
* Active Shooter: 12 hours

Requests for advanced or specialized training varies based on need. Employees or Division Commanders may submit requests for advanced/specialized training to the Chief of Police. The Chief of Police or the Training and Inspections officer may also select officers to attend available training.

Recommendations:

* Leadership training is routinely provided to supervisors. However, too often, entry-level personnel are not considered for leadership training. Police officers supervise and direct the activities of members of the public (and at times their peers) during emergency/crisis events as well as in the normal course of their duties. The essence of leadership is the ability to influence an individual’s behavior to accomplish/achieve a goal. Police officers can benefit from basic instruction that develops leadership skills and abilities. Therefore, the APD should consider providing police officers with basic leadership training.
* Similar to the lack of consistent leadership training for police officers, too few departments include principles of followership in their supervisory training. Supervisors who are able to correctly ascertain a follower’s readiness level (i.e., ability and willingness) are better positioned to select and apply the most appropriate leadership practice to influence/motivate a subordinate’s performance. The APD should consider including followership training, as it relates to individual “readiness levels,” in the leadership training it provides to supervisors.

#### Inspection Services

The Inspections Services function includes four distinct parts: 1) Evaluations of facilities, equipment, records, employees, operational procedures, crime reporting practices, and incident reports as required by the Chief of Police, 2) Internal affairs investigations,   
3) Background investigations, and 4) Maintenance of personnel and evaluation files.

Evaluations/Audits

Evaluations may be conducted at the direction of the Chief of Police. To date, the Training and Inspections Unit has conducted two evaluations in 2016: one concerning an attempted suicide in the jail and the other involving a shooting by off-duty APD corrections officer. The internal inspection function is a useful tool in determining agency compliance with its stated rules and procedures. The compliance inspection function should be utilized to a greater extent within the APD. For example, APD units that accept cash or other forms of payment for fees should be included in an inspection cycle (for example, quarterly, semi-annually, annually, biennial, etc.) to assess compliance with APD’s policies and procedures. Compliance inspections are recommended even though a review or oversight process may exist within the unit or is conducted by another city agency.

Recommendation:

* Increase the frequency of compliance evaluations conducted by the Training and Inspections Unit. This type of assessment is not driven by misconduct or integrity concerns. The department should consider establishing a regular inspection cycle for specific aspects of its operations (for example, any unit that handles cash; property/evidence held and disposed of by the department; UCR Part I Offense Classifications, etc.).

Internal Affairs Investigations

The Training and Inspections officer (lieutenant) records, registers, and oversees investigations of complaints against APD employees. These citizen complaints are normally investigated by the member’s immediate supervisor. The lieutenant will investigate in-custody deaths, officer-involved-shootings of humans, and major incidents in the jail. The lieutenant assumed this position in April 2016 and to-date has not conducted an internal investigation. In 2015, two internal investigations of members of the APD were conducted.

The department’s nomenclature and definitions for internal investigations case closing dispositions were recently revised to conform to Commission on the Accreditation for law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) standards. The APD is currently seeking CALEA accreditation.

Complaints against APD members are documented in the Guardian Tracking System by the employee’s immediate supervisor or the supervisor receiving the complaint. These complaints are investigated by the employee’s immediate supervisor. Once the investigation is completed, the investigation is reviewed by the Division Commander and later the Chief of Police, who determines what action, if any, is appropriate in each case.

Thirty-six citizen complaints were investigated by the APD in 2015. The allegations included police harassment, rude behavior/unprofessional conduct, dereliction of duty, excessive force, unlawful search and seizure, racial profiling and excessive force. In 20 of the 36 cases (55.5 percent), the complaint was deemed unfounded; in 8 of the 36 cases (22.2 percent), the APD member was exonerated; the complaint was not sustained in 4 of the 36 cases (11.1 percent); and the complaint was sustained in 4 of the 36 cases (11.1 percent) cases. In 77.7 percent (28/36) of the cases, the investigator concluded that the member did not engage in misconduct. In 11.1 percent of the cases, the investigator concluded that the member engaged in misconduct. As of October 16, 25 citizen complaints had been filed against members of the APD in 2016. In 80 percent (20/25) of these cases, the investigator concluded that the member did not engage in misconduct. In 16 percent (4/25) of these cases, the investigator concluded that the member engaged in misconduct. Members of the APD wear body cameras and the video is available to the supervisor investigating the citizen complaint. The Department concluded that in the vast majority of these citizen complaints, the officer had not engaged in misconduct. Even so, the APD should be concerned that its ratio of citizen complaints to officers in 2014 was 1:1.93, in 2015 was 1:2.41, and as of October 16, 2016 was 1:3.48. It should be noted that staffing levels fluctuate, so the figure of 87 APD members was used to calculate these ratios. Citizen perception of their police influence police-community relations. Therefore, a more comprehensive analysis should be conducted to identify the factors associated with the filing of citizen complaints.

Recommendations:

* A comprehensive analysis should be conducted to determine which factors are causing or are correlated with the filing of citizen complaints (such as assignment of officer, category of complaint, officer years of service, whether or not it is associated with an arrest, etc.).
* Ensure that newly promoted supervisors receive instruction in conducting internal investigations and that instruction for veteran supervisors be refreshed as necessary. The Training and Inspections Unit could be helpful in the development/delivery of this training. This training should be beyond that which supervisors receive in promotional/first-line supervisory training.
* The APD should consider explaining the process to file a citizen complaint on its website to include the ways in which citizen complaints are accepted (i.e., walk-ins, telephone, mail, electronically via portal on website, etc.)

Use of Force Investigations

Members of the APD are required to immediately report any use of force to a supervisor. Officers who use force are required to prepare a Use of Force/Vehicle Pursuit Report and submit it to their supervisor. The supervisor reviews all documents prepared related to the incident (including body camera and/or in-car camera video), conducts an investigation of the incident including an interview of the subject/witnesses, and prepares a Use of Force/Vehicle Pursuit Report – Supervisor’s Investigation. The supervisor makes a finding as to whether the use of force or vehicle pursuit was within department guidelines. The Supervisor’s Investigation Report, along with all documents related to the incident, are reviewed by the captain (Division Commander) and then forwarded to the Chief of Police and the Training and Inspections Unit. The Chief makes the final determination as to whether the use of force was within department guidelines and what action, if any, is to be taken with respect to the incident. It can be seen that use of force incidents are well documented and reviewed through the chain of command. The thoroughness of the initial investigation plays a significant role in determining the appropriateness of the force used. Therefore, supervisors conducting these investigations must be appropriately trained.

Recommendations:

* Ensure that first-line supervisors receive formal training/guidance for conducting internal investigations. This training should be above that received in promotional/first-line supervisor courses of instruction. The Training and Inspections Unit could provide guidance in the steps necessary to conduct a comprehensive investigation (i.e., what reports must be prepared and by whom, what documents must be reviewed, what individuals must be interviewed, ensure that findings are supported by the facts of the case, etc.).

# Section 6. Administrative Division

APD’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) assign the following duties to the Administrative Division:

* Process and maintain records of all purchase requests, approve or disapprove purchase, and control the expenditures of budgetary funds.
* Receive, catalog, store, and issue all property confiscated, turned in to the department, or belonging to the city of Anniston. Maintain an up-to-date inventory.
* Maintain and control the operation of the municipal jail.
* Maintain and control the function of the central records unit.
* Supervise the inmate work supervisor in the housekeeping and maintenance of the police building.
* Supervise the inmate work/trash crew.

CPSM’s assessment of the Administrative Division was limited to the Property and Evidence and Records Units.

## Property and Evidence

One sworn member is assigned to property and evidence. This officer works Monday through Friday from 6:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. and is responsible for maintaining a current inventory and for storing property coming into the possession of the APD. Members of the APD taking/receiving property prepare a Property Invoice/Crime Lab Request. The property, along with this form, is delivered to the property and evidence officer or placed in one of 20 evidence lockers located adjacent to the property and evidence room. The property and evidence room is secured via scan cards, CCTV, and deadbolts, and unescorted access in the property and evidence room is limited to the property and evidence officer and the jail administrator/lieutenant.

APD began using Spillman Technologies’ records management software in February 2016 to account for property held by the department. The property and evidence officer enters pertinent information into the system and forwards/stores the property/evidence as appropriate. Prior to February 2016, the department used ADSI software to accomplish this function. Spillman Technologies has not been able to electronically transfer property information contained in ADSI into Spillman. Therefore, property and evidence held by APD is currently being managed with two systems. The property and evidence officer is in the process of manually transferring existing data from ADSI into Spillman. This is a labor-intensive and slow process. It took this officer from May 2016 until September 2016 to enter calendar year 2015 data from ADSI into Spillman. ADSI contains property records dating back to 1995. At the current rate of entry, it is projected that it will take two years before all of the ADSI data is entered into Spillman. When asked about the self-inspection schedule, the property and evidence officer stated that it is normally performed on a quarterly basis but he will not be able to perform quarterly inspections until all of the information is entered into Spillman. This presents an obvious concern. While there is nothing to suggest an integrity issue exists with respect to property/evidence held by the APD, a regular and systematic accounting of property/evidence held by the department is an absolute necessity and an industry best practice.

The property and evidence officer “purges” property/evidence that is no longer required to be retained by the APD. For property held as evidence, this process includes conferring with the police officer who invoiced the property and the court to determine the status of the case. Once approval is obtained, the property is purged (guns and drugs are destroyed). After the 90-day statutory period, found or abandoned property can be disposed of after public notice is provided (i.e., advertise in newspaper for two weeks, post on public bulletin board in the District Attorney’s office lobby, etc.). Property may be converted to Department use (court order for guns), sold, or destroyed.

Lastly, the property and evidence officer performs a limited quartermaster function in that he issues/replaces Tasers and OC-Freeze + P to sworn members of the APD.

Recommendation:

* During the transition of data from ADSI to Spillman, internal affairs should conduct an audit of 100 randomly selected items held in the property and evidence room to ensure that property continues to be properly accounted for.

## Records

The Records Unit is staffed by one records supervisor and two records clerks (all nonsworn personnel); the unit is staffed Monday through Friday from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

In March 2016, APD began using the records management module (RMS) of its Spillman Technologies software to manage department records. The Records Unit supervisor and the Chief’s secretary are the department’s systems administrators for Spillman. At the time of the site visit, Records Unit personnel were continuing to acquaint themselves with the full functionality of the software.

The Records Unit supports the operations of the department in several ways. Records Unit personnel process arrest reports, Alabama Uniform Incident Offense Reports (offense reports), and miscellaneous incident cards via Spillman. Field investigation cards (used to document “Terry” stop information) are captured in Spillman but are not processed by the Records Unit. Field investigation cards are processed by the Investigations Unit. Accident reports are processed electronically via E-Crash, which is not part of Spillman.

Patrol officers enter offense reports into Spillman. These reports are reviewed by a supervisor and when approved, forwarded electronically to the Records Unit and the Investigations Unit (supervisor). Records Unit personnel enter Uniform Crime Report (UCR) offense data daily into the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA) database.

Records Unit personnel engage customers entering police headquarters who are seeking copies of police reports or who wish to file a report with APD. Records Unit personnel, however, are precluded from preparing certain types of reports and must request the on-duty complaint officer from the Investigations Unit (or the property/evidence officer) to receive the report. The APD charges a $10 cash fee for a copy of a police report. Credit cards and personal checks are not accepted. Once the fee is accepted, a written receipt is prepared and issued to the patron. The patron’s name, report type, and report number are printed on the receipt. This information is then entered into a daily receipt book. Fees received by Records Unit personnel are delivered once a day to the city’s Finance Department.

Records Unit personnel prepare three monthly reports:

* ALEA Verification Report – ALEA randomly selects APD NCIC (National Crime Information Center) entries and submits them to the APD for verification (i.e., accuracy and continuing need for the NCIC entry).
* UCR Report – The ALEA database is queried for Part I Offenses that occurred the prior month. This report also contains the value of stolen property, whether property was recovered, and case clearance data by category. This report is distributed to the Chief of Police and all division heads.
* Traffic Stop Report – This report contains the traffic stops reported by APD officers as well as the race and gender of the motorist. This report is forwarded to the Chief of Police.

The Records Unit also receives a monthly seat belt report from the municipal court and which contains the number of citations written by APD officers for seat belt violations. Lastly, Records Unit personnel verify active warrants possessed by the department. For example, on October 6, 2016, the APD possessed 3,110 active warrants (i.e., felonies, misdemeanors, juveniles, contempt, pick-ups, etc.), the majority of which were for failure to appear in court. The large number of active warrants possessed by the APD is in part attributable to its minimal warrant enforcement practices.

Records Unit personnel process subpoenas for department records and process document requests submitted by law enforcement agencies.

Recommendation:

* Records Unit personnel should continue to familiarize themselves with the full functionality of the Spillman software, particularly its report function. It does not appear that the Spillman system is fully utilized in this regard.

## Information Systems

The city of Anniston does not have a city agency responsible for information technology. Instead, that function is contracted to TekLinks, an IT solutions company that provides managed services and cloud services to companies in Alabama and surrounding states. John Piatt is the TekLinks Systems Engineer who is the point of contact with the city. He works through the finance director, and provides IT technical support for the entire city two days a week (Tuesdays and Thursdays). He is responsible for 140 computers and 313 users citywide. The city’s contract with TekLinks does not have a response time requirement but it does contain an escalation process if Mr. Piatt is non-responsive to a call for service. When the APD requires IT support, it submits a ticket. If it is a server issue, a telephone call is made or an e-mail is sent directly to Mr. Piatt. Mr. Piatt assesses the severity of the issue and responds accordingly.

Mr. Piatt installs and maintains desktop computers, servers, and software. He does not, however, install police-specific software. According to Mr. Piatt there is neither a schedule to make upgrades to computers (he does install patches remotely whenever Windows-based updates are required) nor a schedule for lifecycle replacements.

Mr. Piatt indicated he was involved in the evaluation of the Spillman software prior to it being purchased and will engage Spillman system engineers on behalf of the APD when problems are encountered.

# Section 7. Organizational Culture and Climate

Organizational culture is based on the shared assumptions, values, and beliefs that govern how members behave in the organization, while organizational climate is how members experience the culture of an organization. The climate of an organization is shaped by the upper management of an organization. Organizational climate influences productivity, effectiveness, performance, job satisfaction, innovativeness, leadership, and decision making.**[[9]](#footnote-9)** There are individual, organizational, and environmental factors that affect officers’ understanding of their organizational culture and influences their orientation towards police work and job satisfaction.**[[10]](#footnote-10)**

CPSM staff wanted to capture a picture of the department’s culture through the lens of its members. At the same time, CPSM staff wanted to evaluate the department’s internal potential and limitations, and the possible opportunities and threats from the external environment. To accomplish these goals, an analysis using the S.W.O.T. method was conducted to provide the department’s leadership with a snapshot of the department’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats from the perspectives of the department members.

Four focus groups were conducted to develop this analysis. The first focus group was made up of community members, the second focus group was made up of sworn supervisory members, the third focus group was made up of sworn police officers, and the fourth focus group was made up of the department’s civilian/support members. The community members were selected by the city manager. All other participants were selected by the department.

The community focus group was two hours in duration due to the high level of interaction among the community members. All other sessions were sixty minutes in duration.

Table 7-1 summarizes the responses of the community focus group. The community focus group had 13 participants: six black males, one black female, four white males and two white females. Participants were residents, business owners, and community activists. It was apparent that all participants had a great respect for one another.

Major strengths of the department the participants identified included: police officers are visible in the community, are good at dealing with neighborhood problems, are well-trained, are respected and respectful, and are improving their interaction with the community. The participants also identified poor pay, high turnover rate, and the need to align the demographics of the community and composition of the police department as weaknesses. The areas that participants saw as opportunities included: the need to create precincts throughout the city for greater visibility and interaction with citizens, installing cameras throughout the city to help impact crime, providing incentives for officers to live in the city, and implementing a Police Athletic League to help in reducing juvenile crime.

TABLE 7-1: Community Focus Group

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Strengths (Internal)   * Police are visible in the community * Police are good with neighborhood problems * Some neighbors love the police while others do not like the police * Community has respect for the police * Police department has an open-door policy with the community * Police and commanders work well with the community even with adversarial issues * Police have improved their communication with the community * Police are well-trained * Police have good interaction with the community * Civil rights nonprofit organization works well with the police department * Police and community are constantly working together to improve things * Citizen Advisory Group has a good partnership with the police and has improved community relations * Police are respectful to community * Police facility is very nice and new * Police have good cars and equipment | Weaknesses (Internal)   * Anniston police officers are not paid well and this results in a high turnover * High turnover rate results in negative impacts on community relations because a neighborhood gets to know an officer and then he leaves the department * High turnover rate in the department affects the building of trust between the police and community * Demographics of the community do not match the demographics of the police department * Maybe Chief’s position should be opened to applicants outside of the department so new ideas can be brought into the department |
| Opportunities (External)   * Create precincts throughout the community for greater visibility and interaction with citizens * Install cameras throughout the city to help the police with crime * Give the officers incentives to live in the city – i.e. take-home cars and reduced rent * Increase officers’ pay to keep them * Allow businesses to hire officers for off-duty details to increase their pay * Create a Police Athletic League to help reduce juvenile crime | Threats (External)   * Some community members are not helpful in healing the city and moving the city forward * Small group of citizens in the city are disrupting the relationship between the police and community * There is a national negative perspective towards police, which makes their jobs harder to do |

Table 7-2 displays the responses of the sworn supervisory focus group. This focus group consisted of sergeants and lieutenants, and had ten participants: one black male and nine white males, represented by a range of experience of from 8 years to 20 years at the department.

These participants pointed out a number of strengths of the department, principally the department’s experience in dealing with crime but with few resources, strong teamwork, and the fair application of law to the community.

The participants had strong concerns about the weaknesses of the department. They identified lack of staffing, lack of support by city hall, low pay, high turnover rate, aging equipment, and low morale as significant weaknesses. This focus group identified limited opportunities for the department. A potential opportunity would be for social service organizations to provide more programs to help impact juvenile crime, but at the same time department members felt that these organizations do not help. The threats to the department were identified as council members not being supportive of the police department, failing public schools, low tax base, high turnover of staff, and an abundance of public housing in the city as threats.

TABLE 7-2: Sworn Command/Supervisory Focus Group

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Strengths (Internal)   * Department is experienced in dealing with crime * Department has lack of resources but still gets the job done * Department applies laws fairly to the community * Other departments respect us and ask for our help * Leave time is good * Good camaraderie among shifts | Weaknesses (Internal)   * Department needs more staffing to deal with crime * Department needs more support from city hall * Low tax rate in city has resulted in poor pay for the department * Department is paid less than other departments but has more crime to deal with * High turnover rate in department * In-car cameras are out-of-date and are only in the old cars. New cars do not have in-car cameras * None of the new cars have in-car radars or license plate readers * Aging vehicle fleet * Poor morale in the department. On a scale of 1-10, morale is around a 3 or 4 * Difficult to get a department transfer |
| Opportunities (External)   * We could impact juvenile crime more if social service organizations would help us with programs in the community. But they do not help. | Threats (External)   * Some city council members are not supportive of the police department * Failing public schools are contributing to creating crime * Poor tax base for funding * Recruitment of our police officers by other departments * Turnover of department staff affects our crime-fighting abilities * An abundance of public housing * Turnover rate affects our relationship with the community and they are hesitant to give us information because the police officers change |

Table 7-3 summarizes the responses of the focus group of sworn officers. The sworn police officers focus group had eight participants: one black male, six white males, and one white female, represented by a range of experience of from 3 years to 17 years.

Participants identified professionalism, ability to get the job done with limited staffing, camaraderie, and few complaints on officers as strengths. Weaknesses cited were staffing shortages, being dispatched to too many non-police calls, lack of resources for mental illness when dealing with these calls for service, young tenure of field training officers, no support by city manager or council, and old equipment. Opportunities were seen as limited and were identified as possibilities to obtain grant money but at the same time the lack of resources to research and obtain grants. Threats included conflict among the city council members, city council not being supportive of the department, lack of incentives for economic development, and lack of funding to demolish buildings identified by code enforcement.

TABLE 7-3: Sworn Officers Focus Group

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Strengths (Internal)   * Department is professional * Department works short-handed but still gets the job done * Officer safety is good * Camaraderie on each shift is good * Officers know the law and how to enforce it fairly * Motivated staff * Public relations are good between department and community * Department gets few complaints on officers * Department is accountable to the community | Weaknesses (Internal)   * Staffing shortages force us to cut corners on calls for service * Since we lost Anniston PD dispatch, we are being dispatched to calls we should not be dispatched to. (For example, child refuses to go to school. Parents should handle this.) * Minimum staffing causes us to be reactive and not proactive * Too many repeat calls for mental illness and we don’t have the needed mental health facilities * Officers work too much off-duty because department pay is poor * Junior police officers are serving as field training officers * No support from city manager or council * More training time is needed. We don’t use our F.A.T.S. system much. * Equipment is old – old cameras, no license plate readers, no radars in new cars, no GPS in cars, new cars don’t have radios only portables are used |
| Opportunities (External)   * Grant money would help us with some of our challenges but we don’t have the staff to be proactive in seeking it. | Threats (External)   * City council members fight too much among themselves and don’t get things done * City council is not supportive of the police department * No incentives by city to bring in new economic development * Not enough money for code enforcement to tear down buildings – this contributes to broken windows theory * Nationally how the media portray police makes our job more difficult |

Table 7-4 summarizes the responses of the department’s civilian/support focus group. This focus group had four participants: one white male and three white females with a range of experience of from 5 years to 26 years.

Participants identified good teamwork, knowledgeable staff, and respect by the community as strengths of the department. Weaknesses included the need for more staff, poor pay, and the high turnover rate. Staff expressed little hope for the future of the city and department because of limited jobs in the community, poor economic growth, and few department members wanting to live in the city. Threats included the fear of future budget cuts and an increased sense of lack of job security.

TABLE 7-4: Civilian/Support Focus Group

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Strengths (Internal)   * Good department teamwork * Staff is knowledgeable about their jobs * Staff is good at helping one another * Department is respected by the community * Department is actively involved in the community * Department is well-trained * Department is a good place to work | Weaknesses (Internal)   * More staff is needed in the department * Pay is poor and we need salary increases for all department members * High turnover rate in department |
| Opportunities (External)   * Very difficult to see any opportunities for the department or city because of limited jobs, poor economic growth, and few department members want to live in the city * We have little hope anymore for the department or city | Threats (External)   * Future budget cuts we cannot afford to make * There is a false sense about job security – we are civil service but department members have been let go like in 2014 |

Table 7-5 summarizes the common themes derived from the four focus groups for each category of the S.W.O.T. analysis. There were several similar themes for the strengths and weaknesses categories.

In the area of strengths, participants agreed the department is good at dealing with crime and community problems and has a good relationship with the community, the police are respected by the community, and officers are well trained. Weaknesses included poor pay, high turnover rate, lack of staffing, lack of support by city hall and council, and aging or lack of equipment.

The common themes in the areas of opportunities and threats were somewhat limited. Participants identified the need for social service organizations to get more involved and the establishment of a Police Athletic League as ways to have an impact on juvenile crime. The internal focus groups had a significant challenge in identifying opportunities for the department. In the area of threats, participants cited lack of support of the department by city council members, the continued high turnover rate affecting the department’s performance and relationship with the community, and a negative national perspective of police by community members.

TABLE 7-5: Common Core Perspectives of All Focus Groups

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Strengths (Internal)   * Department is good at dealing with crime and community problems * Good relationship with the community * Respected by the community * Well-trained police department | Weaknesses (Internal)   * Poor pay * High turnover rate * Lack of staffing to deal with crime * Lack of support by city hall and council * Aging or lack of equipment |
| Opportunities (External)   * Social service organizations or Police Athletic League could reduce juvenile crime | Threats (External)   * City council members not supportive of the department * Continued high turnover rate affects the department’s ability to fight crime and impacts community relations and trust * Negative national perspective of police |

Recommendations:

* Convene a planning committee with department staff, city manager, council members, and the city’s human resource manager to analyze the turnover rate of the police department over the last five years. If the turnover rate of personnel at the police department is significant, strategies to reduce turnover and that are in-line with the city’s budget capabilities should be implemented. Retention of personnel is extremely important for the city, not only from a budgetary perspective, but also since the stability of the department’s staff could increase community interaction and trust, thus enabling the department to enhance its intelligence gathering capabilities for crime reduction.
* Convene a dispatch committee with department members and members from the dispatch center to analyze the calls for service and determine a policy as to what types of calls will not be dispatched to the Anniston Police Department and what types of calls for service could be taken by a desk officer.
* Convene a technology committee to determine the need to replace outdated equipment and calculate the return on investment (ROI) for implementing newer technology such as license plate readers, in-car cameras, and GPS in cars in order to reduce crime and increase officer safety.
* Have council members ride with police officers to create a path for increased understanding of the job of a police officer and the challenges they face. Additionally, police officers would be exposed to council concerns and have an opportunity to understand the challenges faced in managing a city and balancing multiple concerns and political forces.
* Conduct a strategizing session with all social service organizations throughout the city to determine how they can contribute to reducing juvenile crime. Determine the feasibility of and funding for a Police Athletic League.

# Section 8. Strategic Planning

The department’s leadership relies on informal strategic planning in both operational and administrative management of the department. CPSM observed that department members understood the daily mission of the department, but long-term strategic planning was not prevalent in the department. Leadership had a clear “gut-instinct” as to when, where, why, and how crimes were occurring throughout the community, but there is no formal data analysis by the department to support both tactical and strategic planning. CPSM offers the following suggested steps to enable the department to make more effective use of strategic planning.

### Step 1 – Implement a Three- to Five-year Strategic Planning Process

Strategic planning must be integrated throughout the department. The initial step taken by the department should be to create a three- to five-year strategic plan for the department. Leadership should create the broad goals and objectives for the entire department. Each component of the department should use these department-wide goals and objectives to sculpture unit-level goals and objectives. The strategic plan should include goals and objectives, measurable outcomes, projected personnel and capital expenses with the end goal of reducing crime and increasing the quality of life in the city of Anniston. A detailed strategic plan will enable the department to work with city leadership to determine priorities and funding.

### Step 2 – Implement a Crime Analysis Unit

The department should consider hiring an experienced civilian crime analyst to help the department move toward greater use of problem-oriented policing, greater accountability through use of a CompStat process, and implementation of intelligence-led policing. Furthermore, a data-driven approach to resource allocation is needed by the department and could be accomplished by taking the first step of creating a crime analysis unit. APD has been faced with a high crime rate for at least the past 10 years. New approaches, both strategic and tactical, need to be adopted by the department.

Based on focus group discussions, it is apparent the department has a good relationship with the community. However, a crime analysis unit could institute crime mapping capabilities that could be used to educate the public as to the locations experiencing crime. The department could initiate active neighborhood watch and business watch programs designed to educate citizens on how they can assist in crime prevention. A holistic strategy for reducing crime is needed, with a focus on implementing technology for tactical and strategic planning, enhanced community partnerships, and community crime prevention education.

### Step 3 – Embrace an Organizational Culture Shift, Reengineering the Department

Formalizing operational and administrative processes within a police department requires a shift in the organizational culture. Just as policing requires a proactive and not reactive approach to reduce crime, systems must be into place to enable the department to shift to a proactive philosophy. The implementation of a Compstat process designed to meet the needs and capabilities of APD is warranted. Current approaches to reducing the city’s high crime rate have achieved moderate results in reducing property crime, but in 2015, violent crime experienced a significant spike. A new approach is needed to combat crime. Implementing a Compstat system of police management will enable the department to focus on measuring outcomes with a concurrent goal of improving outcomes. Leadership will need to focus on reengineering the department to embrace performance-based benchmarking and the adoption of a data-driven decision-making model.

A data dashboard system needs to be constructed by the department and it must be used regularly by senior leadership to actively manage daily operations. The data dashboard should initially be used to collect data related to operational performance indicators to reduce crime and strategically deploy personnel. Subsequently, it should be used to collect data related to administrative issues. Examples of administrative and operational performance indicators include but not limited to:

* The total number of training hours performed, type and total number of personnel trained.
* The type and number of use-of-force reports prepared, personnel involved, time and place of occurrence, and general description of circumstances.
* The geographic location (i.e., zone) and time of all arrests.
* The geographic location and time of citations issued.
* The type and number of civilian and internal complaints (and dispositions).
* The type, number, location, and time of civilian vehicle accidents.
* The type, number, location, and time of department vehicle accidents, both “at fault” and “no fault” accidents.
* The type, number, location, and nature of all firearm discharges.
* The results of systematic and random audits and inspections of all police operations (i.e., calls for service response and dispositions, property receipt and safeguarding, etc.).
* The type, location, and number of any *Terry* stops (i.e., investigatory stops of suspects, otherwise known as stop, question, and frisk) performed, as well as a description of all individuals involved and a description of all actions taken. Data obtained in connection with these stops should be analyzed and actively tracked. It is important for the department to know: 1) how many stops are being made, 2) by whom, 3) who is being stopped, 4) where, 5) when, and 6) for what reason(s). Note: Information of this type is recommended by the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing.

Strategic planning should be a priority of the department. The above three recommended steps should be considered as an initial shift toward strategic planning and which could have a significant impact on the department’s performance in reducing crime and increasing accountability and planning within the department. Each of these three steps requires committed leadership and thoughtful reengineering of the culture of the department.

# Section 9. Summary

CPSM staff observed the practices of the department through data analysis, interviews, focus groups, document review, and operational/administrative observations. It is the opinion of CPSM staff that the entire department is dedicated to executing the department’s mission, which is state as:

*The Anniston Police Department provides efficient and effective law enforcement services on a daily basis to all citizens of Anniston and its police jurisdiction. Its functional objectives are as follows:*

*Protection of Life and Property Crime Prevention and Deterrence*

*Maintenance of Public Order Service to Public*

*Preventive Patrol Traffic Control/Direction & Accident &  
 Investigation*

*Criminal Investigation Development of Good Public Relations*

*Apprehension of Offenders Recovery and Return of Property*

*It interfaces daily with the citizenry, organizations, community officials and other local, state and federal law enforcement agencies. It responds to and deals with crisis and disasters.*

The Anniston Police Department has a strong relationship with the community it serves. This was validated through the perspectives and experiences shared through interviews and focus groups. The department members interviewed by CPSM staff were professional and were proud of the reputation the department has established with the community. Department members were open and honest with their perspectives and comments. The Anniston Police Department needs to focus on technology improvements and strategic planning to move the department forward in an effort to reduce a long history of high crime rates plaguing the city. This requires department leadership to shift toward a more proactive position using crime analysis and data-driven decision making for tactical operations and deployment. Long-term planning is also needed by the department.

Progressive departments are able to strategically focus on continuous improvement. As described by Jim Collins in Good to Great (2001), “Leadership does not begin just with vision. It begins with getting people to confront the brutal facts and to act on the implications” (p.89). It is hoped that this report is a step toward the Anniston Police Department critically examining its operations in the spirit of continuing to strive for excellence in police services. The recommendations offered in this report should not be viewed as direct criticism of the department. Rather, they are opportunities to enhance practices and procedures, leading to a more progressive and well-managed police department that has a desire and vision to reduce crime and improve the quality of life in the city of Anniston.

# Section 10. Data Analysis

This analysis of police patrol operations for the Anniston, Alabama, Police Department, focuses on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are related almost exclusively to patrol operations, which constitute a significant portion of the police department’s personnel and financial commitment.

All information in this analysis was developed directly from the Anniston Police Department’s dispatch data, retrieved with the assistance of the Calhoun County 911 Center and the city’s IT personnel.

CPSM collected data for the one-year period of September 1, 2015 through August 31, 2016. The majority of the first section of the analysis, concluding with Table 10-9, uses call data for this one-year period. For the detailed workload analysis and the response-time analysis, we use two four-week sample periods. The first period is from March 1 through March 28, 2016, or winter, and the second period is from August 1 through August 28, 2016, or summer.

## Workload Analysis

When CPSM analyzes a set of dispatch records, we go through a series of steps:

1. We first process the data to improve accuracy. For example, we remove duplicate patrol units recorded on a single event and records that do not indicate an actual activity. We also remove incomplete data, as found in situations where there is not enough time information to evaluate the record.
2. At this point, we have a series of records that we call “events.” We identify these events in three ways:

* We distinguish between patrol and nonpatrol units.
* We assign a category to each event based upon its description.
* We indicate whether the call is “zero time on scene” (i.e., patrol units spent less than a minute on scene), “police-initiated,” or “other-initiated.”

1. We then remove all records that do not involve a patrol unit to get a total number of patrol-related events.
2. At important points during our analysis, we focus on a smaller group of events designed to represent actual calls for service. This excludes events with no officer time spent on scene and directed patrol activities.

In this way, we first identify a total number of records, then limit ourselves to patrol events, and finally focus on calls for service.

As with similar cases around the country, we encountered a number of issues when analyzing the dispatch data from Anniston. We made assumptions and decisions to address these issues.

* The department used two different computer-aided dispatch systems during the time period. The newer system (Spillman) was more readily available, so we limited our focused analysis to months that were recorded within the newer system.
* About 1,650 events (4 percent) involved patrol units spending zero time on scene.
* Approximately 17 percent of other-initiated calls lacked any recorded arrival time. We used the remaining calls when measuring the department’s overall response times.
* The computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system used approximately 250 different event descriptions, which we condensed to 15 categories for our tables and 8 categories for our figures (shown in Chart 10-1). Table 10-18 in the appendix shows how each call description was categorized.

Between September 1, 2016, and August 31, 2016, the communications center recorded approximately 40,400 events that were assigned call numbers and which included an adequate record of a responding patrol unit as either the primary or secondary unit. When measured daily, the department reported an average of 110 patrol-related events per day, approximately 4 percent of which (4.5 per day) had fewer than 30 seconds spent on the call.

In the following pages we show two types of data: activity and workload. The activity levels are measured by the average number of calls per day, broken down by the type and origin of the calls and categorized by the nature of the calls (crime, traffic, etc.). Workloads are measured in average work hours per day.

CHART 10-1: Event Descriptions for Tables and Figures

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Table Category | Figure Category |
| Prisoner–arrest | Arrest |
| Prisoner–transport |
| Assist other agency | Assist |
| Crime–persons | Crime |
| Crime–property |
| Directed patrol | Directed patrol |
| Animal calls | General noncriminal |
| Juvenile |
| Miscellaneous |
| Alarm | Investigations |
| Check/investigation |
| Disturbance | Suspicious incident |
| Suspicious person/vehicle |
| Accident | Traffic |
| Traffic enforcement |

FIGURE 10-1: Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator

****

**Note:** Percentages are based on a total of 40,409 events.

TABLE 10-1: Events per Day, by Initiator

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Initiator | No. of Events | Events per Day |
| Zero on scene | 1,645 | 4.5 |
| Police-initiated | 9,702 | 26.5 |
| Other-initiated | 29,062 | 79.4 |
| Total | 40,409 | 110.4 |

Observations:

* 4 percent of the events had zero time on scene.
* 24 percent of all events were police-initiated.
* 72 percent of all events were other-initiated.
* On average, there were 110 events per day, or 4.6 per hour.

FIGURE 10-2: Percentage Events per Day, by Category



**Note**: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart 10-1.

TABLE 10-2: Events per Day, by Category

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | No. of Calls | Calls per Day |
| Accidents | 2,030 | 5.5 |
| Alarm | 1,910 | 5.2 |
| Animal calls | 864 | 2.4 |
| Assist other agency | 936 | 2.6 |
| Check/investigation | 3,211 | 8.8 |
| Crime–persons | 3,734 | 10.2 |
| Crime–property | 4,571 | 12.5 |
| Directed patrol | 135 | 0.4 |
| Disturbance | 5,145 | 14.1 |
| Juvenile | 59 | 0.2 |
| Miscellaneous | 5,143 | 14.1 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 576 | 1.6 |
| Prisoner–transport | 472 | 1.3 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 3,446 | 9.4 |
| Traffic enforcement | 8,177 | 22.3 |
| Total | 40,409 | 110.4 |

Observations:

* The top three categories accounted for 67 percent of calls:
* 25 percent of calls were traffic-related.
* 21 percent of calls were suspicious incidents.
* 21 percent of calls were crimes.

FIGURE 10-3: Percentage Calls per Day, by Category



**Note**: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart 10-1.

TABLE 10-3: Calls per Day, by Category

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | No. of Calls | Calls per Day |
| Accidents | 2,007 | 5.5 |
| Alarm | 1,880 | 5.1 |
| Animal calls | 839 | 2.3 |
| Assist other agency | 925 | 2.5 |
| Check/investigation | 3,091 | 8.4 |
| Crime–persons | 3,632 | 9.9 |
| Crime–property | 4,416 | 12.1 |
| Disturbance | 5,060 | 13.8 |
| Juvenile | 59 | 0.2 |
| Miscellaneous | 4,262 | 11.6 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 558 | 1.5 |
| Prisoner–transport | 471 | 1.3 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 3,346 | 9.1 |
| Traffic enforcement | 8,084 | 22.1 |
| Total | 38,630 | 105.5 |

**Note:** The focus here is on recorded calls rather than recorded events. We removed events with zero time on scene.

Observations:

* On average, there were 106 calls per day, or 4.4 per hour.
* The top three categories accounted for 69 percent of calls:
* 26 percent of calls were traffic-related.
* 22 percent of calls were suspicious incidents.
* 21 percent of calls were crimes.

FIGURE 10-4: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months



TABLE 10-4: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Initiator | Sept-Oct | Nov-Dec | Jan-Feb | Mar-Apr | May-June | July-Aug |
| Other-initiated | 81.4 | 80.1 | 79.8 | 79.5 | 79.6 | 76.2 |
| Police-initiated | 19.4 | 20.7 | 30.5 | 29.6 | 29.6 | 27.2 |
| Total | 100.8 | 100.7 | 110.3 | 109.1 | 109.1 | 103.4 |

Observations:

* The number of calls per day was lowest in September-October and November-December.
* The number of calls per day was highest in January-February.
* The months with the most calls had 9 percent more calls than the months with the fewest calls.
* January-February had the most police-initiated calls, with 58 percent more than the period of September-October, which had the fewest.
* September-October had the most other-initiated calls, with 7 percent more than the period of July-August, which had the fewest.

FIGURE 10-5: Calls per Day, by Category and Months



**Note**: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart 10-1.

TABLE 10-5: Calls per Day, by Category and Months

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Sept-Oct | Nov-Dec | Jan-Feb | Mar-Apr | May-June | July-Aug |
| Accidents | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 | 5.9 | 5.0 | 5.0 |
| Alarm | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 9.8 | 10.2 | 10.6 |
| Animal calls | 2.6 | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.2 | 1.9 |
| Assist other agency | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 4.0 | 3.2 |
| Check/investigation | 10.0 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 6.9 |
| Crime–persons | 8.1 | 7.2 | 7.0 | 12.4 | 12.5 | 12.1 |
| Crime–property | 17.9 | 18.5 | 17.1 | 7.2 | 6.0 | 5.9 |
| Disturbance | 11.7 | 11.0 | 9.5 | 16.6 | 17.1 | 16.9 |
| Juvenile | 0.0 | 0.0 | <0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.5 |
| Miscellaneous | 15.1 | 16.1 | 19.4 | 6.4 | 7.0 | 6.2 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 1.6 | 1.8 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 1.3 |
| Prisoner–transport | 1.2 | 0.9 | 1.3 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.1 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 7.4 | 7.5 | 9.3 | 9.5 | 11.2 | 9.8 |
| Traffic enforcement | 17.4 | 18.0 | 27.2 | 25.3 | 22.6 | 22.1 |
| Total | 100.8 | 100.7 | 110.3 | 109.1 | 109.1 | 103.4 |

**Note:** Calculations were limited to calls rather than events.

Observations:

* The top three categories averaged between 67 and 71 percent of calls throughout the year:
* Traffic calls averaged between 23.4 and 32.6calls per day throughout the year.
* Suspicious incidents averaged between 18.5 and 28.4 calls per day throughout the year.
* Crimes averaged between 18.0 and 26.1 calls per day throughout the year and accounted for 17 to 26 percent of total calls.

FIGURE 10-6: Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator



**Note**: The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart 10-1. For this graph, we removed four calls with an inaccurate busy time.

TABLE 10-6: Primary Unit’s Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Other-Initiated | | Police-Initiated | |
| Minutes | Calls | Minutes | Calls |
| Accidents | 38.8 | 1,958 | 30.5 | 48 |
| Alarm | 12.7 | 1,868 | 6.1 | 12 |
| Animal calls | 25.3 | 823 | 19.2 | 16 |
| Assist other agency | 37.8 | 887 | 17.0 | 38 |
| Check/investigation | 23.9 | 2,936 | 16.4 | 155 |
| Crime–persons | 30.0 | 4,338 | 16.5 | 92 |
| Crime–property | 24.8 | 3,555 | 13.7 | 61 |
| Disturbance | 24.0 | 4,969 | 13.5 | 91 |
| Juvenile | 25.2 | 58 | 7.4 | 1 |
| Miscellaneous | 25.3 | 2,711 | 11.7 | 1,551 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 47.9 | 527 | 31.7 | 31 |
| Prisoner–transport | 73.1 | 442 | 80.8 | 28 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 18.9 | 2,399 | 13.1 | 947 |
| Traffic enforcement | 18.2 | 1,587 | 15.0 | 6,497 |
| Weighted Average/Total Calls | 26.1 | 29,058 | 14.6 | 9,568 |

**Note:** The information in Figure 10-6 and Table 10-6 is limited to calls and excludes all events that show zero time on scene. A unit’s occupied time is measured as the time from when the call was received until the unit becomes available again. The times shown are the average occupied minutes per call for the primary unit, rather than the total occupied minutes for all units assigned to a call. Observations below refer to times shown within the figure rather than the table.

Observations:

* A unit's average time spent on a call ranged from 13 to 59 minutes overall.
* The longest average times were for other-initiated arrest calls.
* The average time spent on crime calls was 27 minutes for other-initiated calls and 15 minutes for police-initiated calls.

FIGURE 10-7: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category



**Note:** The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart 10-1.

TABLE 10-7: Average Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Other-Initiated | | Police-Initiated | |
| No. Units | Calls | No. Units | Calls |
| Accidents | 1.5 | 1,959 | 1.4 | 48 |
| Alarm | 1.9 | 1,868 | 1.3 | 12 |
| Animal calls | 1.2 | 823 | 1.1 | 16 |
| Assist other agency | 2.0 | 887 | 1.3 | 38 |
| Check/investigation | 1.8 | 2,936 | 1.5 | 155 |
| Crime–persons | 1.7 | 4,339 | 1.3 | 92 |
| Crime–property | 1.6 | 3,556 | 1.2 | 61 |
| Disturbance | 2.0 | 4,969 | 1.8 | 91 |
| Juvenile | 1.6 | 58 | 1.0 | 1 |
| Miscellaneous | 1.4 | 2,711 | 1.2 | 1,551 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 1.2 | 527 | 1.5 | 31 |
| Prisoner–transport | 1.4 | 443 | 1.4 | 28 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 1.8 | 2,399 | 1.4 | 947 |
| Traffic enforcement | 1.3 | 1,587 | 1.3 | 6,497 |
| Weighted Average/Total Calls | 1.7 | 29,062 | 1.3 | 9,568 |

FIGURE 10-8: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-initiated Calls



**Note**: The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart 10-1.

TABLE 10-8: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-initiated Calls

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Responding Units | | |
| One | Two | Three or More |
| Accidents | 1,215 | 533 | 211 |
| Alarm | 507 | 1,146 | 215 |
| Animal calls | 695 | 109 | 19 |
| Assist other agency | 276 | 414 | 197 |
| Check/investigation | 1,119 | 1,375 | 442 |
| Crime–persons | 1,779 | 1,265 | 507 |
| Crime–property | 2,180 | 1,742 | 425 |
| Disturbance | 1,215 | 533 | 211 |
| Juvenile | 28 | 26 | 4 |
| Miscellaneous | 1,914 | 626 | 171 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 441 | 70 | 16 |
| Prisoner–transport | 314 | 89 | 40 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 819 | 1,307 | 273 |
| Traffic enforcement | 1,174 | 342 | 71 |
| Total | 13,624 | 11,920 | 3,518 |

Observations:

* The overall mean number of responding units was 1.7 for other-initiated calls and 1.3 for police-initiated calls.
* The mean number of responding units was as high as 1.0 for agency assist calls that were other-initiated.
* 47 percent of other-initiated calls involved one responding unit.
* 41 percent of other-initiated calls involved two responding units.
* 12 percent of other-initiated calls involved three or more responding units.
* The largest group of calls with three or more responding units involved suspicious incidents (including disturbances).

FIGURE 10-9: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Beat



**Note:** Calls without a recorded zone are included in “Other” category.

TABLE 10-9: Calls and Work Hours by Zone, per Day

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Zone** | **Per Day** | | **Area**  **(Sq. Miles)** |
| **Calls** | **Work Hours** |
| 1 | 5.7 | 3.4 | 10.2 |
| 2 | 12.3 | 5.8 | 2.3 |
| 3 | 14.7 | 7.6 | 11.9 |
| 4 | 16.2 | 9.4 | 9.1 |
| 5 | 9.0 | 4.7 | 2.2 |
| 6 | 7.5 | 4.0 | 4.9 |
| 7 | 14.9 | 8.5 | 7.4 |
| 8 | 12.2 | 7.9 | 12.8 |
| Other | 13.4 | 8.4 | - |
| **Total** | 105.9 | 59.6 | 60.8 |

Observations:

* Zone 4 area had more calls and workload than other zones. It accounted for 15 percent of total calls and 16 percent of total workload.
* With unknown calls and workload excluded, an even distribution would allot 11.6 calls and 6.4 work hours per zone.

FIGURE 10-10: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2016



TABLE 10-10: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2016

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Per Day | |
| Calls | Work Hours |
| Arrest | 3.0 | 3.5 |
| Assist | 2.8 | 2.6 |
| Crime | 18.4 | 13.3 |
| General noncriminal | 9.0 | 4.3 |
| Investigations | 15.4 | 7.4 |
| Suspicious incident | 24.4 | 16.0 |
| Traffic | 32.4 | 15.7 |
| Total | 105.4 | 62.8 |

Observations, Winter:

* The average number of calls per day and average daily workload was higher in winter than in summer.
* On average, there were 105 calls per day, or 4.4 per hour.
* Total workload averaged 63 hours per day, meaning that, on average, 2.6 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
* Traffic calls constituted 31 percent of calls and 25 percent of workload.
* Suspicious incident calls constituted 23 percent of calls and 26 percent of workload.
* Crime calls constituted 17 percent of calls and 21 percent of workload.

FIGURE 10-11: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2016



TABLE 10-11: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2016

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Per Day | |
| Calls | Work Hours |
| Arrest | 2.2 | 3.1 |
| Assist | 3.1 | 2.8 |
| Crime | 18.5 | 11.8 |
| General noncriminal | 9.4 | 4.4 |
| Investigations | 16.6 | 7.6 |
| Suspicious incident | 27.0 | 15.5 |
| Traffic | 27.2 | 14.0 |
| Total | 103.9 | 59.2 |

**Note:** Workload calculations focused on calls rather than events.

Observations, Summer:

* On average, there were 104 calls per day, or 4.3 per hour.
* Total workload averaged 59 hours per day, meaning that on average 2.5 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
* Traffic calls constituted 26 percent of calls and 24 percent of workload.
* Suspicious incident calls constituted 26 percent of calls and 26 percent of workload.
* Crime calls constituted 18 percent of calls and 20 percent of workload.

## Noncall Activities

In the period from September 2015 to August 2016, the dispatch center recorded activities that were not assigned a call number. However, we could only access activities that were recorded within the newer Spillman CAD system. We focused on those activities that involved a patrol unit. We also limited our analysis to noncall activities that occurred during shifts where the same patrol unit was also responding to calls for service. Each record only indicates one unit per activity. There were a few problems with the data provided and we made assumptions and decisions to address these issues:

* Noncall activities were recorded from February 29, 2016 to August 31, 2016 (185 days).
* We excluded activities that lasted less than 30 seconds. These are irrelevant and contribute little to the overall workload.
* Another portion of the recorded activities lasted more than eight hours. As an activity is unlikely to last more than eight hours, we assumed that these records were inaccurate.
* After these exclusions, 12,170 activities remained. These activities had an average duration of 33 minutes.

In this section, we report noncall activities and workload by type of activity. In the next section, we include these activities in the overall workload when comparing the total workload against available personnel in winter and summer.

TABLE 10-12: Activities and Occupied Times by Type

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Description | Occupied Time | Count |
| Arrived at scene | 41.4 | 7 |
| At jail | 32.1 | 44 |
| Begin tour of duty | 91.1 | 56 |
| Booking | 60.1 | 508 |
| Busy | 31.0 | 1,663 |
| En route | 18.3 | 138 |
| Gas pump/vehicle maintenance/car wash | 12.5 | 684 |
| Meet supervisor | 31.4 | 135 |
| Out at station | 36.2 | 1,977 |
| Paper work | 50.5 | 1,313 |
| Pending on duty | 51.7 | 728 |
| Regional medical center | 27.9 | 66 |
| Security check | 10.5 | 1,189 |
| Traffic stop | 1.7 | 41 |
| Administrative - Weighted Average/Total Calls | 34.4 | 8,549 |
| Gym | 64.7 | 397 |
| Home | 13.0 | 29 |
| Lunch | 24.8 | 2,612 |
| Restroom | 20.4 | 583 |
| Personal -Weighted Average/Total Calls | 28.4 | 3,612 |
| Weighted Average/Total Calls | 32.6 | 12,170 |

Observations:

* The most common administrative activity was “Out at station,” and the most common personal activity was “Lunch.”
* The longest average time spent on administrative activities was for “Begin tour of Duty,” and the longest average time spent on personal activities was for “Gym.”
* While some traffic stops were only recorded without call numbers, the majority of traffic stops were assigned a call number.
* The average time spent on administrative activities was 34 minutes and for personal activities was 28 minutes.

FIGURE 10-12: Percentage Activity and Work Hours, by Type



TABLE 10-13: Activity and Work Hours per Day, by Type

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Type | Per Day | |
| Calls | Work Hours |
| Administrative | 46.2 | 26.5 |
| Personal | 19.6 | 9.3 |
| **Total** | **65.8** | **35.8** |

Observations:

* The most common administrative activity was “Out at station,” and the most common personal activity was “Lunch.”
* On average, there were 66 noncall activities per day, or 2.8 per hour.
* Administrative activities constituted 70 percent of calls and 74 percent of workload.
* Personal activities constituted 30 percent of calls and 26 percent of workload.

## Deployment

For this study, we examined deployment information for four weeks in winter (March 1 through March 28, 2016) and four weeks in summer (August 1 through August 28, 2016). The department’s main patrol force consists of patrol officers, field training officers, sergeants, and lieutenants, and operates on 12-hour shifts starting at 7:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m. The police department's main patrol force deployed an average of 9.3 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in winter 2016 and 8.9 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in summer 2016. When additional units are included (accident investigators and supervisors), the department averaged 9.6 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in winter 2016 and 9.2 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in summer 2016.

In this section, we describe the deployment and workload in distinct steps, distinguishing between summer and winter and between weekdays (Monday through Friday) and weekends (Saturday and Sunday):

* First, we focus on patrol deployment alone.
* Next, we compare deployment against workload based on other-initiated calls for service.
* Finally, we compare “all” workload, which includes police-initiated calls and out-of-service patrol activities.

Comments follow each set of four figures, with separate discussions for summer and winter.

FIGURE 10-13: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-14: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-15: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2016



FIGURE 10-16: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2016



Observations:

* For winter (March 1 through March 28, 2016):
* The average deployment was 9.7 officers per hour during the week and 9.4 officers per hour on the weekend.
* Average deployment varied from 8.3 to 14.2 officers per hour on weekdays and 8.7 to 14.2 officers per hour on weekends.
* For summer (August 1 through August 28, 2016):
* The average deployment was 9.2 officers per hour during the week and 9.1 officers per hour on the weekend.
* Average deployment varied from 7.5 to 12.6 officers per hour on weekdays and 8.0 to 12.8 officers per hour on weekends.

FIGURE 10-17: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-18: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-19: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2016



FIGURE 10-20: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2016



Observations:

* For winter:
* Average other-initiated workload was 2.2 officers per hour during the week and 2.1 officers per hour on weekends.
* This was approximately 23 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 22 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
* During the week, workload reached a maximum of 40 percent of deployment between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m.
* On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 44 percent of deployment between   
  7:45 p.m. and 8:00 p.m.
* For summer:
* Average other-initiated workload was 2.0 officers per hour during the week and 2.1 officers per hour on weekends.
* This was approximately 22 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 23 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
* During the week, workload reached a maximum of 38 percent of deployment between 8:45 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.
* On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 41 percent of deployment between   
  4:15 p.m. and 4:30 p.m.

FIGURE 10-21: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-22: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-23: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2016



FIGURE 10-24: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2016



**Note:** Figures 10-21 to 10-24 show deployment along with all workload from other-initiated calls, police-initiated calls, directed patrol activities, and out-of-service activities

Observations:

* For winter:
* Average workload was 4.4 officers per hour during the week and 4.2 officers per hour on weekends.
* This was approximately 46 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 45 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
* During the week, workload reached a maximum of 62 percent of deployment between 1:30 p.m. and 1:45 p.m.
* On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 62 percent of deployment between   
  1:15 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. and between 4:00 a.m. and 4:15 a.m.
* For summer:
* Average workload was 3.8 officers per hour during the week and 4.0 officers per hour on weekends.
* This was approximately 41 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 44 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
* During the week, workload reached a maximum of 58 percent of deployment between 8:45 p.m. and 9:00 p.m.
* On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 58 percent of deployment between   
  7:45 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., and between 9:30 p.m. and 9:45 p.m.

## Response Times

We analyzed the response times to various types of calls, separating the duration into dispatch and travel time, to determine whether response times varied by call type. Response time is measured as the difference between when a call is received and when the first unit arrives on scene. This is further divided into dispatch delay and travel time. Dispatch delay is the time between when a call is received and when the first unit is dispatched. Travel time is the remaining time until the first unit arrives on scene.

We begin the discussion with statistics that include all calls combined. We started with 3,007 events for winter and 2,991 events for summer. We limited our analysis to 2,191 other-initiated calls for winter and 2,145 calls for summer. After excluding calls without valid arrival times, we were left with 1,687 calls in winter and 1,756 calls in winter for our analysis. For the entire year, we began with 40,409 calls, limited our analysis to 29,184 other-initiated calls, and further focused our analysis on 23,948 calls after excluding those lacking valid arrival times.

Our initial analysis does not distinguish calls on the basis of their priority; instead, it examines the difference in response for all calls by time of day and compares summer and winter periods. We then present a brief analysis of response time for high-priority calls alone.

### All Calls

This section looks at all calls without considering their priorities. In addition to examining the differences in response times by both time of day and season (winter vs. summer), we show differences in response times by category.

FIGURE 10-25: Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, Winter 2016 and  
Summer 2016



Observations:

* Average response times varied significantly by hour of day.
* In summer, the longest response times were between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., with an average of 25.6 minutes.
* In summer, the shortest response times were between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., with an average of 9.0 minutes.
* In winter, the longest response times were between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m., with an average of 30.4 minutes.
* In winter, the shortest response times were between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., with an average of 9.7 minutes.

FIGURE 10-26: Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2016



FIGURE 10-27: Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2016



TABLE 10-14: Average Response Time Components, by Category

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Winter | | | Summer | | |
| Dispatch | Travel | Response | Dispatch | Travel | Response |
| Arrest | 17.1 | 6.9 | 24.0 | 21.0 | 7.5 | 28.4 |
| Assist | 12.4 | 6.9 | 19.3 | 5.4 | 9.1 | 14.6 |
| Crime | 13.6 | 7.5 | 21.1 | 9.7 | 8.8 | 18.5 |
| General noncriminal | 13.4 | 6.8 | 20.2 | 10.0 | 9.8 | 19.9 |
| Investigations | 10.7 | 6.8 | 17.6 | 6.7 | 7.2 | 13.9 |
| Suspicious incident | 9.1 | 6.6 | 15.7 | 4.3 | 7.0 | 11.3 |
| Traffic | 8.5 | 7.0 | 15.4 | 7.0 | 8.7 | 15.7 |
| Total Average | 11.3 | 7.0 | 18.3 | 7.4 | 8.0 | 15.4 |

**Note:** The total average is weighted according to the number of calls per category.

Observations:

* In winter, the average response time for most categories was between 15 minutes and   
  22 minutes.
* In winter, the average response time was as short as 15 minutes (for traffic calls) and as long as 24 minutes (for arrests).
* In summer, the average response time for most categories was between 11 minutes and   
  22 minutes.
* In summer, the average response time was as short as 11 minutes (for suspicious incidents) and as long as 28 minutes (for arrests).
* The average response time for crimes was 21 minutes in winter and 19 minutes in summer.

TABLE 10-15: 90th Percentiles for Response Time Components, by Category

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Category | Winter | | | Summer | | |
| Dispatch | Travel | Response | Dispatch | Travel | Response |
| Arrest | 124.0 | 19.3 | 133.4 | 375.1 | 17.8 | 380.6 |
| Assist | 30.3 | 15.3 | 39.5 | 11.2 | 18.0 | 24.0 |
| Crime | 38.4 | 15.0 | 46.8 | 29.2 | 16.7 | 40.1 |
| General noncriminal | 43.4 | 14.7 | 53.4 | 28.2 | 17.1 | 43.3 |
| Investigations | 24.6 | 13.0 | 34.5 | 17.7 | 13.5 | 26.5 |
| Suspicious incident | 21.9 | 12.3 | 29.6 | 8.9 | 12.8 | 19.8 |
| Traffic | 23.5 | 15.4 | 30.5 | 17.3 | 17.2 | 30.1 |
| Total Average | 30.2 | 13.9 | 39.5 | 20.0 | 14.7 | 32.0 |

**Note:** A 90th percentile value of 40 minutes means that 90 percent of all calls are responded to in fewer than 40 minutes. For this reason, the columns for dispatch delay and travel time may not be equal to the total response time.

Observations:

* In winter, the 90th percentile value for response time was as short as 30 minutes (for suspicious incidents) and as long as 133 minutes (for arrests).
* In summer, the 90th percentile value for response time was as short as 20 minutes (for suspicious incidents) and as long as 381 minutes (for arrests).

FIGURE 10-28: Average Response Time Components, by Zone



**Note:** These averages reflect all calls with valid response times for the study period and with a valid zone―a total of 23,948 calls.

TABLE 10-16: Average Response Time Components, by Zone

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Zone | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Calls | Area (Sq. Miles) |
| 1 | 7.5 | 9.9 | 17.4 | 1,429 | 10.2 |
| 2 | 6.2 | 6.4 | 12.7 | 2,181 | 2.3 |
| 3 | 7.1 | 6.2 | 13.3 | 2,866 | 11.9 |
| 4 | 8.8 | 6.5 | 15.4 | 3,793 | 9.1 |
| 5 | 6.7 | 6.7 | 13.4 | 2,086 | 2.2 |
| 6 | 7.3 | 6.7 | 14.0 | 1,710 | 4.9 |
| 7 | 8.0 | 7.4 | 15.4 | 3,377 | 7.4 |
| 8 | 7.9 | 9.6 | 17.5 | 3,036 | 12.8 |
| Other | 9.2 | 6.5 | 15.8 | 3,470 | - |
| Weighted Average/ Total | **7.8** | **7.2** | **15.1** | 23,948 | 60.8 |

Observations:

* Zone 2 had the shortest average response time and zones 1 and 8 had the highest average response time.
* Zone 2 had the shortest dispatch delay and zones 2 and 3 had the shortest travel times.

### High-Priority Calls

The department assigned priorities to calls with Priority 1 as the highest priority. Table 10-17 shows average response times by priority, with an additional line for injury accidents (call types “VEH ACC W/INJ,” “VEH ACC-INJ/ENT,” “350-350-TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WITH INJURY,” and “HIT AND RUN WITH INJURY”). Priorities were only available for calls recorded within the Spillman CAD system. The calls with no priority recorded (ADSI CAD system) are listed as “unknown.” Figure 10-29 focuses on Priority 1 calls.

TABLE 10-17: Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by Priority

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Priority | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Calls |
| 1 | 5.8 | 7.2 | 13.0 | 6,374 |
| 2 | 9.6 | 7.9 | 17.5 | 3,309 |
| 3 | 13.3 | 8.2 | 21.4 | 1,996 |
| 4 | 12.4 | 6.8 | 19.2 | 1 |
| Unknown | 7.6 | 6.9 | 14.4 | 12,268 |
| Weighted Average/Total | 7.8 | 7.2 | 15.1 | 23,948 |
| Injury Accidents | 2.9 | 6.3 | 9.3 | 475 |

**Note:** The total average is weighted according to the number of calls within each priority level.

FIGURE 10-29: Average Response Times and Dispatch Delays for High-Priority Calls and Injury Accidents, by Hour



Observations:

* High-priority calls had an average response time of 13.0 minutes, lower than the overall average of 15.1 minutes for all calls.
* Average dispatch delay was 5.8 minutes for high-priority calls, compared to 7.8 minutes overall.
* Average response time for injury accidents was 9.3 minutes, with a dispatch delay of 2.9 minutes.
* For high-priority calls, the longest response times were between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., with an average of 21.9 minutes.
* For high-priority calls, the shortest response times were between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. and between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., with an average of 9.0 minutes.
* For injury accidents, the longest response times were between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, with an average of 11.7 minutes.
* For injury accidents, the shortest response times were between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m., with an average of 4.6 minutes.
* Average dispatch delay for high-priority calls was consistently 9.7 minutes or less, except between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m.

## Appendix A: Call Type Classification

Call descriptions for the department’s calls for service from September 1, 2015, to August 31, 2016, were classified within the following categories. The descriptions below are a combination for both the ADSI and Spillman systems.

TABLE 10-18: Call Type, by Category

| Call Type | Table Category | Figure Category |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1060-1060 WARRANT SERVICE | Prisoner–arrest | Arrest |
| WARRANT SERVICE |
| 1005-TRANSPORT PRISONER | Prisoner–transport |
| PRISONER TRANS |
| TRANSPORT/PU |
| 1054L-1054L LIVESTOCK ON HIGHWAY - LIVE ANIMAL | Assist other agency | Assist other agency |
| 1070A-1070A FIRE ALARM |
| 1070E-1070E FIRE/EMT CALL |
| 1070G-1070G GRASS FIRE |
| 1070M-1070M OTHER FIRE RUN |
| 1070S-1070S STUCTURE FIRE |
| 1070T-1070T TRASH FIRE |
| 1070V-1070V VEHICLE FIRE |
| 1070W-1070W WOODS FIRE |
| 1079GAS-1079GAS REPORT ONLY |
| 1089-1089 DEATH NATURAL CAUSES |
| 1096-1096 MENTAL PERSON |
| 1177-1177 DRUG OVERDOSE |
| 1192-1192 SUICIDE AND ATTEMPT SUICIDE |
| 21050-21050 TRAFFIC ACCIDENT REFERRED TO ANOTHER AGENCY |
| ABD/BACK |
| AGENCY ASSIST |
| ALLERGIC |
| BLEEDING |
| CHEST/HEART |
| DIABETIC |
| ELEVATOR RESCUE |
| FALL |
| FIRE-BRUSH |
| FIRE-OTHER |
| FIRE-SMOKE COMP |
| FIRE-STRUCT |
| FIRE-VEHICLE | Assist other agency | Assist other agency |
| FLOODING |
| GAS LEAK |
| HEADACHE |
| INTOX PERSON |
| LIFT ASSIST |
| MEDICAL NONSPEC |
| MEDICAL/NONSPEC |
| MENTAL PERSON |
| NEU/HEAD INJ |
| OVERDOSE/POISON |
| POWER LINE DOWN |
| PROPERTY DAMAGE |
| SEIZURE |
| UNCONS/UNRESP |
| UTILITY PROBLEM |
| 1066I-1066I SEX OFFENSE/IN PROGRESS | Crime–persons | Crime |
| 1066R-1066R SEX OFFENSE REPORT ONLY |
| 1068C-1068C CUTTING |
| 1068R-1068R SHOOTING/CUTTING REPORT ONLY |
| 1080-1080 CRIMINAL MISCHIEF |
| 1080R-1080R CRIMINAL MISCHIEF REPORT ONLY |
| 1088I-1088I ROBBERY IN PROGRESS |
| 1088J-1088J ROBBERY JUST OCCURRED |
| 1088R-1088R ROBBERY REPORT ONLY |
| 1097F-1097F FAMILY VIOLENCE |
| 1097FR-1097FR FAMILY VIOLENCE REPORT ONLY |
| 1098-1098 ESCAPE OR JAIL BREAK |
| 1122R-KIDNAPPING - REPORT ONLY |
| 1124-1124 THREATENING PHONE CALLS |
| 1136I-OFFENSE AGAINST FAMILY/CHILD - IN PROGRESS |
| 1136R-OFFENSE AGAINST FAMILY/CHILD - REPORT ONLY |
| 1139R-HARASSMENT REPORT ONLY |
| 1140-1140 UNAUTHORIZED USE OF VEHICLE |
| 1166J-RAPE - JUST OCCURRED |
| 1166R-RAPE - REPORT ONLY |
| 1197I-ASSAULT/FIGHTING - IN PROGRESS |
| 1197J-ASSAULT/FIGHTING - JUST OCC |
| 1197R-ASSAULT/FIGHTING - REPORT ONLY | Crime–persons | Crime |
| ASSAULT IN PROG |
| ASSAULT PREVOCC |
| BOMB THREAT/ATT |
| BREATHING PROB |
| BURG IN PROG |
| BURG PREV OCCUR |
| CHILD ABUSE |
| DRUG |
| ESCAPE |
| GUN/STAB VIC |
| HARASSING COMM |
| HARASSMENT |
| HIT/RUN PED |
| HIT/RUN PROP |
| HOSTAGE/BAR SUS |
| INDECENT EXP |
| INTOX DRIVER |
| KIDNAPPING |
| MENACING |
| PROSTITUTION |
| RAPE |
| ROBBERY IN PROG |
| ROBBERY PREVOCC |
| SEX OFFENSE |
| STALKING |
| SUICIDE/ATT |
| TERRORIST THRT |
| TRESPASSING |
| VEH ACC-HIT/RUN |
| WEAPONS |
| 1040-1040 AUTO THEFT | Crime–property |
| 1040R-1040R AUTO THEFT REPORT ONLY |
| 1079I-1079I THEFT IN PROGRESS |
| 1079J-1079J THEFT JUST OCCURRED |
| 1079R-1079R THEFT REPORT ONLY |
| 1083AI-1083AI BURGLARY/VEHICLE IN PROGRESS |
| 1083AR-1083AR BURGLARY/VEHICLE REPORT ONLY |
| 1083BI-1083BI BURGLARY/BUSINESS IN PROGRESS |
| 1083BR-1083BR BURGLARY/BUSINESS REPORT ONLY |
| 1083RI-1083RI BURGLARY/RESIDENCE IN PROGRESS |  |
| 1083RR-1083RR BURGLARY/RESIDENCE REPORT ONLY |  |
| 1090-1090 BURGLARY/HOLDUP ALARM | Crime–property | Crime |
| 1126-1126 TRESPASSING |
| 1126R-TRESPASSING - REPORT ONLY |
| 1128-1128 FORGERY/COUNTERFEIT |
| 1129I-FRAUD/FLIM FLAM - IN PROGRESS |
| 1129R-FRAUD/IWC/FLIM FLAM - REPORT ONLY |
| CRIM MISCHIEF |
| FORG/FRAUD/NWNI |
| SHOPLIFT-INCUST |
| SHOPLIFT-UNCOOP |
| STOLEN PROPERTY |
| STOLEN VEHICLE |
| THEFT/STOLEN |
| THEFT-IN PROG |
| UNAUTH USE VEH |
| 10100-10100 HOT PURSUIT | Directed patrol | Directed patrol |
| 1059-1059 ESCORT OR CONVOY |
| BOLO |
| DIRECT TRAFFIC |
| ESCORT |
| FOOT PURSUIT |
| SERVICE CALL |
| 1123-1123 ANIMAL COMPLAINT | Animal calls | General noncriminal |
| 1123R-ANIMAL COMPLAINT - REPORT ONLY |
| ANIMAL ABUSE |
| ANIMAL BITE |
| ANIMAL BITE REP |
| ANIMAL PROB |
| CHILD ENDANGER | Juvenile |
| CHINS |
| 1028-VEHICLE REGISTRATION INFORMATION | Miscellaneous |
| 1046-1046 ASSIST MOTORIST |
| 1046L-1046L ASSIST MOTORIST LOCKED VEHICLE |
| 1048-1048 NEED ASSISTANCE NOT EMERGENCY |
| 1064-1064 DELIVER MESSAGE OR PACKAGE |
| 1072-1072 MEET COMPL. |
| 1132-1132 RECOVERY STOLEN PROPERTY |
| 1133-1133 LOST PROPERTY |
| 1134-1134 FOUND PROPERTY |
| 1141-1141 MISC. CALLS FOR SERVICE |
| 1141CC-CITIZENS COMPLAINT | Miscellaneous | General noncriminal |
| AIRCRAFT PROB |
| ASSIST CITIZEN |
| ASSIST MOTORIST |
| CUSTODIAL INTER |
| DAMAGE REPORT |
| DELIVER MESSAGE |
| EXERCISE |
| KEY LOCKED VEH |
| LOST/FOUND/RCVR |
| MISC/UNK/NOCRIM |
| MISSING PERSON |
| REPORT TO |
| REPOSSESSION |
| UNK-P-UNKNOWN POLICE INCIDENT |
| ALARM CARB MON | Alarm | Investigations |
| ALARM FIRE |
| ALARM GEN BURG |
| ALARM MED NC |
| ALARM PAN/HOLD |
| 1029-WANTED PERSON CHECK | Check/investigation |
| 1032-1032 PERSON WITH WEAPON |
| 1036-LIGHTS AND SIREN |
| 1056-1056 DRUNK PERSON |
| 1067-1067 PROWLER |
| 1067R-1067 PROWLER REPORT ONLY |
| 1068S-1068S SHOOTING |
| 1076-1076 MAKE INVESTIGATION |
| 1077-1077 DRUG INVESTIGATION |
| 1086-1086 MISSING PERSON |
| 1121-1121 DISCHARGING FIREARM |
| 1121R-DISCHARGING FIREARMS - REPORT ONLY |
| 1125-1125 PEDDLER COMPLAINT |
| 1138-1138 BOLO |
| CITIZEN COMP |
| MEET CALLER |
| OPEN PREMISE |
| SUSPICIOUS ITEM |
| TIP INFORMATION |
| WANTED PERSON |
| WARRANT CHECK | Check/investigation | Investigations |
| WATCH ORDER |
| WELFARE CHECK |
| 1097-DISTURBANCE | Disturbance | Suspicious incident |
| 1097N-DISTURBANCE NOISE ORDINANCE |
| 1097R-1097R DISTURBANCE REPORT ONLY |
| 1139-1139 DISORDERLY CONDUCT/HARRASSMENT |
| 1142-1142 LOITERING |
| ALCOHOL OFFENSE |
| CODE ENFORC VIO |
| DISCHARGING GUN |
| DISORDERLY COND |
| DISTURBANCE |
| DOM DISP INPROG |
| DOM DISP PREVOC |
| FIREWORK PROB |
| GAMBLING |
| HANGUP/ABAND |
| LITTER/POLLUTE |
| LOITERING |
| NOISE COMPLAINT |
| UNWANTED GUEST |
| 1038-SUSPICIOUS PERSON | Suspicious person/vehicle |
| 1038VO-SUSPICOUS VEHICLE - OCCUPIED |
| 1038VU-SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE - UNOCCUPIED |
| SUSPICIOUS PVC |
| 1031-1031 HIT AND RUN | Accidents | Traffic |
| 1031R-1031R HIT AND RUN REPORT ONLY |  |  |
| 1050-1050 TRAFFIC ACCIDENT |
| 1131-1131 HIT AND RUN WITH INJURY |
| 1150-1150 TRAFFIC ACCIDENT PRIVATE PROPERTY |
| 350-350-TRAFFIC ACCIDENT WITH INJURY |
| INDUSTRIAL ACC |
| VEH ACC W/INJ |
| VEH ACCIDENT |
| VEH ACC-INJ/ENT |
| VEH ACC-PRIPROP |
| 1039-TRAFFIC STOP | Traffic enforcement |
| 1051-WRECKER SERVICE NEEDED |
| 1053-1053 ROAD BLOCKED |
| 1055-1055 DUI - INTOXICATED DRIVER |
| 1058-1058 DIRECT TRAFFIC | Traffic enforcement | Traffic |
| 1074-INTOXILIZER OPERATOR |  |  |
| 1094-1094 DRAG RACING |
| 1095-1095 RECKLESS DRIVING |
| ABANDONED VEH |
| AUTO UBE |
| DRAG RACING |
| LIVESTOCK RDWY |
| PARKING PROBLEM |
| RECKLESS DRIVER |
| RECOVERED VEH |
| ROAD BLOCKED |
| ROAD HAZARD |
| TRAFFIC DETAIL |
| TRAFFIC STOP |
| TREE BLOCK RDWY |
| VEH REGIS/INFO |
| VEHICLE PURSUIT |
| VIN INSPECTION |

## Appendix B: Uniform Crime Report Information

This section presents information obtained from Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) collected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The tables and figures include the most recent information that is publicly available at the national level. This includes crime reports for 2006 through 2015, along with clearance rates for 2015. Crime rates are expressed as incidents per 100,000 population.

TABLE 10-19: Reported Crime Rates in 2015, by City

| City | State | Population | Crime Rates | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Violent | Property | Total |
| Albertville | ALA | 21,534 | 139 | 3,357 | 3,497 |
| Athens | ALA | 25,192 | 56 | 2,402 | 2,457 |
| Bessemer | ALA | 26,828 | 1,771 | 9,844 | 11,615 |
| Daphne | ALA | 25,087 | 128 | 2,109 | 2,236 |
| Enterprise | ALA | 28,028 | 321 | 3,450 | 3,771 |
| Fairhope | ALA | 18,821 | 207 | 2,752 | 2,959 |
| Foley | ALA | 16,644 | 306 | 3,803 | 4,110 |
| Helena | ALA | 18,109 | 116 | 696 | 812 |
| Hueytown | ALA | 15,745 | 337 | 3,480 | 3,817 |
| Northport | ALA | 25,032 | 388 | 3,635 | 4,023 |
| Opelika | ALA | 29,888 | 689 | 5,025 | 5,715 |
| Oxford | ALA | 21,113 | 336 | 4,234 | 4,571 |
| Pelham | ALA | 22,997 | 143 | 2,061 | 2,205 |
| Prichard | ALA | 22,236 | 1,511 | 4,484 | 5,995 |
| Talladega | ALA | 16,006 | 762 | 6,291 | 7,054 |
| Troy | ALA | 19,377 | 872 | 4,402 | 5,274 |
| Anniston | ALA | 22,306 | 2,721 | 7,375 | 10,096 |
| Alabama | | 4,858,979 | 472 | 2,979 | 3,451 |
| United States | | 321,418,820 | 373 | 2,487 | 2,860 |

FIGURE 10-30: Reported Violent and Property Crime Rates, by Year

FIGURE 31: Reported City and State Crime Rates, by Year

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Anniston | | | | Alabama | | | | National | | | |
| Population | Violent | Property | Total | Population | Violent | Property | Total | Population | Violent | Property | Total |
| 2006 | 23,956 | 2,175 | 12,707 | 14,881 | 4,616,525 | 333 | 3,049 | 3,382 | 304,567,337 | 448 | 3,103 | 3,551 |
| 2007 | 23,736 | 2,279 | 12,268 | 14,548 | 4,646,319 | 388 | 3,431 | 3,819 | 306,799,884 | 442 | 3,045 | 3,487 |
| 2008 | 23,620 | 2,422 | 10,284 | 12,705 | 4,684,189 | 422 | 3,813 | 4,235 | 309,327,055 | 438 | 3,055 | 3,493 |
| 2009 | 23,598 | 2,479 | 10,081 | 12,560 | 4,732,747 | 434 | 3,642 | 4,076 | 312,367,926 | 416 | 2,906 | 3,322 |
| 2010 | 23,106 | 1,523 | 8,820 | 10,344 | 4,792,630 | 329 | 3,085 | 3,414 | 314,170,775 | 393 | 2,833 | 3,225 |
| 2011 | 23,217 | 1,770 | 10,006 | 11,776 | 4,815,348 | 409 | 3,506 | 3,915 | 317,186,963 | 376 | 2,800 | 3,176 |
| 2012 | 23,051 | 2,186 | 10,776 | 12,963 | 4,834,334 | 438 | 3,392 | 3,830 | 319,697,368 | 377 | 2,758 | 3,135 |
| 2013 | 22,648 | 2,035 | 8,778 | 10,813 | 4,845,981 | 407 | 3,159 | 3,567 | 321,947,240 | 362 | 2,627 | 2,989 |
| 2014 | 22,567 | 2,375 | 7,582 | 9,957 | 4,861,676 | 403 | 2,991 | 3,394 | 324,699,246 | 357 | 2,464 | 2,821 |
| 2015 | 22,306 | 2,721 | 7,375 | 10,096 | 4,858,979 | 472 | 2,979 | 3,451 | 321,418,820 | 373 | 2,487 | 2,860 |

TABLE 10-20: Reported Municipal, State, and National Crime Rates, by Year

TABLE 10-21: Reported Municipal, State, and National Clearance Rates in 2015

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crime | Anniston | | | Alabama | | | National | | |
| Crimes | Clearances | Rate | Crimes | Clearances | Rate | Crimes | Clearances | Rate |
| Murder Manslaughter | 8 | 7 | 88% | 353 | 192 | 54% | 14,392 | 8,850 | 62% |
| Rape | 44 | 30 | 68% | 1,988 | 863 | 43% | 110,582 | 41,700 | 38% |
| Robbery | 79 | 41 | 52% | 4,506 | 1,635 | 36% | 299,232 | 87,700 | 29% |
| Aggravated Assault | 477 | 394 | 83% | 15,432 | 6,424 | 42% | 707,017 | 382,000 | 54% |
| Burglary | 602 | 138 | 23% | 34,159 | 5,045 | 15% | 1,450,074 | 187,000 | 13% |
| Larceny | 970 | 502 | 52% | 96,042 | 23,743 | 25% | 5,225,538 | 1,140,000 | 22% |
| Vehicle Theft | 74 | 38 | 51% | 9,996 | 2,669 | 27% | 657,090 | 86,100 | 13% |

**Note:** \*2015 national UCR clearance totals are not released by the FBI until Spring 2017. The above clearance totals are provisional estimates calculated from the FBI UCR clearance percentages.

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   %20Benchmark%20City%20Survey%20-%202014%20Data%20-%20Demographics.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. CPSM benchmarks are derived from data analyses of police agencies similar to the APD. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. John Campbell, Joseph Brann, and David Williams, “Officer-per-Thousand Formulas and Other Policy Myths,” *Public Management* 86 (March 2004): 22−27. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Amendola, K., Weisburd, D., Hamilton, E., Jones, G., Slipka, M.. (2011). “The Impact of Shift Length in Policing on Performance, Health, Quality of Life, Sleep, Fatigue, and Extra-Duty Employment.” Police Foundation. Retrieved from https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237331.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Sherman, L. & Weisburd, D. (1995). General deterrent effects of police patrol in crime “hot spots”: a randomized, controlled trial. Justice Quarterly, 12(4), 625-648. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Braga, A. A., Weisburd, D. L., Waring, E. J., Mazerolle, L. G., Spelman, W., & Gajewski, F. (1999). Problem‐oriented policing in violent crime places: a randomized controlled experiment. Criminology, 37(3), 541-580. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
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8. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Boke, K. & Nalla, M. (2009). “Police Organizational Culture and Job Satisfaction: A Comparison of Law Enforcement Officers’ Perceptions in Two Midwestern States in the U.S.” Retrieved on November 30, 2015 from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/24173193 [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)