

Police Department Final Operations and Data Analysis Report

**Vancouver, Washington
March 2013**



POLICE OPERATIONS

POLICE OPERATIONS

C E N T E R F O R P U B L I C S A F E T Y M A N A G E M E N T

**Submitted by and reply to:
ICMA Center for Public Safety
International City/County Management Association
777 North Capitol Street NE, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20002
PublicSafety@icma.org
202-962-3607**



Leaders at the Core of Better Communities

Background

About ICMA

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is a 100-year-old, nonprofit professional association of local government administrators and managers, with approximately 9,000 members located in 28 countries.

Since its inception in 1914, ICMA has been dedicated to assisting local governments in providing services to their citizens in an efficient and effective manner. Our work spans all of the activities of local government: parks, libraries, recreation, public works, economic development, code enforcement, brown-fields, public safety, and a host of other critical areas.

ICMA advances the knowledge of local government best practices across a wide range of platforms including publications, research, training, and technical assistance. Our work includes both domestic and international activities in partnership with local, state, and federal governments as well as private foundations. For example, we are involved in a major library research project funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and we are providing community policing training in El Salvador, Mexico, and Panama with funding from the United States Agency for International Development. We have personnel in Afghanistan assisting with building wastewater treatment plants and have teams in Central America conducting assessments and developing training programs for disaster preparedness working with SOUTHCOM.

ICMA Center for Public Safety Management

The ICMA *Center for Public Safety Management* (ICMA/CPSM) is one of four centers within the ICMA's U.S. Programs Division, providing support to local governments in the areas of police, fire, emergency medical services (EMS), emergency management, and homeland security. In addition to providing technical assistance in these areas, we also represent local governments at the federal level and are involved in numerous projects with the U. S. Department of Justice and the U. S. Department of Homeland Security.

ICMA/CPSM is also involved in police and fire chief selection, assisting local governments in identifying these critical managers through original research and the identification of core competencies of police and fire managers and by providing assessment center resources.

Our local government technical assistance includes workload and deployment analysis, using operations research techniques and credentialed experts to identify workload and staffing needs, and identifying best practices. We have conducted approximately 140 such studies in 90 communities ranging in size from 8,000 population (Boone, Iowa) to 800,000 population (Indianapolis, Indiana).

Thomas Wieczorek is the Director of the Center for Public Safety Management. Leonard Matarese is the Director of Research & Project Development.

Methodology

The ICMA Center for Public Safety Management team follows a standardized approach to conducting analyses of police departments and other departments involved in providing public safety services to the public. We have developed this standardized approach by combining the experience sets of dozens of subject matter experts in the areas of police, fire, and EMS. Our collective team has more than one hundred years of conducting research in these areas for cities in and beyond the United States.

The Public Safety Management team begins most projects by extracting calls for service and raw data from a public safety agency's computer-aided dispatch system. The data are sorted and analyzed for comparison to nationally developed performance indicators. These performance indicators (e.g., response times, workload by time, multiple-unit dispatching) are valuable measures of agency performance regardless of departmental size. The findings are shown in tables and graphs organized in a logistical format. Due to the size and complexity of the documents, a consistent approach to structuring the findings allows for simple, clean reporting. The categories for the performance indicators and the overall structure of the data and documents follow a standard format, but the data and recommendations are unique to the organization under scrutiny.

The team conducts an operational review in conjunction with the data analysis. The performance indicators serve as the basis for the operational review. The review process follows a standardized approach comparable to that of national accreditation agencies. Prior to the arrival of an on-site team, agencies are asked to provide the team with key operational documents (e.g., policies and procedures, asset lists, etc.). The team visits each city on-site and interviews police department managers, supervisors, rank-and-file officers, and local government staff.

The information collected during the site visits and through data analysis results in a set of observations and recommendations that highlight strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the organizations and operations under review. To generate recommendations, the team reviews operational documents; interviews key stakeholders and observes physical facilities; and reviews relevant literature, statutes and regulations, industry standards, and other information and/or materials specifically included in a project's scope of work.

The standardized approach ensures that the ICMA Center for Public Safety Management measures and observes all of the critical components of an agency, which in turn provides substance to benchmark against localities with similar profiles. Although agencies may vary in size, priorities, and challenges, there are basic commonalities that enable comparison. The approach also enables the team to identify best practices and innovative approaches.

In general, the standardized approach adopts the principles of the scientific method: We ask questions and request documentation upon project start up; confirm accuracy of information received; deploy operations and data analysis teams to research each unique environment; perform data modeling; share preliminary findings with the jurisdiction; assess inconsistencies reported by client jurisdictions; follow-up on areas of concern; and communicate our results in a formal written report.

ICMA Center for Public Safety Project Contributors

Thomas J. Wieczorek, Director, ICMA Center for Public Safety

Leonard A. Matarese, Director, Research & Program Development

James E. McCabe, Senior Associate, Team Lead

Paul O'Connell, Senior Associate

George Aylesworth, Senior Associate

Duane J. Lovello, Senior Associate

Dov N. Chelst, Senior Quantitative Analyst

Priscila Monachesi Kale, Quantitative Analyst

Sarita Vasudevan, Quantitative Analyst

Dennis Kouba, Editor

Contents

Background	i
About ICMA	i
ICMA Center for Public Safety Management.....	i
Methodology	ii
ICMA Center for Public Safety Project Contributors.....	iii
Contents.....	iv
Tables	vii
Figures.....	viii
Executive Summary.....	1
Major Recommendations:.....	1
Methodology.....	3
Community Overview	5
Vancouver Demographics	5
Uniform Crime Report/Crime Trends	5
Comparisons/Benchmarks	7
Patrol Division	9
Demand	9
Patrol Staffing and Deployment	14
Tactical Services	30
Special Operations.....	31
Traffic Unit.....	34
Investigations Division	36
Major Crime Unit.....	38
Digital Evidence Cybercrime Unit.....	38
Child Justice Center	39
Domestic Violence Unit.....	40
Safe Streets Gang Task Force	40
Drug Task Force	41
Technical Services Division	43
Policies and Procedures.....	43
Administrative Reporting	44
Internal Affairs and Discipline	45

Early Warning System.....	46
Use of Force.....	47
Vehicle Pursuits	47
Hiring and Recruitment	48
Volunteer Program	48
Training.....	49
Fleet.....	50
Property and Evidence	50
Records.....	51
Information Technology	51
Communications.....	52
Facilities and Building Maintenance.....	52
Organizational Culture and Communications.....	53
Focus Groups, Interviews, and Survey	53
Leadership	54
Division	55
Disruptive Change	55
Communications.....	57
Accountability.....	57
Respect/Trust	59
Employee Survey.....	62
Strengths/Positives.....	63
Weaknesses/Negatives	64
Performance Measurement and Strategic Planning	70
Summary	72
Data Analysis.....	74
Workload Analysis	75
Deployment.....	98
Response Times.....	111
High-Priority Calls	118
Appendix A: Comparison of Proposed (4-Shift) and Current (3-Shift) Deployment Plan	120
Appendix B. Employee Survey Results.....	123
Sworn Officer Survey	123
Noncommissioned Employee Survey	128

Survey – Open-Ended Question – Please share any additional comments about the Department (optional) – 8 Responses	132
Appendix C: VPD Current and ICMA Proposed Organization Chart	135
Appendix D: Deployment and Workload by Precinct	137
Appendix E: Comparison with Internal Reports	150
Precinct Productivity	151
Call Response.....	151
Event Response	153
Beat Activity.....	154
Call Interval.....	155
Appendix F: Internal Vancouver Police Department Reports	156

Tables

TABLE 1:	2011 ^a UCR Crime Comparisons	6
TABLE 2:	Vancouver Police Department in Perspective	8
TABLE 3:	2011 Calls for Service	10
TABLE 4:	Average Response Time Components, by Category	14
TABLE 5:	Rating Average of Survey Statements, Sworn Personnel.....	66
TABLE 6:	Rating Average of Survey Statements, Civilian Employees	68
TABLE 7:	Events per Day, by Initiator	77
TABLE 8:	Events per Day, by Category.....	78
TABLE 9:	Calls per Day, by Category.....	80
TABLE 10:	Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months.....	82
TABLE 11:	Calls per Day, by Category and Months	83
TABLE 12:	Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator	85
TABLE 13:	Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category	87
TABLE 14:	Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-Initiated Calls	88
TABLE 15:	Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Beat.....	91
TABLE 16:	Calls per Day, by Category and District	92
TABLE 17:	Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2012	94
TABLE 18:	Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2012	96
TABLE 19:	Average Response Time Components, by Category	114
TABLE 20:	90th Percentiles for Response Time Components, by Category	115
TABLE 21:	Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by District.....	116
TABLE 22:	Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by Priority	118
TABLE A1:	ICMA Proposed 4-Shift Deployment Plan	120
TABLE A2:	Sample of Current VPD 3-Shift Deployment Plan	121
TABLE A3:	Comparison of VPD Current and ICMA Proposed Deployment Plan for West Precinct, Districts 1&2.....	122
TABLE B1:	Demographic Information	124
TABLE B2:	Statement Responses and Rating Average, Sworn Employees	125
TABLE B3:	Demographic Information	128
TABLE B4:	Statement Responses and Rating Average, Noncommissioned Employees	129
TABLE C1:	VPD Current Organization Chart	135
TABLE C2:	VPD Proposed Organization Chart	136
TABLE E1:	Event Count by Source and Responding Unit.....	151
TABLE E2:	Calls by Minute and Priority	152
TABLE E3:	Calls by Unit Status and Priority, Raw Data.....	153
TABLE E4:	Dispatch Delay by Unit Status and Priority, Processed Data.....	153
TABLE E5:	Beat Activity Comparison by Study, Count and Percentage	154

Figures

FIGURE 1: Crime Rate, Vancouver, Washington	7
FIGURE 2: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012	17
FIGURE 3: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, Winter 2012	17
FIGURE 4: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012	19
FIGURE 5: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekends, Winter 2012	19
FIGURE 6: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012	20
FIGURE 7: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, Summer 2012	21
FIGURE 8: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012	22
FIGURE 9: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekends, Summer 2012	22
FIGURE 10: Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator	77
FIGURE 11: Percentage Events per Day, by Category	78
FIGURE 12: Percentage Calls per Day, by Category	80
FIGURE 13: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months	82
FIGURE 14: Calls per Day, by Category and Months	83
FIGURE 15: Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator	85
FIGURE 16: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category	87
FIGURE 17: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-Initiated Calls	88
FIGURE 18: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by District	90
FIGURE 19: Calls per Day, by Category and District	92
FIGURE 20: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2012	94
FIGURE 21: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2012	96
FIGURE 22: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2012	99
FIGURE 23: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2012	99
FIGURE 24: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2012	100
FIGURE 25: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2012	100
FIGURE 26: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012	102
FIGURE 27: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012	102
FIGURE 28: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012	103
FIGURE 29: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012	103
FIGURE 30: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012	105
FIGURE 31: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012	105
FIGURE 32: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012	106
FIGURE 33: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012	106
FIGURE 34: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012	108
FIGURE 35: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012	108
FIGURE 36: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012	109
FIGURE 37: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012	109

FIGURE 38: Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, Winter and Summer 2012.....	112
FIGURE 39: Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2012	113
FIGURE 40: Average Response Time by Category, Summer 2012	113
FIGURE 41: Average Response Time by District	116
FIGURE 42: Average Response Times and Dispatch Delays for High-Priority Calls, by Hour	119
FIGURE D1: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2012	138
FIGURE D2: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2012	138
FIGURE D3: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2012	139
FIGURE D4: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2012	139
FIGURE D5: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012	141
FIGURE D6: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012.....	141
FIGURE D7: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012.....	142
FIGURE D8: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012	142
FIGURE D9: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2012.....	144
FIGURE D10: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2012	144
FIGURE D11: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2012	145
FIGURE D12: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2012	145
FIGURE D13: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012	147
FIGURE D14: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012.....	147
FIGURE D15: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012.....	148
FIGURE D16: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012	148

Executive Summary

ICMA was commissioned to review the operations of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD). While our analysis covered all aspects of the department's operations, a particular focus of our study was on identifying the appropriate staffing of the agency given its workload, community demographics, and crime levels.

We analyzed departmental workload using operations research methodology¹ and compared that workload to staffing and deployment levels. We reviewed thousands of pages of documents provided by the department to better understand the implications of service demand on current staffing. We looked at the department's organizational design to determine if the many functions required of a modern police agency are staffed appropriately. Our study involved data collection, interviews with key police and administration personnel, on-site observations of the job environment, data analysis, comparative analyses, and development of alternatives and recommendations. Major recommendations appear below and are described in detail throughout the report.

Based on our review, it is our opinion that the VPD provides a high level of service to the Vancouver community with the resources it has. ICMA believes the department is understaffed and lacks direction and focus. Personnel reductions and budget cuts over the last several years have created a fragmented organization. A succession of administrations, each with a different policing philosophy, has contributed to a palpable sense of disorientation with respect to the vision and mission of the department. Years of internal turmoil have had a negative effect on the workplace climate.

The combination of these forces has resulted in a deeply divided organization, which undoubtedly impacts the VPD's ability to provide services. An extended period of dynamic stability, with a return to core organizational principles and services, is strongly recommended. The recommendations provided here seek to rebalance the VPD and begin the process of stabilizing the department and focusing the department on the delivery of outstanding police services to the Vancouver community. Implementation of these recommendations should be undertaken with full participation of all involved stakeholders.

Major Recommendations:

1. Create a calls for service (CFS) committee made up of members of the VPD and stakeholders in the community with a mission of evaluating how CFS are received and dispatched in Vancouver in order to develop methods to screen and triage calls more effectively.
2. Explore the creation of a differential response function for nonemergency calls and past occurrences so as to supplement the current web-based reporting system.
3. Add police officers to the patrol function to support high demand from CFS and administrative activities.
4. Reorganize patrol into two precincts; assign one commander in each precinct.

¹ Operations Research is a discipline that deals with the application of advanced analytical methods to help make better management decisions.

5. Reinstate the rank of lieutenant.
6. Abandon territorial command at the beat level.
7. Embrace a process of case management and vigorous investigation of property crimes.
8. Assign two civilians to a new Crime Scene and Evidence Unit.
9. Merge the Digital Evidence Cybercrime Unit (DECU) and Child Justice Center (CJC).
10. Merge the Safe Streets Gang Task Force (SSGTF) and Drug Task Force (DTF).
11. The VPD should seek accreditation as soon as possible.
12. Establish a system for conducting periodic inspections of all departmental units, following a set checklist of items to be examined, to ensure compliance with agency policies and procedures.
13. Realign the Professional Standards Unit to report directly to the chief of police.
14. Consolidate units and assign personnel to work out of the East or West precincts, except where confidentiality is required. The headquarters facility should be closed and all positions relocated to one of the precincts.
15. Create a leadership team.
16. Institute an informal Labor-Management Committee.

ICMA contends that implementing these recommendations will lead to an improved organization. The “new” organization would have more personnel and would be structured in a way to enhance the delivery of core services and return to its stated mission and purpose. Also, the new organization would be streamlined, making it more efficient and cost-effective. The culmination of these recommendations can be found in Appendix C, where a remodeled organization chart is presented.

The ICMA team thanks the city and police administrations of Vancouver for their assistance in completing this project. In particular, ICMA commends City Manager Eric Holmes and Interim Police Chief Chris Sutter for their enthusiasm and cooperation with the ICMA team regarding documentation requests and the overall project.

Methodology

Data Analysis

We used numerous sources of data to support our conclusions and recommendations for the Vancouver Police Department. Information was obtained from the FBI Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, Part I offenses, along with numerous sources of VPD internal information. UCR Part I crimes are defined as murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and larceny of a motor vehicle. Internal sources included data from the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system for information on calls for service (CFS).

Interviews

This study relied extensively on intensive interviews with VPD personnel. On-site and in-person interviews were conducted with all division commanders regarding their operations.

Focus Groups

A focus group is an unstructured group interview in which the moderator actively encourages discussion among participants. Focus groups generally consist of eight to ten participants and are used to explore issues that are difficult to define. Group discussion permits greater exploration of topics. For the purposes of this study, focus groups were held with a representative cross-section of employees within the department.

Document Review

ICMA consultants were furnished with numerous reports and summary documents by the Vancouver Police Department. Information on strategic plans, personnel staffing and deployment, monthly and annual reports, operations manuals, and performance statistics were reviewed by project team staff and follow-up phone calls were used to clarify information as needed.

Operational/Administrative Observations

Over the course of the evaluation period, numerous observations were conducted. These included observations of general patrol, special enforcement, investigations, and administrative functions. ICMA representatives engaged all facets of department operations from a “participant observation” perspective.

Implementing the Report’s Recommendations

ICMA’s conclusions and recommendations provide a blueprint for both the city and police administrations to move forward. It is strongly recommended that the chief identify and task one individual with responsibility for implementing these recommendations. This person should establish a liaison with the chief of police and should be given the authority and responsibility to effectuate the recommended changes. This includes ensuring the recommendations are executed in a timely fashion and then evaluating the department’s progress.

All of ICMA’s recommendations are practical and sensible and should be considered by the police administration within a reasonable period of time. If the city desires, ICMA can provide a service to

review, monitor, and evaluate the department's progress to help ensure that the recommendations adopted are being implemented properly. If the police administration experiences difficulty implementing the recommendations, ICMA can be of assistance.

Community Overview

Policing involves a complex set of activities. Police officers are not simply crime fighters whose responsibilities are to protect people's safety and property and to enhance the public's sense of security. The police have myriad other basic responsibilities on a daily basis, including preserving order in the community, guaranteeing the movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, protecting and extending the rights of persons to speak and assemble freely, and providing assistance for those who need it. The VPD provides a full range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service, performing directed activities, and solving problems.

Vancouver Demographics

When determining the appropriateness of the deployed resources—both current and future—it is important to take into account the demographics of the community.

Vancouver is located in Clark County, Wash., across the Columbia River from Portland, Ore. According to the U. S. Census Bureau, the city's population is approximately 162,000, and has increased substantially over the last 20 years. The population growth is a reflection of both an increase in geographic size of the city and its status as an attractive residential suburb of Portland. The racial makeup of the city is roughly 81 percent white, 3 percent African-American, 1 percent American Indian, and 5 percent Asian, with 10 percent of persons reporting to be of Hispanic or Latino origin. The median household income in Vancouver is \$50,387, which is approximately 14 percent lower than the median household income for the state of Washington. From 2007 to 2011, an average of 15.5 percent of Vancouver residents lived below the poverty level, which is slightly higher than the statewide rate of 12.5 percent.²

Uniform Crime Report/Crime Trends

As defined by the Uniform Crime Reporting Program (UCR), seven major Part I offenses are used to measure the extent, fluctuation, and distribution of serious crime in geographical areas. Part I crimes are the seven most serious offenses in two categories: violent crime and property crime. Part I violent crimes are murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault; Part I property crimes are burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.

As shown in Table 1, in 2011, Vancouver had a UCR Part I violent crime rate (VCR) of 385 violent crimes and a Part 1 property crime rate (PCR) of 3,923 property crimes per 100,000 residents. The violent crime rate in Vancouver is 31 percent higher than the state average and the same as the national average. The property crime rate is 10 percent higher than the state average and 35 percent higher than the national average. At the same time, Vancouver has a relatively low property crime rate for a city its size. Crime, in general, is on par with communities of similar size in the region.

² The figures in this paragraph are taken from the U. S. Census Bureau at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/32/3231900.html>.

TABLE 1: 2011^a UCR Crime Comparisons

Jurisdiction	Population	Violent Crime Rate	Property Crime Rate
Vancouver	162,000	385	3,923
Tacoma	201,510	748	5,986
Bellevue	124,283	113	3,539
Everett	104,635	430	7,503
Washington	6,830,038	294	3,574
United States	311,591,917	386	2,909

^a 2011 was the most recent UCR data available on comparison jurisdictions.
Source: FBI UCR, *Crime in the United States*.

Table 1 also shows the Uniform Crime Rates of the several jurisdictions in Washington that are close in population size and demographic characteristics as Vancouver. The analysis is not intended to compare Vancouver with Tacoma or Everett, but rather is meant as an illustration of communities in Washington and how they compare with respect to rates of crime. With a population of approximately 162,000, Vancouver is the 4th largest city in the state. Therefore, only large cities (excluding Seattle) with populations over 100,000 were selected for comparison.

Over the last ten years, the rate of crime in Vancouver has fluctuated, as shown in Figure 1. Violent crime reached a high in 2003, a low in 2002, and appears to be relatively stable. Property crime in Vancouver has been decreasing steadily over the decade with a high mark in 2003 and the low point in 2008. In totality, it appears that the crime rates in Vancouver fluctuate from year to year, but in general are decreasing and are similar to comparable Washington communities as well as the state and national averages.

FIGURE 1: Crime Rate, Vancouver, Washington



Comparisons/Benchmarks

In order to put the VPD's performance into perspective it is important to compare it with other police departments. In a 2011 study, IBM looked at several financial, organizational, and demographic variables to assess the relative efficiency of local governments. The resulting report, *Smarter, Faster, Cheaper*, presents the data from the 100 largest U. S. cities in various regions.³ In addition, the Overland Park, Kansas, Police Department conducts an annual survey of 26 small- to medium-sized police departments each year on, among other measures, the same measures reported in the IBM report. This report, entitled "Benchmark Cities Survey"⁴ is also useful in evaluating the VPD. Furthermore, the Bureau of Justice Statistics publishes periodic reports (Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics, or LEAMS) on the administrative and managerial characteristics of police departments in the United States.⁵ Keeping in mind that each community has characteristics that govern the style and size of its police department, these characteristics and comparisons can help assess the relative performance of the VPD.

These documents are useful in benchmarking the VPD on several key variables, including per-capita spending on police services, spending per crime, number of sworn personnel per crime, overtime expense, and sworn officers per capita (see Table 2).

³ David Edwards, *Smarter, Faster, Cheaper: An Operational Efficiency Benchmarking Study of 100 US Cities* (Somers, NY: IBM, 2011), available at http://icma.org/en/icma/knowledge_network/documents/kn/Document/303182/Smarter_Faster_Cheaper.

⁴ <http://www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/>

⁵ Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics* (2007).

On average, the VPD spends approximately \$214 per capita on police services, much less than the average of \$323 per capita presented in the IBM report, and about the same as the \$217 per capita amount presented in the Benchmark Cities Survey. Vancouver's 2011 crime rate of 4,308 serious crimes per 100,000 residents is approximately 14 percent lower than the average crime rate of 5,000 crimes per 100,000 among the cities in the IBM report, and is approximately 32 percent higher than the average crime rate reported in the Benchmark Cities Survey. Also, the VPD spent \$1,329,529 on overtime expenses in FY2011 (local funded only). Out of a total budget of \$34.7million, this represents approximately 3.8 percent of expenditures. This 3.8 percent overtime-to-total budget is lower than the benchmark on police overtime expenses from the IBM report and about the same as the overtime percentage reported in the Benchmark Cities Survey.

TABLE 2: Vancouver Police Department in Perspective

Benchmark Area	VPD	IBM Benchmark	Vs. IBM Benchmark	Benchmark City Survey	Vs. Benchmark City Survey
Per capita police spending	\$214	\$323	LOWER	\$217	SAME
Crime rate	4,308	5,000	LOWER	3,277	HIGHER
Overtime	3.8%	5%	LOWER	3.8%	SAME

Overall, the VPD earns high marks for financial benchmarks. Costs of operations appear lower in most areas. This is related to many factors that will be discussed in the body of the report. In brief, the department spends less per capita and has a lower number of officers per capita, has a mixed crime rate compared to the comparison cities, and is lower than the benchmark cities with regards to officers per capita and overtime spending.

The key to operational efficiency, however, is not found exclusively in financial austerity. The size and style of a police department and the types of services that it provides are a reflection of the character and demands of that community. The challenge is to determine how many police officers are necessary to meet that demand, and how to deploy those personnel in an effective and efficient manner. The above analysis demonstrates that the VPD is financially efficient in its personnel deployment. The analysis that follows is an attempt to build upon this discussion and answer the "how many" and "how to deploy" questions that are the essence of police operational and personnel resource decisions.

Our report now turns to the various elements of the VPD and an assessment of those elements in context with prevailing industry standards and best practices.

Patrol Division

The VPD provides the community with a full range of police services, including responding to emergencies and calls for service, performing directed activities, and solving problems. The VPD is a service-oriented department that provides a high level of service to the community. The department considers every request for service from the public important and deserving of a police response: Essentially every call for service from the public gets a police response and every criminal case gets investigated.

Demand

The VPD staff reported to the ICMA team that no call is considered too minor to warrant a response. The result of this philosophy is the delivery of comprehensive policing services to the Vancouver community. The department has the hallmark of a small-town approach to policing in which people are not just citizens but members of a community. Service is personalized, the police are part of the fabric of the community, and expectations for police service are high. From conversations with VPD officers of all ranks, it is clear that the community of Vancouver expects this level of service, and the VPD is structured to deliver it.

This approach is not without costs, however. Considerable resources are needed to maintain the small-town approach. The patrol division must be staffed with enough officers to respond to virtually every call placed to the VPD.

Since the department entertains almost every request for police service, it may face the choice between the questions of “Do we continue to police the community in a full-service mode?” or “What steps can we take to restructure demand and still promote order and safety?” That is, the department must decide whether to sustain this comprehensive level of police service or take the steps necessary to manage it. Essentially, this is a political decision regarding the quantity of police services offered to the community. But quality doesn’t need to suffer. The recommendations offered in this report regarding operations, if implemented, will permit the VPD to continue its full-service model of policing and run the agency more efficiently.

Table 3 presents several main categories of calls for service that were handled by the VPD from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2102. During this 12-month period VPD officers were dispatched to 84,860 calls, an average of approximately 233 calls per day. To evaluate the workload demands placed on the VPD, it is useful to examine the number of calls for service (CFS) received from the public in relation to the population size. As noted, the VPD handles about 85,000 calls per year. With a population estimated to be approximately 162,000, this translates to about 524 CFS per 1,000 residents. While there is no accepted standard ratio between calls for service and population, ICMA studies of other communities show a CFS-to-population ratio ranging between 400 and 1,000 CFS per 1,000 persons per year. Lower ratios typically suggest a well-managed approach to CFS. Although the value of 524 CFS/person/year indicates that VPD call volume is managed effectively, additional steps can be taken to triage the calls more efficiently, which would likely result in a decrease in the volume of CFS.

ICMA's experience indicates that without effective management, the 911 system can become a catch-all for community demands. Being open 24 hours, 365 days each year, 911 is often the "go-to" resource for community concerns. If not properly managed, this can result in the misuse or ineffective deployment of valuable police resources. The data indicate that the VPD is screening calls to limit police response. This is in contradiction to the anecdotal reports from the officers themselves. Officers report routinely being dispatched to frivolous CFS. Therefore, while it appears that CFS are being managed aggressively, perhaps the VPD should take a closer look at the calls actually being dispatched to see if they can be screened even more aggressively. Several recommendations will be offered to manage this call volume more effectively and make better use of available patrol resources to meet service demands more efficiently.

TABLE 3: 2011 Calls for Service

Category	Police-initiated			Other-initiated			All Calls		
	Calls	Units per Call	Minutes	Calls	Units per Call	Minutes	Total Calls	% of Total	Rank
Accidents	110	1.6	35.4	2,241	1.9	44.7	2,356	2.8	8
Alarm	6	1.5	8.5	2,492	1.7	14.6	2,498	2.9	9
Assist other agency	106	1.2	23.1	1,024	1.9	23.4	1,132	1.3	12
Check/investigation	8,524	1.2	20.0	9,922	1.6	30.0	18,460	21.8	2
Crime—persons	401	1.2	22.9	10,391	1.6	41.8	10,803	12.7	3
Crime—property	103	1.3	32.6	4,174	1.5	39.2	4,282	5.0	7
Disturbance	120	1.8	17.6	6,463	2.3	29.6	6,587	7.8	6
Juvenile	20	1.1	22.1	1,823	1.4	34.1	1,843	2.2	10
Miscellaneous	1,246	1.2	30.5	7,101	1.5	25.4	8,353	9.8	5
Prisoner—arrest	427	1.9	36.4	840	2.5	44.1	1,267	1.5	11
Suspicious person/vehicle	1,316	1.5	17.9	7,087	1.6	21.2	8,408	9.9	4
Traffic enforcement	16,448	1.2	10.6	2,419	1.3	18.9	18,871	22.2	1
Total	28,827	1.2	15.4	55,977	1.7	30.8	84,860	100.00	

Reducing Responses to Certain Calls

Overall, the demand management of CFS in Vancouver can be evaluated to reduce CFS volume, triage CFS more effectively, and reduce police response to nonpolice CFS. The quantity and quality of calls for service can be examined for enormous potential for operational efficiencies. Certain types of calls—burglar alarms, traffic crashes-property damage only, and miscellaneous CFS—do not necessarily require the response of a sworn police officer. The bottom line here is that a substantial number of CFS dispatches to officers in the VPD could be eliminated.

Automobile accidents are a category for which the need for response by a sworn officer is questionable. At motor vehicle accidents involving only property damage, the police role is largely

administrative: preparing and filing reports. When injuries occur or vehicles are inoperable and blocking traffic, police response is important, but most accidents involve only property damage to vehicles, and the role of an officer is simply to prepare a report. Thus, dispatching police officers to all vehicle crashes is not recommended. Proper training of dispatchers and inquiries by dispatchers during the initial call-taking process can easily triage vehicle accident calls to determine whether they require a police response. The data in Table 3 show that the VPD responded to 2,356 calls for service that were traffic accidents. This represents approximately 2.8 percent of all calls. Arguably, most of these were administrative in nature and did not necessarily warrant the response of a sworn police officer.

During the 12-month period studied, the VPD responded to almost 2,498 alarm calls. Industry experience also tells us that greater than 98 percent of all burglar alarms are false. The alarm industry is a strong advocate of developing ordinances and procedures to address police response to false alarms and will work closely with any agency exploring this issue. The 98 percent of alarm calls that are false are caused by user error, and this can be addressed by alarm management programs. For example, a double-call verification, or visual verification, protocol is being implemented across the country. Alarm reduction needs to be addressed aggressively in Vancouver. The double-call verification program is not designed to cite residents for activating false alarms. Alarm ordinances that penalize home owners, and generate fines, while beneficial, do not reduce the response of the police in the first place. Adopting an alarm callback program has the potential to reduce calls for service by more than 2,000 calls, or roughly 3 percent of all CFS that come from the public.

Similarly, during the 12-month period studied, the VPD responded to 8,353 calls categorized as “miscellaneous.” Calls in this category amounted to 9.8 percent of all calls. The calls in this category are unlikely to be crime-related and may be unrelated to any type of police services. At 25.4 minutes per call (with 1.5 officers responding to each call), VPD’s response means that officers spend more than 5,000 hours each year on calls that have limited relevance to police services. Anecdotal accounts of these types of CFS from officers themselves indicate that a police response is unwarranted. Officers report being dispatched to calls such as:

- Parking complaints
- “There’s a man in the dumpster”
- “My boyfriend won’t pick up his clothes”
- “There is litter on my lawn”
- “My 8 year old won’t go to school”

Officers report that dispatchers are not given the authority to screen calls, and that every call made to 911 and processed by the VPD results in a response by a sworn officer, regardless of how frivolous the report. This “assistance” being requested in many of these cases does not fall within the duties of a sworn police officer, and are either civil in nature or simply frivolous. The VPD would improve efficiency and lighten the burden on patrol officers by minimizing the response to calls of this nature.

Combined, calls for traffic accidents, burglar alarms, and miscellaneous categories represent more than 15 percent of CFS volume. However, a police response at the large majority of these incidents is likely not necessary. These categories of CFS should be examined carefully. It is recommended that the VPD, and all of the relevant stakeholders in the community, meet to reevaluate response protocols to 911 calls for service. There is clearly an opportunity to examine call categories and triage them more effectively. A committee made up of police and community representatives could examine CFS protocols and design a more efficient police response to CFS. It is not recommended that the VPD indiscriminately stop responding to these types of calls, but the VPD should reexamine the calls in all of these categories to determine whether police response to CFS can be improved.

A shift from a “small town” approach in which a response is made to every call made to the department, to a more efficient, professional approach will require the VPD to manage CFS more aggressively. The VPD should work with the Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency (CRESA) to train and empower dispatchers, 911 call takers, and supervisors to triage CFS received by the department and only assign a patrol response to appropriate police-related incidents.

From ICMA’s examination of CFS, and based on discussions with members of the VPD, it is clear that the department could benefit from a differential response program to better manage CFS. The VPD prides itself on “customer” service and providing police services to a community in an effort to deliver a “small town” or “intimate” style of police service. In a small-town, no request is too small and the community and the police work together to create a safe and secure environment. The demand for this type of service and the ability to provide it by the VPD, however, is being strained.

In other communities, departments have been very effective at identifying CFS that can be shifted away from a direct police response to another service or eliminated altogether. In order to properly identify these categories of calls, however, the department must undertake a deliberate process. The command staff should create a committee to explore this issue and determine what and how CFS get processed and dispatched. The overall goal of this committee should be to minimize unnecessary CFS while still maintaining a high level of customer service.

In addition to the CFS committee, the department should consider adopting a differential police response program. The department website features a list of incidents for which the public can prepare a report online and without the response of an officer. Inspection of the website reveals a professional and well-designed portal for the community to use. This is a positive approach to reducing CFS volume and the VPD should be commended for this effort, but it does not appear to alleviate the CFS demand on patrol officers.

In addition to the web-based reporting, the VPD should consider staffing a telephone response program to various categories of CFS. The telephone response or differential response function could deal with past crimes and routine inquiries to the VPD, thus eliminating the response of a sworn officer. Nonemergency calls, such as past crimes, minor property damage, and harassment (all of the categories of web-based reporting options) can be handled by this program. Instead of dispatching an officer to these types of calls, the information is deferred (delayed) until a unit becomes available to respond to the call. Dispatchers can record reports for certain categories of nonemergency incidents over the telephone. This process could divert nonemergency calls from the

patrol units, and thus provide officers with more time to engage in proactive and directed patrols or traffic enforcement duties.

Time Spent on Calls

Further examination of various elements of CFS and patrol response data prompts further discussion. The data analysis section of this report provides a wealth of information about VPD service demand, workload, and deployment. This section of the report is meant to highlight the effective use of patrol resources in Vancouver. The data analysis should be referenced for a more detailed discussion and description of the methodology employed.

Three key pieces of information need to be highlighted to demonstrate the effective use of patrol resources in Vancouver. Response time, service time, and units per call are important variables to examine in order to determine the effectiveness of the patrol response. Taken together these statistics provide an excellent lens through which to view the efficiency of patrol operations.

As shown in Table 3, VPD patrol units on average take 30.8 minutes to handle a call for service. A unit's occupied time is measured as the time from when the call was received until the unit becomes available. This figure is on par with average occupied of about 30 minutes for a CFS, based on our experience.⁶ When considering the large distances in Vancouver covered by patrol units, this figure is remarkable.

Also, the VPD dispatches an average of 1.7 officers per "other-initiated" CFS. The number of officers dispatched (like occupied time) varies by category of call. In general, prisoner transports, crimes in progress, alarms, and disturbances require more officers to be assigned, and traffic-related CFS would likely have fewer officers assigned. The data in Table 3 also confirm these assumptions and indicate that VPD officers are assigned appropriately. More revealing is that the VPD averages 1.7 officers assigned to "other-initiated" CFS. This is an excellent assignment rate and is consistent with other agencies of similar size studied by ICMA in the past.

In order to evaluate effectiveness in this area, ICMA employs a benchmark of 60 unit-minutes for the average "other-initiated" CFS. In this case the VPD average service time per CFS is 30.8 minutes, and there is an average of 1.7 units per CFS. The combination of service minutes times average number of units assigned equals 52.4 unit-minutes ($30.8 \times 1.7 = 52.4$). This is well below the expected service benchmark of 60 unit-minutes. This demonstrates that the VPD patrol function assigns the appropriate number of officers to CFS and handles those CFS in less time than expected.

Finally, Table 4 shows response times to various types of calls for service. As shown, response time in Vancouver averaged 19.6 minutes per call. This is higher than the generally accepted target response time of 15 minutes per call. It appears that "dispatch time" (the time from when a CFS is received to when it is assigned a unit) averages around 11 minutes per CFS. Overall response time to high-priority CFS is 8.2 minutes, which is slightly higher than the benchmark of 5.0 minutes considered acceptable for these types of calls. Similarly, injury accidents have a slightly higher response time of 9.6 minutes, compared to response of 5.0 minutes expected for this type of call. It

⁶ ICMA considers 30 minutes to be a benchmark of police departments to handle CFS. This figure is derived from data analyses of police agencies similar to the VPD.

is recommended that the Vancouver Police Department further examine dispatch procedures to understand the dynamic behind the relatively long dispatch time.

TABLE 4: Average Response Time Components, by Category

Priority	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Total Calls
0-2	1.9	6.4	8.2	3,612
3	8.5	8.6	16.6	24,892
4	18.5	12.2	28.8	11,770
5	15.4	10.3	24.3	1,124
7-9	31.9	10.7	8.3	100
Total	11.0	9.5	19.6	41,498
Injury accidents	3.0	6.6	9.6	236

Patrol Staffing and Deployment

Uniformed patrol is considered the backbone of policing. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that more than 95 percent of U. S. police departments roughly equal in size to the VPD provide uniformed patrol. Officers assigned to this important function are the most visible members of the department and command the largest share of departmental resources. Proper allocation of these resources is critical to having officers readily available to respond to calls for service and to provide law enforcement services to the public.

Deployment

Some police administrators suggest that there are national standards for the number of officers per thousand residents, but this is not the case. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) states that ready-made, universally applicable patrol staffing standards do not exist. Furthermore, ratios such as officers-per-thousand population are inappropriate to use as the basis for staffing decisions. An article on this topic published in *Public Management* concludes, “A key resource is discretionary patrol time, or the time available for officers to make self-initiated stops, advise a victim in how to prevent the next crime, or call property owners, neighbors, or local agencies to report problems or request assistance. Understanding discretionary time, and how it is used, is vital. Yet most police departments do not compile such data effectively. To be sure, this is not easy to do and, in some departments may require improvements in management information systems.”⁷

Essentially, “discretionary time” on patrol is the amount of time available each day during which officers are not committed to handling calls or other demands from the public. It is discretionary in that the officer can use his or her discretion about how to best use this time to address problems in the community and be available in the event of emergencies. When there is no discretionary time, officers are entirely committed to service demands, do not have an opportunity to address problems that do not arise through 911, and may be unavailable in times of a serious emergency.

⁷ John Campbell, Joseph Brann, and David Williams, “Officer-per-Thousand Formulas and Other Policy Myths,” *Public Management* 86 (March 2004): 22–27.

The lack of discretionary time indicates a department is understaffed. Conversely, when there is too much discretionary time officers are idle. This is an indication that the department is overstaffed.

Staffing decisions, particularly in patrol, must be based on actual workload, defined as the time required to complete essential activities. The actual workload must be determined first and then the amount of discretionary time. Only then can staffing decisions be made consistent with the department's policing philosophy and the community's ability to fund it.

As mentioned, the VPD is a full-service police department. Its philosophy is to address essentially all requests for service in a community policing style. With this in mind it is necessary to look at workload to understand the impact this style of policing has in the context of community demand.

Understanding actual workload requires reviewing total reported events within the context of how the events originated, such as through directed patrol, administrative tasks, officer-initiated activities, and citizen-initiated activities. Doing this analysis allows the activities that are really "calls" to be differentiated from other types of activities. Understanding the difference between the various types of events and the resulting staffing implications are critical to determining deployment needs. This portion of the study looks at the total deployed hours of the police department with a comparison to the time being spent to currently provide services.

From an organizational standpoint, it is important to have uniformed patrol resources available at all times of the day to deal with issues such as proactive enforcement and community policing. Patrol is generally the most visible and most available resource in policing and the ability to harness this resource is critical for successful operations.

From an officer's standpoint, once a certain level of CFS activity is reached, the officer's focus shifts to a CFS-based reactionary mode. Once a threshold, or saturation-point, is reached, the patrol officer's mindset begins to shift from a proactive approach in which he or she looks for ways to deal with crime and quality-of-life conditions in the community to a mindset in which he or she continually prepares for the next CFS. After saturation, officers cease proactive policing and engage in a reactionary style of policing. Uncommitted time is spent waiting for the next call. The saturation threshold for patrol officers is believed to be 60 percent.

Rule of 60 – Part 1

In general, a "Rule of 60" can be applied to evaluate patrol staffing. The Rule of 60 has two parts. The first part maintains that 60 percent of the sworn officers in a department should be dedicated to the patrol function, and the second part maintains that no more than 60 percent of patrol time should be "saturated" by workload demands from the community.

According to the VPD personnel listing dated 1/4/2013, patrol in the VPD is staffed by 5 commanders (1 acting), 19 sergeants, 15 corporals, and 88 police officers assigned to a CFS response capacity. These 127 of the 180⁸ sworn officers in the department represent 70.6 percent

⁸ The authorized staffing of the VPD is 189 sworn officers. The department makes every effort to maintain this headcount, but retirements and attrition result in vacancies throughout the year. At the time of the ICMA site visit the actual headcount was 180 officers with 9 vacancies. For the purposes of this analysis the actual number of officers is used.

of the sworn officers in the VPD. At full strength (189 officers) the percentage of officers on patrol compared to total would be (127/189) 67.2 percent. These data indicate that the current deployment of officers to the patrol function is unbalanced with the other personnel assignments in the organization. Staffing is not aligned proportionately based on this part of the rule, subsequent analysis reveals that personnel are not allocated correctly and the department is understaffed.

Rule of 60 – Part 2

The second part of the Rule of 60 examines workload and discretionary time and suggests that no more than 60 percent of total patrol time should be committed to calls for service. In other words, ICMA suggests that no more than 60 percent of available patrol officer time be spent responding to the service demands of the community. The remaining 40 percent of the time is the discretionary time for officers to be available to address community problems and be available for serious emergencies. This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does not mean the remaining 40 percent of time is downtime or break time. It is simply a reflection of the point at which patrol officer time is saturated by CFS.

This ratio of dedicated time compared to discretionary time is referred to as the saturation index (SI). It is ICMA's contention that patrol staffing is optimally deployed when the SI is less than 60 percent. An SI greater than 60 percent indicates that the patrol manpower is largely reactive, and overburdened with CFS and workload demands. An SI of somewhat less than 60 percent indicates that patrol manpower is optimally staffed. SI levels much lower than 60 percent, however, indicate patrol resources that are underutilized and signal an opportunity for a reduction in patrol resources or reallocation of police personnel.

Departments must be cautious in interpreting the SI too narrowly. For example, one should not conclude that SI can never exceed 60 percent at any time during the day, or that in any given hour no more than 60 percent of any officer's time be committed to CFS. The SI at 60 percent is intended to be a benchmark to evaluate service demands on patrol staffing. If SI levels are near or exceed 60 percent for substantial periods of a given shift, or at isolated and specific times during the day, decisions should be made to reallocate or realign personnel to reduce the SI to levels below 60. Lastly, this is not a hard-and-fast rule, but a benchmark to be used in evaluating staffing decisions.

The ICMA data analysis in the second part of this report provides a rich overview of CFS and staffing demands experienced by the VPD. The analysis here looks specifically at patrol deployment and how to maximize the personnel resources of the VPD to meet the demands of calls for service while also engaging in proactive policing to combat crime, disorder, and traffic issues in the community.

The eight figures that follow represent the personnel staffing and demand during weekdays and weekends during two months studied in-depth, one in winter and one in summer 2012. Examination of these figures permits exploration of the second part of the Rule of 60. Again, the Rule of 60 examines the relationship between total work and total patrol, and to comply with this rule, total work should be less than 60 percent of total patrol.

Figures 2 and 3 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in winter 2012.

FIGURE 2: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE 3: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, Winter 2012



Workload vs. Deployment: Weekdays, Winter 2012

Average workload:	8.2 officers per hour
Average % deployed (SI):	36 percent
Peak SI:	56 percent
Peak SI time:	5:00 p.m.

As these figures indicate, the SI does not exceed the 60 percent threshold during the day during weekdays in winter. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 10 percent at 6:00 a.m. to a high of 56 percent at 5:00 p.m., with a daily average of 36 percent. Figures 2 and 3 indicate that during weekdays during the month studied (February) the VPD has adequate resources on patrol to handle the call volume.

At the same time, two important observations from Figure 2 must be raised. One is the high amount of administrative time spent by officers in the VPD. Data obtained from CRESA indicate almost 40,000 incidents of administrative time, which amounts to approximately 30 percent of all incidents in 2012. Examining this administrative time in context of the 24-hour cycle indicates that administrative time peaks during the time periods when patrol shifts overlap. Figure 2 shows that the gray area denoting administrative time increases dramatically between 3:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. and again between 8:00 p.m. and midnight. Undoubtedly, the workload in the VPD requires officers to prepare considerable paperwork in conjunction with CFS, and it appears that the shift overlaps are the times when the officers leave patrol to complete this work. Combined with the observation regarding a low “interaction” time of 11.2 minutes, the nature of patrol service in the VPD seems to be one of high CFS volume, brief interactions at the CFS, and using the shift overlap to complete administrative functions.

The second observation is the large proportion of “extra patrol.” Extra patrol is defined as supervisors and K-9, and it appears that there is a high level of supervisory assignment to patrol in the VPD. Anecdotal accounts and personal observations indicate that supervisors in the VPD routinely handle CFS. While usually not assigned as the primary unit, supervisors regularly handle CFS. Any time supervisors handle a CFS, however, is time taken away from their supervisory functions. If the extra patrol data are removed from Figure 2 (and Figures 4, 6, and 8), a pattern emerges that indicates the basic patrol function of the VPD is confronted with an extremely high CFS volume. Absent the extra patrol, the Saturation Index would easily spike at times during the 24-hour period into the 80 percent range and in all likelihood would average more than 60 percent for the day. Without the contribution of the extra patrol, the basic patrol function in the VPD would be faced with extremely high demand. The extra patrol alleviates this pressure, but to the extent supervisors are part of this relief effort, they are taken away from their supervisory responsibilities.

Figures 4 and 5 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekends in winter 2012.

FIGURE 4: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012





FIGURE 5: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekends, Winter 2012



Workload v. Deployment: Weekends, Winter 2012

Average workload:	8.0 officers per hour
Average % deployed (SI):	41 percent
Peak SI:	55 percent
Peak SI time:	4:30 p.m.

Figures 4 and 5 indicate a relatively high and consistent workload throughout the day. The SI hits a high point at 4:30 p.m. and averages 41 percent throughout the day. Although not surpassing the 60 percent threshold, the workload demand in the VPD is high.

Figures 6 and 7 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in the summer of 2012.

FIGURE 6: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE 7: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, Summer 2012



Workload v. Deployment: Weekdays, Summer 2012

Average workload: 10.9 officers per hour

Avg. % deployed (SI): 50 percent

Peak SI: 74 percent

Peak SI time: 7:45 p.m.

Summer paints a slightly different picture. As these figures indicate, the SI exceeds the 60 percent threshold twice during the 24-hour period. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 20 percent at 6:00 a.m. to a high of 74 percent at 7:30 p.m., with a daily average of 50 percent.

Finally, Figures 8 and 9 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekends in summer 2012.

FIGURE 8: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012





FIGURE 9: Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekends, Summer 2012



Workload v. Deployment: Weekends, Summer 2012

Average Workload:	10.5 officers per hour
Average % deployed (SI):	51 percent
Peak SI:	63 percent
Peak SI time:	2:00 a.m.

As Figures 8 and 9 indicate, the SI exceeds the 60 percent threshold at several points during the day. On average, approximately 10.5 officers per hour are required to meet the service demands from CFS on weekends in summer in Vancouver, and the VPD struggles to meet demand. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 25 percent at 6:00 a.m. to a high of 63 percent at 2:00 a.m., with a daily average of 51 percent.

Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 indicate that patrol resources in the VPD during the summer are under stress. From about 7:00 a.m. until after midnight, the patrol saturation index hovers just below the 60 percent threshold. This demonstrates that patrol resources in Vancouver are largely reactive. The 60 percent threshold is considered the point where discretionary patrol time changes from potentially productive time that can be directed at community conditions, to unproductive time where patrol units wait for the next CFS to be dispatched. Essentially, for the bulk of the day in Vancouver, patrol resources operate very close to this “unproductive” threshold and measures should be taken to support patrol staffing. Reaching this level during any period under observation also has the adverse impact of tainting all other periods under observation. In other words, once officers experience high, and sustained, levels of patrol saturation, they are likely to conclude that patrol saturation is high always, or that they need to be prepared to respond to high CFS demands. This effectively ends proactive police response. In the context of high violent and property crime rates, this is a situation that needs to be reexamined. Vancouver’s best defense against high crime is an active and productive patrol force. The data shown in these figures indicate that the VPD patrol staffing is reactive and not positioned well to respond to crime occurrences in the community.

Compounding this situation is that the SI calculations include supervisors. Had they not been included the situation would be much worse. It is commendable that supervisors help with the workload, but an over-reliance on their participation is not recommended. Also, the very high administrative time spent by officers is cause for concern. It appears officers rely on this time so they can keep up with the demand for CFS and save the paperwork for later. The presence of the extended overlaps between shifts appears to be the crutch that gets them through the busy times. In this sense, the VPD is not using the overlap as effectively as it could. Instead of having the overlaps dedicated toward crime, traffic, and quality-of-life issues in the community, it appears it is used to perform administrative duties associated with high call volume.

Additional resources committed to patrol, in conjunction with a modified shift schedule, are strongly recommended.

In Figures 3, 5, 7, and 9, the patrol resources available are denoted by the dashed green line at the top. The 100 percent value indicates the total police officer hours available during the 24-hour period. This amount varies during the day consistent with the staffing of the shifts, but at any given hour the total amount of available manpower will equal 100.

The red dashed line fixed at the 60 percent level represents the saturation index (SI). As discussed above, this is the point at which patrol resources become largely reactive as CFS and workload demands consume a larger and larger portion of available time. The solid black line represents total workload experienced by the VPD. Looking at the comparisons of the green, red, and black lines in the SI figures, comparing workload to available staffing, the data indicate that more officers are required to properly staff the patrol function in Vancouver.

Schedule and Staffing

The VPD uses three shifts, each 10.5 hours in length, to staff patrol. Patrol officers work a “5/4 schedule” which is a three-part cycle with five days on and four days off for two cycles, followed by five days on and five days off in the third cycle. It is also known as a “5/4,5/4,5/5 cycle” The net effect is that each officer works 15 days in a 28-day work period. The schedules for the three shifts—day, swing, and graveyard—are 6:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., 3:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m., and 8:00 p.m. to 6:30 a.m., respectively There is a 30-minute overlap between the graveyard and day shift, a 90-minute overlap between the day and swing shift, and a 330-minute overlap between the swing and graveyard shift.

The patrol shift schedule in the VPD is extremely popular with the employees, but wasteful from a deployment and staffing perspective. The employee survey administered as part of this study indicated that “work schedule satisfaction” received the most favorable rating (1.51) from the sworn officers, and interest in changing the patrol schedule received the most disagreeable rating (5.17) in the entire survey.⁹

That said, the shift schedule in place in Vancouver is inefficient. Using three 10.5 hour shifts results in 7.5 hours of overlapping coverage each day. Inspection of the timing of this overlap shows that it is creating substantial inefficiencies in patrol coverage and costing approximately 15 percent more in personnel than is necessary to provide the same service. Overlaps occur at three times during the day; however, overlaps in staffing should be designed to align staff availability with demands for service. The shift model in the VPD appears haphazard, only minimally addresses service demands, and appears more designed for administrative time.

Furthermore, the 10.5-hour shift is an awkward shift length. The available literature on shift length provides no definitive conclusions on an appropriate length of shift. A recent study published by the Police Foundation examined 8-hour, 10-hour, and 12-hour shifts, and found positive and negative characteristics associated with all three.¹⁰ ICMA contends that the length of the shift is secondary to the application of shifts to meet service demands. Again, a 10.5-hour shift does not appear to address any needs and it unnecessarily lengthens the workday of the officer.

Therefore, it is strongly recommended that the department seek to modify the shift schedule to more appropriately align the schedule to meet the demands of the community. An example of an alternative shift schedule is provided in Appendix A. This schedule still relies on 10.5-hour shifts, but uses four start times instead of three, and uses the exact number of personnel assigned to the West Precinct. In other words, the same level of personnel staffing is remodeled to create the new ICMA schedule. Inspection of Appendix A shows that the basic structure of the VPD work plans remains in place, but an additional shift is added and the start time of the swing shift is moved ahead one hour. The new shift is scheduled for 10:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m., with a complement of one

⁹ Survey respondents were asked to report their level of agreement with several statements (from Strongly Agree coded as a 1, to Strongly Disagree coded as a 6). The lower the value, the more agreement there is with the statement.

¹⁰ Police Foundation, *The Shift Length Experiment: What we know about 8-, 10-, and 12-hour shifts in policing*, 2012.

sergeant and four officers in each rotation (A and B). Also, under the ICMA schedule the swing shift begins at 4:00 p.m. and works until 2:30 a.m.

In addition to the altered start times and new shift, the ICMA schedule offers several advantages over the current schedule in place in the VPD. First, the ICMA plan has a smoother distribution of officers working throughout the day. The individual shifts are designed to work in pairs (0600x1630 with 1600x0230 and 1000x2030 with 2000x0630), with two pairs of twenty-hour shifts to assign during the times of day when demands from the community are the greatest. In this case, the overlaps occur from 10:00 a.m. until 1:00 a.m., the times officers are most needed on patrol, and the shifts run with lower personnel when there is less demand from the community. The ICMA schedule can also be altered to fit changing community demands, if necessary. The two pairs of twenty-hour shifts can be “dialed” to fit the needs of the community. Second, looking at the number of officers assigned during the day in the VPD shows very low levels of staffing during peak times of the day and surplus staffing during times when officers are not needed. Under the B-rotation in the West Precinct, between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. there are only six officers assigned to patrol. The six officers are the lowest number assigned within the VPD schedule and this assignment occurs at one of the busiest times of the day. Similarly, in the early morning hours between 2:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m. there are nine officers assigned (50 percent more than the busiest times of the day), when clearly the demand for services is very low. The ICMA schedule addresses this inconsistency and assigns officers to work when they are needed the most by redeploying them from times when they are needed the least.

There are numerous options available that are superior alternatives to the current patrol shift schedule in place in the VPD. These alternatives should be pursued aggressively.

It is also understood that the current schedule is a provision of the labor contract and subject to collective bargaining. However, the current shift model in place in Vancouver is inefficient and steps should be taken to change it.

Meeting Demand

One of the most important roles of the police is to respond to calls for service from the community. ICMA contends that the VPD is strained meeting this demand. The saturation indexes reported for the VPD indicate that the patrol function is overburdened and struggles to meet the demand for its services. The solution to this problem can be achieved in one of three ways identified in this report. The VPD can reduce demand through a more aggressive triage of incoming CFS. The VPD can add more officers to patrol. And the VPD can restructure the patrol shift schedule to better align the availability of officers with the demand for their services. Applying pressure to each one of these three “levers” would be a step in the right direction and would provide more resources during the times when they are need most, addressing the CFS that are most appropriate for a police response.

Addressing any one of them alone is a less than optimal approach and ICMA recommends that all three measures be addressed successively. First, the issue of triaging demand and reducing non-police related CFS should be addressed. Establishing a committee to explore this issue rigorously to identify categories of CFS that can be reduced, or potentially eliminated, should be the first step. The data analysis included in this discussion indicates that the VPD can reduce its CFS volume by upwards of 15 percent. This would provide immediate relief to the demand placed on patrol

resources. The second step would be to restructure the patrol shift schedule. ICMA contends that the current shift schedule in place in the VPD is inefficient. The overlap created by the three, 10.5-hour shifts, creates a surplus of resources in times when they are not needed and a shortage of resources when they are needed the most. Adopting the ICMA shift schedule that appears in Appendix A, has the potential to yield a 10 to 15 percent increase in patrol capacity with the existing resources.

Once these two measure have been implemented (and only after they have been implemented), additional resources should be added to the patrol division. It must be stressed that simply adding resources to an inefficient work schedule and CFS system is not recommended, without first restructuring the schedule and triaging demand.

Neighborhood Police Officers

In July 2007, four corporals were shifted within the department to support Neighborhood Police Officer (NPO) positions. One officer is assigned to each of VPD's four patrol districts. The NPO works at the direction of the district commander and is responsible for communicating with neighborhood associations and businesses to improve relations with the public and act as the liaison for the department. The NPO is also responsible for addressing long-term "livability issues" that confront Vancouver neighborhoods.

The implementation and overall management of this program is impressive. Police organizations around the country struggle to implement community policing. The competing demands of "traditional" police work (reactive response to crime and CFS) often leave little time and resources for "community" policing activities by the patrol force. As our earlier discussion demonstrated, patrol resources in the VPD are under stress and the notion that they can provide a substantial level of community policing is unrealistic. Thus, in philosophy, a department might be committed to community policing, but there may be little in the way of actual community policing because of other demands on resources. The VPD does an excellent job balancing these competing demands and has developed what appears to be an effective way of implementing community policing in a challenging environment.

Neighborhood Response Teams

Each precinct in the VPD is assigned a Neighborhood Response Team (NRT). Each NRT is supervised by a sergeant and is staffed with a team of detectives (five detectives in the West Precinct and four detectives in the East Precinct). The primary focus of the NRT is to reduce crime. The NRT conducts short-term, street-level investigations into auto theft, narcotics, gangs, fugitive apprehension, burglary, and other cases deemed appropriate. The NRTs work four 10-hour shifts, generally noon to 10:00 p.m., Tuesday through Friday. The work schedule is flexible as conditions dictate, but examination of team schedules indicates that this deployment is relatively fixed.

The NRTs work at the direction of the district commanders, and like the NPOs, appear effective at addressing crime and quality-of-life concerns in Vancouver. Conceptually, having a cadre of officers available to district commanders to address crime and quality-of-life issues is an excellent idea. The manner in which the NRTs are deployed, however, indicates that they are not being used to their full potential. Undoubtedly, crime occurs at all times during the day. Working a rigid schedule of

1200 by 2200 hours Tuesday to Friday ignores crime that occurs on the weekends and during the day. An important part of the mission of the NRTs is, among other things, to reduce burglary, auto theft, and narcotics. The current work schedule essentially ignores the peak times of these offenses.

Anecdotal reports about the NRT from VPD officers are that the teams address the “crime of the day,” implying that they react to crime as it occurs. Although it is difficult to validate this claim, observation of VANSTAT (see discussion below) would lend support to this assertion. The VANSTAT meeting where crime strategies are presumably discussed was unfocused and more of a briefing than a strategy session. It is likely that the unfocused nature of VANSTAT is indicative of an unfocused and reactive NRT. Again, it is impossible to make this conclusion definitively; however, closer examination of the mission and impact of the NRTs is warranted.

Patrol Reorganization

Patrol staffing in the VPD is fragmented and borders on chaotic. The patrol function is organized into two precincts (East and West), four districts (1, 2, 3, and 4), and 16 beats. In the recent past, the department was evolving into the concept of “territorial” command where all sworn personnel would have “ownership” of distinct geographic sections of the city. Essentially, commanders would be responsible for their districts, and officers responsible for their beats. It appears at one time the VPD desired to staff each of the 16 beats with officers on each shift. The staffing necessary to support the territorial command concept never materialized. Due to personnel reductions, staffing each beat 24/7 is not possible.

Compounding this situation is the heavy concentration of supervisors on patrol. The VPD staffs 19 sergeant positions for 15 corporals and 88 officers. This is a 5:1 ratio of officers to supervisors, which is low. It is not uncommon in policing for an officer-to-supervisor ratio of 8:1 or greater. The overstaffing of supervisors on patrol is the result of several factors. First, the contractual agreement between the Vancouver Police Officers Guild (VPOG) and the city requires two sergeants on duty on patrol at all times. Second, numerous sergeant positions were created to support territorial command, but this concept never materialized. Third, the structure of the VPD patrol schedule has numerous squads of officers (A and B rotations) that require a supervisor.

Inspection of the VPD organization chart dated 1/4/2013 shows each that each district is supposed to have three shifts of officers (day, swing, grave) and two rotations (A and B). Personnel reductions forced the VPD to collapse district/rotations to ensure proper coverage of officers on patrol. Thus, it is apparent that the structure intended to support the patrol shift schedule within the context of territorial command is labor-intensive and cannot be supported. The VPD is already making adjustments to accommodate the manpower shortages with combined squads. This process should be accelerated and a new organizational structure created to properly staff and support patrol operations.

The department has two precincts, but no precinct commander. The “precinct” label currently exists only to describe the facility within which officers are assigned. The “district” command is the actual locus of organizational control. The District Commander is responsible for four beats, one NPO, shares a NRT, and supervises fewer than 30 officers. This sphere of responsibility is small; strong consideration should be given to expanding it. The VPD would be better served with only

two commanders, one in each precinct, and one executive level position (deputy or assistant chief) responsible for patrol operations.

Elimination of the lieutenant rank in the VPD was a mistake. ICMA strongly believes that reinstating the rank of lieutenant will have a direct positive impact on department operations. First, this move created organizational dysfunction by alienating the command staff from the rank-and-file. Lieutenants, particularly on patrol, represent “management on the street” and an important and visible command presence. Information obtained during this study indicated that the current command staff is largely missing from patrol operations. The 9-to-5 work schedule and the administrative demands placed on the commanders require that the bulk of their time be dedicated to activities other than patrol supervision. The refrain, “we never see the commanders,” was heard time and time again. Reinstating the lieutenant rank would create that necessary and visible command presence on patrol.

Eliminating a layer of bureaucracy is generally thought to improve communications among and between the remaining layers. In the VPD case, however, it appears that eliminating the lieutenant rank added to dysfunctional communication and did not improve communication in the department. It is clear that the lieutenant rank was the critical position in the VPD, apparently acting as “go-between,” providing direction, management, and communication between management and rank-and-file personnel. Removing this rank created a logjam in communication within the organization, and it isolated the commanders and executive staff from the rest of the personnel in the department.

Instead of having District Commanders, the VPD should reinstate the rank of lieutenant and assign them to oversee districts. Also, each new precinct should have one additional lieutenant assigned for operational and administrative support for the precinct commander (Precinct Commander position would be in the rank of Commander). With lieutenants in place and responsible for operations in the districts the VPD will build greater organizational control. Organizational control allows the VPD to carry out its mission more effectively, supervise and monitor its employees more closely, and improves the quality and consistency of services being delivered.

Lastly, eliminating lieutenants appears to be a symbol of the serious problems involving the organizational culture and leadership of the VPD (discussed later in the report). Undoing the elimination and restoring the rank not only benefits the VPD from a management perspective, it helps to heal the past wounds and divisions within the department.

Recommendations:

- Create a calls for service (CFS) committee made up of members of the VPD and stakeholders in the community, with a mission of evaluating how all CFS are received and dispatched in Vancouver in order to suggest ways to screen and triage calls more effectively.
- Explore the creation of a differential response function for nonemergency calls and past occurrences so as to supplement the current web-based reporting system.
- Add police officers to the patrol function to support high demand from CFS and administrative activities.

- Realign the shift schedule to better match service demands.
- Reorganize patrol into two precincts, with one commander in each precinct.
- Reinstate the rank of lieutenant.
- Abandon territorial command at the beat level.

Tactical Services

The Tactical Services Division, supervised by a commander, is comprised of three separate units. The first, which does not appear to carry a specific title, consists of Homeland Security, the Arson Team, and the Civil Disorder Team (CDT). The second, 'Special Ops,' consists of K9, Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT), Hostage Negotiation Team (HNT), Metro Explosive Disposal Unit (MEDU), and the Tactical Emergency Medical Support team (TEMS). The third unit is 'Traffic.'

Homeland Security is an area of responsibility for the commander only; no personnel are otherwise assigned. The Arson Team consists of personnel of the VPD and VFD Fire Marshal Division. Some work may involve ATF and the local prosecutor's Office. VPD personnel are assigned to the team as a "collateral assignment," meaning it is not their primary assignment. The CDT is staffed entirely by VPD officers.

Within 'Special Ops' the K9 unit consists of four teams of one VPD handler and one canine each; one team also provides services to the SWAT team. The SWAT team is staffed by members of the VPD and the Clark County Sheriff's Office (CCSO). The HNT is a regional team with officers from three departments; VPD, CCSO, and Battleground PD, or BGPD. The MEDU is a regional team with one VPD officer assigned. The TEMS team consists of two VPD corporals.

The 'Traffic' unit consists of five VPD officers.

The VPD does a commendable job in posting openings for the assorted specialized positions within the department. These announcements carry a description of the position, required qualifications, description of tasks performed, and the frequency of training. One unusual aspect of these announcements, though, is the disparity in the "length of assignment." For instance, the TEMS description advises applicants of a five-year commitment. The HNT asks for a commitment of two years, while the SWAT announcement lists the length of the assignment at three years. While it is desirable for officers to have some understanding of the length of a particular commitment, it would seem more logical to offer some standardized length of assignment or commitment.

Homeland Security

Homeland Security exists simply as an area of responsibility assigned to the Commander of the Operations Support Bureau. There are no other personnel assigned to this function. The general duties associated with this assignment include attendance at meetings involving Homeland Security and serving as the VPD liaison on Homeland Security issues. The city of Vancouver is included as part of the Portland, Ore. UASI region.

Arson Team

Staffing of the Arson Team includes one VPD sergeant and four police officers serving in a "collateral assignment," meaning these personnel are used only as needed and are primarily assigned to other duties such as patrol. The VFD Fire Marshal, ATF, and local prosecutor's office also provide resources as necessary.

The Arson Team is charged with investigating arson and unlawful explosions. In 2011, according to a report prepared by the Vancouver Fire Marshal, the Fire Marshal's office conducted 96 investigations. The VPD conducted 54 investigations and there were 34 "combined" investigations. Two investigations were conducted by the Metro Explosive Disposal Unit (MEDU); four with the Portland Fire Bureau K9, and two with ATF. There were three arrests.

These statistics show sufficient workload to support keeping the officers assigned to the team in the present collateral assignment configuration. The report submitted does not indicate how many cases were criminal in nature or how many cases were cleared by the three arrests made.

The location of this unit in the VPD's table of organization is unusual in that its role is to conduct investigations. Consideration should be given to reassigning this team to the Investigations Division.

Civil Disorder Team

The CDT is a VPD collateral assignment consisting of two sergeants, one corporal, and sixteen police officers. The mission of the CDT is to respond to "civil disorder incidents that require specialized tactics and equipment."

The CDT, which trains approximately 50 hours annually, experiences minimal use. There were no missions in 2012; two 2011 missions consisted of responses to Occupy Vancouver and Occupy Portland. The single mission of 2010 consisted of staging in Portland for an annual parade. There were no missions in 2009.

The reports submitted over a four-year period each list "goals" that are nearly identical. There was no information provided in the reports as to which goals were accomplished. The "summary" section of the reports for each of the four years was identical.

While there appears to be a level of commitment by the officers assigned to this team, it has seen its ranks fall over time. It does not appear that a definable purpose exists for this team, given the lack of reported activity over an extended period of time. Serious consideration should be given to disbanding this unit.

Special Operations

K9 Unit

The VPD maintains four K9 teams of one handler and one K9 each. K9 teams are assigned to patrol shifts but are not assigned to a specific patrol area. The K9 teams are used in a manner consistent with common use such as searches for suspects or missing persons and narcotics searches. One K9 team does work with SWAT and has received the necessary training to operate in a SWAT environment.

Activity levels for the K9 teams show a high level of activity sufficient to support the current number of teams. The VPD K9 teams use the "bite and hold method" so proper training and

supervisory oversight is critical. The VPD had explored the feasibility of switching to the “bark and hold method” used by the Portland Police Bureau, but such a change was not implemented.

While the “bite to capture” ratio appears normal, there was some elevated “bite to searches” ratios noted that, while not a cause for immediate concern, need to be carefully monitored.

All bites are investigated and documented by a detached supervisor. The records kept on the bites were well-organized, complete, professional, and thorough.

SWAT

Assignment to SWAT is a collateral assignment for VPD personnel. SWAT is a regional team consisting of four corporals and seven police officers from the VPD. CCSO provides six deputies to the team and BCPD provides one officer. SWAT missions can either be planned in advance, such as high risk warrant service, or unplanned, such as a barricaded suspect.

In 2011 SWAT responded to 48 missions, broken down as follows: 23 ‘high risk’ search warrants; 10 ‘high risk’ arrest warrants; 10 armed suicidal subjects; and 1 hostage situation. The two remaining missions involved the TEMS (Tactical Emergency Medical Support) officers only. The activity of the team is sufficient to support current staffing levels.

The SWAT team trains on average twice per month. Additional specialized training occurs as needed to accommodate specialized skill sets or new training modules. This SWAT unit appears to be well trained, with impressive specialized vehicles at their disposal. The team does use a “safety officer” and should continue to do so. The use of a safety officer is reflective of best practices among tactical teams. One recent undertaking is the ongoing development of a SWAT training ‘course catalog’ carrying course descriptions for the array of different training routinely done by SWAT. This is a good project demonstrating a professional overall posture for the Team.

SWAT currently operates under a “draft” set of operating guidelines that have not been not formally approved. This is an area for which significant liability can exist and the VPD appears to be giving a proper sense of urgency to quickly completing an up-to-date manual. A review of the work done thus far on the new manual shows it to be a sufficiently comprehensive document being worked on collaboratively by the various stakeholders. Progress on the manual should continue in an accelerated manner until completion. The manual should include guidelines for HNT, K9, TEMS, and MEDU when operating in a SWAT environment.

The decision to deploy SWAT resources in the field, while in some cases apparent, should be carefully considered in others. SWAT currently makes use of a “Planned Operations Risk Assessment” form, sometimes referred to as a “threat matrix,” to assist in the decision-making process regarding whether a SWAT deployment is in order on a pre-planned operation such as arrest and search warrant executions. This form should only be viewed as one component of a very deliberate process that should occur prior to SWAT activation. The assessment form cannot be used as a substitute for proper intelligence gathering, surveillance, experience, and proper supervisory consideration. Simply relying on a sufficient number of “points” on the assessment form to deploy SWAT should never occur. Similarly, deploying SWAT on search warrants should be done with a heightened sense of caution.

After-action reports, or AARs, are completed after each mission. The AARs maintained by the VPD are impressive. The folders for each mission are clearly labeled and the contents carefully organized. Documents pertaining to mission planning and execution and documents supporting the mission, including photographs and operator reports, are all contained within the AAR folder.

Hostage Negotiation Team

The HNT is a collateral assignment and is staffed by one VPD corporal and four officers. CCSO contributes one sergeant and five deputies. BGPD provides one officer.

The HNT responds to incidents involving hostages, barricaded subjects, emotionally disturbed and suicidal subjects, and high-risk warrants. The HNT responded to 48 incidents in 2011. The HNT generally responds on every SWAT deployment. The team reports an increasing number of callouts involving returning members of the military. Staffing of the unit in the collateral assignment configuration should continue.

The team trains at least once per month for approximately three hours, and generally trains jointly with SWAT at least twice per year. Team reports are professional and complete. The team has indicated a desire to engage a mental health professional as a technical advisor. This is a good idea that ought to be supported and implemented.

Consideration is being given to renaming the team the 'Crisis Negotiation Team' to better reflect the broader purpose of the team beyond hostage negotiation. This name change should be implemented.

The skills possessed by members of this team should be incorporated into the daily operations of the VPD when dealing with subjects who might benefit from their ability to engage subjects and diffuse emotionally charged incidents.

Tactical Emergency Medical Support Team

The TEMS team is a collateral assignment, with two VPD corporals assigned. The team provides tactical medical support to SWAT but can be used independent of SWAT for medical incidents outside of a tactical setting, such as outdoor rescue. TEMS team members are required to become certified at a minimum EMT-B level within one year of appointment.

The 'Job Announcement' posted for a TEMS team opening details TEMS training as occurring twice per month, but it is unknown if TEMS members receive specialized training beyond SWAT. Similarly, TEMS is charged with maintaining medical records for SWAT and CDT; however, it could not be determined if this has been done.

TEMS responds on all SWAT callouts. In 2011, TEMS completed two missions independent of SWAT; reports on these two incidents were not immediately available. TEMS is encouraged to carefully report details of its activity and training.

TEMS is a vital component of a progressive, well-structured SWAT unit.

Metro Explosive Disposal Unit

The MEDU is a regional team with one VPD officer assigned as a collateral assignment. Access could not be gained to the MEDU stats on the web portal furnished by the city of Vancouver. While only one Vancouver officer is assigned to MEDU, the VPD houses the MEDU vehicle and it appears that duties related to MEDU command more time than other collateral VPD assignments.

Traffic Unit

The Traffic Unit is staffed by one sergeant and four police officers. Of the four officers, one is assigned to commercial enforcement, one is assigned to traffic investigations, and two are “motor officers,” generally assigned to a motorcycle as weather and conditions permit. The Traffic Unit sergeant is motor certified. The Traffic Unit has undergone some significant staffing reductions as the number of sworn positions in the department was reduced and staff reassigned.

The unit is charged primarily with the enforcement of traffic laws; major crash/fatality investigations; DUI enforcement; special events such as escorts and parades; and community outreach and public education. The Traffic Unit assists the Patrol Division when patrol resources are depleted.

In 2011, the unit investigated 19 incidents including two fatalities and 12 serious collisions. The VPD maintains a ‘traffic hotline’ affording citizens a dedicated means of conveying concerns regarding traffic issues to the department.

The officers assigned to the Traffic Unit would be better served by having a clearly defined mission and access to timely data that can be retrieved internally. Currently, crash data and statistics most useful to the unit are maintained by the city of Vancouver’s Public Works Department, and the data that are maintained are sometimes inconsistent with the needs of a police traffic unit. Further, the data that are maintained are not always current, as the city manages many competing priorities under a strained economic environment. The inability to gather appropriate data will negatively impact the ability of the city to obtain grant funding to support traffic enforcement and crash reduction efforts. It is essential that the Traffic Unit be able to compile and retrieve data to target resources effectively. It is simply not enough to know how often and where crashes are occurring. Accident severity, causal factors, and rate of injury are all things that must be used to effectively bring down accident rates.

Enforcement of traffic laws must be given similar consideration to be effective in increasing levels of compliance. The enforcement of traffic laws, including DUI, can never be viewed as solely the responsibility of the Traffic Unit. Traffic enforcement is an important function of the Patrol Division. Simply deploying scant traffic resources to a location based on a complaint may assuage the person making a complaint, but better rates of compliance will result if enforcement is provided not only where it is needed, but when it is needed. Simply measuring the number of citations issued or the revenue generated provides no useful measure in determining whether the number and severity of collisions are being reduced or the rate of compliance with traffic laws is increasing.

The VPD should develop a policy that provides a protocol on activating the Traffic Unit for investigations where their expertise could be advantageous.

Finally, VPD should consider the Traffic Unit as an essential tool that can be used to increase the frequency of contact with motorists in high-crime areas. Vehicles are frequently used in the commission of crimes, and many of the vehicles used are lacking appropriate registration, are being driven by operators not licensed or suspended from doing so, or carrying persons with active arrest warrants. By placing multiple traffic units in an area with increased levels of criminal activity, the likelihood of contact with offenders increases.

Recommendations

- Move the Arson Team to the Investigations Division.
- Disband the Civil Disorder Team; the level of activity does not support continued operation of the Team.
- Make the completion and approval of a comprehensive SWAT operating manual a high priority. The manual should also cover SWAT operations with the HNT, TEMS, MEDU, and K9 units.
- Define a clear mission for the Traffic Unit, identify a means to provide timely and more useful information to the unit, and recognize the ongoing utility of the unit to crime reduction efforts.

Investigations Division

The Investigations Division, supervised by a commander, is comprised of the Major Crimes Unit (MCU); the Digital Evidence Cybercrime Unit (DECU); the Domestic Violence Unit (DV); the Child Justice Center (CJC); the Safe Streets Gang Task Force (SSGTF); and the Drug Task Force (DTF).

The MCU and DV are stand-alone units comprised solely of VPD personnel. DECU and CJC are staffed by a combination of VPD and Clark County Sheriff's Office (CCSO) personnel. The SSGTF and DTF are typically configured "task force" units with multi-agency representation.

The MCU and DECU are housed in VPD's West Precinct. CJC is housed in a downtown Vancouver courthouse. DV is housed in a separate downtown location. The SSGTF shares space with the FBI in downtown Vancouver. The DTF is housed in yet another location. In total, the six Investigations Division units are housed in five separate locations.

Housing the six different units of the Investigations Division in so many different locations presents challenges to effective supervision at the commander level. While it is not unusual to find units housed in different locations, the situation in Vancouver is such that routine coordination of the efforts of the units does not occur. Communications and coordination between the units, which ought to occur as a matter of routine, is infrequent and not formalized. The end result is that the mission of the units is not driven by the VPD, but by the units themselves. This not to suggest that these units are disengaged from providing quality police services to the city of Vancouver. Each unit appears to work hard and is professionally committed. However, the current arrangement is not productive and leads to overlap, unnecessary duplication of work, and presents the Division Commander with some difficult terrain to navigate.

The current VPD work schedule, while attractive to officers owing to the number of days off, does provide some challenges in maintaining case investigation continuity. When staff resources are less than ideal, as with the VPD, it cannot be expected that another investigator will be able to pick up an investigation when the primary investigator takes scheduled days off. This is an issue to be addressed via collective bargaining, so the issue is not one that can be remedied quickly.

VPD has a long-standing policy of mandatory rotations through certain assignments, including the Investigations Division. While the goals of mandatory rotation can be laudable in that it serves to broaden the base of experience for those involved, it should not be done when it disrupts the continuity or function of a unit. Any rotation plan should have an inherent capability to withstand the requisite "learning curve" of the newly assigned personnel while the unit continues to provide high-quality service. In other words, if the ability of the unit to provide critical services at a high level is compromised, then the ongoing efficacy of the mandatory rotation should be reviewed. When the staffing levels of the VPD were at much higher levels in the past, units were better able to withstand the loss of an experienced person as the newly assigned personnel "learned the ropes." Under the distressed staffing plan now existing at the VPD, the ongoing use of the mandatory rotation may be ill-advised. As resources are stretched thin, the importance of experienced personnel in key positions cannot be understated.

The VPD should revisit what appears to be a very restrictive policy on the use of informants. Information gathering is central to the successful operation of any law enforcement agency. The use of informants is admittedly not without hazards and it is only proper to make sure the use of informants is monitored closely. Current VPD policy generally restricts patrol officers from developing and using informants. Patrol officers and the frequent contact they have with the public, particularly as they develop professional relationships within their respective patrol areas, are ideally situated to gather information that could be of use to specialized units. The current VPD policy appears to unnecessarily stifle the essential information gathering process.

A recurring issue raised during a review of the Investigations Division centered on the lack of mission-driven functionality and general inefficiencies of the EPR software system. EPR lacks a robust case management function but does allow for flagging of cases along predetermined deadlines. Clearance rates are not tracked routinely and the many reports generated by patrol officers in the field must be individually read by an MCU supervisor to ensure that cases needing follow-up receive proper attention. It was noted that several reports submitted in preparation for the ICMA team carried a disclaimer that the accuracy of the information submitted depended on the correct “box” being checked in the EPR. There was a general sense that software currently being used by the VPD could use improvement; an assessment of these needs should be undertaken immediately. When staffing is reduced, inefficient software can only contribute to compounding problems. In the interim, however, the VPD should ensure that all personnel receive training on the function and use of the EPR, while acknowledging the system’s apparent limitations.

At the core of any police agency there must always be an effective patrol plan and investigative capacity properly allocated along available resources. As a city grows in population or size and additional staff and resources are assigned to the agency, new or specialized units can be added to enhance the level of service given to a particular area or problem. What must always remain, though, is an effective patrol plan and investigative capacity *properly allocated along available resources*. These must be reviewed periodically and adjusted to maximize efficiency. When an agency attempts to retain a commitment to patrol plans, “philosophies,” or specialized units at the expense of the core function, discord will result as the agency loses focus and police services become fragmented and marginalized. As the staffing levels of an agency become constrained, primary consideration must always remain with staffing the core function in the most efficient manner possible. Such is the situation confronting the VPD. The current “territorial command” patrol plan cannot be sustained with resources currently available. Similarly, the investigative function has devolved into so many specialized units that there exists no real capacity to investigate property crime.

Given the significant staffing challenges being experienced by the VPD and the relatively small size of some specialized units, serious consideration ought to be given to flattening the organization of the Investigations Division by merging units and combining functions. The outcome will result in a more efficient and better-organized division with a sharpened operational focus and a new agility to meet the dynamic nature of its missions.

Major Crime Unit

The MCU is staffed by one sergeant, one corporal, and six detectives. As of 2012, one of the detectives is assigned to the Elder Justice Center, charged with investigating crimes centering on the unique vulnerabilities of the elderly. This particular assignment was described as being in the “formative stages” and underutilized—not for lack of work, but by a need to bolster public awareness of the EJC and its capabilities.

The MCU investigates homicides, unattended deaths, robberies, rapes, sexual assaults with a victim over sixteen years of age, crimes against persons, felony harassment, or other cases as determined by the Unit Commander. The unit currently handles approximately 350 cases annually. The work handled by the MCU is otherwise typical, with the notable exception of property crime. Over time, reductions in staffing, diversions in resources, and a reordering of priorities has resulted in a gradual increase to the threshold value of an individual property crime to trigger assignment to the MCU. The current threshold is extraordinarily high; some personnel have affixed the threshold amount at \$100,000. Crimes not reaching the threshold are generally left to the investigating patrol officer, or sometimes the NRT (Neighborhood Response Team) to investigate. It would be unwise to assume that these units, dealing with the myriad issues of a typical patrol shift, would have sufficient time to properly investigate a substantial property crime.

The investigation of property crime is a core function of any police organization. The use of “thresholds” is not at all unusual and is indeed reflective of sound police management in properly deploying sometimes scant resources. The extraordinarily high threshold set by VPD, however, essentially results in an abdication of responsibility to investigate property crime. The city of Vancouver experiences approximately 1,000 burglaries of assorted descriptions annually. For some of the most vulnerable residents of Vancouver, a \$100,000 threshold could represent—many times over—the total value of everything they own. This can leave these victims disenfranchised and disillusioned, ultimately eroding police legitimacy. This situation should be addressed immediately with a reordering of priorities and an allocation of additional staff to the MCU.

Detectives assigned to the MCU are responsible for processing their own crime scenes and the evidence collected there. The work done by the detectives in this area is professional. While having the detectives do this work may not be problematic for low-level crimes, it will hamper the unit’s ability to begin a prompt investigation of more serious crimes, when the ability to move a sufficient number of detectives into the field quickly is paramount. VPD should consider having dedicated staff to handle the processing of crime scenes and the intake of evidence; this is an area that could be staffed by civilians.

Digital Evidence Cybercrime Unit

The DECU is staffed by one sergeant, three detectives, and three civilians, one of whom is a grant-funded temporary employee. The Clark County Sheriff’s Office also provides one civilian. DECU is responsible for investigating crimes involving child exploitation, sex trafficking, missing persons, runaways, sex offender tracking, and other related crimes.

Two of the three detectives are assigned to sex offender tracking. Sex offenders are labeled as Level 1, 2, or 3, with each level carrying different tracking requirements. Level 3 offenders carry the most significant tracking mandates and require police contact once every thirty days. VPD staff estimated the number of Level 3 offenders at approximately thirty. Level 2 offenders are contacted on a semiannual basis. Level 1 offenders are contacted once annually. Workload related to sex offender tracking is substantial; in 2011 there were 1,475 “attempts” made to contact registered offenders with 794 being “completed.”

The two detectives handling sex offender tracking also cover ICAC, or Internet Crimes Against Children. The civilians perform cell phone, computer, and electronic device forensic analysis.

Again, in interviews with this team, the functionality of the EPR software was raised, as were issues associated with CAD. An officer checking ‘DECU’ on the EPR distribution box does nothing more than route the report to a location where it must still be manually queried for retrieval.

The investigation of cases involving sex trafficking, child exploitation, missing persons, and runaway cases can be labor intensive due to the generally uncooperative posture of involved parties.

The name of this unit is outdated and based on the former mission of the unit upon its inception. This unit has evolved and should be renamed to more appropriately reflect its current mission.

Child Justice Center

The CJC is staffed by one sergeant and three detectives from the VPD and three detectives from the CCSO. The CJC investigates felony-level physical and sexual abuse and criminal neglect of victims under sixteen years of age. The unit also provides community awareness presentations. The unit occasionally works with VPD detectives assigned to the DECU. Cases are generally referred to the CJC from Child Protective Services or reports generated by law enforcement personnel in the field. Statistics provided regarding cases referred, assigned, or cleared include both the city of Vancouver and Clark County. The CJC lacks the ability to break down cases by jurisdiction of occurrence or crime classification. Currently, VPD manually culls reports for cases originating in Vancouver. This is an issue that should be corrected as the VPD explores software options going forward.

A substantial number of cases are referred to the unit each year. In 2012, as of the date the information was received, the CJC received 3,043 cases for referral. Of these, 349 were assigned for investigation. Cases not assigned are referred back to the Patrol Division. The CJC recorded 401 cases cleared for 2012. As with the DECU, cases can be labor intensive owing to the general nature of the cases and the ages of the victims. Detectives assigned to this unit generally carry ten to fifteen cases at any given time.

Credit should be given to the unit for the implementation of a more aggressive case oversight that resulted in cases being cleared more quickly than in the past. This is reflected in the “cases cleared” statistic, which shows a marked increase in 2012 over 2011 and 2010.

Domestic Violence Unit

The DV Unit is staffed with one sergeant and three detectives. The unit investigates “major cases” involving domestic violence (as defined by the state of Washington) with persons over sixteen years of age. Cases can include attempted murder, sexual assault, and Assault 2. The state of Washington is a “mandatory arrest” state as pertains to domestic violence. Each victim of domestic violence is furnished a victim’s assistance pamphlet and assigned a civilian advocate through the city, county, or the YWCA.

Over the three-year period including 2010, 2011, and 2012, 11,542 incidents were reported and referred to the DV Unit. However, a separate report shows the number of incidents for this same time period at 13,565. One report carries the disclaimer that the accuracy of the data provided was dependent in part on the “DV box” being checked in the EPR. The ability to maintain and produce accurate data is important. Personnel should not have to be concerned that a routine query of data records can return different results.

Referred cases are reviewed manually for potential assignment; this is a time-intensive process. According to the VPD 2011 Annual report, 6,003 patrol reports were reviewed. Of those, 486 were assigned to a DV detective resulting in 161 arrests.

The DV Unit clearly assigns cases based on not only the seriousness of the crimes committed, but on the practical limitations of the number of staff assigned to the unit. The number of DV incidents reported to the VPD is very high, leaving the DV Unit supervisor with the difficult task of prioritizing which cases from many will be assigned to a detective. Recidivists not referred to the DV Unit because of the “lower” level of their offenses are not tracked and targeted for closer monitoring or assignment to a detective.

Safe Streets Gang Task Force

The SSGTF is staffed with one VPD sergeant and one detective. One FBI agent is assigned, as are two detectives from CCSO and one officer from the Department of Corrections (DOC). The work of the DOC officer is generally confined to gang members monitored by DOC. Two VPD detectives were reassigned from the unit in 2012.

SSGTF generally works cases with a gang nexus and offenders over eighteen years of age. The unit will occasionally work a case with an offender under eighteen years of age if it is a “major” crime involving violence. Younger offenders with gang affiliations not meeting these criteria are generally referred to the SROs, NPOs, or Juvenile Probation. The unit also provides approximately 50 public educational sessions per year.

Cases investigated include major crimes upon request from the agency having jurisdiction or cases initiated by the SSGTF. These include gun, drug, or financial crimes involving gang members. A majority of the cases are within Vancouver city limits. The unit also works with the Portland Metro Gang Task Force.

In 2012, the unit handled 105 cases of the 462 VPD incidents reporting a potential gang affiliation. In 2011, 166 cases were handled by the unit out of the 821 VPD incidents reporting a potential gang affiliation. A further detailing of the types of cases was not available.

The SSGTF will work cases with the NRT. An effort to have the NRT train a “gang specialist” was not successful, so routine street level contact with gang members is not occurring. The unit reports that gang violence on the street is increasing, but “not on paper,” as most victims of gang violence do not self-report.

The lack of directed attention being given to younger gang members is problematic and will only serve to perpetuate the gang population and influence. The failure to actively engage and monitor these younger members will likely result in “up-and-coming” gang members with an increasingly honed criminal skill-set and proclivity to violence. Any expectation that the SROs and NPOs can effectively address the issues associated with this group is not realistic. This situation needs to be addressed and given a higher priority.

Drug Task Force

The DTF is staffed with one VPD sergeant and one detective. CCSO provides one commander, one sergeant, three detectives, and one deputy who serves as an Intelligence Specialist. The Washington State Patrol (WSP) provides one trooper, two civilian financial investigators, and two administrative support personnel.

The DTF worked 359 cases in 2011, the last year for which data was provided. This represented a significant increase over the 90 cases worked in 2010 and the 115 cases in 2009. Of the 359 cases reported in 2011, 235 originated in the city of Vancouver; 171 cases resulted in arrests and 108 search warrants were completed. Two meth labs were closed, 31 weapons were recovered, and \$579,270 was seized.

It should be of concern that the SSGTF and NRT will on occasion work drug cases. Given the general lack of formalized communication between units, this arrangement is counterproductive and could cause conflict or case disruption between the units. This needs to be corrected.

The DTF makes use of information-sharing databases, such as the Western States Information Network (WSIN), not generally used by other VPD units. Additionally, the DTF uses an “older” version of EPR not available to other VPD units. While the need to maintain the security of confidential information routinely used by specialized units is apparent, using separate and exclusive information tools can present challenges to commanders who have an obligation to ensure the proper and efficient operation of the unit.

As with the other Investigations Division units, case management in the DTF is not formally structured and the performance of the unit is not benchmarked to maximize efficiency and monitor performance. The lack of a formalized case management system to include “triaging” cases for assignment and evaluating solvability factors must be addressed.

Recommendations

- Additional detectives should be added to investigate property crimes and other crimes generally encountered by the Investigations Division.
- Two civilians should be assigned to a new Crime Scene and Evidence Unit. The current practice of having detectives process their own crime scenes is not efficient and will compromise the division's ability to conduct investigations.
- The DECU and CJC units should be combined and renamed, given the many parallels of their respective missions. This new nomenclature could be reflected in a name such as the Child Protection and Sex Offender Unit or something similar. The increased staffing levels resulting from the merger would make the new unit more agile in responding to large problems or significant cases and streamline the ability to effectively identify shared offenders or victims. The new unit should establish regular communications with the DV Unit.
- The SSGTF and DTF should be combined, renamed, and refocused on a broader mission. A name such as the Safe Streets Task Force reflects this new mission and is easily understood by the public. The current arrangement and strained staffing levels leave both units marginalized and vulnerable to case conflicts. The present overlaps existing in the work of the two units, coupled to a high likelihood of shared offenders via gang-related activity makes the merger of the two units logical. The new unit needs to redefine priorities to include younger gang offenders likely to be committing low-level crime or dealing drugs. The VPD needs to clearly identify the mission of the NRT to avoid potential conflicts with other specialized units.

Technical Services Division

Policies and Procedures

VPD policies and procedures are currently under revision and reorganization. A vendor is preparing the revision. The revision process includes both a legal review and a review of current best practices to make sure the final product is in accord with both. An updated and user-friendly product is anticipated by VPD employees. Some employees expressed frustration with the current state of the policies and procedures due to difficulties encountered in finding items and making sure they are using the most current versions. Presently, software capable of providing a searchable version of VPD policies and procedures, once the revised and reorganized product is available, is being sought. The desired software will also be expected to allow updates based on changes in laws and national standards. Although currently in flux, as noted previously, individual VPD policies and procedures, some of which are subsequently discussed in more detail in later sections, appear to be workable, understandable, and in accord with currently acceptable practices.

Agency policies and procedures are guided by an overarching mission statement and code of conduct which admirably outline expectations for the fair and equitable provision of services by VPD's employees. ICMA notes that these guidelines are not frequently referenced or repeated, in whole or part, throughout the body of policies and procedures examined. The mission statement and canon of ethics should ideally serve as the lens through which all VPD employees view the policies and procedures and their official actions. It may be helpful if actions are taken to ensure that these documents, or relevant parts thereof, are blended into all training materials, policies and procedures, and official communications.

VPD was once accredited with the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), but has not maintained that status. Accreditation would assist VPD in keeping policies and procedures in compliance with national standards and best practices following the delivery and dissemination of the revised product from the vendor. In addition to the national accrediting body for law enforcement, a state accreditation program is offered by the Washington Association of Sheriffs and Police Chiefs.

VPD does not currently maintain a continuous program of inspections of its various units to ensure that elements are compliant with departmental policies and procedures and their unique internal procedures. An audit unit located in the Staff Services Division of the Operations Support Bureau performs audits that are required because of the high risk associated with a particular function or legal mandates, e.g., property and evidence. This audit unit does not have an established procedure for conducting audits. Notwithstanding the presence or absence of outside accreditation, a system providing for continuing general inspections of all units of the agency, following a set checklist of items to be examined, would be beneficial to VPD by assisting the various elements in maintaining compliance with policies and procedures.

Recommendations:

- The VPD should seek accreditation as soon as possible.

- The VPD Mission Statement and Code of Conduct, or pertinent parts thereof, should be frequently and freely referenced in all policies and procedures, training materials, internal and external communications from the chief of police, and, when appropriate, in all communications from the command staff to subordinates.
- Detailed procedures should be adopted for use in conducting audits, and the Audit Unit should be a part of the Professional Standards Unit.
- The VPD should establish a system for conducting periodic inspections of all departmental units, following a set checklist of items to be examined, to ensure compliance with agency policies and procedures. This inspection function, if adopted, could be located in the Professional Standards Unit along with the Internal Affairs function.

Administrative Reporting

The chief of police receives numerous administrative reports from, and has meetings with, departmental elements. The frequency of the meetings varies, and many are accompanied by briefings. A list of such reports and briefings was provided by VPD, and includes the following:

- Department budget and overtime report—monthly reports with briefings every two weeks in command meeting
- C-brief—chief’s briefing on noteworthy criminal cases, this report is generated by patrol sergeants and sent three times daily
- VANSTAT crime analysis and problem-solving report and briefing—monthly
- Criminal intelligence reports—one from each precinct weekly
- PSU internal affairs report and meeting—weekly
- Financial grant review report and briefing—monthly
- Media issues update—weekly verbal briefing, daily interaction as needed
- Backgrounds briefings on internal processes and candidates—verbal briefing weekly
- Quarterly Law Dept. briefing on current civil litigation and issues—quarterly
- CRESA regional 911 administrative board meeting and reports—monthly
- Clark Law Enforcement Executive Council meeting and reports—monthly
- Drug Task Force board meeting and briefing—monthly
- Children’s Justice Center board meeting and reports—monthly
- Fleet management meetings with reports as needed two times a month
- Major case briefings—conducted as needed
- Neighborhood Association(s) reports—monthly

- Chief's Diversity Advisory Team—monthly meeting, verbal report from local diversity leaders
- Policy revision updates with reports and briefings—restarting a monthly meeting
- Command meeting: strategic issues and divisional briefings—two times per month
- Internal audit and external audit reports—as audits are completed reports are submitted

The briefing and meetings associated with these reports are held at various locations within VPD facilities and elsewhere, as appropriate to the topics. For example, the monthly VANSTAT problem-solving meeting and briefing is held at the respective precincts and the major case briefings are held at the Major Crimes Office.

Internal Affairs and Discipline

The processing and coordination of complaints and the investigation of major complaints is accomplished by the Professional Standards Unit (PSU) of VPD. Policy document 101 (Section 101.3) provides that the PSU reports directly to the chief of police, which ICMA believes is appropriate and reflective of the importance of the functions of the PSU. However, this is not consistent with the current organizational chart, which shows PSU as one of the four elements of the Staff Services Division of the Operations Support Bureau. This inconsistency was acknowledged by VPD and characterized as a temporary situation. However, the chief does receive a weekly report and briefing from PSU relating to the status of complaints, active investigations, grievances, pursuits, use of force, K9 bites, vehicle accidents, and any early warning data.

Departmental policy provides for a differentiation between contacts that are inquiries by persons questioning some action by VPD or an employee and major and minor complaints against an employee or employees. Complaints are classified as either external or internal. The policies describing the processes for inquiries and complaints, from receipt through investigation and disposition, are clear and concise. Policy is particularly strong in provisions designed to ensure that complaints or inquiries are not deterred in any manner. All complaints are required to be accepted, including anonymous complaints. A form for filing a complaint online, with instructions, is found on the VPD website. The form and instructions are in English and six other languages. However, on the site there is no explanatory overview or description of the process that ensues subsequent to the filing of a complaint. Likewise, once a complaint is filed, VPD does not send any type of communication to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the complaint and advising them regarding what will or may happen next. All complaints are tracked by PSU and entered into an early warning system, as described in a subsequent section.

Materials provided to ICMA indicate that 59 complaints were received by VPD over the period 2009 through 2012. Of those 59 complaints, 9 were sustained as a result of an investigation. No formal discipline was imposed in any of those cases. The action taken in all nine cases was supervisory referrals, resulting in verbal counseling, written counseling, or remedial training. These actions are all representative of the progressive discipline philosophy outlined in Section 902 of the VPD Department Manual. The lowest form of formal discipline described in this section is the written reprimand, followed by suspension, reduction in rank, and discharge.

The complaint process is described as applying to issues involving all employees of VPD, whether sworn law enforcement or civilian, paid employees, or volunteers. This characterization carries through the subsequent investigation and disposition processes. If applied as described, this uniformity should avoid the complications and divisiveness issues often found where different processes are utilized for different classes of employees. The investigative and disposition process appears to comply with due process requirements and the relevant labor agreements. Processes for the imposition of discipline and for undertaking appeals of discipline are clear and concise. Levels of discipline are governed by a matrix based on severity of violations. This system should help to provide for uniformity of discipline among units throughout the agency.

Upon concluding an investigation of a complaint, VPD policy provides that the complainant is to be contacted by the decision-making authority and advised of the findings and whether or not discipline resulted. The notification is not to discuss or indicate the type of discipline imposed, if any. The date, time, location, and manner of contact is required to be documented, as well as any responses of the complainant. The policy does not specify how the notification is to be made, e.g., verbal or written. A requirement to invariably provide standardized written notifications, issuing from a single source, and containing instructions for responding should a complainant wish to do so, would ensure uniformity and provide the required documentation.

Recommendations:

- The Professional Standards Unit should report directly to the chief of police. A professional standards unit, responsible for internal affairs, early warning systems, audits, and, if an inspections function is instituted as recommended previously, inspections, is an appropriate arm of the chief's office. Placement of these functions in a position of direct report to the chief not only provides the agency head with the clearest and most direct path to critical information, it communicates the importance of these functions to all employees of the agency.
- The VPD should include a general outline of the internal investigation processes on the departmental website, including the definitions of the various disposition classifications.
- Upon receipt and classification of a major complaint, a standardized letter should be sent to the complainant acknowledging receipt of the complaint and it should include a general description of the investigative process. Upon concluding a complaint, that the complainant should be notified by PSU, in all instances, by means of a standardized letter. The letter should indicate the investigative findings whether or not discipline was imposed, and provide directions for responding.

Early Warning System

VPD utilizes an automated early warning (early intervention system), which generates alerts when a certain number of incidents are recorded within a specific time period. The types of incidents include uses of force, citizen complaints, vehicle pursuits, and traffic accidents. When the system, located in PSU, generates an alert relating to an employee, the alert is reviewed by the PSU command, and forwarded to the appropriate commander with instructions to review the alert and take action as deemed necessary. Actions may include coaching, counseling, reassignment and

individual training. If the command receiving the alert takes action, that fact must be reported back to PSU with an explanation. The action taken and explanation is documented by PSU. If no action is taken, no response is expected from the employee's commander. ICMA believes that, if the decision not to take action by the affected command is not reported back and justified, as well as documented by PSU, the potential for serious problems is created. Issues ranging from internal claims of disparate treatment and favoritism to external claims of municipal liability due to failure to control or train adequately could be seriously complicated by the absence of such responses.

Recommendation:

- The early warning/intervention system of VPD should be modified to require responses, with justification, for all alerts forwarded from PSU, whether or not action is taken.

Use of Force

VPD policy regarding use of force appears to provide adequate and understandable guidance for employees and supervisors. Aside from the generalized use of force policy, the topic appears elsewhere in department manual sections dealing with specific methods or items through which force may be applied, e.g., Taser, handcuffs, and lateral vascular neck restraint. When the anticipated revision and reorganization of the department's policies and procedures is complete, if these currently separate elements regarding use of force are consolidated and the terminology standardized, the result should provide even better guidance.

VPD policy requires the documentation of all use of force incidents. The documentation is reviewed by PSU and VPD's Training Division. Review by Training is for the purpose of identifying needs for new training topics or revisions to current topics. Review by PSU is designed to identify potential policy violations or policy deficiencies. Use of force reports are compiled in a database which generates early intervention alerts when a numerical threshold is triggered for a particular employee. These alerts are sent to that employee's supervisors for appropriate action, e.g., counseling, temporary reassignment, or individual training.

Vehicle Pursuits

Vehicle pursuits are the subject of detailed VPD policy and procedure statements which limit pursuits to very serious situations when the risk of not conducting a pursuit outweighs the risks generally associated with pursuits. Supervisory notification is required, as is continuous monitoring by supervisors. Responsibility for deciding to terminate a pursuit is placed on both the involved officer and supervisors, for which detailed guidance is provided. Tactical intervention maneuvers such as PIT, spike strips, and ramming, are narrowly authorized. The policy clearly states that these techniques constitute a use of force and that the department's use of force policy also governs their use. Prior supervisory authorization is required for use of spike strips or ramming in all instances, and "if at all practical" for the PIT maneuver. All pursuits are required to be documented in detail. Pursuit reports are compiled in the early warning system, reviewed by PSU, and generate alerts, which are handled in the same manner as reports regarding use of force.

Hiring and Recruitment

VPD maintains a vigorous recruitment program. Using a private recruitment and testing contractor, the agency advertises in many online sites and local publications, and through an extensive array of colleges, universities, out-of-state police academies, military facilities, community groups, and churches. Lateral entries are also sought from among police agencies within the state. The VPD web page currently features an array of information about the process involved in becoming a VPD employee. Information is provided regarding all aspects of the hiring process, including the qualifications and the various steps that an applicant can expect to encounter. Information is provided for persons interested in law enforcement employment (lateral entry and new hires), civilian employees, and volunteers.

The educational requirement for police officers is a high school diploma. Prospective applicants must pass a test, before undergoing psychological and polygraph screening, and a background investigation. ICMA was informed that three to four hundred applicants must be examined to obtain four candidates for hiring.

VPD is currently in the process of filling several positions. One entry level and one lateral entry officer will begin working shortly. Two additional offers of employment are expected to be issued in the near future. ICMA has noted that VPD ranks are populated by a sizeable number of lateral entry personnel. Documentation provided by VPD indicates that lateral entry employees comprise approximately 63 percent of the department's law enforcement personnel. The agency seeks to maintain a balance between the number of lateral and entry level candidates when hiring, but does not have a required, fixed percentage balance between the two types of candidates.

Volunteer Program

VPD maintains a vigorous and extensive volunteer program, Neighbors On Watch, which is currently comprised of approximately 120 volunteers. Volunteers are recruited through a variety of means, such as brochures, the VPD website, television, booths at community events, advertisements, and referrals from police officers and other volunteers. Neighbors On Watch members must first complete a 26-hour academy and 10-hour mentoring program before beginning any volunteer activities. The patrol component of the program includes nearly 100 persons who patrol their neighborhoods, reporting suspicious activities to VPD for response by patrol officers. These volunteers always patrol in pairs and maintain communication with a third member of the patrol team monitoring a base station radio. The remaining volunteers perform various tasks within agency facilities according to their interests and abilities, and the needs of VPD. Volunteers serve an average two and one-half years, with the most common reason for leaving being a change in personal circumstances.

ICMA was informed that volunteers are well received in the department and their contributions are recognized by VPD employees. The department informed ICMA that in incidents calling for activities such as area searches or large scale distribution of leaflets, e.g., a missing child, the program allowed for the assembly and mobilization of a large number of Neighbors On Watch personnel to provide assistance.

Aside from the benefits conferred by the services provided by the volunteers, this program appears to have great potential benefit to VPD in regard to relations with citizens and various communities in the city. Current and former volunteers who feel they truly are, or were, part of the agency have a stake in the success of VPD within the city government as well as in its law enforcement endeavors. As such, they function as goodwill ambassadors, each capable of informing and influencing a number of fellow community members regarding the people and programs of the VPD.

Training

Training within VPD is delivered and monitored by the Training Unit in the Technical Services Division, Operations Support Bureau. Training is also responsible for maintaining records relating to officer training and the completion of state-imposed mandatory retraining requirements. Some online training is currently offered and more is planned. Many scenario-based and specialized topics require in-person training and the Training Unit is responsible for scheduling these activities in the context of the overall scheduling scheme of VPD.

VPD does not maintain an in-house police academy for either lateral or entry level police officers. Once hired, the new employees are sent through either lateral training or the complete police academy. Upon successfully completing the academy or lateral training, officers begin working under the supervision of a Field Training Officer (FTO) for a period of at least three months. The department also maintains an FTO-style (mentoring) program for newly promoted sergeants. These programs feature detailed programs with checklists and periodic evaluations designed to make sure that persons being trained, or mentored, are familiarized with and required to perform in all aspects of the jobs they are undertaking.

The state-imposed requirement for annual training to maintain law enforcement certification amounts to 24 hours of training, in addition to firearms requalification. The Training Unit is responsible for monitoring the amount of training achieved by each employee toward this requirement and maintaining records establishing successful completion of the required hours. The unit provides an extensive array of courses, some of which can be taken online. Additionally, the Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission (WSCJTC) provides some online and CD-based training that is appropriate for meeting annual requirements. ICMA was informed that in-service training provided by VPD is generally closer to 50 hours per year.

The Training Unit is attempting to make VPD a regional training hub in order to offer training that would be available to VPD employees and other law enforcement personnel in the area and beyond. Tuition received from non-VPD attendees would help to pay for the program, while providing VPD with the opportunity to bring specialized training and seminars to its employees.

Currently, VPD does not have an internal executive development program, but the department wishes to establish one. The agency does send personnel to FBI National Academy sessions when possible. Additionally, there are some regional resources available, e.g., the WSCJTC conducts an annual Northwest Law Enforcement Command College. If the regional training hub concept discussed previously comes to fruition, the agency may be able to attract seminars and programs which will provide executive development opportunities to a greater number of employees. In

conjunction with these resources, a formalized executive development program featuring a progression of critical assignments and mentoring should provide future benefits to the VPD.

Recommendation:

- Create a formalized executive development program.

Fleet

VPD fleet in 2012 was comprised of 170 vehicles, including five motorcycles and eight trailers. Sixty-one vehicles were assigned and equipped for patrol activities. Vehicles observed by ICMA appeared presentable and well maintained. Patrol vehicles contain a great deal of equipment, including mobile digital terminals, and the interiors, though crowded with said equipment, appeared neat and well organized. Funded vehicles are generally replaced every 100,000 to 125,000 miles, with the exception of patrol vehicles, which are replaced at 100,000 miles. Fuel and maintenance for VPD vehicles is provided by a city department, Equipment Services.

VPD recorded 73 vehicle accidents between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2012. In 55 percent of these incidents, fault was attributed to VPD employees, with causation mainly classified as “officer inattention.” Only a very small percentage of these accidents resulted in injuries. The reported statistics do not appear to be excessive. Employee vehicle accidents are tracked by PSU and entered into the early warning system, which generates alerts based on parameters established by the department.

Fifty-eight vehicles are recognized as “take home” vehicles. VPD policy limits vehicles being taken to and from work to those needed in relation to emergency response readiness and call outs. The requirement is further limited to employees living in Clark County, Washington, unless authorized by the chief of police or designee. “Take home” vehicles are an area that would benefit from periodic examination by an inspection program, such as that recommended previously. Aside from the expenses and liability exposure attendant on increased mileage driven, the assignment of “take home” vehicles may often be a source of dissatisfaction and lowered morale in an organization or one of its subdivisions.

Recommendation:

- “Take home” vehicle assignment and usage should be examined periodically to assure that all assignments and usage comply with published VPD policy.

Property and Evidence

VPD property and evidence is stored in a facility separate from the headquarters building and the two precinct buildings. Evidence is collected from the precincts and transported to the storage facility. At the precincts storage lockers are maintained for temporary storage of evidence or found property; it is later collected and transported to the storage facility. Detailed procedures designed to maintain strict security and chain of custody, as well as for the handling of items that are not suitable for placement in the storage lockers, are contained in the department manual.

The evidence facility has 15,000 square feet of space. Items are maintained by a lead evidence technician and two evidence technicians. Currently, approximately 46,000 items are stored in the facility. The actual number fluctuates daily. In 2012, 13,378 items entered the facility and 8,409 were released, including 355 firearms, 1,104 drug items, and 705 found items.

The property and evidence function is one of the aspects of VPD that is subject to periodic examination by the current audit unit of the Operations Support Division. The department manual prescribes that audits will occur, at least, annually, and at any time a new employee is assigned overall responsibility for the property and evidence program. Additionally, the chief of police can order an unannounced audit at any time.

Records

VPD records consisting of police reports and traffic accident reports are maintained by the records department of the Sheriff of Clark County, Washington, pursuant to a contract requiring an annual fee. Members of the public access these records from a sheriff's department facility located in the city, subject to applicable restrictions. ICMA was informed that VPD was satisfied with this arrangement and that members of the public were apparently satisfied as well.

Administrative records are maintained at VPD. Many are kept electronically and are accessible in that format or are printable on demand as needed for internal use. Requests for access to records by the news media are coordinated by the Public Information Office. These and other requests are coordinated by a city central records office in conjunction with departmental records coordinators. All requests are reviewed by the city attorney prior to release. All releases are subject to state public records laws, applicable court decisions, and pertinent sections of collective bargaining agreements.

Information Technology

Many VPD administrative functions are highly automated and dependent on a functional and reliable array of electronic equipment and software supported by trained information technology personnel. VPD obtains such equipment and software through a process within city government administered by the Information Technology Services Department. This involves taking a proposal through a committee process designed to evaluate sought-after technology. Information Technology Services also coordinates or supplies the necessary support for hardware or software once it is acquired. Various VPD members described information systems and programs that were being used, were anticipated to be brought into service, or which were being proposed. All department members appeared to be satisfied with the Information Technology Services Department and the processes involved with acquiring new technology.

Communications

All calls for police service, both emergency and nonemergency, are received and dispatched by the Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency (CRESA). CRESA provides this service for VPD and all local emergency services agencies in Clark County, Washington, as well as for several agencies located outside of the county. Currently, all callers use the number “911” regardless of the nature of the call, as CRESA does not utilize a nonemergency number. The Chief of VPD is involved in the governance of CRESA, serving as a member of the CRESA Administrative Board.

Officers were observed being dispatched and otherwise utilizing the mobile digital terminals in patrol vehicles. They appeared to be very well versed with the equipment as well as satisfied with the communications system. No complaints were noted regarding either the equipment or dispatch system.

Persons seeking information can speak to an officer at the precinct station, at which there is a public lobby. Instances of such call taking were observed; during these calls the callers were treated professionally and courteously. Reports can be made in person at this location. Reporting of certain incidents, classified as “low level crimes” on the VPD website, can also be made online, where instructions and forms are provided. The online features can facilitate the process for many victims/reporters and reduce the necessity for police response in many cases. However, designating crimes as “low level” may deter some online reporting, since although the designation may be technically accurate, the victim of an offense may not view it that way when attempting to report it.

Recommendation:

- Remove references to crimes as “low level” in the online crime reporting portions of the VPD website, and simply state the requirements for offenses applicable to online reporting and provide a list of those offenses.

Facilities and Building Maintenance

The VPD facilities we observed appeared clean and well maintained. Employee work areas appeared orderly and businesslike as did common areas. The public lobby area of the West Precinct, the only point for VPD walk-in services, appeared welcoming, clean, and functional.

Maintenance, inspection, and repair of all city facilities are handled by the facility services unit of the city’s General Services Administration.

Organizational Culture and Communications

Organizational culture is typically defined as the behavioral regularities of a group, including the norms, values, formal philosophies, and shared mental models that underlie behavior, as well as all the symbols and rituals that display these cultural assumptions.¹¹ Organizational culture consists of all the structures, processes, and shared expectations that influence the thinking and behavior of organizational members and helps determine how they interact with each other and outsiders.¹² ICMA assessed the organizational culture of the Vancouver Police Department via employee focus groups, individual meetings with employees and agency administrators, observational assessments of departmental meetings and interactions, and analysis of an employee survey.

Focus Groups, Interviews, and Survey

Focus groups are typically informal meetings that are facilitated by a moderator and involve a general theme of discussion. ICMA conducted two focus groups with sworn personnel at the officer rank and first-line supervisors from various units. These meetings could be characterized as open and free-flowing discussions. ICMA placed no bounds on discussions and only offered prompting questions as needed. In addition, several interviews were conducted with individual employees at various ranks—along with informal discussions with agency administrators—in order to surface issues that employees might have been reluctant to bring up in a group setting. Lastly, ICMA conducted a web-based survey for sworn and civilian employees. The administration of the survey is discussed in greater detail in the next section, and where appropriate, excerpts are taken from the open-ended responses to highlight the themes being presented. The “open-ended” comments provided by the sworn officers are used extensively in this section of ICMA’s report. The comments from the surveys have been combined with anecdotal accounts received from officers during the interviews and focus groups to identify and discuss the most important issues facing the organization.

The following discussion does not paint a flattering picture of the VPD. While seemingly negative, the accounts offered below actually present enormous improvement opportunities for the department. The opportunities exist first through proper identification of the problems and then through working with the outstanding men and women of the VPD to resolve these issues. The VPD employees embraced this process enthusiastically and were extremely forthcoming and frank with their assessment of the organization. Officers at all levels provided detailed and passionate accounts of their experiences. In addition to the themes discussed below, a sense of pride in the department and the community, as well as a desire for professionalism, resonated throughout the conversations and through the survey. The department should be proud of this response and capitalize on this enthusiasm to achieve necessary changes in the organization.

Several themes emerged from these interactions. It will be incumbent on the next chief of police to address these issues head-on. It is ICMA’s contention that these issues have been a destructive force

¹¹ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010).

¹² Neal M. Ashkanasy, Celeste P. M. Wilderom, and Mark F. Peterson (eds.), *The Handbook of Organizational Culture and Climate* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2000).

in the VPD for many years, and while all police organizations face similar challenges, they exist to such an extent in the VPD that the agency is almost paralyzed.

Leadership

When asked what qualities were desired in a new chief, employees indicated that they wanted a strong leader.... a “General Patton”-type of individual who will jump-start the department. Also, employees desire a senior administration that is communicative, open to ideas, transparent, accessible, in touch with frontline employees, empowering, consistent, and visionary. With regard to supervisors and managers, comments from frontline employees were generally positive, but they did express some concern about the organization being “thick in the middle,” a perception that there may be too many supervisors, possibly with too narrow a span of control and overlapping oversight. There were concerns that this may be why vertical communication and information is often lost or filtered.

There was general consensus with the statement that the department was “over-managed and under-led.” Leadership is one of the most studied and most elusive concepts in organizational behavior. As with many concepts, leadership is difficult to define, but you know it when you see it. Leadership is defined as “a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal.”¹³ Based upon our observations of the VPD, discussions with employees, and examination of documents provided, the VPD appears to have a leadership vacuum. There appears to be a cadre of dedicated professionals committed to the organization and who are looking for the opportunity to lead. This leadership potential, however, is being stymied by the organizational culture itself. These issues are identified below and opportunities for improvement are offered to overcome the current state of affairs. The following statements were taken from the employee survey to highlight the problems in this area:

- Our greatest weakness is the lack of leadership in the command staff and the ostensible distrust toward first-line supervisors and their decision-making abilities, tactical and technical expertise, judgment, and a myriad of other leadership characteristics.
- We have good people doing good work and leaders in leadership roles that need to be given the opportunity to be supportive of what the role is and the ability to make hard decisions which they will be accountable for.
- 90 percent of the problems here arise from the inability for senior leadership to actually be leaders. Selfishness seems to be the norm and leadership by pet peeve rules.
- We need leadership, not management. Leadership needs to be from the top down with leading by example.
- We need a return to common sense leadership and we need a chief and command staff that will lead by example.

¹³ Peter G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice*, 4th Edition.

Division

The VPD is a divided and fractured organization. The divisions are organizational, political, and geographic.

From a geographic standpoint, the department is dispersed throughout the city. The administration—chief, assistant chief, and primary administrative staff—work from headquarters on Evergreen Avenue near downtown. The West Precinct is located on Stapleton Ave, about a 10-minute drive from HQ, and the East Precinct is located on SE 155th Street, about a 30-minute drive from HQ. Additionally, several of the investigative units are scattered throughout the city and outside of precinct or headquarters facilities. The result of this separation is limited contact and limited interpersonal interaction between the executive leadership of the department and the rank and file, and a separation between several investigative units and other operational units in the VPD. This leads to ineffective communications and underperformance.

From a political standpoint, there are deep divisions between the leadership of the department and the Vancouver Police Officer's Guild (VPOG). The relationship between leadership of the VPD and the Guild can best be described as acrimonious. Over the past several years this relationship has degraded to the point that the two sides often do not meet to discuss mutually important issues. Several lawsuits, terminations, disciplinary actions, adverse employment decisions, and a vote of "no confidence" have eroded the relationship between parties and created an "us-versus-them" atmosphere. During our site visit, conversations with both sides of this political divide indicated that there may be movement toward a common ground. There was a sentiment expressed that after a lengthy period of battling it might be time to forge another path. The "business as usual" approach appears destructive to the culture of the organization and the morale of its employees, and it would be in the best interests of all concerned to work together.

From an organizational standpoint the department is divided. The elimination of the lieutenant rank resulted in placing additional responsibilities on the commanders. Also, the command staff generally works business hours (8 a.m. to 5 p.m., Monday to Friday), and many operational units work nights and weekends. The combination of these factors has created a situation in which the command staff is organizationally separated from most of the department.

Disruptive Change

Over the last 20 years there have been 10 chiefs of police (6 permanent and 4 acting/interim chiefs). Naturally, each chief brings in new ideas and a new policing and managerial philosophy. The rapid and successive change in executive leadership, however, has not ushered in substantive and lasting change. Rather, it has ushered in disruptive change. Each chief forced new ideas on the organization, but was not around long enough to ensure proper implementation and modification. Each chief entered with new ideas and the process happened all over again, thus creating two decades of chaotic and uncoordinated organizational change.

Policing strategy undoubtedly changes over time. From traditional approaches of policing with rapid response, random patrol, and reactive investigations, to community policing and CompStat, police management and policing philosophy evolves and changes. However, the experience in the

VPD has not been orderly and well-planned, it has been disruptive. A policing “flavor of the day” approach took hold, only to be changed again with a new administration.

The prescription for the VPD is an extended and comprehensive period of dynamic stability. Dynamic stability is a concept from engineering that has useful applications to organizational behavior. It refers to the ability of a device, system, or process to withstand forces from the outside, maintain structural integrity, and respond to those forces by producing subtle and nondisruptive changes. Things need to change in the VPD; no police organization can remain rigid. However, the extended period of disruptive change experienced over the last 20 years requires that the next wave of change be accomplished within the context of dynamic stability. The VPD must change gradually, and evolve incrementally, while maintaining the overall equilibrium of the organization. In other words, the necessary changes must be made without drastic modifications to the organization or its philosophy of policing.

Feedback from the employee survey supports this notion that the department is in a state of disequilibrium, undoubtedly brought on by an extended period of disruptive change. According to some employees:

- The mission and values statements for VPD are just words on a wall. We don't know who we are, where we came from, where we're going or for what we stand.
- There is a lack of mission, lack of vision, internal turmoil [sic], imploded, flattened the organizational structure, destroyed morale, hypersensitive and hypercritical towards officers, blamed the Guild for his own shortcomings, etc., etc., etc. Sad, unprofessional, waste of taxpayer money. I would love to work for real leaders with a vision, and a clear mission.
- No clear mission exists for the department even one as basic as to protect and serve. With the history in the department and city officers have been taught that they should be happy to collect a paycheck so some officers do the minimum to earn their pay. There is no incentive to do better.
- We have no clear mission from the city or the chief, but we continue to perform our jobs.
- It does not appear that the mission, vision, and values of the department are clearly known and communicated by Command Staff

This holds true for dealing with the inefficient work schedule. The current patrol shift schedule is wasteful and inefficient and must be changed; however, caution must be exercised in this situation. The next chief must first gain the trust and respect of the department (see below) before initiating a change of this magnitude. Furthermore, the ICMA operational report is presenting a blueprint for the VPD, but the recommended changes must be implemented carefully, with due diligence, and in recognition of the disruptive change in the recent past.

Communications

Across the board, members of the VPD are dissatisfied with the internal communications process. It appears, however, that interpersonal communications within units, and between rank-and-file employees and their immediate supervisors, is not the issue. Anecdotal accounts of close working relationships and effective communication are supported by responses from the employee survey. Sworn and civilian employees appear to understand what is expected of them, have confidence in their immediate supervisors, and believe there is effective communication with their supervisors. The problem seems to exist between the department and the city administration, and within the department between the command staff and the rank-and-file.

While it is impossible to diagnose the precise communication problem, it is sufficient to highlight that there is a strong perception within the organization that the command staff is not communicating effectively. This translates into the sense of a lack of mission, or perception that no one is in charge. According to members of the VPD:

- There is excellent communication and work being done at the lower (officer/sergeant) level. I do not have confidence in the integrity of command staff. Communication between command staff and lower level is poor.
- The communication within the department—I believe it is seriously lacking between administration and patrol.
- An individual spirit of cooperation, communication, and appreciation will help provide beneficial results many desire to attain through and for this great organization.
- Communication has been a problem at VPD for the 16 years I have been at VPD. I do not even know if what I communicate to my sergeant is communicated effectively up the chain of command. I have experienced ineffective communication down the chain of command. There are too many layers to know if communication is occurring effectively. The only way I know to communicate effectively is to send information by email through my chain of command, but I still do not know how that is filtered.

Accountability

The rank and file members of the VPD offered withering criticism of the command staff with respect to accountability issues. There is a strong perception that ranking members of the VPD are held accountable to a different standard than everyone else in the organization. The situation was referred to as a “caste system” that differentiated between the command staff and line employees. Numerous examples were given that ranged from minor policy violations to potential violations of law, where the conduct by commanders and chiefs was ignored, while the same behavior by the rank-and-file merited disciplinary action. For example, it was alleged that commanders wear uniforms that suit them, regardless of their assignment. Oftentimes, ranking members of the department will be out of uniform or dressed in a uniform that is different from their subordinates. Similarly, allegations were made that members of the command staff “come and go” as they please. By this it is perceived they come to work late, leave early, and are absent for large segments of the day.

Additionally, it was alleged that the command staff submits requests for overtime compensation for time not actually worked, or activities are manipulated in order for the command staff to incur overtime compensation. VPD personnel report that commanders are occasionally called after-hours to be notified of critical police incidents. It is the perception of the officers that the decision to respond and assume command of these incidents is driven by the desire to incur overtime and not operational necessity. So, for example, the perception is that commanders will eschew the response to serious incidents, but will respond to mundane events when their presence is not necessarily required but they were notified as a matter of process. Thus, the perception is that the command staff avoids being involved in serious police incidents in order to avoid responsibility, but gets involved in less serious incidents simply to generate overtime compensation.

Other incidents were reported in which command staff personnel lost firearms, lost shields, misused department vehicles for personal purposes, and conducted personal business during on-duty time. It was further alleged that disciplinary action is not taken against members of the command staff for these violations; violations for which rank-and-file members have been subject to termination.

It must be stressed that the ICMA study of the VPD was not focused on uncovering misconduct, and no actual incidents of misconduct were identified or supported. There is a very strong perception, however, that the command staff regularly commit minor and major violations of department policy and are not held accountable for their behavior. Compounding these transgressions is the perception that the chiefs are aware of these incidents and have done nothing about them, whereas rank-and-file employees are disciplined for similar behavior. It is not the actual policy violations that are important, therefore, it is the perception that is important. The rank-and-file believe the command staff gets away with misconduct, is not held accountable for their behavior, the executive command is aware of the misconduct and does nothing about it, and there is a double-standard in place that holds subordinates accountable for behavior and for which their superior officers are not. According to members of the VPD:

- Commanders can "adjust" their schedule to account for child care or other personal matters, and still obtain overtime. Patrol officers are scrutinized for overtime, sergeants have very little overtime, yet commanders continue to obtain vast amounts. Patrol has minimum staffing, yet the entire precinct command can be off.
- The VPOG runs its own personal agenda, is not willing to be held accountable and does not necessarily represent the majority of the guild body, but rather puts forward the message of the vocal minority.
- There are multiple commanders who are incompetent and never held accountable for severe policy violations. It destroys morale and gives them zero integrity. Until they are held accountable, morale will never improve.
- There is zero accountability at the top and a clear double standard for adhering to policy and use of overtime. It is an us-against-them attitude from those who were given the job to manage morale.
- Specific people in upper management positions have furthered their own agenda and... are never held accountable for their own actions.

It must be stressed that the comments provided above were not verified and have not been substantiated. It is also important to note that the perception of a lack of accountability exists. It is not relevant whether or not any of these allegations are, in fact, true. In the view of the workforce, the situation exists, and therefore it must be dealt with.

Respect/Trust

Similar to the context surrounding issues of accountability, perception is a strong influence with regards to respect, trust, and rapport that exists (or does not exist) between the command staff and the rank-and-file. Several simple examples are offered to illustrate the problems in this area where events, perceived or actual, have created a climate of mistrust and disrespect within the organization. Please keep in mind that the exact dynamics of this process and the actual events that occurred are not relevant to the perception or mistrust that currently exists in the department. This incident, however, was singled out as a glaring example of the breakdown in the organization and a source of divisiveness in the department.

In 2011, the VPD eliminated the rank of lieutenant. Of the ten incumbent lieutenants, three were promoted to commander, and seven were demoted to the rank of sergeant. The reported reason for eliminating the rank was to flatten the organization within the context of community policing, and to save money by lowering the number of command staff personnel. The perception was that there was discord among the executive ranks of the department that resulted in the elimination of the entire rank. There was also a perception that favoritism was the basis for determining which lieutenants got promoted and which got demoted. The perceived disrespect shown for the careers, positions, effort, and salaries of seven senior members of the VPD through the elimination of the entire rank of lieutenant left a deep scar in the culture of the organization.

In July 2009, the Matrix Consulting Group issued a report on the internal affairs, disciplinary process, and cultural assessment of the VPD. According to numerous sources in the VPD, the prior administration used this report as an opportunity to make lasting and substantive changes in the organization, and solicited the input from numerous members of the VPD. Several “working groups” were created to explore the issues identified by Matrix, and a collective process was engaged in order to ensure buy-in and successful implementation. According to the sources in the VPD, numerous VPD personnel worked diligently on this process and made what they considered valuable recommendations to support the necessary changes identified by Matrix. According to VPD officers, these recommendations were ignored by the chief and the perception was that the effort of VPD personnel was wasted and the chief did what he wanted to do anyway. Once again, this process left a deep scar in the culture of the organization and cast a pall over creativity, innovation, and a desire to contribute to the growth of the organization. It also deepened a perceived distrust between the chief, the command staff, and the rest of the department.

According to employee feedback from our survey:

- Command staff should trust us to perform like the professionals we are instead of placing us under a microscope and treating us like children.
- Patrol has a lack of trust in the administration.

- No one has trust in the command staff because discipline and promotions as well as detective slots have not been handed out fairly over the past 6 to 8 years.
- The trust and confidence in our command staff is ZERO.
- Our command staff have become untrustworthy and are never held accountable for their time or work product.

There is a perception among members of the workforce that they do not enjoy support of the organization. Whether or not this is the case is irrelevant. The perception is the reality, and this reality must be dealt with accordingly. Establishing and maintaining trust and support is a delicate undertaking. The exact process by which this occurs is beyond the scope of this report, but is an area that needs attention. Ordinarily, a group of employees and the chief and command staff would work together to flesh-out the issues, but the problem here is that one side does not appear to trust the other. How can there be a collegial and productive exploration of this issue, which is based on trust, when trust is the issue in the first place? A serious dialogue needs to commence between the chief, the police and the union about this issue. Before any process aimed at restoring trust can be put in place, the people responsible for the leadership and management of the organization must first recognize the seriousness of this issue and explore ways of dealing with it.

The VPD must take stock of this situation and repair the various divisions in the organization. In order to overcome this situation, the following recommendations are offered:

Recommendations:

- Consolidate units and assign personnel to work out of the East or West precincts, except where confidentiality is required. The headquarters facility should be closed and all positions relocated to one of the precincts. There appears to be ample room in each facility to support additional personnel
- Create a leadership team. This team would represent a cross-section of the workforce and would weigh in on important organizational decisions, process improvement, change management, and innovation, including the implementation of the recommendations from this study. This group should be multidisciplinary and involve both sworn and civilian employees from various ranks, as well as union representatives.
- Institute an informal Labor-Management Committee. This committee should be comprised of representatives of the employee union, the different units in the department, and the command staff. The committee's responsibility would be two-fold. First, the committee would act as an important conduit between the chief and the officers in the department. Without resorting to memos, press releases, or policy directives, the chief could use this forum as a mechanism for discussing any policy changes with the members of the department in advance of their implementation. The chief could also use this forum as an opportunity to communicate with the department in an "informal" manner. Second, the committee should be responsible for accepting and investigating anonymous reports from members of the department about grievances they have with the department without fear of retaliation.

- Institute a robust leadership development program for the entire department. The disconnect between the department command staff and the rank-and-file officers is probably the issue of greatest concern for the organization and definitely the one easiest to address. The command staff of the VPD needs to reenergize its leadership roles in the organization. Leadership means motivating, building relationships, and understanding the people that you are charged with leading. From a police perspective, it cannot be done from behind a desk working Monday to Friday during regular business hours, while writing and distributing memos. Leadership is a “people” business and the leaders of the VPD need to reengage the workforce. This requires two-way communication, being visible and present, understanding the officers from a personal standpoint, and translating the mission of the department into a vision for the officers to rally around. The VPD should invest in the leadership development of all its sworn officers, from the entry level officer in field training right up to the chief of police.

Leadership development, however, is not the sole domain for supervisors. Every officer is a leader. When members of the community call for assistance they expect leadership and safe and quick resolution to their problems. It is recommended that a robust and vigorous leadership development program be established for all members of the VPD. From the new recruit to the chief, the concepts of effective leadership should be engrained and practiced. Developing leadership skills is a life-long process and it should not be assumed that tenure or rank has invested the individual with those skills. The greatest leaders evolve and continually sharpen their skills and look for opportunities for developing their own personal leadership proficiency as well as the leadership proficiency of their subordinates.

The initial targets of this leadership development program should be first-line supervisors and officers. The command staff should play an integral part of the development of this program and look at it as an opportunity for them to develop their own skills and the skills of their subordinates. On a separate track, the command staff should seek leadership training opportunities to better prepare them for their roles in the department and to enable them to prepare and mentor the next generation of leadership within the agency. Programs exist around the country and are sponsored by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Police Executive Research Forum, and major universities in the region. Formal training should be received by key personnel in the agency and then this training brought back to the department to create an in-house and holistic leadership development program. This program would be incorporated into every facet of training in the department, including entry-level field training.

Employee Survey

As part of the operational assessment of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), ICMA conducted a self-prepared written survey of all sworn officers employed by the VPD. The survey was administered by the online survey website Survey Monkey and was conducted over a two-week period between January 17, 2013 and February 1, 2013. Respondents were asked demographic questions about age, gender, and rank, along with a series of questions related to workplace climate, organizational communications, the meaning and purpose of their work, as well as the degree of supportive relationships in the department.

Job characteristics were rated using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement to numerous facets of work-life in the VPD. Responses were scored from 1 to 6, with 1 representing “strongly agree” and 6 representing “strongly disagree.” In the survey response charts in Appendix B, the actual number of responses in each category appears in the respective column. The rating average is a summation of the actual scores for each response, and then divided by the total number of responses in that category. In some cases the number of responses in each category does not match the total number of respondents because some respondents failed to provide a response in that category. A rating average of less than 3 indicates an overall agreement with the statement. A rating average greater than 3 indicates disagreement. Employees could also submit comments if they desired.

For the sworn officer survey, 145 responses were received. This represents a 72 percent return rate with a margin of error of +/- 4.2 percent.¹⁴ From a practical perspective this means that the survey results are representative of the VPD within 4.2 percentage points. What does this mean? For example, the response average to the first statement “My work conditions are acceptable” was 2.44. Due to the margin of error and confidence level, we are 95 percent certain that this rating could range from 2.34 to 2.54, or 4.2 percent below and above 2.44.

For the civilian employees, 16 responses were received. This represents an 80 percent return rate with a margin of error of +/-11.2 percent. A unique feature of sampling is that the power of the sample is related to the number of the responses received, and not necessarily the return rate. In the civilian sample the return rate was greater, but the confidence in the representativeness of those responses is less. In small groups, it only takes one or two responses to change the overall results, thus a greater number of responses are necessary to increase confidence.

Nonetheless, the civilian employee survey can be very useful in understanding the issues facing the VPD. Considering that survey responses were supported by personal observations and reports from the officers themselves, ICMA has a high degree of confidence in the survey results as accurately describing the attitudes and perceptions of the responding officers. The following is a discussion of the strengths and weakness of the VPD that the survey reveals. The full results of the survey, can be found in Appendix B.

¹⁴ Margin of error, or confidence interval, was calculated by the website <http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm>. The variables under consideration are confidence level (95%), population size (202), and a probability of diversity (.50).

Strengths/Positives

Survey results indicate several positive indicators of work conditions in the VPD. There is a great sense of satisfaction with the work done in the community and with the work schedule. The statement “I am satisfied with my work schedule” received the highest positive score, with a rating average of 1.56, which indicates general agreement. The second highest score was to the statement “My work is important,” at 1.85. In general, the survey indicates a positive work environment with clear expectations, supervisory support, and broad-based satisfaction with the VPD as a place of employment and policing as a career. Similarly, there are no general deficiencies noted with the equipment. The following statements were found to have general agreement from the survey respondents:

- My work conditions are acceptable
- The radios we use work effectively
- The vehicles we use are appropriate
- The technology is effective
- I have adequate supplies
- I have adequate space to do my job
- I am satisfied with my work schedule
- I am proud to be a member of the VPD
- In general I am satisfied with my career
- There needs to be more officers on patrol
- I know what is expected of me
- I have clear information about my job
- I am comfortable with what I am asked to do on my job
- My supervisor and I maintain a clear understanding of what is expected of me
- My supervisor does a good job communicating to people in my unit
- My immediate supervisor is properly trained for the position
- My work is important
- My work makes a positive contribution to the community
- My supervisor takes a personal interest in me
- My supervisor supports my professional development
- My supervisor is an effective leader
- My co-workers are competent at their jobs.

Weaknesses/Negatives

The survey revealed numerous weaknesses/negatives. With average scores of 4.13, 4.14, 4.13, and 5.01 there is clear dissatisfaction with the way training opportunities are distributed, the manner in which specialized assignments are made, the way in which promotions are made, and the way discipline is applied, respectively. These scores indicate that respondents report disagreement with the statements: “training opportunities are distributed fairly,” “selections to specialized assignments are done fairly,” “promotions are done fairly,” and “discipline is applied fairly.” In fact, perception of fair discipline garnered the largest negative level of agreement with a score of 5.1 out of 6. This indicates that there is universal DISAGREEMENT that the disciplinary system is applied fairly. Although these topics are the subject of other sections of the report, it bears repeating that these areas of administration in the VPD need immediate attention and correction.

Likewise, communication in the VPD is criticized. There is disagreement with the statements “In general there is good communication between the department and city hall,” (4.21) and “In general, the communication process in the department is excellent” (4.72). Respondents report high levels of disagreement with the statements relating to the effectiveness of communication in these areas.

Similarly, and as pointed out in other areas of this report, there appears to be a general lack of confidence in the leadership of the VPD. Respondents are in disagreement with the statements “I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department” (score of 4.88), and “The VPD has a clear sense of its mission” (4.48). Also, respondents disagree with the statements regarding innovation within the department. This finding supports the notion that the VPD is not innovative when it comes to crime fighting (4.00).

Lastly, it appears that morale is perceived to be low in the VPD: “Morale is high in the Department” (4.72), or in simpler terms, only 20 percent of the respondents to this survey had some level of agreement to this statement.

The stress placed on the patrol division to respond to CFS was a major topic of an earlier section of this report. The conclusions and the recommendations in that section are supported by the survey results. According to the survey, respondents had the strongest level of disagreement with the following statement: “Patrol units have plenty of time to interact with the community” (score of 4.04). Also, the statement “There need to be more officers on patrol to handle the workload” scored a 1.96. The following statements were found to have general disagreement from the survey respondents:

- Morale is high in the department
- The VPD has a clear sense of its mission
- Patrol units have plenty of time to interact with the community
- The VPD is innovative when it comes to fighting crime
- In general, I believe there is good communication between the department and city hall
- In general, communication in the department is excellent
- Training opportunities are distributed fairly

- Selections to specialized assignments are distributed fairly
- Promotions in the department are distributed fairly
- Discipline in the department is applied fairly
- I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department

Table 5 shows the rating average of statements on the survey taken by sworn personnel. Table 6 shows the rating average of statements on the survey taken by civilian personnel.. A complete presentation of the survey data can be found in Appendix B.

TABLE 5: Rating Average of Survey Statements, Sworn Personnel

Statement	Rating Average
Climate/Work Conditions	
My work conditions are acceptable	2.44
The radios we use work effectively	2.54
The vehicles we use are appropriate	2.07
The technology we employ is effective	2.66
I have adequate supplies/equipment	2.36
I have adequate space to do my job	2.17
I am satisfied with my work schedule	1.51
The VPD would be better off with a different patrol schedule	5.17
I am proud to be a member of the VPD	2.43
I often think of resigning	4.25
I general, I am satisfied with my career	2.57
Morale is high in the Department	4.72
The VPD has a clear sense of its mission	4.48
Patrol Units have plenty of time to interact with the community	4.04
There needs to be more officers on patrol to handle the workload	1.96
Whenever I have a concern at work I can always have my concerns resolved	3.68
I would recommend the Vancouver PD to anyone interested in a career	3.69
The VPD is innovative when it comes to fighting crime	4.00
The VPD is innovative when it comes to dealing with the community	3.58
Communication	
I know what is expected of me at work	2.35
I have clear information about how to do my job	2.66
I feel comfortable with what I am asked to do in meeting my job requirements	2.30
My supervisor and I maintain a clear understanding about what is expected of me	2.20
My supervisor does a good job communicating information to people in my unit	2.30
Often times I hear about changes in the department from the press	3.66
In general, I believe there is good communication between the department and city hall	4.21
My immediate supervisor listens to my ideas about improving the department	2.45
In general, the communication process in the department is excellent	4.72
I wish there was a better way where my ideas could be heard	2.77
Meaningful Work	
I receive timely feedback that my work contributes to the overall success of the department	3.82
I receive necessary training to maintain/ improve my skill and competency levels	3.29
My immediate supervisor is properly trained for the position he/she holds	2.68
Training opportunities are readily available in the department	3.99
Training opportunities are distributed fairly in the department	4.13
Selections to specialized assignments in the Department are done fairly	4.14

Promotions in the Department are done fairly	4.13
In the Department discipline is applied fairly	5.01
My work is important	1.85
My work makes a positive contribution to the community	1.93
Support/Relationships	
My supervisor takes personal interest in me	2.40
My supervisor supports my professional development	2.40
My supervisor is an effective leader	2.45
My coworkers are competent at doing their job	2.08
My coworkers are satisfied with their jobs	3.27
I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department	4.88
Oftentimes it seems like no one is in charge	2.64

Note: Responses highlighted in green indicate general agreement with the statement. Responses highlighted in red indicate general disagreement with the statement.

TABLE 6: Rating Average of Survey Statements, Civilian Employees

Statement	Rating Average
Climate/Work Conditions	
I believe the VPD provides an excellent service to the community	2.13
My work conditions are acceptable	2.56
The technology we employ in general is effective	3.06
I have adequate supplies/equipment necessary to do my job	2.44
I have adequate employee space to do my job	2.25
I am satisfied with my work schedule	2.44
I am proud to be a member of the Vancouver PD	2.13
I often think of resigning from the Department	3.94
In general, I am satisfied with my career	2.44
Morale is high in the Department	4.69
The Department has a clear sense of its mission	4.13
Whenever I have a concern at work I can always have my concerns resolved	3.44
I would recommend the VPD to anyone interested in a career in law enforcement	3.13
The Department is innovative when it comes to fighting crime	3.13
The Department is innovative when it comes to dealing with the community	2.80
Communication	
I know what is expected of me at work	2.31
I have clear information about how to do my job	2.56
I feel comfortable with what I am asked to do in meeting my job requirements	2.60
My supervisor and I maintain a clear understanding about what's expected of me	2.31
My supervisor does a good job communicating information to people in my unit	2.44
Often times I hear about changes in the department from the press	3.19
In general, I believe there is good communication between the department and city hall	3.88
My immediate supervisor listens to my ideas about improving the department	2.80
In general, the communication process in the department is excellent	4.33
I wish there was a better way where my ideas could be heard	3.00
Meaningful Work	
I receive timely feedback that my work contributes to the overall success of the VPD	3.81
I receive necessary training to maintain/improve my skill and competency levels	3.69
My immediate supervisor is properly trained for the position he/she holds	2.63
Training opportunities are readily available in the department	4.06
Training opportunities are distributed fairly in the department	3.87
Selections to specialized assignments in the Department are done fairly	3.33
Promotions in the Department are done fairly	3.60
In the Department discipline is applied fairly	3.75
My work is important	1.60
My work makes a positive contribution to the community	1.87
Support/Relationships	
My supervisor takes personal interest in me	2.44
My supervisor supports my professional development	2.69
My supervisor is an effective leader	2.69

My coworkers are competent at doing their job	1.69
My coworkers are satisfied with their jobs	3.00
I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department	3.81
Often times it seems like no one is in charge	2.88

Note: Responses highlighted in green indicate general agreement with the statement. Responses highlighted in red indicate general disagreement with the statement.

Performance Measurement and Strategic Planning

The VPD must engage in a strategic planning process. In general, the strategic planning process involves a thorough analysis of the problem, development of a plan, and implementation and evaluation of that plan. It also involves identifying strengths, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities for improvement, along with goals, objectives, strategies, and tactics to achieve results.

Strategic planning begins with a thorough analysis of crime. Times, days, locations, types of property stolen, hot spots, frequent offenders/known recidivists, wanted persons, and so on must all be identified at frequent and regular intervals. Armed with this information, a coordinated and integrated plan must be created that involves all elements of the VPD. For example, the role of patrol officers and detectives must be clearly established. NPOs and NRTs, investigative and specialty units all must have responsibilities in addressing these offenses. And these roles, tasks, and responsibilities must be driven by the information presented.

During the site visit, the ICMA team was fortunate to observe a “VANSTAT” meeting. VANSTAT is a process in Vancouver which is modeled after the CompStat process pioneered by the New York Police Department. CompStat, which stands for “comparative statistics” is a management approach to reducing crime. CompStat relies on the accurate intelligence gathering, developing plans, executing those plans, and evaluating the success or failure of that effort. Largely misunderstood as simply crime mapping and/or crime analysis, the CompStat process has tremendous potential for reducing crime and managing all police department operations.

Our observations of VANSTAT indicate that it is more like crime analysis than crime management. It must be recognized that the VANSTAT meeting observed by ICMA consultants was somewhat artificial. The VPD generously offered to demonstrate VANSTAT in a scaled-down and modified format. Nonetheless, the rigor of an effective crime management process was largely absent and was noticeably missing, even from the modified version observed by ICMA.

The crime analysis function in the department is excellent. Data are gathered, processed, and disseminated effectively, and the department has state-of-the-art technology employed to map crime. The problem rests in the development of a strategic focus: developing, implementing, and evaluating tactics and strategies specifically targeted at multiple categories of crime.

Recommendations:

- The VANSTAT meetings should be enhanced. All divisions and units should attend so that the entire organizational chart is represented at these meetings.
- The crime analyst should not lead all discussions at the weekly crime analysis meetings. Commanders should take turns leading or moderating these meetings. This ensures personal accountability.
- A standardized agenda should be circulated and used at all crime analysis meetings, and one person in attendance must be directed to record significant discussions and specific action steps for follow-up.

- VANSTAT should be used to engage the entire organization and encourage joint problem solving, particularly between the patrol and detective divisions. Meetings should be used to collaboratively answer the following questions regarding crime in Vancouver: *What's going on? How do we know? What should we do about it? and Are we having any impact?* The criminal events and conditions must be linked directly to specific anticrime efforts. In this way there can be continuity and accountability when these matters are reexamined at subsequent meetings. If these meetings are viewed or understood as merely informational get-togethers, their true potential will be lost.
- All geographic crime maps that are displayed at crime analysis meetings should also include time of occurrence or report for each incident mapped. Maps should be overlaid in order to display long-term trends in particular sections of the city.
- Field interrogation data should be provided by service area, specific location, and time of day. The department must be able to determine, in an ongoing fashion: *Who is being stopped? Exactly when and where? By whom? and Why?* Once again, the service area commanders should be expected to present this data to the group as evidence of “best efforts” used to address crime in chronic locations.

Summary

ICMA believes that the organizational culture and communications processes have created a department that is divided. The department is divided organizationally, geographically, and politically, and steps need to be taken to repair these divisions. The VPD also struggles to provide core services, and modifications to the patrol and investigative missions are in order.

The VPD must put pressure on the operational “levers” that provide efficient CFS response to community demands. Modification of the current patrol schedule is warranted and will result in cost savings to the department and improved operational efficiency. Recent personnel reductions have created an imbalance in the organization with an overemphasis on patrol operations. The department should consider adding resources to nonpatrol functions to improve operations in these areas. Similarly, the VPD needs to be more aggressive in triaging CFS from the public to minimize nonpolice calls.

The VPD must restructure the organization. In the past, the VPD sought to address crime through specialization of function and fragmentation of personnel. In times of unlimited resources this approach is commendable. In times of limited resources, however, this approach is short-sighted. Having a unit that has a narrow investigative focus, like digital evidence, at the expense of investigating burglary and other property crimes is an example of this approach. Investigating all crimes that can be solved should be the mission of the VPD. By narrowing the focus, and over-specializing, core service delivery suffers. This needs to be revisited and changed. Likewise, the concept of territorial command is a good one. However, in the context of current economic and political environment, this organizational approach is futile. Here again, the VPD must return to the delivery of core services in an efficient way and abandon the vestiges of the territorial command model. The department should direct its resources to two precincts with a commander in each, with lieutenants accountable for district operation, and with sufficient resources to respond to CFS and combat signs of disorder, regulate traffic safety, and respond to the needs of the community. Appendix C presents the current organizational chart for the VPD alongside a proposed chart that reflects these recommendations.

ICMA believes the department is understaffed and lacks direction and focus. Personnel reductions and budget cuts over the last several years have created a fragmented organization. At the time of the ICMA site visit the VPD had a complement of 180 sworn officers. Authorized strength for the VPD is 189. ICMA contends that the department should be brought back up to full strength as soon as possible, and after the recommendations on restructuring and re-organization implemented, an additional ten officers added to the authorized headcount.

Similarly, a succession of administrations, each with a different policing philosophy, has contributed to a palpable sense of disorientation with respect to the vision and mission of the department. Years of internal turmoil have had a negative effect on the workplace climate. A sustained period of dynamic stability is required for the VPD to regain its organizational footing.

The department seems to be at odds with itself. Anecdotal accounts from officers, and information from the survey, indicate a strong perception that the political forces inside and outside the

organization are battling one another. There is a traditional African proverb that states “when two elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers.” Instituting a process whereby the city, the department, and the guild can work together will undoubtedly change this perception, regrow the “grass,” and prepare the VPD to provide excellent service to the Vancouver community.

A combination of factors has resulted in a deeply divided organization, which undoubtedly impacts the VPD’s ability to provide services. An extended period of dynamic stability, with a return to core organizational principles and services, is strongly recommended. The recommendations provided here seek to rebalance the VPD and begin the process of stabilization and focus on the delivery of outstanding police services to the Vancouver community.

The silver lining on this seeming dark cloud is that the VPD has a collection of outstanding men and women dedicated to their careers and to the community. A large majority came to the VPD from other police departments because they recognized the value in both the organization and the community. Embracing the recommendations from this report within the context of sound leadership will put the VPD on sound footing and allow the members of the department to provide the outstanding service they are capable of providing.

The next chief of police must embrace the recommendations contained in this report. The chief must be strong leader with a proven track record of being able to work with stakeholders inside and outside the department. He or she must not continue the cycle of disruptive change experienced by the VPD over the last 20 years, but have the vision and provide the leadership to restructure the department and create a culture of service (to the community and to the employees) that will allow the outstanding people in the VPD rise to the level of their potential.

ICMA contends that the single most significant item for the next administration is to repair the divisiveness and lack of trust that permeates the organization. The chief must heal the scars that divide the department and interfere with operational effectiveness. By establishing rapport with the relevant stakeholders in the department, and developing and fostering professional relationships bound by a common goal, the VPD can begin the process of repairing the organizational culture and establish a culture of excellence instead of a culture of distrust. The chief should not be alone in this process. All parties need to recognize the problems at hand and work in partnership to bring them to a successful resolution. This approach costs nothing in terms of money, but is priceless in terms of potential rewards.

Data Analysis

This data analysis portion of the report on police patrol operations for Vancouver, Washington, focuses on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are related almost exclusively to patrol operations, which constitute a significant portion of the police department's personnel and financial commitment.

All information in this analysis was developed directly from city's database, which included dispatch data captured by the Clark Regional Emergency Services Agency (CRESA) and the police department's own staffing records entered into Telestaff.

The majority of the first section of the report, concluding with Table 16, uses the call and activity data for the entire year. For the detailed workload analysis and the response-time analysis, we use two four-week sample periods. The first period is February 2012 (February 1 to February 28), or winter, and the second period is August 2012 (August 1 to August 28), or summer.

Workload Analysis

When we analyze a set of dispatch records, we go through a series of steps:

1. We first process the data to improve its accuracy. For example, we remove duplicate units recorded on a single event. In addition, we remove records that do not indicate an actual activity. We also remove incomplete data. This includes situations where there is not enough time information to evaluate the record.
2. At this point, we have a series of records that we call "events." We identify these events in three ways.
 - We distinguish between patrol and nonpatrol units.
 - We assign a category to each event based upon its description.
 - We indicate whether the call is "zero time on scene," "police initiated," or "other initiated."
3. Then, we remove all records that do not involve a patrol unit to get a total number of patrol-related **events**.
4. At important points during our analysis, we focus on a smaller group of events designed to represent actual **calls** for service. This excludes events with no officer time spent on scene and out-of-service activities.

In this way, we first identify a total number of records, and then limit ourselves to patrol events, and finally focus on calls for service.

As with similar cases around the country, we encountered a number of issues when analyzing the dispatch data. We made assumptions and decisions to address these issues.

- A moderate number (5 percent or approximately 3,800) of events involving patrol units showed less than thirty seconds of time spent on scene. We call this zero time on scene. We assumed zero time on scene to account for a significant portion of calls canceled on route.
- The computer-aided dispatch system used approximately 180 different event descriptions, which we reduced to thirteen categories for our tables and nine categories for our figures, (shown on the following page).

In the period from January 1 to December 31, 2012, there were approximately 130,700 events recorded by CRESA. Of those events, approximately 98,800 involved a dispatched police officer. Of that total, about 88,640 calls included an adequate record of a patrol unit as either the primary or secondary unit. We also included approximately 39,700 additional out-of-service activities that were recorded by CRESA but were not assigned incident numbers.

In the period from January 1 to December 31, 2012, the police department reported an average of 349 events per day. As mentioned, approximately 5 percent of these events (an average of 17 per day) showed no unit time spent on the call.


In the following pages we show two types of data: activity and workload. The activity levels are measured by the average number of calls per day, broken down by the type and origin of the calls

and categorized by the nature of the calls (crime, traffic, etc.). Workloads are measured in average work hours per day.

We routinely used thirteen call categories for tables and nine categories for graphs, as shown in the chart.

Table Categories	Figure Categories
Prisoner–arrest	Arrest
Assist other agency	Assist other agency
Crime–persons	Crime
Crime–property	
Miscellaneous	General noncriminal
Alarm	Investigations
Check/investigation	
Juvenile	Juvenile
Out of service	Out of service
Disturbance	Suspicious incident
Suspicious person/vehicle	
Accidents	Traffic
Traffic enforcement	

FIGURE 10: Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator



Note: Percentages are based on a total of 128,325 events.


TABLE 7: Events per Day, by Initiator

Initiator	Total Events	Events per Day
Zero on scene	6,269	17.0
Police initiated	66,038	179.5
Other initiated	56,018	152.2
Total	128,325	348.7

Observations:

- 5 percent of the events had zero time on scene.
- 44 percent of all events were police initiated.
- 51 percent of all events were other initiated.
- There was an average of 349 events per day, or 14.5 per hour.

FIGURE 11: Percentage Events per Day, by Category



Note: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description on page 75.


TABLE 8: Events per Day, by Category

Category	Total Events	Events per Day
Accidents	2,402	6.5
Alarm	2,552	6.9
Assist other agency	1,256	3.4
Check/investigation	18,977	51.6
Crime–persons	11,246	30.6
Crime–property	4,373	11.9
Disturbance	7,077	19.2
Juvenile	1,972	5.4
Miscellaneous	8,924	24.3
Out of service	39,685	107.8
Prisoner–arrest	1,304	3.5
Suspicious person/vehicle	9,098	24.7
Traffic enforcement	19,459	52.9
Total	128,325	348.7

Observations:

- The top four categories (out-of-service activities, traffic, investigations, and suspicious incidents) accounted for 77 percent of events.
- 31 percent of events were out-of-service activities.
- 17 percent of events were traffic related.
- 17 percent of events were investigations (alarms and check/investigations).
- 13 percent of events were suspicious incidents (disturbance and suspicious person/vehicle).
- 12 percent of events were crime related.

FIGURE 12 Percentage Calls per Day, by Category



Note: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description on page 75.

TABLE 9: Calls per Day, by Category

Category	Total Calls	Calls per Day
Accidents	2,356	6.4
Alarm	2,498	6.8
Assist other agency	1,132	3.1
Check/investigation	18,460	50.2
Crime–persons	10,803	29.4
Crime–property	4,282	11.6
Disturbance	6,587	17.9
Juvenile	1,843	5.0
Miscellaneous	8,353	22.7
Prisoner–arrest	1,267	3.4
Suspicious person/vehicle	8,408	22.8
Traffic enforcement	18,871	51.3
Total	84,860	230.6

Note: The focus here is on recorded calls rather than recorded events. This means we removed events with zero time on scene, directed-patrol events, and out-of-service activities.

Observations:

- There was an average of 231 calls per day, or 9.6 per hour.
- The top four categories (traffic, investigations, crime, and suspicious incidents) accounted for 85 percent of calls.
- 25 percent of calls were traffic related.
- 25 percent of calls were investigations.
- 18 percent of calls were crime related.
- 18 percent of calls were suspicious incidents (disturbances and suspicious persons/vehicles).

FIGURE 13: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months





TABLE 10: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months

Initiator	Jan.–Feb.	Mar.–Apr.	May–June	July–Aug.	Sept.–Oct.	Nov.–Dec.
Police initiated	92.5	85.6	76.8	80.0	70.9	67.2
Other initiated	140.2	149.1	159.3	167.7	160.1	141.5
Total	232.7	234.7	236.2	247.7	231.0	208.6

Observations:

- The number of calls per day was lowest in November–December.
- The number of calls per day was highest in July–August.
- The months with the most calls had 19 percent more calls than the months with the fewest calls.
- January–February had the most police-initiated calls, with 38 percent more than the period of November–December, which had the fewest.
- July–August had the most other-initiated calls, with 20 percent more than the period January–February, which had the fewest.

FIGURE 14: Calls per Day, by Category and Months



Note: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description on page 75.

TABLE 11: Calls per Day, by Category and Months


Category	Jan.–Feb.	Mar.–Apr.	May–June	July–Aug.	Sept.–Oct.	Nov.–Dec.
Accidents	5.8	6.2	6.7	5.5	7.5	7.0
Alarm	6.3	6.4	7.2	7.5	7.4	6.1
Assist other agency	3.4	3.3	3.1	3.3	2.9	2.5
Check/investigation	47.8	52.9	50.7	54.3	51.3	45.4
Crime–persons	28.4	28.8	30.3	33.2	30.6	25.8
Crime–property	10.8	11.6	10.2	11.5	13.5	12.6
Disturbance	13.7	15.5	20.6	24.9	18.9	14.2
Juvenile	5.1	5.0	5.8	5.3	5.1	3.9
Miscellaneous	21.3	22.9	24.2	25.0	22.4	21.0
Prisoner–arrest	3.8	3.9	4.0	3.5	2.8	3.0
Suspicious person/vehicle	21.5	22.8	22.9	23.8	23.9	23.0
Traffic enforcement	64.8	55.4	50.5	49.9	44.9	44.2
Total	232.7	234.7	236.2	247.7	231.0	208.6

Note: Calculations were limited to calls rather than events.

Observations:

- The top four categories (traffic, investigations, crimes, and suspicious incidents) averaged between 84 and 86 percent of total calls throughout the year.
- Traffic calls averaged between 51.1 and 70.7 calls per day throughout the year.
- Investigations averaged between 51.6 and 61.8 calls per day.
- Crime calls averaged between 38.4 and 44.7 calls per day throughout the year and accounted for 17 to 19 percent of total calls.
- Suspicious incidents averaged between 35.2 and 48.7 calls per day.

FIGURE 15: Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator



Note: The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description on page 75.

TABLE 12: Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator

Category	Police Initiated		Other Initiated	
	Minutes	Total Calls	Minutes	Total Calls
Accidents	35.4	110	44.7	2,241
Alarm	8.5	6	14.6	2,492
Assist other agency	23.1	106	23.4	1,024
Check/investigation	20.0	8,524	30.0	9,922
Crime—persons	22.9	401	41.8	10,391
Crime—property	32.6	103	39.2	4,174
Disturbance	17.6	120	29.6	6,463
Juvenile	22.1	20	34.1	1,823
Miscellaneous	30.5	1,246	25.4	7,101
Prisoner—arrest	36.4	427	44.1	840
Suspicious person/vehicle	17.9	1,316	21.2	7,087
Traffic enforcement	10.6	16,448	18.9	2,419
Total	15.4	28,827	30.8	55,977


Note: We removed 56 calls with inaccurate busy times.

Note: The information in Figure 15 and Table 12 is limited to calls and excludes all events that show zero time on scene. A unit's occupied time is measured as the time from when the call was received until the unit becomes available. The times shown are the average occupied times per call for the primary unit, rather than the total occupied time for all units assigned to a call.

Observations:

- A unit's average time spent on a call ranged from 11 to 44 minutes overall.
- The longest average times were for other-initiated arrest calls.
- The average time spent on crime calls was 25 minutes for police-initiated calls and 41 for other-initiated calls.

FIGURE 16: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category




Note: The categories in this figure use weighted averages to combine those of the following table according to the description on page 75.

TABLE 13: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category

Category	Police-Initiated		Other-Initiated	
	Average	Total Calls	Average	Total Calls
Accidents	1.6	111	1.9	2,245
Alarm	1.5	6	1.7	2,492
Assist other agency	1.2	106	1.9	1,026
Check/investigation	1.2	8,531	1.6	9,929
Crime–persons	1.2	401	1.6	10,402
Crime–property	1.3	103	1.5	4,179
Disturbance	1.8	120	2.3	6,467
Juvenile	1.1	20	1.4	1,823
Miscellaneous	1.2	1,249	1.5	7,104
Prisoner–arrest	1.9	427	2.5	840
Suspicious person/vehicle	1.5	1,318	1.6	7,090
Traffic enforcement	1.2	16,450	1.3	2,421
Total	1.2	28,842	1.7	56,018

FIGURE 17: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-Initiated Calls



Note: The categories in this figure use weighted averages to combine those of the following table according to the description on page 75.

TABLE 14: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-Initiated Calls

Category	Responding Units		
	One	Two	Three or More
Accidents	1,060	657	528
Alarm	1,358	720	414
Assist other agency	461	322	243
Check/investigation	5,919	2,483	1,527
Crime—persons	6,353	2,263	1,786
Crime—property	2,948	662	569
Disturbance	1,810	2,209	2,448
Juvenile	1,294	334	195
Miscellaneous	4,830	1,456	818
Prisoner—arrest	167	278	395
Suspicious person/vehicle	4,139	1,816	1,135
Traffic enforcement	1,852	406	163
Total	32,191	13,606	10,221

Note: The information in Table 13 and Figure 16 is limited to calls and excludes events with zero time on scene, as well as out-of-service records. The information in Table 14 and Figure 17 is further limited to other-initiated calls.

Observations:

- The overall mean number of responding units was 1.2 for police-initiated calls and 1.7 for other-initiated calls.
- The mean number of responding units was as high as 2.5 for arrest calls that were other-initiated.
- 57 percent of other-initiated calls involved one responding unit.
- 24 percent of other-initiated calls involved two responding units.
- 18 percent of other-initiated calls involved three or more units.
- The largest group of calls with three or more responding units involved suspicious incidents.

FIGURE 18: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by District




TABLE 15: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Beat

Beat	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
11	13.4	7.4
12	13.2	7.9
13	15.8	8.7
14	11.5	6.0
21	12.8	7.9
22	18.6	11.3
23	20.3	11.7
24	10.9	7.2
31	10.6	6.7
32	10.0	7.3
33	12.0	7.5
34	13.4	8.7
41	12.4	7.4
42	15.8	10.3
43	21.2	12.9
44	12.3	7.2
Other	7.5	2.5
Total	231.9	138.6

Note: Workload calculations focus on calls rather than events.

Observations:

- The percentage of overall daily call volume for the four districts ranged from 20 percent for District 3 to 27 percent for District 2.
- The percentage of overall daily workload for the four districts ranged from 22 percent for Districts 1 and 3 to 28 percent District 2.

FIGURE 19: Calls per Day, by Category and District




TABLE 16: Calls per Day, by Category and District

Category	District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4
Accidents	1.2	1.4	1.4	2.4
Alarm	1.5	1.4	1.3	2.6
Assist other agency	0.8	1.0	0.6	0.6
Check/investigation	12.6	13.8	9.7	12.8
Crime–persons	6.2	8.2	7.1	7.8
Crime–property	2.5	3.4	2.6	3.2
Disturbance	4.3	5.4	3.7	4.5
Juvenile	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.7
Miscellaneous	4.5	7.1	3.3	6.3
Prisoner–arrest	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.8
Suspicious person/vehicle	6.5	5.8	4.4	6.0
Traffic enforcement	11.9	12.6	10.1	12.9
Total	53.9	62.4	46.0	61.5

Note: Calculations are limited to calls rather than events. Only calls with valid district information were considered in this figure and table.

Observations:

- Investigations (check/investigation and alarms) and traffic-related calls (enforcement and accidents) were the most common type of activities in all four districts. District 4 had the most calls in these two categories with 15.4 investigation calls per day and 15.3 traffic-related calls per day.
- Investigations for each district averaged between 11.0 and 15.4 calls per day.
- Traffic-related calls for each district averaged between 11.4 and 15.3 calls per day.
- Crime calls averaged between 8.7 and 11.5 calls per day for each district.

FIGURE 20: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2012




TABLE 17: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2012

Category	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
Arrest	3.9	4.6
Assist other agency	3.5	2.2
Crime	41.2	35.7
General noncriminal	22.0	11.9
Investigations	54.5	28.6
Juvenile	5.6	3.9
Suspicious incident	33.8	23.9
Traffic	75.3	22.8
Total	239.7	133.6

Observations:

- Total calls averaged 240 per day, or 10.0 per hour.
- Total workload averaged 134 hours per day, meaning that on average 5.6 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Traffic-related calls constituted 31 percent of calls and 17 percent of workload.
- Investigations constituted 23 percent of calls and 21 percent of workload.
- Crimes constituted 17 percent of calls and 27 percent of workload.
- Suspicious incidents constituted 14 percent of calls and 18 percent of workload.
- These top four categories constituted 85 percent of calls and 83 percent of workload.

FIGURE 21: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2012




TABLE 18: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2012

Category	Per Day	
	Calls	Work Hours
Arrest	4.5	5.0
Assist other agency	3.0	1.3
Crime	45.2	40.5
General noncriminal	25.6	14.7
Investigations	60.3	34.6
Juvenile	5.4	2.9
Suspicious incident	47.3	33.8
Traffic	55.9	18.1
Total	247.3	151.0

Note: Workload calculations focused on calls rather than events.

Observations:

- The average number of calls per day was higher in the summer than in the winter. Similarly the summer workload was greater than in winter.
- Total calls averaged 247 per day, or 10.3 per hour.
- Total workload averaged 151 hours per day, meaning that on average 6.3 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Traffic-related calls constituted 23 percent of calls and 12 percent of workload.
- Investigations constituted 24 percent of calls and 23 percent of workload.
- Crimes constituted 18 percent of calls and 27 percent of workload.
- Suspicious incidents constituted 19 percent of calls and 22 percent of workload.
- The top four categories constituted 84 percent of calls and 84 percent of workload

Deployment

The Vancouver Police Department's main patrol force includes patrol officers and supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants). In addition to the main patrol force, we included K9 and traffic units in the analysis of deployment. In this section, "basic deployment" refers to all patrol officers, while "total deployment" includes supervisors, traffic units, and K9 units.

For this study, we examined deployment information for four weeks in winter (February 2012) and four weeks in summer (August 2012). The police department's main patrol force is scheduled on 10.5-hour shifts that start at 6:00 a.m. (the day shift), 3:00 p.m. (the swing shift), and 8:00 p.m. (the graveyard shift). In August, there is an additional 10.5-hour shift starting at 10:00 a.m. (the C shift-day). Traffic shifts are 10 hours long and start at 7:00 a.m.

The police department's main patrol force deployed an average of 15.0 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in winter 2012 and 14.8 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in summer 2012. When supervisors, traffic, and K9 units are included to the analysis, the department averaged 21.1 officers per hour in the winter 2012 and 21.3 officers per hour in the summer 2012.

In this section, we describe the deployment and workload in distinct steps, distinguishing between summer and winter, and between weekdays and weekends:

- First, we focus on patrol deployment alone.
- Next, we compare the deployment against workload based upon other-initiated calls for service.
- Finally, we draw a comparison based upon "all" workload, which includes police-initiated calls and directed patrol activities.

Comments follow each set of four figures, with separate discussions for summer and winter.

FIGURE 22: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE 23: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE 24: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE 25: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2012



Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - The average deployment was 21.8 officers per hour during the week and 19.8 officers per hour on weekends.
 - Average deployment varied from 15.1 to 33.1 officers per hour on weekdays, and 13.4 to 30.8 officers per hour on weekends.
- For Summer 2012:
 - The average deployment was 21.7 officers per hour during the week and 20.6 officers on weekends.
 - Average deployment varied from 15.0 to 33.1 officers per hour on weekdays, and 12.9 to 32.0 officers per hour on weekends.

FIGURE 26: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE 27: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE 28: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE 29: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012



Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - Average other-initiated workload was 4.4 officers per hour during the week and 4.6 officers per hour on weekends.
 - This was approximately 20 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 23 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 44 percent of deployment between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 43 percent of deployment between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m.
- For Summer 2012:
 - Average other-initiated workload was 5.2 officers per hour during the week and weekends.
 - This was approximately 24 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 25 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 47 percent of deployment between 7:00 and 7:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 43 percent of deployment between 2:00 and 2:15 a.m.

FIGURE 30: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE 31: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE 32: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE 33: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012



Note: These figures include deployment along with all workload from other-initiated and police-initiated activities.

Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - Average workload was 5.5 officers per hour during the week and 5.6 officers per hour on weekends.
 - This was approximately 25 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 28 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 51 percent of deployment between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 48 percent of deployment between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m.
- For Summer 2012:
 - Average workload was 6.3 officers per hour during the week and on 6.2 officers per hour on weekends.
 - This was approximately 29 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 30 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 56 percent of deployment between 6:00 and 6:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 51 percent of deployment between 2:00 and 2:15 a.m.

FIGURE 34: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE 35: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE 36: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE 37: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012



Note: These figures include deployment along with all workload from other-initiated, police-initiated, and out-of-service activities

Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - Average workload was 8.2 officers per hour during the week and 8.0 officers per hour during the weekends.
 - This was approximately 38 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 41 percent on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 56 percent of deployment between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 55 percent of deployment between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m.
- For Summer 2012:
 - Average workload was 10.9 officers per hour during the week and 10.5 officers per hour during the weekends.
 - This was approximately 50 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 51 percent on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 74 percent of deployment between 7:45 and 8:00 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 63 percent of deployment between 2:15 and 2:30 a.m.

Response Times

We analyzed the response times to various types of calls, separating the duration into dispatch and travel times. We begin the discussion with statistics that include all calls combined. We analyzed several types of calls to determine whether response times varied by call type.

Before presenting the specific figures and tables, we summarize our observations. We started with 6,927 events for winter 2012 and 7,286 events for summer 2012. We limited our analysis to other-initiated calls. We also encountered some calls without arrival times that we were forced to exclude from our analysis due to lack of information. This left 3,039 calls in winter and 3,483 calls in summer for our analysis.


Our initial analysis does not distinguish calls based on their priority. Instead, it examines the difference in response by time of day and compares summer and winter periods. After the overall statistics, we present a brief analysis of response time for high-priority calls.

Response time is measured as the difference between when a call is received and when the first unit arrives on scene. This is further divided into dispatch delay and travel time. Dispatch delay is the time between when a call is received and when the first unit is dispatched. Travel time is the remaining time until the first unit arrives on scene.

All Calls

This section looks at all calls without considering their priorities. We examine the differences in response by both time of day and season (summer versus winter). We also show differences in response times by category and by district.

FIGURE 38: Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, Winter and Summer 2012



Observations:

- Average response times varied significantly by hour of day.
- In winter, the longest response times were between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m., with an average of 33.4 minutes.
- In winter, the shortest response times were between 4:00 and 5:00 a.m., with an average of 10.1 minutes.
- In summer, the longest response times were between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m., with an average of about 31.1 minutes.
- In summer, the shortest response times were between midnight and 1:00 a.m., with an average of 12.0 minutes.

FIGURE 39: Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2012




FIGURE 40: Average Response Time by Category, Summer 2012




TABLE 19: Average Response Time Components, by Category

Category	Winter 2012			Summer 2012		
	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Dispatch	Travel	Response
Arrest	13.8	11.0	24.7	12.5	10.7	23.2
Assist other agency	5.8	7.8	13.6	4.0	6.9	10.9
Crime	16.1	11.3	27.4	16.8	10.6	27.4
General noncriminal	10.4	9.0	19.4	12.9	9.1	22.0
Investigations	9.5	9.3	18.8	10.3	9.5	19.8
Juvenile	15.5	11.3	26.8	12.9	13.2	26.2
Suspicious incident	7.6	7.8	15.4	8.2	8.0	16.3
Traffic	8.0	7.8	15.9	7.9	8.1	16.0
Total	11.2	9.4	20.6	11.5	9.3	20.9

Note: The total average is weighted according to the number of calls per category.

Observations:

- In winter, the average response time was as short as 14 minutes (for agency assists) and as long as 27 minutes (for crime calls).
- In summer, the average response time was as short as 11 minutes (for agency assists) and as long as 27 minutes (for crime calls).

TABLE 20: 90th Percentiles for Response Time Components, by Category

Category	Winter 2012			Summer 2012		
	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Dispatch	Travel	Response
Arrest	79.3	23.1	92.9	40.6	18.8	60.0
Assist other agency	21.4	10.4	37.9	5.9	13.6	21.4
Crime	61.5	22.9	76.8	63.4	22.2	79.1
General noncriminal	36.8	20.0	51.4	46.4	19.5	62.2
Investigations	31.8	17.4	46.7	34.2	19.6	52.0
Juvenile	51.5	25.9	81.1	57.9	31.1	82.8
Suspicious incident	23.4	15.1	32.8	24.9	15.6	38.5
Traffic	22.7	14.2	39.2	25.6	17.3	38.4
Total	39.1	19.1	55.2	40.5	18.9	56.2

Note: A 90th percentile value of 55 minutes means that 90 percent of all calls are responded to in fewer than 55 minutes. For this reason, the columns for dispatch delay and travel time may not be equal to the total response time.

Observations:

- In winter, 90th percentile values for response times were as short as 33 minutes (for suspicious incidents) and as long as 93 minutes (for arrest calls).
- In summer, 90th percentile values for response times were as short as 21 minutes (for agency assists) and as long as 79 minutes (for crime calls).

FIGURE 41: Average Response Time by District




TABLE 21: Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by District

District	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Total Calls
District 1	10.7	8.7	19.4	9,954
District 2	11.9	8.4	20.3	11,583
District 3	10.7	11.1	21.8	8,609
District 4	10.4	9.9	20.3	11,171
Other	19.8	12.0	31.8	181
Total	11.0	9.5	20.4	41,498

Observations:

- The average response time per district was as short as 19.4 minutes (for District 1) and as long as 21.8 (for District 3).
- The average dispatch delay per district was as short as 10.4 minutes (for District 4) and as long as 11.9 (for District 2).
- The average travel time per district was as short as 8.4 minutes (for District 2) and as long as 11.1 (for District 3).
- Calls identified as “other” may either have inadequate addresses or occur outside of the district limits. They are included in the analysis, but the comments and observations here are restricted to the remainder of the calls.

High-Priority Calls


A priority code is assigned to each call by the dispatch center, with 0 as the highest priority and 9 as the lowest priority. A small number of calls were not assigned a valid priority. Table 22 shows average response times, separated by priority, with an additional line for injury accidents. Calls with a priority code of 0, 1, and 2 have been grouped together. These averages include nonzero-on-scene, other-initiated calls throughout the year from January to December 2012. There were approximately 41,500 other-initiated calls with valid response times. As there was only one other-initiated call assigned a priority of 7, it was grouped with calls with a priority of 9.

TABLE 22: Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by Priority

Priority	Dispatch	Travel	Response	Total Calls
0-2	1.9	6.4	8.2	3,612
3	8.5	8.6	16.6	24,892
4	18.5	12.2	28.8	11,770
5	15.4	10.3	24.3	1,124
7-9	31.9	10.7	38.3	100
Total	11.0	9.5	19.6	41,498
Injury accidents	3.0	6.6	9.6	236

Note: The total average is weighted according to the number of calls within each priority level.

FIGURE 42: Average Response Times and Dispatch Delays for High-Priority Calls, by Hour



Observations:

- High-priority calls had an average response time of 8.2 minutes, lower than the overall average of 19.6 minutes for all calls.
- Average dispatch delay was 1.9 minutes for high-priority calls, compared to 11.0 minutes overall.
- The shortest average response time for high-priority calls was approximately 6.0 minutes between 11:00 p.m. and midnight.
- The longest average response time for high-priority calls was approximately 11.1 minutes between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m.
- Average dispatch delay for high-priority calls was consistently 3 minutes or less, except between 3:00 and 4:00 p.m.
- Average response time for injury accidents was 9.6 minutes, with a dispatch delay of 3.0 minutes

-END OF DATA ANALYSIS SECTION-

Appendix A: Comparison of Proposed (4-Shift) and Current (3-Shift) Deployment Plan

TABLE A1: ICMA Proposed 4-Shift Deployment Plan

	Sq.	Sgt /Cpl	PO	*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
					Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa	Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa	Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa	Su	Mo	Tu	We	Th	Fr	Sa
Day 0600x1630	A	2	5	1	7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7
	B	2	5	2					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7				
	Shift Total				7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Afternoon 1000x2030	A	1	4	1	5	5	5	5					5	5	5	5					5	5	5	5					5	5	5	5
	B	1	4	2					5	5	5	5					5	5	5	5					5	5	5	5				
	Shift Total				5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Swing 1600x0230	A	2	5	1	7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7
	B	2	5	2					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7				
	Shift Total				7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Grave 2000x0630	A	2	5	1	7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7
	B	2	5	2					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7					7	7	7	7				
	Shift Total				7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7

* = Rotation number.

	Hour:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Day	0600x1630							7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7								
Afternoon	1000x2030											5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5				
Swing	1600x0230	7	7															7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7
Grave	2000x0630	7	7	7	7	7	7															7	7	7	7
Officers Assigned		14	14	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	14	14	14	14

TABLE A2: Sample of Current VPD 3-Shift Deployment Plan

VPD West Precinct – Districts 1 & 2				
A Squad				
Current Shifts	Sgt.	Cpl.	PO	Total
0600x1630	2	1	6	9
1500x0130	1	0	8	9
2000x0630	2	1	6	9
	5	2	20	27

Hour:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Day 0600x1630							9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9								
Swing 1500x0130	9															9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Grave 2000x0630	9	9	9	9	9	9	9														9	9	9	9
Officers Assigned	18	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	18	9	9	9	9	18	18	18	18

VPD West Precinct – Districts 1 & 2				
B Squad				
Current Shifts	Sgt.	Cpl.	PO	Total
0600x1630	1	1	4	6
1500x0130	2	1	7	10
2000x0630	1	1	7	9
	4	3	18	25

Hour:	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23
Day 0600x1630							6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6								
Swing 1500x0130	10															10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Grave 2000x0630	9	9	9	9	9	9															9	9	9	9
Officers Assigned	19	9	9	9	9	9	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	16	10	10	10	10	19	19	19	19

TABLE A3: Comparison of VPD Current and ICMA Proposed Deployment Plan for West Precinct, Districts 1&2

Hour	A-Curr.	A-Prop.	Difference	B-Curr.	B-Prop.	Difference	A+B-Curr.	A+B-Prop.	Difference
12a	18	14	-4	19	14	-5	37	28	-9
1	9	14	5	9	14	5	18	28	10
2	9	7	-2	9	7	-2	18	14	-4
3	9	7	-2	9	7	-2	18	14	-4
4	9	7	-2	9	7	-2	18	14	-4
5	9	7	-2	9	7	-2	18	14	-4
6	9	7	-2	6	7	1	15	14	-1
7	9	7	-2	6	7	1	15	14	-1
8	9	7	-2	6	7	1	15	14	-1
9	9	7	-2	6	7	1	15	14	-1
10	9	12	3	6	12	6	15	24	9
11	9	12	3	6	12	6	15	24	9
12p	9	12	3	6	12	6	15	24	9
13	9	12	3	6	12	6	15	24	9
14	9	12	3	6	12	6	15	24	9
15	18	12	-6	16	12	-4	34	24	-10
16	9	12	3	10	12	2	19	24	5
17	9	12	3	10	12	2	19	24	5
18	9	12	3	10	12	2	19	24	5
19	9	12	3	10	12	2	19	24	5
20	18	14	-4	19	14	-5	37	28	-9
21	18	14	-4	19	14	-5	37	28	-9
22	18	14	-4	19	14	-5	37	28	-9
23	18	14	-4	19	14	-5	37	28	-9
			-10			10			0

Appendix B. Employee Survey Results

Sworn Officer Survey

As part of the operational assessment of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), ICMA conducted a self-prepared written survey of all sworn officers employed by the VPD. The survey was administered by the online survey website Survey Monkey and was conducted over a two-week period between January 17, 2013 and February 1, 2013. Respondents were asked demographic questions about age, gender, and rank, and a series of questions related to workplace climate, organizational communications, the meaning and purpose of their work, as well as the degree of supportive relationships in the department.

When the survey closed, 145 responses were collected. This represents 72 percent of the 202 respondents contacted. The sample of 145, drawn from a population of 202, has a margin of error of +/-4.3 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. The +70 percent response rate and 4.3 percent confidence interval, indicate that the survey results are representative of the entire group of sworn officers in the VPD. Below are the descriptive statistics obtained from the survey; inferential analyses were not performed.

Job characteristics were rated using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement to numerous facets of work-life in the VPD. Responses were scored from 1 to 6, with 1 representing “strongly agree” and 6 representing “strongly disagree.” The actual number of responses in each category appears in the respective column. The rating average is a conversion of the actual counts in the columns multiplied by the respective score, and then divided by the total number of responses in that category. In some cases the number of responses in each category does not match the total number of respondents because respondents failed to provide a response in that category. A rating average of less than 3 indicates an overall agreement with the statement, and a rating average of greater than 3 indicates disagreement.

TABLE B1: Demographic Information

Characteristic	Response Percent	Response Count
Age		
20-29	2.8	4
30-39	20.7	30
40-49	57.9	84
50+	18.6	27
Gender		
Male	82.6	119
Female	17.4	25
Rank		
Officer/Corporal	73.9	99
Sergeant	19.4	26
Commander/Chief	6.7	9

TABLE B2: Statement Responses and Rating Average, Sworn Employees

Statement	Rating Average	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Climate/Work Conditions							
My work conditions are acceptable	2.44	15	75	29	9	4	4
The radios we use work effectively	2.54	10	77	31	8	7	4
The vehicles we use are appropriate	2.07	28	84	17	6	3	0
The technology we employ is effective	2.66	12	64	36	15	10	2
I have adequate supplies/equipment	2.36	13	85	26	12	2	2
I have adequate space to do my job	2.17	21	92	16	4	3	3
I am satisfied with my work schedule	1.51	86	42	8	2	2	0
The VPD would be better off with a different patrol schedule	5.17	3	9	8	12	15	91
I am proud to be a member of the VPD	2.43	29	53	32	18	3	3
I often think of resigning	4.25	10	14	23	14	40	38
In general, I am satisfied with my career	2.57	16	70	24	18	6	4
Morale is high in the Department	4.72	1	5	12	38	42	42
The VPD has a clear sense of its mission	4.48	0	12	24	25	41	37
Patrol Units have plenty of time to interact with the community	4.04	1	17	32	34	36	19
There need to be more officers on patrol to handle the workload	1.96	52	53	23	7	2	1
Whenever I have a concern at work I can always have my concerns resolved	3.68	1	27	40	36	18	17
I would recommend the Vancouver PD to anyone interested in a career	3.69	4	27	40	27	17	23
The VPD is innovative when it comes to fighting crime	4.00	1	15	37	34	32	19
The VPD is innovative when it comes to dealing	3.58	3	24	47	29	22	12

Statement	Rating Average	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
with the community							
Communication							
I know what is expected of me at work	2.35	14	82	30	8	4	1
I have clear information about how to do my job	2.66	9	66	39	16	6	3
I feel comfortable with what I am asked to do in meeting my job requirements	2.30	14	86	27	9	1	2
My supervisor and I maintain a clear understanding about what is expected of me	2.20	24	77	27	6	1	2
My supervisor does a good job communicating information to people in my unit	2.30	24	77	18	14	4	2
Oftentimes I hear about changes in the Department from the press	3.66	8	16	37	40	28	9
In general, I believe there is good communication between the Department and city hall	4.21	0	9	32	41	27	26
My immediate supervisor listens to my ideas about improving the department	2.45	19	64	37	12	4	2
In general, the communications process in the department is excellent	4.72	0	3	19	29	50	37
I wish there were a better way where my ideas could be heard	2.77	16	43	44	22	11	0
Meaningful Work							
I receive timely feedback that my work contributes to the overall success of the department	3.82	2	21	34	39	27	15
I receive necessary training to maintain/improve my skill and competency levels	3.29	7	46	35	17	18	16
My immediate supervisor is properly trained for the position he/she holds	2.68	23	60	21	15	13	7

Statement	Rating Average	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Training opportunities are readily available in the Department	3.99	4	15	40	22	35	23
Training opportunities are distributed fairly in the department	4.13	3	16	29	27	36	26
Selections to specialized assignments in the Department are done fairly	4.14	3	26	26	13	28	39
Promotions in the Department are done fairly	4.13	2	26	23	20	29	35
In the Department discipline is applied fairly	5.01	0	10	13	14	25	72
My work is important	1.85	51	63	21	3	1	0
My work makes a positive contribution to the community	1.93	46	65	22	4	2	0
Support/Relationships							
My supervisor takes personal interest in me	2.40	22	71	27	7	11	1
My supervisor supports my professional development	2.40	24	67	27	10	8	2
My supervisor is an effective leader	2.45	27	59	35	5	7	6
My coworkers are competent at doing their jobs	2.08	36	66	30	5	1	1
My coworkers are satisfied with their jobs	3.27	3	37	47	25	14	9
I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department	4.88	0	11	11	16	43	55
Oftentimes it seems like no one is in charge	2.64	36	40	28	13	11	9

Noncommissioned Employee Survey

As part of the operational assessment of the Vancouver Police Department (VPD), ICMA conducted a self-prepared written survey of all non-commissioned employees in the VPD. The survey was administered by the online survey website Survey Monkey and was conducted over a two-week period between January 17, 2013 and February 1, 2013. Respondents were asked demographic questions about age and gender, and a series of questions related to workplace climate, organizational communications, the meaning and purpose of their work, as well as the degree of supportive relationships in the department.

When the survey closed, 16 responses were collected. This represents 80 percent of the 20 respondents contacted. The sample of 16, drawn from a population of 20, has a margin of error of +/-11.2 percent at a 95 percent confidence level. The +80% response rate and 11.2% confidence interval, indicate that the survey results are fairly representative of the entire group. Below are the descriptive statistics obtained from the survey; inferential analyses were not performed.

TABLE B3: Demographic Information

Characteristic	Response Percent	Response Count
Age		
20-29	0.0	0
30-39	6.7	1
40-49	53.3	8
50+	40.0	6
Gender		
Male	20.0	3
Female	80.0	12

The following job characteristics were rated using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” Respondents were asked to rate their level of agreement to numerous facets of work-life in the VPD. Responses were scored from 1 to 6, with 1 representing “strongly agree” and 6 representing “strongly disagree.” The actual number of responses in each category appears in the respective column. The rating average is a conversion of the actual counts in the columns multiplied by the respective score, and then divided by the total number of responses in that category. In some cases the number of responses in each category does not match the total number of respondents because respondents failed to provide a response in that category. A rating average of less than 3 indicates an overall agreement with the statement, and a rating average of greater than 3 indicates disagreement.

TABLE B4: Statement Responses and Rating Average, Noncommissioned Employees

Statement	Rating Average	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Climate/Work Conditions							
I believe the VPD provides an excellent service to the community	2.13	3	8	5	0	0	0
My work conditions are acceptable	2.56	1	9	3	2	1	0
The technology we employ in general is effective	3.06	1	4	5	5	1	0
I have adequate supplies/equipment necessary to do my job	2.44	2	7	5	2	0	0
I have adequate employee space to do my job	2.45	4	8	1	2	1	0
I am satisfied with my work schedule	2.44	3	9	2	0	0	2
I am proud to be a member of the Vancouver PD	2.13	2	10	4	0	0	0
I often think of resigning from the Department	3.94	0	2	6	1	5	2
In general, I am satisfied with my career	2.44	2	7	5	2	0	0
Morale is high in the Department	4.69	0	0	2	4	7	3
The Department has a clear sense of its mission	4.13	0	1	3	6	5	1
Whenever I have a concern at work I can always have my concerns resolved	3.44	0	3	5	6	2	0
I would recommend the VPD to anyone interested in a career in law enforcement	3.13	0	4	7	2	2	0
The Department is innovative when it comes to fighting crime	3.13	0	4	6	4	1	0
The Department is innovative when it comes to dealing with the community	2.80	0	6	6	3	0	0
Communication							
I know what is expected of me at work	2.31	1	10	4	1	0	0
I have clear information about how to do my job	2.56	1	7	6	2	0	0
I feel comfortable with what I am asked to do in	2.60	2	5	7	0	0	1

Statement	Rating Average	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
meeting my job requirements							
My supervisor and I maintain a clear understanding about what's expected of me	2.31	1	10	4	1	0	0
My supervisor does a good job communicating information to people in my unit	2.44	2	7	5	2	0	0
Often times I hear about changes in the department from the press	3.19	1	6	3	2	3	1
In general, I believe there is good communication between the Department and city hall	3.88	0	0	7	6	1	2
My immediate supervisor listens to my ideas about improving the department	2.80	1	6	5	1	2	0
In general, the communication process in the department is excellent	4.33	0	0	3	5	6	1
I wish there were a better way where my ideas could be heard	3.00	1	4	6	4	1	0
Meaningful Work							
I receive timely feedback that my work contributes to the overall success of the VPD	3.81	0	1	5	6	4	0
I receive necessary training to maintain/improve my skill and competency levels	3.69	0	3	5	4	2	2
My immediate supervisor is properly trained for the position he/she holds	2.63	2	7	3	3	1	0
Training opportunities are readily available in the Department	4.06	0	2	5	3	2	4
Training opportunities are distributed fairly in the Department	3.87	0	2	4	4	4	1
Selections to specialized assignments in the	3.33	0	5	2	6	2	0

Statement	Rating Average	Strongly Agree	Agree	Somewhat Agree	Somewhat Disagree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Department are done fairly							
Promotions in the Department are done fairly	3.60	0	2	4	7	2	0
In the Department discipline is applied fairly	3.75	0	2	5	6	1	2
My work is important	1.60	7	7	1	0	0	0
My work makes a positive contribution to the community	1.87	5	7	3	0	0	0
Support/Relationships							
My supervisor takes personal interest in me	2.44	1	9	4	2	0	0
My supervisor supports my professional development	2.69	1	8	3	3	1	0
My supervisor is an effective leader	2.69	1	8	3	3	1	0
My coworkers are competent at doing their job	1.69	7	7	2	0	0	0
My coworkers are satisfied with their jobs	3.00	1	5	5	3	2	0
I have confidence in the command staff to lead the department	3.81	1	0	6	5	2	2
Oftentimes it seems like no one is in charge	2.88	1	6	5	2	2	0

Survey – Open-Ended Question – Please share any additional comments about the Department (optional) – 8 Responses

Noncommissioned employees are made to feel like second class employees. Command Staff perpetuates this attitude. We occasionally suffer the tirades of commissioned personnel with no real recourse. VPD has the lowest ratio of civilian employees per 1000 population of the five largest cities in Washington. The workload is tremendous.

Civilian staff that are in place were put into place to make sure the department was following processes, policies and procedures that are in-line with what City, State and Federal may mandate/require and provide support to keep officers on the road, etc. In 2010 when cuts were made the civilians were affected by having to take on more work and there was never any reduction in work. For some departments around the City who have taken cuts, those cuts have meant having less, providing less service internally (slower turnaround times) and less availability/service to the public (e.g., reduced hours to the public, less maintenance, reduced turnaround times, etc.). For VPD civilians even though front counter service at one precinct has gone away, none of our workloads have been reduced nor has there been any change in the expectation that our internal customer service and turnaround times would change. We are held to a high standard that we provide the same level of support as before layoffs in 2010 with no reduction in workloads and fewer resources not only within our own department but across the City. For those civilians whose main purpose is to provide internal support to the department, it's been increasingly difficult to provide a level of service the department expects and demands and when we can't provide those services to officers' expectations we at times have demeaning comments made and referenced at/to us as an individual, a unit or group. Not only have workloads and expectations NOT been reduced but the following are some increased expectations 1) mandated changes in the City, State or Federal processes and procedures to follow and report on 2) City pushing workloads down to departments that they can no longer provide 3) no or reduced OT/Comp to complete work (sometimes feels like they want you to give them time without giving you the compensation). Moral with Civilians is low as it seems some of those in authoritative positions overlook the value we provide to the department and only see civilians as low support, who can't meet the department expectations and forget the expertise we bring to the department and that what we do does help keep the department in compliance by providing consistencies, following City, State or Federal process, procedures or guidelines that have been set forth and help keeps officers on the road instead of having highly trained and paid officers sitting in an office. My hope is no persons are singled out for these comments and provides a point of view that isn't just an officer or commander.

I wish our Command and Chief's Office would consider for ALL citizen employees to work a 4/10 schedule. At this time I would say the majority of citizen employees are able to work the 4/10 schedule, but there are a select few who are not offered the ability to do so. We used to have the 4/10 hour shift in which it was taken away from us when the last chief was hired. I believe it improved morale within our area, which made us a more productive unit. Thank you.

The department morale has been very low for quite some time although I believe Chief Sutter has been effective at trying to improve it. I feel civilians are not respected for their expertise in a their field. For example, the Business Manager previously reported directly to the Chief. This not only elevated the position as a respected member of the "command/management" staff but prevented

conflicts of interest and having to report to all Commanders as well as the Chiefs. A few years back that position was changed and a Commander was placed in charge of the division. I have the utmost respect for the level of expertise our Command staff have for proper police procedures and administration of police personnel, but they admittedly aren't as educated nor are they as interested in other administrative functions such as budget, logistics, alarms, evidence, PST, etc. They often try to treat civilians with the same paramilitaristic approach and do not understand the civilian contracts or employment agreements. Command staff does not seem cohesive or in agreement and consequently employees receive mixed messages or completely conflicting messages, instructions, expectations, etc. I feel I report to 8 Commanders and 2-3 Chiefs. This is fine except when two or more believe I should do as they say but yet their instructions are in conflict. I have also received criticism for carrying out the instructions of a Commander.

I see this department doing the very best it can given the resources available, but constantly ask HOW it can continue to serve the public with the staff levels as they are.

The constant change/rotation in command staff makes it difficult to develop a strong working relationship with my immediate supervisor. In the past year (2012) the commander that oversaw my position changed seven times. Then again in January 2013 it changed for the 8th time in a year. Training for noncommissioned employees is almost non-existent. I typically only get training when I take the time to seek out free local training. I don't mind doing this, but eventually I will need training beyond this to maintain skills in my position. I have asked for at least 5 years straight for training specific to my job duties to be hosted at our department with no response from the training department. Although my job duties are non-commissioned in nature, the trainings I have requested to be hosted would benefit detectives and patrol officers interested in expanding their job skills. I know of non-commissioned employees who have not been to any developmental training in years. This is a disservice to the community and the department. The staffing levels of non-commissioned employees makes our jobs difficult and stressful. There are some employees who are trying to maintain some sense of order in their positions, while doing the work of 3-4 people. I understand budget cuts, but it is unreasonable to ask people to continue doing more work than is possible while cutting health benefits and no pay compensation. For example, the Chief's office has two admin assistants for the entire precinct (which is closed to the public) while there is only one person to oversee the day-to-day functions, maintain supplies, paperwork etc. for two precincts (one open to public, the other closed). This is a very unfair distribution of job duties. Additionally, the department overall is top heavy. VPD needs officers on the street, not 30 sergeants. I would like to see the position of Lieutenant return, as it provided a better line of communication between non-commissioned staff and supervisors. The lack of an Intel Unit and inability of officers to have informants has hurt information gathering and investigations tremendously over the past years. Analysts rely on this information to link crimes and provide proactive information to patrol and supervisors. I strongly encourage consideration of redevelopment of an Intel Detective with an Intel Analyst to assist in information and intel gathering. The lack of fraud/financial crimes detectives has also hurt the department and community. Almost daily I see cases where some simple follow up may help lead to the development suspect(s), but there is no one to do the work. Our financial crimes associated with prowls, burglaries and Internet fraud have risen considerably over the last few years. The most common answer to the community is sorry there is no one to investigate this issue. This truly saddens me as I just watch a report of a Army veteran be scammed out of personal vehicle

(transport scam) while he was serving our country and VPD does not have anyone to assist in this case. VANSTAT (Compstat) this monthly meeting is truly unaffactive. The analysts do a good job of updating daily or weekly of time sensitive information to patrol, detectives and commanders as needed. This includes a weekly Intel Brief with all the same information that ends up being discussed at VANSTAT. In addition, the fact that only precinct commanders report at the meeting leaves out critical information on ongoing investigations from our traffic unit, digital crimes, major crimes, sex offender, missing persons/underage sex trafficking and gang task force. If VANSTAT stays I believe that all units need to participate. The City and Department could do a better job of making certain positions with the department self-sufficient, not requiring funding from departmental funds. Examples, Alarms and Volunteer program. Lastly, the new Chief needs to be aware of recognizing non-commissioned staff and all they do (more with less). Over the past year I have seen many emails come out on what great jobs patrol is doing, detectives and NOW Volunteers, but never noting something great a non-commissioned employee has done. I believe that this mostly stems from the fact the the supervisors have no clue on what we do day to day. This is evident based on the tasks that are assigned to some staff with unreasonable time constraints. Thank you for your time.

Too much rapid-fire turnover at the very top for the past 20+ years has contributed to an overall lack of stability. The most recent Chief and both ACs had a history of decision making that was at times nonsensical, lacking in common sense, and was not in the best interests of the department, the community, or the individual(s) impacted by their decisions. I love the people in this department and we all know that no agency is trouble-free. This department needs a clean-start with fresh thinking and strong leadership at the top - fair leaders who set high expectations - leaders who have a strong police background and who aren't afraid to let their people do their jobs... leaders who aren't micro-managers of pettiness and instead are devoted to the welfare of this department and our community.

With each new chief, we head in a different direction. Unfortunately, with so many chiefs over the years we are constantly changing directions which can be very frustrating to the line people who have no say in what the department will look like or direction we will head.

Appendix C: VPD Current and ICMA Proposed Organization Chart

TABLE C1: VPD Current Organization Chart

	Chief	Asst. Ch.	Cmdr.	Sgt.	Cpl.	PO	Total Sworn	Civilian
Executive	1						1	3
Operations Support Bureau		1					1	
Technical Services			1				1	
Evidence							0	3
Training				3		5	8	1.5
Finance/Logistics							0	5
Staff Services			1				1	
PSU/IA				1			1	
Audit				1			1	
Backgrounds				2		1	3	
LT Leave						3	3	
Tactical Services			1				1	
Special Operations				1			1	
Traffic				1		4	5	
Operations Bureau		1					1	
Investigations			1				1	
Major Crime				1	1	6	8	
DECU				1		3	4	3
DVU				1		3	4	
Child Justice Center				1		3	4	
SSGTF				1		1	2	
Drug TF				1		1	2	
Patrol Division								
West				1		1	2	
District 1			1		1		2	
District 1 Patrol				3	1	10	14	
District 2			1		1		2	
NRT				1		5	6	
District 2 Patrol				3	2	9	14	
District 1 & 2 Patrol				3	2	19	24	
East								
District 3			2		1		3	
MRT				1		4	5	
District 3 Patrol				1	2	8	11	
District 4			1		1	3	5	
District 4 Patrol				3	1	11	15	
District 3 & 4 Patrol				3	3	18	24	
Total (org. chart dated 1/4/2013)	1	2	9	34	16	118	180	15.59

TABLE C2: VPD Proposed Organization Chart

	Chief	Asst. Ch.	Cmdr.	Lt.	Sgt.	Cpl.	PO	Total Sworn
Executive	1							1
Operations Support Bureau		1	1					2
Technical Services				1				1
Evidence							1	1
Training				1	3		5	9
Finance/Logistics								
Staff Services				1				1
PSU/IA					1			1
Audit					1			1
Backgrounds					2		1	3
LT Leave							3	3
Tactical Services				1				1
Special Operations					1			1
Traffic					1		4	5
Operations Bureau		1	1					2
Investigations				1				1
Major Crime					1	2	10	13
DECU					1		6	7
DVU					1		3	4
SSGTF					2		2	4
Patrol Division								
West			1				3	4
NRT/NPO					1	2	5	8
District 1				1	4	2	22	29
District 2				1	4	2	22	29
East			1				1	2
NRT/NPO					1	2	5	8
District 3				1	4	2	22	29
District 4				1	4	2	22	29
Total	1	2	4	9	32	14	137	199

Appendix D: Deployment and Workload by Precinct

We conducted an analysis of officer deployment and workload for each precinct individually. When focusing on a specific precinct, we limited ourselves to units that were clearly assigned to the East or West Precinct. These included regular patrol officers and supervisors and excluded all K9 and traffic officers. In addition, we did not assign workload to a precinct based upon the call's location. Instead, we included all calls that involved a unit from a specific precinct regardless of the call's actual location. Finally, this analysis does not account for out-of-service activities. In this way, the appendix extends both the analysis within the earlier "deployment" section and also the analysis of calls and workload by district shown earlier. First, we show an analysis of the West Precinct, followed by an analysis of the East Precinct.

FIGURE D1: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE D2: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE D3: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2022





FIGURE D4: West Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2022



West Precinct Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - The average deployment was 9.9 officers per hour during the week and 9.4 officers per hour on weekends.
 - Deployment varied from 6.9 to 15.4 officers per hour on weekdays and 6.5 to 14.1 officers per hour on weekends.
- For Summer 2012:
 - The average deployment was 9.9 officers per hour during the week and 9.4 officers per hour on weekends.
 - Deployment varied from 6.7 to 15.4 officers per hour on weekdays and 6.5 to 14.3 officers per hour on weekends.

FIGURE D5: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE D6: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE D7: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE D8: West Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012



Note: These figures include deployment along with all workload from other-initiated and police-initiated activities.

West District Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - Other-initiated average workload was 2.1 officers per hour during the week and 2.2 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 21 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 24 percent on weekends.
 - Total average workload was 2.7 officers per hour during the week and 2.8 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 27 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 30 percent on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 52 percent of deployment, between 1:45 and 2:00 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 59 percent of deployment, between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m.
- For summer 2012:
 - Other-initiated average workload was 2.5 officers per hour during the week and 2.6 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 25 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 28 percent on weekends.
 - Total average workload was 3.1 officers per hour during the week and 3.0 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 31 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 32 percent on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 59 percent of deployment, between 6:00 and 6:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 57 percent of deployment, between 2:00 and 2:15 a.m.

FIGURE D9: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE D10: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE D11: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE D12: East Precinct Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2012



East Precinct Observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - The average deployment was 9.9 officers per hour during the week and 9.5 officers per hour on weekends.
 - Deployment varied from 7.2 to 15.1 officers per hour on weekdays and 6.8 to 14.8 officers per hour on weekends.
- For Summer 2012:
 - The average deployment was 10.0 officers per hour during the week and on weekends.
 - Deployment varied from 7.0 to 15.5 officers per hour on weekdays and 6.1 to 15.8 officers per hour on weekends.

FIGURE D13: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2012




FIGURE D14: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2012




FIGURE D15: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2012





FIGURE D16: East Precinct Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2012



Note: These figures include deployment along with all workload from other-initiated and police-initiated activities.

East District observations:

- For Winter 2012:
 - Other-initiated average workload was 2.2 officers per hour during the week and 2.4 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 22 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 25 percent on weekends.
 - Total average workload was 2.7 officers per hour during the week and 2.8 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 27 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 29 percent on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 59 percent of deployment, between 5:00 and 5:15 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 52 percent of deployment, between 6:30 and 6:45 p.m.
- For Summer 2012:
 - Other-initiated average workload was 2.6 officers per hour during the week and 2.6 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 26 percent of hourly deployment during the week and weekends.
 - Total average workload was 3.1 officers per hour during the week and 3.0 officers per hour during the weekends. This was approximately 31 percent of hourly deployment during the week and on weekends.
 - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 58 percent of deployment, between 5:30 and 5:45 p.m. and between 7:30 and 7:45 p.m.
 - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 52 percent of deployment, between 4:30 and 4:45 p.m.

Appendix E: Comparison with Internal Reports

This section compares ICMA's analysis with five reports produced internally by the police department and city of Vancouver. The main goal is to verify that our analysis relies upon the same data used by the city. Whenever possible, we illustrate where the results are consistent but also show where they differ.

The analysis will not match perfectly for two main reasons. First, our analysis is limited to calls that involve a responding patrol officer. This tends to make our counts smaller than those of the city. This could shrink our measured totals by as much as 10 percent. When analyzing a precinct, the city focused on calls where the beat was clearly identified, while we independently filled in the beat information for approximately 2,700 additional calls, or approximately 4 percent of the total. We make little attempt to reconcile these discrepancies as long as our counts do not differ from those found by the city by more than 10 percent.

The five internal reports that we examine are:

- **Precinct Productivity:** A three-page precinct productivity report for the West Precinct during the month of August. This includes counts of events, self-initiated activities (not including out-of-service activities), traffic stops, and hourly variability. We do not count reports or arrests as part of our analysis and do not try to reconcile these against the data we extracted.
- **Call Response:** A two-page call response analysis for the entire city during the month of August. While this is called "call response," this term corresponds to what we refer to as "dispatch delay." Dispatch delay is averaged and dispatched as a cumulative table. This is also broken down by hour of day and by priority.
- **Event Response:** A three-page event response analysis for the entire city during August. This report computes average dispatch delays distinguishes between calls based upon priority. In addition, it separates calls where no unit is available when the call is received by dispatch.
- **Beat Activity:** A short analysis of events by beat throughout the city during an unknown period during 2012. While this report examines hourly variability for each beat, this is beyond the scope of our report, and we do not draw comparisons with that section of the analysis.
- **Call Interval:** A short analysis of time intervals averaged over each call description individually. The different time intervals measured are all listed at the beginning of the report.

Precinct Productivity

We compared the department's internal report against our own calculations. We focused on calls that whose location we could identify as for the West District. In addition, while it seems that the city's report calculates "primary" and "backup" slightly differently, we treated "primary" as a count of "all calls" and used "backup" to indicate any call requiring multiple patrol units. "Dispatched" is the city's equivalent for "other-initiated" calls and "officer" equates with "police-initiated" calls.

Table E1 shows that our data of police-initiated and other-initiated calls match well with the department's internal reports. However, the city calculates "primary" in a way that differs slightly from its overall count of events. In addition, "backup" appears to include more calls than those with multiple responding patrol units. Finally, we counted 574 traffic stops within the West precinct, 529 traffic stops performed by patrol units specifically assigned to the precinct. The department's internal report counts 530 traffic stops for the same time period.

TABLE E1: Event Count by Source and Responding Unit

Source	ICMA		Internal	
	All	Backup	All	Backup
Dispatched	2,717	1,106	2,727	1,164
Officer	1,209	215	1,099	300
Total	3,918	1,321	3,839	1,464

Call Response

The Vancouver Police Department's internal report had a total 5,558 calls for August 2012. This internal count matches well with ICMA's data when calls whose source is listed as "officer" are excluded. We restricted our analysis in a few additional ways. First, we excluded 378 calls identified as "zero time on scene." As our analysis focuses on total response time, we also ignored 1,291 calls that lacked complete response times, 49 calls with a response time under 15 seconds, and 42 calls with a response time over three hours. Our initial data had a few calls fewer than the police department's data, and these exclusions resulted in a count of 3,790 calls.

For actual statistics, our values differ from those calculated by the Vancouver Police Department as well. We attempted to reproduce the department's average dispatch delay of 34.5 minutes. Even when all calls are included, our average was 23.8 minutes, which is significantly shorter than the 34.5 minutes reported by Vancouver. A quick measure of total response time gave 33.9 minutes. This matched the internal report's number a bit better, but it only used 3,962 valid calls.

We calculated response times slightly differently. First, we restricted our analysis to the 3,795 calls identified above. Then, we handled the effect of outliers on averages by truncating values above one hour to just 60 minutes. This gave us an average dispatch delay of 11.1 minutes, an average travel time of 9.4 minutes, and an average total response time of 20.5 minutes.

The Vancouver Police Department's analysis does include an interesting chart separating dispatch delay by minute and by priority. Any call whose dispatch delay was between 1 minute and 1 minute, 59 seconds was listed as "1 minute" in this table. To fit on this page, we switched the columns and rows of the original table.

TABLE E2: Calls by Minute and Priority

Dispatch Delay (Minute)	Priority						
	1	2	3	4	5	9	Total
<1	7	165	528	133	9	0	842
1	4	89	463	97	19	1	673
2	0	21	260	75	9	0	365
3	0	13	155	49	7	0	224
4	0	5	115	35	2	0	157
5	0	2	78	27	4	0	111
6	0	1	54	26	2	0	83
7	0	1	58	33	2	0	94
8	0	5	45	21	2	0	73
9	0	3	29	24	1	0	57
10	0	2	33	21	1	0	57
11	0	0	30	18	0	0	48
12	0	3	31	17	1	0	52
13	0	4	14	19	2	0	39
14	0	1	22	11	1	0	35
15	0	2	19	19	1	0	41
16	0	0	24	10	1	0	35
17	0	0	21	16	1	0	38
18	0	0	12	14	0	1	27
19	0	0	15	12	0	0	27
20	0	0	20	7	2	0	29
>20	0	7	272	374	27	3	683
Total	11	324	2,298	1,058	94	5	3,790

Event Response

The department distinguishes between calls that are identified as “unit not available” (UNA) at the time when the call is initially received. It generates a report that shows how often this occurs for calls with different priorities. The department also examines how call processing time (dispatch delay) differs for UNA calls. The precise interpretation of UNA is still unclear and without a better understanding of this term, the report lacks adequate grounding. However, a separate statistical problem arises from the inclusion of police-initiated calls within this analysis. The department’s internal report shows 2,738 calls listed as UNA out of 11,777. After 3,115 police-initiated calls are removed, 2,734 UNA calls remain out of 8,662. While the department measured that 23 percent of calls are listed as UNA, the true value is approximately 32 percent.

Two tables are shown below. The first shows the number of raw calls without a unit available listed by priority. Priorities above 5 are combined for simplicity. Police-initiated calls are excluded. The second table calculates dispatch delays by priority using our processed data and standard methods matching Table 22. This only includes calls with a responding patrol unit that eventually arrives on scene. However, calls with a unit not available are separated from calls with a unit available.

TABLE E3: Calls by Unit Status and Priority, Raw Data

Priority	Unit Status			
	Available	Not Available	Total	Percent
1	12	0	12	0.00
2	372	41	413	9.93
3	3,926	1,293	5,219	24.77
4	1,072	1,121	2,193	51.12
5	350	225	575	39.13
6	0	1	1	100.00
8	23	0	23	0.00
9	173	53	226	23.45
Total	5,928	2,734	8,662	31.56

TABLE E4: Dispatch Delay by Unit Status and Priority, Processed Data

Priority	Unit Status				
	Available		Not Available		Percent
	Average	Count	Average	Count	
0-2	1.3	297	11.2	38	11.3
3	2.7	1,493	18.5	807	35.1
4	4.4	410	29.4	649	61.3
5	5.2	50	28.8	44	46.8
7-9	18.3	3	24.4	2	40.0
Total	2.9	2,253	23.2	1,540	40.6

Beat Activity

The department's internal beat activity report measures events by beat and creates a pyramid, sorting beats from most to least active. If the department remains fixed to its "beat deployment" model, this type of report could be quite useful in situations when fewer than 16 patrol units are on duty. The basic idea revolves around staffing the more active beats before those that are less active.

At the moment, we do not know the exact time frame of this report and cannot reproduce the values shown. In addition, a quick count shows a total count of 106,177 events, which significantly exceeds our count of events for 2012. Nevertheless, our hierarchy of beat activity closely matches that of the city. Both are shown in the table that follows. Percentages are also calculated for each count to facilitate a comparison between the two measurements.

TABLE E5: Beat Activity Comparison by Study, Count and Percentage

Beat	Internal Report		ICMA Study	
	Count	Percent	Count	Percent
223	9,697	9.1	7,737	9.0
243	9,690	9.1	8,170	9.5
222	9,353	8.8	7,043	8.2
213	7,613	7.2	6,023	7.0
242	7,408	7.0	6,038	7.0
234	6,516	6.1	5,197	6.1
211	6,450	6.1	5,083	5.9
212	6,359	6.0	5,010	5.8
221	6,174	5.8	4,897	5.7
233	5,801	5.5	4,629	5.4
244	5,612	5.3	4,773	5.6
241	5,302	5.0	4,782	5.6
231	5,207	4.9	4,100	4.8
232	5,184	4.9	3,845	4.5
214	4,928	4.6	4,375	5.1
224	4,883	4.6	4,107	4.8
Total	106,177	100.0	85,809	100.0

Call Interval

The Vancouver Police Department's internal analysis of call time intervals is rather comprehensive. It contains a large table with a separate line for nearly every call description and priority level. Given these features, an attempt to reproduce this table would not be productive.

There are some suggestions worth noting. The department calculates each component of a call's time independently. Unfortunately, some key timestamps may or may not be missing values depending upon the call. When handled directly, the averages for individual components no longer equal the overall average. As these averages would still be accurate if a sample were used, not all calls need to be factored into the calculations. We would recommend:

- Limit the calculations to only those calls with complete time information
- Some departments may not record when a unit is "en route" to a call, so this aforementioned limitation might be relaxed for "en route" times. In fact, the columns for "dispatch to en route" and "en route to arrive" might be removed completely with only "dispatch to arrive" used instead.
- Averages should be additive. Currently, the first row shows priority 1 assaults with an average "arrive to clear" time of 176 minutes and an average "dispatch to clear" time of 170 minutes. This seems counterintuitive when for each call the "dispatch to clear" time should be no smaller than the "arrive to clear" time. While there is a valid explanation, this seems odd to an untrained reader.

Appendix F: Internal Vancouver Police Department Reports

The five internal VPD documents referenced in Appendix E are attached below.