# Report and Analysis of Police Services Queen Creek, Arizona

**March 2016**

POLICE OPERATIONS POLICE OPERATIONS

CENTER FOR PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT

CPSM

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# Section 1. Executive Summary

The Center for Public Safety Management, LLC (CPSM), was retained by the Town of Queen Creek to assist the community with an assessment of current law enforcement services and development of a strategic plan for providing these services in the future. Law enforcement services are currently being provided through a contract with the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO).

The MCSO units serving the city operates out of a police facility located on municipal grounds and will shortly be moving into a new public safety building on the same property. The Queen Creek command is the largest "contract for services" relationship for the MCSO and operates under the leadership of a Captain who essentially serves as the town's police chief.

Our approach involved both the "art and science" of analyzing police agencies. We began with a thorough data analysis of patrol workload and staffing to identify whether the services are appropriately staffed to meet workload of the community. The results of this analysis are reported in detail in the full study in Section 5, Data Analysis.

We note that the staffing levels of the command, compared to the actual workload, are more than adequate and provide for significant opportunities for the patrol force to engage in proactive or community oriented activities. That is, the workload (both citizen initiated and officer initiated) is well below that level which would limit the opportunity for more citizen engagement. We believe that this issue—increased citizen engagement—is critical, based upon our conversations with a wide range of stakeholders, which are described in Section 3.

We then conducted extensive interviews with stakeholder focus groups, with the goal to identify the public's perception of the quality of law enforcement services being provided to the community. We found that the groups were satisfied with the levels of services provided by the MCSO, and comfortable with the agency's responsiveness, equipment, and training. However, there were issues raised about better establishing in the public's mind the identity of the MSCO command as the town's police agency. There was a strong interest in there being a closer relationship between the command and the community along with efforts to improve communication between the citizens and the agency. In a series of recommendations, (Section 4) we identified ways that the town can move to improve that communication.

The issue of particular concern for the town leadership as well as the focus group participants was the issue of how long Queen Creek should continue to maintain a contract for police services as opposed to creating its own police department. Among some of the stakeholders there was a perception that there existed some sort of "tipping point" where it became desirable or even mandatory to establish a municipal agency. This perception was apparently based upon a prior consultant's study and recommendation.

No such formula exists. The decision to create a municipal police agency should be based upon determining if the alternative available (in this case, MCSO) continues to meet the needs of the community; if service levels are adequate; if there is a positive relationship between the contracting

agency and the community; and how the costs of creating and operating a distinct police agency compare with the contract costs.

Creating a municipal agency is difficult—it is expensive both in startup costs as well as annual operating costs. Additionally, a police department carries a huge liability exposure for a community. Finding and retaining quality officers is challenging. Maintaining appropriate training, equipment, and vehicles creates a whole new series of management issues that, under a contract, the town is not required to address.

Given the fact that the current relationship with MCSO is meeting the needs of the community and is adequately staffed to provide additional opportunities for greater citizen interaction, we can see no reason at this time to move away from the current arrangement.

At the same time, this is a situation that needs to be monitored on a regular basis for several reasons. First is the uncertainty of future leadership in the MCSO both at the Queen Creek command and at the chief law enforcement officer position. The quality of the "chief" at the local level really determines the services received by the citizens. A change in that leadership can have a dramatic effect. Second is the matter of leadership at the sheriff level. We have observed in other communities that we have studied that a change in the sheriff, through an election, can have a significant effect on the relationship between the community and the sheriff's office.

Further, the appropriate staffing levels should be monitored on a regular basis. As we have shown in the data analysis, there are currently more than adequate resources to police the town. Workload does not typically vary greatly from year to year. But over a period of several years, particularly in high-growth communities, demand can change significantly. Thus, Queen Creek should revisit workload and staffing regularly.

Finally there is the issue of cost. Currently, there is no clear understanding of what the creation of a town police force would cost and what operational expenses would be over the course of future years. This is an area that the town should begin to explore if only to provide solid facts to assist in future contract negotiations with the MCSO.

In summary, we believe that while there are numerous opportunities to improve the level of service from the MCSO command, the current arrangement is more than satisfactory and should be continued

# Section 2. Scope of Engagement and Methodology

The Center for Public Safety Management, LLC (CPSM) was engaged to assist the town of Queen Creek, Arizona, in preparing for the review and potential revision of the town's Master Plan. Specifically, CPSM was asked to perform a quantitative analysis of the patrol operations of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) within Queen Creek, for which the town contracts with the MCSO. CPSM obtained data from the MCSO's computer-assisted dispatch (CAD) system and performed a detailed analysis of calls for service, workload, and response for a one-year period. The results of that analysis are provided in Section 4 of this report.

Also, in an effort to obtain qualitative data concerning police services provided by the MCSO, CPSM was asked to conduct a series of semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with members of the Queen Creek community. Town officials identified two groups of "external stakeholders" who were invited to participate in focus groups. These stakeholders are members of the Queen Creek community who are knowledgeable about or have some familiarity with the current and past operations of the police in Queen Creek as well as the current and past relations between the police and the community. CPSM recommended that the external stakeholders include residents from various neighborhoods throughout the town, business owners and business leaders, school administrators, clergy, town officials, healthcare professionals, and community advocates/activists.

In order to stimulate discussion during these focus groups, all respondents were asked to consider the following questions: "What are the current strengths and weaknesses of the police department?" and "Projecting forward, can you identify any specific opportunities or threats/challenges to the department in terms of its overall ability to satisfy its mission?" The questioning was meant to prompt an informal SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis. A summary of responses that comprise the SWOT is shown in Section 3.

Participants were also asked to respond to these additional questions: "What exactly are the current needs and expectations of the Queen Creek community concerning police services?" and "Are these expectations currently being met?" The consultants utilized this method of inquiry in order to gain closer insight and obtain an in-depth understanding of commonly held opinions, perceptions, and concerns from members of the community. Key informant interviews of this type have proven to be a form of qualitative research that is particularly effective in identifying major themes and patterns.

All participants were guaranteed anonymity. They were assured that any quotes recorded and used for this report would not be attributed to any particular individual.

During the course of our discussions, CPSM continually probed the respondents by utilizing a direct form of questioning designed to challenge them to provide factual examples and to fully support their observations and opinions. This was accomplished without suggesting any particular position, findings, or opinions on the part of the consultants. These questioning techniques were used simply to move the discussions forward and to challenge informants to articulate statements and opinions with sufficient detail.

Please note that the comments contained in this section of the report, as well as the recommendations that follow, are based exclusively on the information obtained from our participants. CPSM was not engaged to perform a comprehensive operational analysis of this department. We believe that the resulting information is nonetheless instructive in terms of identifying community needs, informing decisions, and choosing the future direction of the department.

# Section 3. Discussion Topics and Themes

The stakeholders had very robust and fruitful discussions. We present here a summary of the various topics and themes that emerged during these discussions.

## The Community

Queen Creek has a population of approximately 34,000. The median age for residents is reported to be 32. Since it was first incorporated, Queen Creek has been provided with police services by the MCSO under a multiyear contract. A distinct cohort of MCSO deputies is assigned to patrol Queen Creek; this provides continuity for the town and the deputies on patrol. An MCSO Captain is assigned to manage MCSO patrol in the town and essentially serves as the *de facto* "police chief" of Queen Creek.

The community is divided into five distinct patrol beats (the fifth was added in 2014). The Queen Creek command receives approximately 25,000 calls for service annually.

The Queen Creek community has experienced an extended period of population growth and development in recent years. We were advised that Queen Creek is currently the fastest growing town in Arizona. Current projections suggest that growth will continue.

Our participants indicated that “traffic has been a challenge” in Queen Creek. Participants in our focus groups uniformly praised the MCSO for its past and current efforts to ensure the free flow of vehicular traffic within the town, but agreed that traffic will “continue to be a challenge” going forward. Several individuals identified the anticipated high growth rate of the community, in and of itself, as a challenge for police services going forward.

## Crime

CPSM was told repeatedly by participants that serious or violent crime is generally not a concern among Queen Creek residents. The consultants’ review of the data from the department’s computer-assisted dispatch system and the FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) confirms that the community experiences a particularly low rate of reported violent crime relative to other American communities of similar size. As one participant noted, “This community is safe and people don't feel at risk here." Another stated, “I’ve always felt safe and secure in our community.” These findings are generally consistent with data obtained through the Town of Queen Creek Citizen Survey. These survey results suggest a general perception of safety throughout the community. However, the percentage of respondents who gave a rating of “safe” to their neighborhood during the day and to shopping in Queen Creek dropped significantly between 2010 and 2014.

It should be noted, however, that two individuals indicated that "some panhandling" has recently been observed "in and around the shopping areas." This development was identified as a potential

concern to citizens. During our discussions, we were advised that the Town Council has recently responded to these concerns by developing a new ordinance to address "aggressive panhandling" (Ordinance 574-15)

We were advised that a census of homeless persons residing in Queen Creek is periodically performed.

Several individuals suggested that further commercial development could lead to an increase in property crime. One person stated "With lots of construction and new businesses coming into town, won't that increase property crime? Do we have a plan for this?" The concern about increased property crime and diminished "quality of life" was identified by several of our participants as a future threat. After an extended discussion concerning this point, the group concluded that the town needs to "get out in front of this issue" and perhaps "require [retailers] to have their own security who could make their own arrests and process them" without drawing further upon department patrol resources. As one person noted, "Since we don't have a court here in town" for processing and arraignment, processing and transportation costs can be quite significant. The person added, "They should look into this now."

Several of our participants expressed concern about the national heroin epidemic. Our participants identified several nearby communities that currently are experiencing a significant heroin problem. One person stated, "it might not be here now, but maybe it's coming. With the growth of the community, we need to have a plan." Another suggested, "If it's happening there, it can happen here, and very quickly." This opinion was shared by the majority of our participants who recommended that the police "should get involved . . . perform outreach to the kids . . . to be proactive" on this issue. A looming heroin problem was identified in each of our sessions and was considered as an ongoing challenge to the community and the department.

Several individuals mentioned that traffic enforcement within Queen Creek is performed "not just to raise revenue, but to reduce accidents . . . to save lives." We were advised that the town does not operate its own traffic court, therefore funds received as fines do not go directly to Queen Creek. One person explained that the department "is doing directed patrols" and they are "seeing a reduction in the number of crashes."

## Quality of Police Service

All of our participants commended the department for routinely providing "professional" police services to the community. There were no criticisms whatsoever concerning the department's crime fighting or public safety efforts. Deputies assigned to the Queen Creek command were characterized as being "professional," "respectful," and "well trained." One person stated, "There are no complaints about the service here. It has dramatically improved in recent years." Overall, the quality of police service delivery was identified as the department's greatest strength.

All of our participants agreed that they have no concerns whatsoever concerning the integrity of the deputies assigned to the Queen Creek command. When asked, no individuals suggested that there were any "use of force" or improper "racial profiling" issues with the department or its deputies.

Several individuals noted that the current contract Queen Creek has with the MCSO allows the town to approve the leadership of the department. That is, there is an opportunity to veto the selection of the commander for the Queen Creek command. This was generally viewed as a very positive factor.

By contrast, however, several individuals questioned the stability of the contractual relationship between Queen Creek and the MCSO. In other words, assuming that officials and residents in Queen Creek remain satisfied with the existing service contract, what guarantee is there that the sheriff will decide to offer a renewal upon completion of the current contract? Will a subsequent sheriff offer the same services and terms? This issue arose during both of our focus group sessions. It is therefore likely that this is a common concern. Our participants identified this issue as an ongoing threat, though "not an imminent one."

## Resources

All participants agreed that the department and its deputies appear to be quite well-equipped. In the discussions, there was consensus that the vehicles and equipment utilized by and made available to the deputies meet or exceed current community expectations. Several of our participants suggested that the contractual agreement with the MCSO provides Queen Creek with an array of specialized equipment that would not otherwise be made available to the community. This point was debated, however, as some participants suggested that the sheriff's office has an obligation to provide material support to Queen Creek in an emergency, including providing specialized equipment and police services such as temporary use of an aviation unit, bomb squad, etc. Nevertheless, all participants appeared to view both the quantity and quality of physical assets utilized by the department as a strength.

With regard to human resources, we were advised that assignment to the Queen Creek command is quite desirable and that deputies in fact "want to come here." Several individuals praised the department for the diversity of its deputies and viewed this is a strength.

Several individuals noted that the opportunities for career advancement within the Queen Creek command are relatively limited when compared to those available within the sheriff's office generally. One person noted, "If a deputy or supervisor wants to move up in [the MCSO] they will need to move out of Queen Creek." This was identified as a potential weakness in terms of the ability to develop and maintain strong police-community relations.

## Police-Community Relations

While it is difficult to accurately measure or assess the quality of police-community relations in any American community, there are in fact various dimensions or factors that, when identified, are

indicative of a close or strong relationship between members of a police department and the community at large. We therefore addressed the following issues with our participants:

## Police Responsiveness

Our participants uniformly praised the department for the timeliness of its response to both priority and nonemergency calls for police service. One individual stated, "If you need them, you just call them – they are always right there whenever you call." Police response time was consistently characterized as being "excellent." One person described a "sense of urgency when [deputies] respond to the schools" and noted, "It feels like they really want to help." Another individual stated, "It feels like they take every call seriously . . . that they are concerned."

So while responsiveness is considered a current strength of the department, the consultants note that this could create a threat in the future given the pressure to maintain the high level of expectations from the community.

Several individuals who were quite familiar with the workings of town government noted that over the last few years, "the police began adopting the town's vision" and that the police now "are responsive to our needs, [our] requests. It's being seen on the streets." A number of isolated street encounters were discussed and offered as evidence that patrol deputies are now quite responsive to community needs.

One individual offered the following observation, "I think they [the MCSO] took the Queen Creek contract for granted [previously] – once we began to look elsewhere, they complied [with community request and needs]."

[Note: The Department reports that, in 2013, it implemented a variety of progressive policing programs, such as components of intelligence-led policing, problem-oriented policing, and other community-based policing initiatives to identify specific needs for police responsiveness.]

## Police Visibility

The majority of our participants indicated that the department's deputies are frequently present and are continually observed working throughout the community. One person described the department's deputies as being "highly visible" throughout all areas within Queen Creek. Participants suggested that local business leaders in particular are quite satisfied with the overall level of police visibility.

Two individuals disagreed, however, with this assessment and suggested that the police are primarily visible "only while attending large [community sponsored] events." They suggested that deputies concentrate their work in commercial or downtown areas and do not actively patrol all residential areas. They also suggested that the police do not attend smaller, less formal community activities. One person stated that, other than large-scale town sponsored events, "the only time you see [department deputies] is as they are driving by." Another individual stated "as a resident, I only see them occasionally and when I do, they are in the car." This person added "they need more

interaction at the community level – not just at special events. . . . It would be nice to know who my neighborhood officer is. I would like to know whether they are regularly assigned to my area."

It should be noted that this opinion was actively challenged by several of our participants. These individuals insisted that the department's deputies are in fact omnipresent and that they make a concerted effort to perform their duties in all neighborhoods within Queen Creek and not solely within commercial or downtown areas of the town. One person in fact stated, "I see a cop every day. . . I see them in my area every single day."

There was a clear split of opinion concerning this issue. This is not unusual, however, as participants typically provide opinions based upon their own personal experience, as well as that of their friends and family members. The purpose of our inquiry was not to determine the actual level of police presence or visibility with any degree of scientific accuracy but rather to probe the impressions and perceptions of community members regarding this issue.

There was general agreement among all participants in our focus groups that the department's overall level of visibility is quite high. It is quite possible that the foregoing comments concerning a lack of police visibility might pertain specifically to a perceived lack of *foot* patrols performed relative to the number of motor patrols conducted throughout the town. This issue likely requires further investigation to determine whether in fact the department regularly assigns deputies to foot posts in locations other than the downtown commercial area of town.

## Police Engagement with the Community

A clear trend developed during these discussions. While eliciting the above opinions it became clear to the consultants that the critical issue was not police visibility but rather police '*involvement*' with the community. One person suggested that the department's deputies "are not as involved as they should be." Another stated "there is not a strong culture of interaction here." Yet another suggested, "[the department and its deputies] are doing the must-do's well [i.e., traditional crime fighting duties and prompt response to calls for service], now we need to get better at the nice-to-do's."

All of our participants indicated that the Queen Creek community wants a close relationship with its police department and that efforts should be undertaken to accomplish this.

During our discussions, a clear pattern emerged concerning the perceived level of police involvement with the business community relative to the level of involvement with residents in general. Several participants in our focus groups suggested that there is a particularly close relationship between the police and the business community. One business leader stated, "we partner with them all the time – they [the police] have been phenomenal." Two individuals suggested that this relationship in fact had grown stronger within the past several years. One stated that "the change in attitude and orientation occurred about two years ago." They explained further, "the sheriff's office seemed to have no vision for Queen Creek a few years ago – they delivered the same product they delivered everywhere else that they contracted for."

The current leadership of the Queen Creek command was referred to as being "transformational." This was perceived as being a positive factor that should be maintained and leveraged. One person inquired, "But how do we sustain this progress in the absence of the captain?" and suggested that this was a threat. This person suggested that recent positive changes within the department "cannot be personality driven" and that they "need to be institutionalized." Several others, however, again referred to the town's ability to veto the appointment of the Queen Creek commander and concluded that this was not in fact a threat.

At the same time, several individuals suggested the department's relationship with residents is not as strong. One person noted, "residential people feel differently – there is a different perception; that the community is overlooked by the police." An example was provided by one of our participants, who indicated that the police routinely perform 'security assessments' at all new businesses in the community, but that such assessments are not routinely performed at places of worship within the community. There were several comments of this type that suggested a perception of a different level of treatment between businesses and the community at large.

All participants eventually agreed that there was a clear need for more involvement on the part of the department's deputies in an effort to form a deeper relationship with the community. Several of our participants explained that they believe that all members of the Queen Creek community do in fact "have a relationship with members of the fire department, but not with the police." One person noted, "we want more of a relationship with our police – more like what we have with the fire department."

Several individuals explained that the department and its personnel are quite effective at traditional law enforcement activities but that there is "room for improvement [regarding] being a part of our community." One person stated, "I'm interested in knowing, on their down time – what are they doing? [to develop and maintain close relationships with the community]"

Many of our participants shared personal accounts of interactions that they have had with the police. While the majority of these encounters were quite positive, one individual identified situations where the police response was less than optimal. This person recounted a situation where his family reported a crime that occurred at his residence. According to this person, the police who responded "did not properly investigate" the situation and appeared to minimize it. The individual stated that he had to look to resources outside the department in order to obtain the answers that he required. This person explained that "the police did not see it as a priority – I felt trivialized – there was an attitudinal problem on their part . . . we were made to feel like it didn't matter – that it just wasn't that important." These statements prompted an extended discussion concerning community expectations concerning encounters of this type. Another individual offered another example where the responding officers failed to appear properly concerned about the individual's complaint.

At this point in our discussions, the consultants probed a bit further by asking "but is it reasonable to expect these deputies who are working under a contract between Queen Creek and the MCSO to perform these type of community policing efforts?" All participants strongly agreed that such an

expectation on the part of Queen Creek community members and town officials was indeed quite reasonable.

It should be noted that both of the above examples related to past criminal occurrences, rather than actual crimes in progress. At no point during our discussions did any participants suggest that the patrol response was anything but rapid. In these examples the initial response was timely, the individuals were merely questioning the quality of 'follow-up'; that is, work that was conducted after the initial response. It became clear to the consultants that a contributing factor to these situations was a misunderstanding on the part of the residents about the respective roles of responding patrol officers compared to detective investigators.

One of these individuals stated that "residents need to know who to call." Our discussions concerning these incidents led to a general conclusion that the "the police could be better at communicating with residents" both at the scene of such events and generally. Several of our participants suggested that patrol deputies could be more effective at "closing the loop" during such nonemergency encounters with citizens; that is, by responding to any relevant inquiries, providing residents with contact information, and assuring citizens that their questions and concerns are taken seriously.

## Police Community Outreach

The majority of participants in these discussions indicated a clear need for more community outreach on the part of the department and its personnel. This led into an extended discussion concerning the lack of a distinct identity for deputies assigned to the Queen Creek command.

Participants identified several rather concrete opportunities for developing stronger police community relations:

- Develop a chief's advisory committee, a small group of residents, business leaders, school administrators, community advocates, etc., who would periodically meet with the captain assigned to the Queen Creek command in order to informally provide advice concerning current and future operations and initiatives to forge closer ties with the community.
- Develop a distinct virtual presence for the Queen Creek command. This would include developing and leveraging both a dedicated department website, Facebook page, Twitter account, etc. The department's website should include a separate listing of the names and ranks of all sworn members of the Queen Creek command, as well as contact telephone numbers and email addresses.
- Utilize and the leverage the Interfaith Council that currently exists in Queen Creek. This is a body of local clergy who could periodically meet with the captain and/or his representative in order to work toward developing closer ties with the community.
- Continue to utilize the town's information officer and ultimately designate a public information officer (PIO) from among the department's uniformed ranks.

- Continue to use and leverage the liaison deputies to perform additional outreach beyond the business community in the downtown area.
- Institute a formal medal or awards day ceremony for deputies assigned to the Queen Creek command. It is important to officially recognize instances of exceptional police service delivered within the Queen Creek community.
- Train and equip all patrol units with Narcan and automatic defibrillators (AEDs). In addition to life-saving benefits that would be achieved, it is likely that department would immediately convey a very strong message to members of the community that it is eager to continue to find new ways to ensure public safety. This would likely establish a greater depth of relationship with members of the community.

## Patrol and Operations Issues

### Community Policing

It is clear that the department needs to implement and maintain a robust community policing program. Our participants continually suggested that a formal community policing program would do much to enhance police-community relations. While several of their comments suggested that the Department is in fact currently engaging in activities that can accurately be characterized as traditional "community-policing" techniques, the majority of our participants appeared to be unaware of any formalized program that is currently being carried out or reported upon. This should be considered a significant finding. Even the most well-structured community-policing initiatives will experience limited effectiveness if these efforts are not understood and embraced by a large segment of the community.

During the course of our discussions, many concrete examples of community policing were described and praised by our participants. Additionally, the department reports that it has implemented such initiatives as: "First & Second Contact" (a program designed to improve the deputy's initial response to a call for service while providing timely follow-up with victims); HOA/Block Watch; Vacation Watch; and "RUOK" (a call back/citizen welfare check program for senior citizens and homebound individuals); Patrol watch (a neighborhood-based program where deputies identify potential hazards or security issues); specialized patrol methods (such as bicycle, ATV and mounted units); as well as a number of other community outreach and crime prevention programs.

So while the consultants believe that many components of community policing are in fact being performed, public awareness should therefore be considered to be the main issue. One of our participants suggested that a townwide community policing program would be welcomed but that, "each neighborhood [within Queen Creek] needs its own police product."

Additionally, the issue of police/youth relations was continually raised. In sum, our participants noted that the police are currently doing a "good job" of developing relations with the town's youth, but could do better. Several individuals stated that this should be a critical component of any formal

community policing program. One individual summed up this sentiment as follows, "I want our kids to have a positive image of the police, we need more of this . . . we need to help make that happen."

Several individuals stated that this is a particularly "critical" or "sensitive" time for American policing. They suggested that youth outreach is a necessity and is "very much needed" in the "post-Ferguson (MO) era." These individuals explained their desire "to instill mutual respect – on both sides."

## Police Identity

This emerged as an important theme in our discussions. The majority of individuals that we spoke with suggested that the current contractual arrangement between the MCSO and the town of Queen Creek is satisfactory, as long as the deputies performing work within the community are identified and understood as "the Queen Creek police department." As one person suggested, "we just need to identify them as being Queen Creek, not the sheriff's office."

The department's patrol vehicles are currently marked in such a way as to indicate that they are assigned to the Queen Creek command. Several of our participants indicated that these markings are relatively innocuous and that it would be beneficial to highlight the fact that these units and deputies are assigned to the Queen Creek command.

Several people suggested that public statements are frequently made by the sheriff suggesting that "these are [his] deputies, [his] people." This was identified as a barrier to forging a distinct Queen Creek police identity. Several individuals noted that a local police commander [i.e., the captain assigned to the Queen Creek command] is not generally "identified as the face of the department, its champion . . . the sheriff is." Several individuals who were not affiliated with town government stated that they would not recognize the Queen Creek captain if they saw a photo of him or met him in person.

The majority of our participants suggested that this is a public relations issue that should be addressed.

It is apparently not the practice of department deputies to provide any community members with personalized business cards. None of our participants had been provided with cards. On more than one occasion during our discussions individuals stated, "I didn't know who to call."

We identified several instances where our participants lacked information concerning current police operations. One individual stated, "I didn't understand the relationship that we had with the MCSO, this is news to me." Two individuals stated that they were unaware that the community was divided into distinct patrol beats. (There are in fact five distinct patrol beats that have been carefully developed.)

One individual quite pointedly suggested that the issue of a distinct Queen Creek police identity is actually irrelevant. This person indicated that they personally knew of the contractual arrangement between Queen Creek and the sheriff's office but suggested that many others within the community probably are unaware of the agreement and its terms. This individual suggested that "the average

citizen really would not care" whether the unit responding to a call for police service is technically a sheriff's office resource or a unit specifically dedicated to the Queen Creek community. The person explained "most people don't really care who they [i.e., the individuals in patrol units] are, they just care that they respond."

Several other participants took issue with the above opinion and strongly disagreed. Several individuals suggested that a distinct identity for the Queen Creek deputies is essential to any community policing efforts. One person suggested that a relatively large "segment of the community wants its own police department." The consultants explored this comment in order to determine whether there was a general feeling that our participants believed that the current contractual agreement with the MCSO should be terminated. Upon further reflection, our participants suggested that regardless of the current contractual arrangement, residents want to *feel* as if they have their own police department. We believe that this is a subtle but nonetheless important distinction. Once again, it appears that our participants wish merely to identify more closely with the officers who serve their community and to build more meaningful relations with them.

One individual explained that "if the deputies are ingrained in the community, then their presence will be considered routine and will be welcomed." Another stated "there is an opportunity here to develop the type of relationship we have with the fire department . . . to get the police more connected to the community." When asked what particular techniques or methods should be used to develop such a relationship this individual described what is essentially a park, walk, and talk program.

## School Resource Officers

We were advised that one school resource officer (SRO) is permanently assigned at Queen Creek High School and that three other deputies are periodically assigned at the middle schools during special events. Several of our participants indicated that the department's SROs are actively involved within the school districts. We were informed that the school superintendent meets regularly with SROs and that deputies assigned as SROs are continually made available to school administrators. We were advised that the school superintendent has the telephone numbers of SROs speed-dialed into his telephone. Another person stated, "SROs and other deputies know school office people by first name."

A school administrator stated "I feel like I have good connections [with the SROs]" and commended them for "good communication" during and after events, such as arrests and building lockdowns. We were told that SROs generally are quite responsive and proactive with regard to criminal justice matters arising in or pertaining to the schools. The SRO assigned to the high school has assisted the school district in conducting tabletop exercises (for emergency preparedness) and lockdown drills. Several individuals agreed that the SRO program is well coordinated and supervised. Our participants also generally praised the individuals who perform the role of SRO. We were informed that the overall quality service is currently quite good, particularly when compared to SRO service that was provided in prior years. One individual explained, "the police have a more preventative attitude at the schools. They have been more proactive within the last two years, even more

preventative." This person added, "a few years ago there was a feeling that these weren't our deputies. The change came from within the department."

All of our participants agreed that the department is currently "doing a good job with the schools" and with the business community. Again, this led to comments regarding the department's need to "be doing more" with regard to normal patrol operations and routine interactions with members of the community generally.

## Public Communication

Several participants commended the department concerning the flow of communication during school lockdowns and similar events. It was the consensus of all participants that the department is quite good at providing timely and accurate information whenever police activity occurs at one of the community's school campuses.

During our discussions we identified several instances that suggest a general lack of understanding among residents concerning the department's operations. For example, several residents expressed their understanding that deputies are only assigned to the Queen Creek command for a period of one year. They suggested that this "high turnover rate" among deputies places considerable strain upon the department's efforts to develop meaningful police community relations. One person stated, "Is this the model we want or are we okay with anonymous policing?" When this issue arose, several participants who had actual knowledge of the department's assignment policy explained that there is in fact no requirement for a mandatory one-year maximum rotation through the Queen Creek command. Once this issue was clarified, several individuals suggested that the mere fact that there was a misunderstanding regarding this point suggested that both the department and the town should work to communicate more effectively concerning the department's actual operations.

Several of our participants stated that they were unaware that the department performs residence checks for individuals who spend extended time away from their homes (the vacation watch program). One person stated, "Wow, why didn't I know about that?" When this practice was mentioned during the course of our discussions, one individual suggested that "We need to publicize that more." A recurring theme was the need for "continuous messaging" by the department in terms of publicizing its operations.

One individual offered the following observation: "There is a perception issue here – citizens need to learn more about what the police are doing. The police need to let the public know what they're doing, there is a need for public education." Interestingly, this same individual added "But there's a responsibility on the part of the community – to get to know what's going on – to care, to be interested in what the police are doing and attempting to do."

Several of our participants suggested that the Queen Creek command would benefit from a separate or distinct web page. They indicated that there's "no messaging or positive branding of the Queen Creek command" on the MCSO's website.

Several individuals suggested that the town develop a “public education plan” to inform citizens about the basic terms and service expectations addressed in the contract with the MCSO.

One person stated “It’s simply an issue of branding, of imaging – of being a champion of the department. This should not cost us any more, its simple enough to do.”

### Use of Social Media

Our participants noted that the MCSO does have and utilizes a Facebook page, but that the Queen Creek command does not maintain a page of its own. The majority of our participants viewed having a Facebook page as a necessity in order to ensure adequate outreach to the community. As a one individual noted, “the blogosphere does complicate police work . . . the department needs a social media presence in order to get its message out.”

Several individuals suggested that the department’s efforts to communicate with the general public could be improved. Several individuals noted that the attendance at the public meetings with the police would be greater if the department had a more effective means of communication. We were advised that the "coffee with a cop program at Target [department store]” was publicized through the Queen Creek Facebook page and not through a department Facebook page.

One of our participants noted "there are a lot of very positive things going on in this community that are not on the [MCSO] website.” This very same comment was made by another person in a separate focus group session.

Several of our participants advised us a program known as “RAIDS Online.” This is an online resource that utilizes mapping software to supply basic information concerning recent crimes. The consultants reviewed this resource and found it to be appropriate for its intended purposes. Brief descriptions of the type of crime, time and date of offense, and the location were provided. Interestingly, it appeared that the participants who were aware of this resource were affiliated with either the town or local businesses. The residents participating in our focus groups seemed less knowledgeable about this resource. Indeed several indicated that they were unaware of its existence.

## Contract vs. Town Police Department

It is important to note that one of the themes that *did not* arise during these discussions was the desire or need to discontinue the contractual relationship with the MCSO and establish an entirely new Queen Creek Police Department. This issue arose tangentially and it was addressed rather briefly. One of our participants indicated that it was his understanding that the need for a distinct police department would arise when the total population of Queen Creek grew to some predetermined size (approximately 55,000). This individual suggested that this was a persistent impression or rumor in town but could not account for its source or credibility. Another of our participants indicated that they too had heard this rumor. The consultants were asked whether they were aware of any such "tipping point" in population that would require the establishment of a

separate town police department. When the consultants responded that they were unaware of any such requirement, the discussion ended and the topic was not raised again.

The issue of a population threshold for the development of a town police department apparently stems from the work performed by Carrol Buracker and Associates, Inc., in connection with the development of the 2004 Strategic Plan for Law Enforcement Services (i.e., the original master plan for police services). This issue was raised and discussed by participants in a stakeholder focus group, not the consultants. It should be noted that the population threshold was specifically not recommended as a criterion by the Buracker study.

The issue of establishing a new police department did not emerge as a major theme in our study, but it is nevertheless an important issue that will remain as a possibility going forward. As explained in the accompanying executive summary, the MCSO is currently taking concrete steps towards engaging the community. Our data analysis of patrol operations clearly indicates that MCSO patrol deputies have sufficient time available each shift to engage in meaningful community engagement activities. Therefore, these activities should not dramatically impact costs related to the current contract. In the event that these efforts prove ineffective (for whatever reason), Queen Creek should revisit the question of whether a newly-formed Queen Creek Police Department would more effectively and efficiently serve the needs of the community.

# Section 4. Recommendations and SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) Analysis

Based upon these discussions and findings, CPSM offers the following recommendations / observations that should be considered by Queen Creek town officials and the Queen Creek command as they move forward.

1. It is recommended that the town undertake research to determine exactly what level of police service the sheriff's office is statutorily or legally obligated to provide to Queen Creek, relative to the level of services that are presently being contracted for. The results of this research should prove to be instructive going forward.
2. It is recommended that the town and the MCSO work together to find ways to develop/manage a distinct identity for a Queen Creek police force to address the community's desire to forge a closer and lasting relationship.
3. It is recommended that the department continue to invest in training/support for the position of public information officer (PIO) in order to conduct outreach to eliminate confusion and misinformation within the community. If it is not possible to establish an effective PIO designated specifically for the Queen Creek Command, perhaps the MCSO could designate a PIO for those communities that currently contract with it for police services. It is clear that the dissemination of public information related to the activities of the police is of high importance and therefore the PIO role remains critical.
4. It is recommended that the PIO identify and convene a group to develop a multiyear public information strategy. This group should consist of three to five individuals of various ranks who would periodically meet to plan, develop, and implement a clear public information strategy for the department. This group should work closely with the town's Communications and Marketing Department and the town's PIO who may provide guidance and additional support for all communications efforts.
    a. The public information strategy should incorporate a significant social media presence in order to adequately engage with the community. CPSM suggests that the department look to the Boca Raton (Florida) Police Department as an example of a modern police agency with a sophisticated public information strategy as well as a potential source of information and support.
    b. The resulting public information strategy should be designed to encourage self-promotion of the Queen Creek command, in order to deepen its relationship with the community.
    c. The resulting public information strategy should be incorporated into the department's overall strategic plan. The public information strategy should include clear goals and objectives regarding community outreach including but not limited to the effective use of social media.
    d. The resulting public information strategy should publicize and leverage RAIDS Online.

5. It is recommended that the department focus on community "engagement" as a central component of the department's ongoing operational plan, including a "Park, Walk, and Talk" program for patrol officers and their supervisors.

    a. Based upon our analysis of CAD data provided in this report, patrol officers (not merely deputies assigned to "special details") have ample opportunity within each patrol shift to park their patrol units and walk through populated areas such as parks, schools, commercial areas, etc. A program of this type would afford patrol officers the opportunity to further develop personal ties to the community and obtain immediate feedback concerning public perceptions and expectations about police service. The department's command staff would identify the specific areas within Queen Creek and times for such patrols. Police officers would be encouraged to perform community foot patrols of this type during most day shifts. Officers should be directed to advise dispatch when such community patrols commence and conclude. The quantity and quality of such community patrols should be considered as a performance measure for the department, and for patrol officers and their supervisors.

6. It is recommended that the department perform a community survey in order to determine the current level of service expectations by members of the community. This would be a survey instrument designed specifically to address police services, rather than a general instrument addressing other town services. It is recommended that the department consider reaching out to a local or regional college or university in order to obtain assistance in survey instrument construction, administration, and analysis. Periodic community surveys have become common practice in most American police departments. A community survey would explore the issues of police responsiveness, professionalism, fairness, respect for civil liberties, visibility, integrity, use of force, etc. The central question will be to determine service level expectations and public opinion regarding the quality of service and the department's relative degree of effectiveness and responsiveness.

7. It is recommended that the town create a standing Public Safety Committee. This group would be made up of community stakeholders such as local clergy, business leaders, school administrators, homeowners, and community advocates, etc., who would meet with the fire and police commanders perhaps on a quarterly basis to informally discuss community needs and police-community relations and to advise the Queen Creek commander, as necessary. This committee would periodically be provided with performance data from the department and serve as a "sounding board" for both the police and town officials. A critical part of the success of contractual relationships such as the current one for police services is strong and positive relationships with local officials. A public safety committee could do much to accomplish this. Advisory groups of this type have proven to be indispensable in many American police departments.

8. Publication of a formal community policing program is recommended in order to maintain/enhance strong police community relationships and improve perceived engagement by the community. It is highly recommended that any such program include clearly articulated specific goals and performance measures for the department, its patrol division, and all patrol deputies and their supervisors. For example, all patrol deputies

should be directed and encouraged to engage frequently with community groups, homeowners associations, church groups, etc. Members of the Queen Creek community should take an active part in developing such goals and measures for the department.

   a. The consultants' analysis of CAD data clearly suggests that patrol deputies have sufficient time to engage in "community policing activities" during the course of each patrol shift. It should not be necessary to designate a distinct cohort of "community policing" or "community liaison" deputies as an overlay to the existing patrol force.

9. It is recommended that the department develop a plan for addressing issues arising out of increased traffic, specifically reducing the number of collisions that occur within the town.

   a. It appears that there is existing capacity within the department to develop an effective program to reduce traffic collisions. We were advised during these discussions that the department has performed directed patrols in the past in order to address traffic problems. The police commander should analyze and use available data (such as collision reports contained in the department's records management system (RMS), as well as data obtained at identified speeding 'hot spots' by mobile speed boards) to inform management and deployment decisions and to determine whether these enforcement actions do in fact result in a reduction in the total number of collisions. If additional software technologies are required to assist in tracking and producing individualized reports and action plans, then it is recommended that the department and/or the town address this issue as soon as possible.

10. It is recommended that the town consider the appointment of a public safety director who would supervise the operations of both the police and fire departments. The majority of participants in our focus groups indicated that the community currently enjoys a rather close relationship with members of the town's fire department, which can be leveraged to extend to the police department. This would likely do much to address the image and identity problem that the police department currently suffers from. It is likely that a large part of the department's public image and identity problems are attributed directly to the fact that the Queen Creek command is still a contracted service. By combining both police and fire departments under a common public safety director and office, the town should be able to establish the identity that its police department needs in order to effectively engage in community outreach and traditional community policing programs and techniques.

If the town does not consider recommendation #10, in creation of a Public Safety Director over both Police and Fire Services, it is recommended that the town, at the very least, strongly consider a police services contract manager position reporting directly to the town manager. The purpose of the position would be to serve as the face of the department to the community, be responsible for working directly with the captain of MCSO, and ensure that effective reports and crime analyses are completed and delivered to the town manager and town council. In addition, the position would be responsible for budget analysis and contract review, and would possibly serve as the public information officer of the department, as needed.

## SWOT Analysis

| INTERNAL FACTORS | |
|---|---|
| STRENGTHS | WEAKNESSES |
| **Lack of serious/violent crime.**<br>**Community sense of safety/well-being.**<br>**Traffic enforcement focuses on safety of citizens.**<br>**High quality of police services delivered.**<br>**Integrity of police force in not abusing power.**<br>**Contractual ability to town to veto selection of police commander.**<br>**High quantity/quality of equipment /physical assets utilized by the department.**<br>**Racial/gender diversity of deputies.**<br>**Timely response to both priority and nonemergency calls.**<br>**Existing/perceived high level of responsiveness to articulated needs of the community.**<br>**High visibility in businesses/downtown area/large community events.**<br>**Close engagement/relationship between the police and the business community.**<br>**Proactive/'transformational" attitude of current police commander.**<br>**SRO program is responsive to school administration concerns and proactive in terms of focusing on prevention.**<br>**Timely/accurate info on police activity occurring at schools.** | **Lack of career advancement opportunities within the Queen Creek command.**<br>**Real/perceived lack of visibility/foot patrols in residential areas.**<br>**Real/perceived lack of visibility at small, localized community events.**<br>**Lack of engagement/relationship between the police and residents.**<br>**Real/perceived lack of adequate concern during follow-up when handling calls for service from residents.**<br>**Lack of knowledge on part of residents about the respective roles of responding patrol officers and those of detective investigators.**<br>**Lack of knowledge on part of the residents of any existing formalized community policing program.**<br>**Lack of feeling that residents "have their own police department" due to lack of distinct identification of Queen Creek police command apart from MCSO.**<br>**Need for "continuous messaging" by the department in terms of publicizing its operations.**<br>**Misinformation/misconception about workings of MCSO contract (e.g., one-year rotation of force).**<br>**Lack of community awareness about the services/work being done by the police.**<br>**Queen Creek police command does not control its own publicity and therefore misses opportunities to communicate "positive things" being done in this community** |

| EXTERNAL FACTORS | |
|---|---|
| OPPORTUNITIES | THREATS |
| **Model engagement practices currently existing between community and fire department.**<br><br>**Patrol deputies could be more effective at "closing the loop" during nonemergency encounters with citizens by providing residents with the correct contact information for follow-up.**<br><br>**Create formal youth outreach program "to instill mutual respect – on both sides."**<br><br>**Develop ways to create a unique Queen Creek police identity for chief, staff, and equipment to build more meaningful relationships between community and police.**<br><br>**Use good working relationship with schools and business community as a model for forging closer relationships with residents of Queen Creek outside of routine public safety activities.**<br><br>**An opportunity for police to let the public know what they're doing for public through public education campaign.**<br><br>**Queen Creek command would benefit from a separate or distinct web page to promote its community activities and positive branding. This should be separate or in addition to MCSO's website and a separate page on MCSO Facebook.**<br><br>**Create awareness program for "RAIDS Online."** | **Management of traffic flow in light of continued rapid population growth.**<br><br>**Rise in panhandling in shopping districts.**<br><br>**Potential for increased property crime and diminished "quality of life" due to continued growth of the commercial business areas.**<br><br>**Higher costs of processing/arraignment related to increased property crime.**<br><br>**Potential for heroin problem to infect community in the future.**<br><br>**Stability of the MCSO contract during renewals.**<br><br>**High turnover of deputies would restrict ability to develop and maintain strong police community relations.**<br><br>**Pressure to maintain the traditionally high level of service given expectations from the community.**<br><br>**Change in existing police leadership could stall the positive momentum of community-police relations.** |

# Section 5. Data Analysis

## Introduction

This data analysis on the police patrol operations of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) for the town of Queen Creek, Arizona, focuses on three principal areas of department operations: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are related almost exclusively to patrol operations, which constitute a significant portion of the personnel and financial commitment incurred by the town.

All information on which this analysis is based was developed directly from the data collected by the MCSO.

The majority of the first section of the report, concluding with Table 4-12, uses call data for the period of one year, from July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015. For the detailed workload analysis and the response-time analysis, we use two four-week sample periods. The first period is from August 1 through August 28, 2014, or summer, and the second period is from February 1 through February 28, 2015, or winter.

## Workload Analysis

When we analyze a set of dispatch records, we go through a series of steps:

1. We first process the data to improve accuracy. For example, we remove duplicate patrol units recorded on a single event along with records that do not indicate an actual activity. We also remove incomplete data, as found in situations where there is not enough time-stamp information to evaluate the record.
2. At this point, we have a series of records that we call "events." We identify these events in three ways:
    - We distinguish between patrol and nonpatrol units.
    - We assign a category to each event based upon its description.
    - We indicate whether the call is "zero time on scene" (i.e., patrol units spent less than 30 seconds on scene), "police-initiated," or "other-initiated."
3. We then remove all records that do not involve a patrol unit to get a total number of patrol-related events.
4. At important points during our analysis, we focus on a smaller group of events designed to represent actual calls for service. This excludes out-of-service activities and events with no officer time spent on scene.

By going through these steps, we first identify a total number of records, then limit ourselves to patrol events, and finally focus on calls for service.

As with similar cases around the country, we encountered a number of issues when analyzing the dispatch data from Queen Creek. We made assumptions and decisions to address these issues.

- About 960 events (3 percent) involved patrol units spending zero time on scene.
- The computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system used 147 different event descriptions (or “incident types”), which we condensed to 14 categories for our tables and 8 categories for our figures (shown in Chart 5-1). Table 5-20 in the appendix shows how each call description was categorized.

Between July 1, 2014, and June 30, 2015, the communications center recorded approximately 27,552 events that were assigned call numbers and which included an adequate record of a responding patrol unit as either the primary or secondary unit. Thus, on average, this means the department reported an average of 75 patrol-related events per day, approximately 3 percent of which (2.6 per day) had fewer than 30 seconds spent on the call.

In the following pages we show two types of data: activity and workload. The activity levels are measured by the average number of calls per day, broken down by the type and origin of the calls and categorized by the nature of the calls (crime, traffic, etc.). Workloads are measured in average work-hours per day.

## CHART 5-1: Event Descriptions for Tables and Figures

| Table Category | Figure Category |
|---|---|
| Prisoner–arrest | Arrest-other |
| Assist other agency | Agency assist |
| Crime–persons | Crime |
| Crime–property | |
| Directed patrol | Directed patrol |
| Animal calls | General noncriminal |
| Juvenile | |
| Miscellaneous | |
| Alarm | Investigation-other |
| Check/investigation | |
| Disturbance | Suspicious incident |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | |
| Accidents | Traffic |
| Traffic enforcement | |

## FIGURE 5-1: Percentage Events per Day, by Initiator




**Note:** Percentages are based on a total of 27,552 events.

## TABLE 5-1: Events per Day, by Initiator

| Initiator | Total Events | Events per Day |
|---|---|---|
| Zero on-scene | 960 | 2.6 |
| Police-initiated | 18,404 | 50.4 |
| Other-initiated | 8,188 | 22.4 |
| **Total** | **27,552** | **75.5** |

## Observations:

- 3 percent of the events had zero time on scene.
- 67 percent of all events were police-initiated.
- 30 percent of all events were other-initiated.
- On average, there were 75 events per day, or 3.1 per hour.

## FIGURE 5-2: Percentage Events per Day, by Category




**Note:** The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart 5-1.

## TABLE 5-2: Events per Day, by Category

| Category | Total Events | Events per Day |
|---|---|---|
| Accidents | 990 | 2.7 |
| Alarm | 1,017 | 2.8 |
| Animal calls | 290 | 0.8 |
| Assist other agency | 389 | 1.1 |
| Check/investigation | 2,140 | 5.9 |
| Crime–persons | 751 | 2.1 |
| Crime–property | 1,069 | 2.9 |
| Directed patrol | 14,081 | 38.6 |
| Disturbance | 556 | 1.5 |
| Juvenile | 336 | 0.9 |
| Miscellaneous | 400 | 1.1 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 154 | 0.4 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 1,271 | 3.5 |
| Traffic enforcement | 4,108 | 11.3 |
| **Total** | **27,552** | **75.5** |

## Observations:

- The top three categories (directed patrol, traffic, and investigation-other) accounted for 81 percent of events:
  - 51 percent of events were directed patrol. Most of the directed patrol events, approximately 90 percent, were described as "patrol/vacation watch."
  - 19 percent of events were traffic-related.
  - 11 percent of events were investigation-other.
- Seven percent of events were crimes.

## FIGURE 5-3: Percentage Calls per Day, by Category




**Note**: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart 5-1.

## TABLE 5-3: Calls per Day, by Category

| Category | Total Calls | Calls per Day |
|---|---|---|
| Accidents | 980 | 2.7 |
| Alarm | 996 | 2.7 |
| Animal calls | 286 | 0.8 |
| Assist other agency | 372 | 1.0 |
| Check/investigation | 2,066 | 5.7 |
| Crime–persons | 737 | 2.0 |
| Crime–property | 1,067 | 2.9 |
| Disturbance | 541 | 1.5 |
| Juvenile | 331 | 0.9 |
| Miscellaneous | 397 | 1.1 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 149 | 0.4 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 1,250 | 3.4 |
| Traffic enforcement | 4,030 | 11.0 |
| **Total** | **13,202** | **36.2** |

**Note:** The focus here is on recorded calls rather than recorded events. We removed events with zero time on scene as well as directed patrol events. All police-initiated calls other than those classified as directed patrol, are included.

## Observations:

- On average, there were 36.2 calls per day, or 1.5 per hour.
- The top four categories (traffic, investigation-other, crime, and suspicious incidents) accounted for 88 percent of calls:
  - 38 percent of calls were traffic-related.
  - 23 percent of calls were investigation-other.
  - 14 percent of calls were crimes.
  - 14 percent of calls were suspicious incidents.

## FIGURE 5-4: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months




## TABLE 5-4: Calls per Day, by Initiator and Months

| Initiator | Jul-Aug | Sep-Oct | Nov-Dec | Jan-Feb | Mar-Apr | May-Jun |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Police-initiated | 11.8 | 12.2 | 8.2 | 10.3 | 16.0 | 23.9 |
| Other-initiated | 20.4 | 21.9 | 21.9 | 24.5 | 22.5 | 23.5 |
| **Total** | **32.2** | **34.1** | **30.1** | **34.8** | **38.5** | **47.4** |

### Observations:

- The number of calls per day was lowest in November-December.
- The number of calls per day was highest in May-June.
- The months with the most calls had 57 percent more calls than the months with the fewest calls.
- May-June had the most police-initiated calls, with approximately three times as many calls per day than the period of November-December, which had the fewest.
- January-February had the most other-initiated calls, with 20 percent more than the period of July-August, which had the fewest.

## FIGURE 5-5: Directed Patrol Events per Day, by Months




## TABLE 5-5: Directed Patrol Events per Day, by Month

| Months | Calls |
|---|---|
| July-August | 45.1 |
| September-October | 36.1 |
| November-December | 27.2 |
| January-February | 31.2 |
| March-April | 30.1 |
| May-June | 50.2 |
| **Yearly Average** | **36.7** |

## FIGURE 5-6: Calls per Day, by Category and Months




**Note**: The figure combines categories in the following table according to the description in Chart 5-1.

## TABLE 5-6: Calls per Day, by Category and Months

| Category | Jul-Aug | Sep-Oct | Nov-Dec | Jan-Feb | Mar-Apr | May-Jun |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Accidents | 2.2 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 2.8 | 3.2 | 2.7 |
| Alarm | 3.2 | 2.6 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 3.1 | 2.7 |
| Animal calls | 0.5 | 0.9 | 1.0 | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 |
| Assist other agency | 1.0 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.0 | 1.0 |
| Check/investigation | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.8 | 5.8 | 5.0 | 6.7 |
| Crime–persons | 1.8 | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.4 |
| Crime–property | 2.7 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.9 | 2.8 | 2.4 |
| Disturbance | 1.1 | 1.4 | 1.5 | 1.8 | 1.4 | 1.7 |
| Juvenile | 0.7 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 0.9 |
| Miscellaneous | 1.3 | 0.8 | 1.1 | 0.9 | 1.2 | 1.3 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.4 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 2.8 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 3.6 | 3.8 | 4.7 |
| Traffic enforcement | 8.4 | 10.7 | 6.2 | 7.9 | 13.2 | 19.8 |
| **Total** | **32.2** | **34.1** | **30.1** | **34.8** | **38.5** | **47.4** |

**Note:** Calculations were limited to calls rather than events.

## Observations:

- The top four categories (traffic, investigation-other, crime, and suspicious incident) averaged between 86 and 91 percent of calls throughout the year:
  - Traffic calls averaged between 8.9 and 22.4 calls per day throughout the year.
  - Investigation-other averaged between 7.8 and 9.4 calls per day throughout the year.
  - Crimes averaged between 4.6 and 5.9 calls per day throughout the year.
  - Suspicious incidents averaged between 3.9 and 6.4 calls per day throughout the year.
- Crime calls accounted for from 10 to 17 percent of total calls by month.

## FIGURE 5-7: Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator




**Note**: The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart 5-1. For this graph we removed 15 calls with inaccurate busy times.

## TABLE 5-7: Primary Unit's Average Occupied Times, by Category and Initiator

| Category | Police-Initiated | | Other-Initiated | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total Calls | Minutes | Total Calls | Minutes |
| Accidents | 75 | 64.2 | 905 | 68.1 |
| Alarm | 4 | 4.3 | 992 | 16.5 |
| Animal calls | 11 | 35.7 | 275 | 41.4 |
| Assist other agency | 46 | 38.6 | 325 | 39.2 |
| Check/investigation | 837 | 39.7 | 1,225 | 36.0 |
| Crime–persons | 32 | 82.1 | 701 | 71.2 |
| Crime–property | 38 | 52.7 | 1,026 | 65.5 |
| Disturbance | 18 | 30.9 | 521 | 32.1 |
| Juvenile | 8 | 21.3 | 323 | 46.3 |
| Miscellaneous | 31 | 16.3 | 365 | 39.3 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 121 | 56.7 | 28 | 73.8 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 418 | 15.7 | 832 | 28.1 |
| Traffic enforcement | 3,371 | 17.1 | 659 | 30.4 |
| **Total** | **5,010** | **23.4** | **8,177** | **43.4** |

**Note:** The information in Figure 5-7 and Table 5-7 is limited to calls and excludes all events that show zero time on scene. A unit's occupied time is measured as the time from when the call was received until the unit becomes available again. The times shown are the average occupied minutes per call for the primary unit, rather than the total occupied minutes for all units assigned to a call. Observations below refer to times shown within the figure rather than the table.

### Observations:

- A unit's average time spent on a call ranged from 16 to 74 minutes overall.
- The longest average times were for other-initiated arrest-other calls.
- The average time spent on crime calls was 68 minutes for other-initiated calls and 66 minutes for police-initiated calls.

## FIGURE 5-8: Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category




**Note:** The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart 5-1.

## TABLE 5-8: Average Number of Responding Units, by Initiator and Category

| Category | Police-Initiated | | Other-Initiated | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Average | Total Calls | Average | Total Calls |
| Accidents | 2.2 | 75 | 2.5 | 905 |
| Alarm | 2.0 | 4 | 1.8 | 992 |
| Animal calls | 1.3 | 11 | 1.5 | 275 |
| Agency assist | 1.6 | 46 | 2.3 | 326 |
| Check/investigation | 1.2 | 840 | 1.9 | 1,226 |
| Crime–persons | 2.2 | 33 | 2.2 | 704 |
| Crime–property | 1.7 | 38 | 1.6 | 1,029 |
| Disturbance | 1.7 | 18 | 1.9 | 523 |
| Juvenile | 1.1 | 8 | 1.9 | 323 |
| Miscellaneous | 1.2 | 31 | 1.6 | 366 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 2.9 | 121 | 2.6 | 28 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 1.6 | 418 | 1.9 | 832 |
| Traffic enforcement | 1.2 | 3,371 | 1.5 | 659 |
| **Total** | **1.3** | **5,014** | **1.9** | **8,188** |

## FIGURE 5-9: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-initiated Calls




**Note**: The figure combines categories using weighted averages from the following table according to the description in Chart 5-1.

## TABLE 5-9: Number of Responding Units, by Category, Other-initiated Calls

| Category | Responding units | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | One | Two | Three or more |
| Accidents | 225 | 277 | 403 |
| Alarm | 450 | 355 | 187 |
| Animal calls | 165 | 84 | 26 |
| Agency assist | 108 | 88 | 130 |
| Check/investigation | 563 | 332 | 331 |
| Crime–persons | 283 | 155 | 266 |
| Crime–property | 626 | 249 | 154 |
| Disturbance | 227 | 177 | 119 |
| Juvenile | 143 | 95 | 85 |
| Miscellaneous | 213 | 100 | 53 |
| Prisoner–arrest | 7 | 5 | 16 |
| Suspicious person/vehicle | 361 | 285 | 186 |
| Traffic enforcement | 424 | 166 | 69 |
| **Total** | **3,795** | **2,368** | **2,025** |

## Observations:

- The overall mean number of responding units was 1.3 for police-initiated calls and 1.9 for other-initiated calls.
- The mean number of responding units was as high as 2.9 for arrest-other calls that were police-initiated.
- 46 percent of other-initiated calls involved one responding unit.
- 29 percent of other-initiated calls involved two responding units.
- 25 percent of other-initiated calls involved three or more responding units.
- The largest group of calls with three or more responding units involved investigation-other calls.

## FIGURE 5-10: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Beat




**Note**: Other beats include calls with other beat assignments as well as calls with no beat assignments.

## TABLE 5-10: Calls and Work Hours by Beat, per Day

| | Per Day | |
|---|---|---|
| **Beat** | **Calls** | **Work Hours** |
| 121 | 3.6 | 2.2 |
| 651 | 21.0 | 13.6 |
| 652 | 8.7 | 5.2 |
| 653 | 21.2 | 12.4 |
| 654 | 16.9 | 11.5 |
| Other | 1.4 | 1.2 |
| **Total** | **72.9** | **45.9** |

## Observations:

- Beats 651 and 653 accounted for 58 percent of the calls and 57 percent of the workload.

## FIGURE 5-11: Event Responses and Workload by Unit Type




**Note**: Responses count each unit responding to a call individually. So, a single event may include multiple responses. Responses include responses to calls and directed patrol events.

## TABLE 5-11: Number of Responses and Workload per Day, by Unit Type

| Unit Type | Responses | Workload |
|---|---|---|
| Noncontract | 3.1 | 1.8 |
| Contract | 99.1 | 46.1 |
| **Total** | **102.2** | **47.8** |

### TABLE 5-12: Event Responses of Noncontract Units by Category

| Category | Counts | Percent |
|---|---|---|
| Arrest–other | 10 | 0.9 |
| Assist other agency | 28 | 2.5 |
| Crime | 118 | 10.4 |
| Directed patrol | 404 | 35.7 |
| General noncriminal | 31 | 2.7 |
| Investigation–other | 93 | 8.2 |
| Suspicious incident | 96 | 8.5 |
| Traffic | 353 | 31.2 |
| **Total** | **1,133** | **100.0** |

## Observations:

- Contract units accounted for 97 percent of the call responses and 96 percent of the workload.
- Directed patrol calls made up the highest percentage of responses by noncontract units, at 36 percent.

## FIGURE 5-12: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Summer 2014




## TABLE 5-13: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Summer 2014

| Category | Per Day | |
|---|---|---|
| | Calls | Work Hours |
| Arrest-other | 0.9 | 2.2 |
| Agency assist | 1.0 | 0.7 |
| Crime | 4.7 | 8.2 |
| General | 2.6 | 2.3 |
| Investigation–other | 8.3 | 6.6 |
| Suspicious Incident | 4.0 | 2.6 |
| Traffic | 9.7 | 7.7 |
| **Total** | **31.1** | **30.2** |

## Observations:

- Total calls averaged 31 per day, or 1.3 per hour.
- Total workload averaged 30 hours per day, meaning that on average 1.3 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Traffic calls constituted 31 percent of calls and 25 percent of workload.
- Investigation–other calls constituted 27 percent of calls and 22 percent of workload.
- Crime calls constituted 15 percent of calls and 27 percent of workload.
- These top three categories constituted 73 percent of calls and 74 percent of workload.

## FIGURE 5-13: Percentage Calls and Work Hours, by Category, Winter 2015




## TABLE 5-14: Calls and Work Hours per Day, by Category, Winter 2015

| Category | Per Day | |
|---|---|---|
| | Calls | Work Hours |
| Arrest-other | 0.3 | 0.6 |
| Agency assist | 1.1 | 1.2 |
| Crime | 5.2 | 9.2 |
| General noncriminal | 2.8 | 3.0 |
| Investigation–other | 9.2 | 7.1 |
| Suspicious Incident | 5.8 | 3.9 |
| Traffic | 10.7 | 10.2 |
| **Total** | **35.0** | **35.2** |

**Note:** Workload calculations focused on calls rather than events.

## Observations:

- The average number of calls per day and the average daily workload was higher in February than in August.
- Directed patrol calls, which are significantly higher in August than in February, are not included in these calculations. If included, the numbers in August are higher than in February. Figures 4-27 to 4-30 in the deployment section show the total workload for August and February, including directed patrol calls and noncall activities.
- Total calls averaged 35 per day, or 1.5 per hour.
- Total workload averaged 35 hours per day, meaning that on average 1.5 officers per hour were busy responding to calls.
- Traffic calls constituted 31 percent of calls and 29 percent of workload.
- Investigation-other calls constituted 26 percent of calls and 20 percent of workload.
- Crimes constituted 15 percent of calls and 26 percent of workload.
- These top three categories constituted 72 percent of calls and 75 percent of workload.

## Noncall Activities

In the period from July 2014 to June 2015, the dispatch center also recorded activities that were not assigned a call number. We focused on those activities that involved a patrol unit. We also limited our analysis to noncall activities that occurred during shifts when the same patrol unit was also responding to calls for service.

There were a few problems with the data provided, and we made certain assumptions and decisions to address these issues:

- We excluded activities that lasted fewer than 30 seconds. These contribute little to the overall workload.
- Another portion of activities lasted more than eight hours. As an activity is unlikely to last more than eight hours, we assumed that these records were inaccurate.
- After these exclusions, 3,153 activities remained.

In this section, we describe an activity's average duration, and report on the variation of noncall activities by noncall category. In the next section, we include these activities in the overall workload when comparing the total workload against available personnel in February and August.

The noncall activity codes have been categorized as specified in Table 5-21 in the Appendix.

### TABLE 5-15: Number of Noncall Activities, by Category

| Category | Activities | Minutes |
|---|---|---|
| Administrative | 156 | 71.0 |
| Report writing & other duty | 2,132 | 14.2 |
| Station | 792 | 67.2 |
| Other | 73 | 49.3 |
| **Total** | **3,153** | **31.1** |

### Observations:

- The highest percentage of noncall activities, 68 percent, was related to report writing and other duties. Other duties included activities classified as court, jail, and "abd."

## FIGURE 5-14: Noncall Activities per Day, by Month




## TABLE 5-16: Activities per Day, by Month

| Months | Activities per day |
|---|---|
| July-August | 7.62 |
| September-October | 9.38 |
| November-December | 5.03 |
| January-February | 6.55 |
| March-April | 9.12 |
| May-June | 14.95 |
| **Yearly Average** | **8.6** |

## Observations:

- The number of noncall activities was highest in May-June and lowest in November-December.

## Deployment

For this study, we examined deployment information for four weeks in summer (August 1 through August 28, 2014) and four weeks in winter (February 1 through February 28, 2015). The MCSO's patrol force assigned to Queen Creek includes patrol officers and their supervisors. Most units were described as regular patrol officers, while units working a special detail were considered as "added patrol." The Queen Creek patrol force is scheduled on 12-hour shifts starting at 6:30 a.m. and 6:30 p.m.

The MCSO's main patrol force deployed an average of 4.4 contract officers per hour during the 24-hour day in August 2014 and 4.7 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in February 2015. When officers assigned to special detail are included, the department averaged 4.7 officers per hour during the 24-hour day in August 2014 and in February 2015.

In this section, we describe the deployment and workload in distinct steps, distinguishing between summer and winter and between weekdays (Monday through Friday) and weekends (Saturday and Sunday).

- First, we focus on patrol deployment alone.
- Next, we compare deployment against workload based on other-initiated calls for service.
- Then, we compare deployment against "main" workload, which includes police-initiated calls.
- Finally, we compare "all" workload, which includes out-of-service and directed patrol activities.
- The deployment figures only include the deployment of contract officers. The workload includes the workload for the contract and noncontract officers. As noted earlier in Figure 5-11 and Table 5-11, only a marginal portion of the workload is handled by noncontract officers.

Comments follow each set of four figures, with separate discussions for summer and winter.

## FIGURE 5-15: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Summer 2014




## FIGURE 5-16: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Summer 2014



## FIGURE 5-17: Deployed Officers, Weekdays, Winter 2015




## FIGURE 5-18: Deployed Officers, Weekends, Winter 2015



## Observations:

- For summer:
  - The average deployment was 4.8 officers per hour during the week and 4.5 officers per hour on the weekend.
  - Average deployment varied from 3.4 to 5.3 officers per hour on weekdays and 3.2 to 4.9 officers per hour on weekends.
- For winter:
  - The average deployment was 4.7 officers per hour during the week and 4.6 officers per hour on the weekend.
  - Average deployment varied from 3.0 to 5.5 officers per hour on weekdays and 4.2 to 5.4 officers per hour on weekends.

**FIGURE 5-19: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2014**




**FIGURE 5-20: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Summer 2014**



**FIGURE 5-21: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2015**




**FIGURE 5-22: Deployment and Other-Initiated Workload, Weekends, Winter 2015**



## Observations:

- For summer:
  - Average other-initiated workload was 0.9 officers per hour during the week and 1.1 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 18 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 25 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 32 percent of deployment between 3:45 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 50 percent of deployment between 2:15 p.m. and 2:30 p.m.
- For winter:
  - Average other-initiated workload was 1.1 officers per hour during the week and 1.5 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 24 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 32 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 44 percent of deployment between 4:30 p.m. and 4:45 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 64 percent of deployment between 10:00 p.m. and 10:15 p.m.

## FIGURE 5-23: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2014




## FIGURE 5-24: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Summer 2014



## FIGURE 5-25: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2015




## FIGURE 5-26: Deployment and Main Workload, Weekends, Winter 2015




**Note:** Figures 5-23 to 5-26 show deployment along with workload from other-initiated and police-initiated calls.

## Observations:

- For summer:
  - Average workload was 1.2 officers per hour during the week and 1.4 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 25 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 31 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 47 percent of deployment between 3:45 p.m. and 4:00 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 56 percent of deployment between 2:15 p.m. and 2:30 p.m.
- For winter:
  - Average workload was 1.4 officers per hour during the week and 1.7 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 29 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 36 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 49 percent of deployment between 6:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 65 percent of deployment between 10:00 p.m. and 10:15 p.m.

## FIGURE 5-27: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Summer 2014




## FIGURE 5-28: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Summer 2014



## FIGURE 5-29: Deployment and All Workload, Weekdays, Winter 2015




## FIGURE 5-30: Deployment and All Workload, Weekends, Winter 2015



**Note:** Figures 5-27 to 5-30 show deployment along with all workload from other-initiated calls, police-initiated calls, directed patrol activities, and out-of-service (call and noncall) activities.

## Observations:

- For summer:
  - Average workload was 2.2 officers per hour during the week and 2.2 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 46 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 50 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 65 percent of deployment between 7:15 p.m. and 7:30 p.m. and between 8:15 p.m. and 8:30 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 86 percent of deployment between 3:15 a.m. and 3:30 a.m.
- For winter:
  - Average workload was 2.1 officers per hour during the week and 2.2 officers per hour on weekends.
  - This was approximately 44 percent of hourly deployment during the week and 47 percent of hourly deployment on weekends.
  - During the week, workload reached a maximum of 63 percent of deployment between 6:30 p.m. and 6:45 p.m. and between 7:30 p.m. and 7:45 p.m.
  - On weekends, workload reached a maximum of 69 percent of deployment between 10:30 p.m. and 10:45 p.m.

## Response Times

We analyzed the response times to various types of calls, separating the duration into dispatch and travel time, to determine whether response times varied by call type. Response time is measured as the difference between when a call is received and when the first unit arrives on scene. This is further divided into dispatch delay and travel time. Dispatch delay is the time between when a call is received and when the first unit is dispatched. Travel time is the remaining time until the first unit arrives on scene.

We begin the discussion with statistics that include all calls combined. We started with 2,150 calls for summer and 1,993 calls for winter. We limited our analysis to 566 other-initiated calls for summer and 687 calls for winter. After excluding calls without valid arrival times, we were left with 513 calls in summer and 609 calls in winter for our analysis. For the entire year, we began with 27,552 calls, limited our analysis to 8,188 other-initiated calls, and further focused our analysis on 7,276 calls after excluding those lacking valid arrival times.

Our initial analysis does not distinguish calls on the basis of their priority; instead, it examines the difference in response for all calls by time of day and compares summer and winter periods. We then present a brief analysis of response time for high-priority calls alone.

## All Calls

This section looks at all calls without considering their priorities. In addition to examining the differences in response times by both time of day and season (winter versus summer), we show differences in response times by category.

### FIGURE 5-31: Average Response Time, by Hour of Day, Summer 2014 and Winter 2015




## Observations:

- Average response times varied significantly by hour of day.
- In August, the longest response times were between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., with an average of 19.5 minutes.
- In August, the shortest response times were between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, with an average of 8.5 minutes.
- In February, the longest response times were between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m., with an average of 23.3 minutes.
- In February, the shortest response times were between 4:00 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., with an average of 5.1 minutes.

## FIGURE 5-32: Average Response Time by Category, Summer 2014




## FIGURE 5-33: Average Response Time by Category, Winter 2015



## TABLE 5-17: Average Response Time Components, by Category

| Category | Summer | | | Winter | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Dispatch | Travel | Response |
| Arrest-other | 10.6 | 18.6 | 29.2 | 11.2 | 13.1 | 24.3 |
| Assist other agency | 4.6 | 6.4 | 11.0 | 4.3 | 7.2 | 11.5 |
| Crime | 6.9 | 8.7 | 15.6 | 10.0 | 11.6 | 21.6 |
| General noncriminal | 10.4 | 11.4 | 21.7 | 8.5 | 13.9 | 22.4 |
| Investigation–other | 3.9 | 8.2 | 12.2 | 4.0 | 8.2 | 12.2 |
| Suspicious incident | 5.8 | 8.2 | 14.0 | 7.0 | 9.6 | 16.6 |
| Traffic | 3.9 | 7.7 | 11.5 | 5.4 | 8.6 | 13.9 |
| **All** | **5.7** | **8.6** | **14.3** | **6.6** | **9.9** | **16.4** |

**Note:** The total average is weighted according to the number of calls per category.

## Observations:

- In August, the average response time for most categories was between 11 minutes and 24 minutes.
- In August, the average response time was as short as 11 minutes (for assist other agency) and as long as 29 minutes (for arrest-other).
- In February, the average response time for most categories was between 11 minutes and 23 minutes.
- In February, the average response time was as short as 11 minutes (for assist other agency) and as long as 24 minutes (for arrest-other).
- The average response time for crimes was 16 minutes in August and 22 minutes in February.

## TABLE 5-18: 90th Percentiles for Response Time Components, by Category

| Category | Summer | | | Winter | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Dispatch | Travel | Response |
| Arrest-other | 10.6 | 18.6 | 29.2 | 19.4 | 26.7 | 29.6 |
| Assist other agency | 14.0 | 11.8 | 24.4 | 7.6 | 15.1 | 30.8 |
| Crime | 18.6 | 17.1 | 35.7 | 30.4 | 25.6 | 60.9 |
| General noncriminal | 29.3 | 22.0 | 50.9 | 23.8 | 37.9 | 52.1 |
| Investigation–other | 10.4 | 15.4 | 24.9 | 7.9 | 16.1 | 25.0 |
| Suspicious incident | 13.1 | 17.5 | 38.2 | 15.2 | 19.3 | 34.7 |
| Traffic | 10.8 | 13.9 | 23.9 | 11.6 | 18.5 | 30.1 |
| **All** | **14.0** | **16.8** | **30.0** | **16.3** | **21.0** | **35.9** |

**Note:** A 90th percentile value of 30 minutes means that 90 percent of all calls are responded to in fewer than 30 minutes. For this reason, the columns for dispatch delay and travel time may not be equal to the total response time.

### Observations:

- In August, the 90th percentile value for response time was as short as 24 minutes (for traffic) and as long as 51 minutes (for general noncriminal).
- In February, the 90th percentile value for response time was as short as 25 minutes (for investigation-other) and as long as 61 minutes (for crime).

## High-Priority Calls

A priority code is assigned to calls by the department, with 1 as the highest priority. Table 5-19 shows average response times by priority, with an additional line for injury accidents. Figure 5-34 focuses on priority 1 calls.

### TABLE 5-19: Average Dispatch, Travel, and Response Times, by Priority

| Priority | Dispatch | Travel | Response | Total Calls |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 1.1 | 4.6 | 5.7 | 335 |
| 2 | 3.8 | 7.6 | 11.4 | 3,285 |
| 3 | 8.7 | 11.2 | 19.9 | 3,654 |
| 4 | 20.3 | 4.3 | 24.6 | 2 |
| **All** | **6.2** | **9.3** | **15.4** | **7,276** |
| Injury accidents | 1.3 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 171 |

**Note:** The total average is weighted according to the number of calls within each priority level.

### FIGURE 5-34: Average Response Times and Dispatch Delays for High-Priority Calls, by Hour



## Observations:

- High-priority calls had an average response time of 5.7 minutes, lower than the overall average of 15.4 minutes for all calls.
- Average dispatch delay was 1.1 minutes for high-priority calls, compared to 6.2 minutes overall.
- Average response time for injury accidents was 5.9 minutes, with a dispatch delay of 1.3 minutes.
- For high-priority calls, the longest response times were between 7:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., with an average of 9.6 minutes.
- For high-priority calls, the shortest response times were between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., with an average of 3.5 minutes.
- Average dispatch delay for high-priority calls was consistently 1.7 minutes or less, except between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m.

## Appendix – Call Description Classification

Call descriptions for the department's calls for service from July 1, 2014, to June 30, 2015, were classified within the following categories.

### TABLE 5-20: Call Descriptions, by Category

| Call Description | Table Category | Figure Category |
|---|---|---|
| ESCAPE FROM CUSTODY | Prisoner–arrest | Arrest-other |
| FELONY PURSUIT | | |
| WARRANT ARREST | | |
| WARRANT ARREST ATTEMPT | | |
| ASSIST OTHER AGENCY | Assist other agency | Agency assist |
| FIRE | | |
| HAZARDOUS MATERIALS | | |
| INJURED/SICK PERSON | | |
| MENTAL HEALTH PETITION (WARR) | | |
| MENTALLY ILL PERSON | | |
| SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATION | | |
| STOLEN AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY FOR OTHER AGENCY | | |
| ADULT ENTERTAINMENT VIOLATION | Crime–persons | Crime |
| ARMED ROBBERY | | |
| ASSAULT | | |
| ASSAULT ON DEPUTY | | |
| ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY WEAPON | | |
| ATTEMPT SUICIDE | | |
| CHILD ABUSE | | |
| CONTRIB TO DELIQ OF MINOR | | |
| ENDANGERMENT | | |
| FALSE INFO TO OFFICER | | |
| FIGHT/MUTUAL COMBAT | | |
| FIGHT/MUTUAL COMBAT -DOMESTIC VIOLENCE | | |
| HARASSMENT/STALKING | | |
| ILLEGAL POSSESSION/CONSUMPTION ALCOHOL | | |
| INDECENT EXPOSURE | | |
| KIDNAPPING | | |
| NARCOTICS/OTHER DRUGS | | |
| SEX CRIME - OTHER THAN RAPE | | |

| Call Description | Table Category | Figure Category |
|---|---|---|
| SEXUAL ASSAULT - MINOR VICTIM | | |
| SEXUAL ASSAULT ADULT | | |
| SHOOTING TOO CLOSE | | |
| SHOOTING VICTIM | | |
| SHOTS FIRED | | |
| SOLICIT/PEDDLING W/OUT LICENSE | | |
| STABBING | | |
| STRONG ARM ROBBERY | | |
| SUBJECT WITH A GUN | | |
| SUBJECT WITH WEAPON | | |
| SUICIDE | | |
| THREAT/ANNOY/OBSCENE PHONE CAL | | |
| THREAT/ANNOY/OBSCENE PHONE CALL | | |
| THREATS TO COMMIT AN OFFENSE | | |
| VIOLATION OF COURT ORDER | | |
| VOYEUR | | |
| ATTEMPTED BURGLARY | Crime–property | |
| ATTEMPTED THEFT | | |
| ATTEMPTED VEHICLE THEFT | | |
| BURGLARY | | |
| BURGLARY FROM VEHICLE | | |
| CONVENIENCE MARKET THEFT | | |
| CRIMINAL DAMAGE | | |
| FORGERY OR BOGUS CHECKS | | |
| FRAUD OR CON GAME | | |
| IDENTITY THEFT | | |
| IDENTITY THEFT EMPLOYMENT | | |
| ILLEGAL BURNING | | |
| ILLEGAL DUMPING | | |
| LOSS REPORT-INSURANCE | | |
| SHOPLIFTING | | |
| STOLEN VEHICLE | | |
| THEFT | | |
| THEFT FROM VEHICLE | | |
| THEFT OF METALS | | |
| TRESPASSING | | |
| COMMUNITY POLICING | Directed patrol | Directed patrol |
| PATROL/VACATION WATCH | | |
| SCHOOL PROGRAMS(COMM SERV) | | |

| Call Description | Table Category | Figure Category |
|---|---|---|
| SPECIAL DETAIL | | |
| ANIMAL NOISE PROBLEM | Animal calls | General noncriminal |
| ANIMAL PROBLEM | | |
| CURFEW VIOLATION | Juvenile | |
| INCORRIGIBLE JUVENILE | | |
| JUVENILE DISTURBING | | |
| MISSING PERSON - JUVENILE | | |
| RUNAWAY JUVENILE | | |
| TRUANT JUVENILE | | |
| CIVIL ACTION | Miscellaneous | |
| CIVIL MATTER/STANDBY | | |
| CIVIL PROCESS - CIVIL USE ONLY | | |
| CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE | | |
| DROWNING | | |
| EMERGENCY MESSAGE | | |
| FIREWORKS | | |
| FOUNTAIN HILLS MUNI CODE | | |
| GAME & FISH VIOLATION | | |
| LOST PERSON ASSIST | | |
| MINOR ASSISTANCE/BACKUP | | |
| PROPERTY IMPOUND SAFEKEEPING | | |
| QUEEN CREEK MUNI CODE | | |
| QUEEN CREEK MUNI CODE VIOLATION | | |
| TOW TRUCK REQUEST | | |
| AUDIBLE BURGLAR ALARM | Alarm | Investigation-other |
| FALSE ARMED ROBBERY ALARM | | |
| FALSE BURGLAR ALARM | | |
| FALSE PANIC ALARM | | |
| PANIC ALARM | | |
| SILENT BURGLAR ALARM | | |
| SILENT PANIC ALARM | | |
| 9-1-1 HANGUP | Check/investigation | |
| ATTEMPT TO LOCATE | | |
| BAR CHECK | | |
| BOMB THREAT | | |
| DEAD BODY | | |
| EXPLOSION | | |
| FOLLOW UP | | |
| FOUND PROPERTY | | |

| Call Description | Table Category | Figure Category |
|---|---|---|
| FOUND PROPERTY (DETENTION/JAIL ONLY) | | |
| MAN DOWN | | |
| MISSING PERSON | | |
| NEAR DROWNING | | |
| PERSON FOUND | | |
| RECOVERY OF STOLEN PROPERTY | | |
| STOLEN AUTOMOBILE RECOVERY - MCSO | | |
| WELFARE CHECK | | |
| COUNTY PARKS VIOLATION | Disturbance | Suspicious incident |
| DISORDERLY CONDUCT | | |
| DRUNKS DISTURBING | | |
| LOITERING | | |
| LOUD NEIGHBORS DISTURBING | | |
| MOTORIZED BIKES DISTURBING | | |
| NEIGHBOR TROUBLE | | |
| UNKNOWN TROUBLE | | |
| UNWANTED GUEST | | |
| PROWLER | Suspicious person/vehicle | |
| SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY | | |
| SUSPICIOUS PACKAGE | | |
| SUSPICIOUS PERSON | | |
| SUSPICIOUS PERSON AND VEHICLE | | |
| SUSPICIOUS VEHICLE | | |
| VEHICLE CRASH FATALITY | Accidents | Traffic |
| VEHICLE CRASH NO INJURY | | |
| VEHICLE CRASH UNKNOWN INJURIES | | |
| VEHICLE CRASH W/INJURIES | | |
| ABANDONED VEHICLE | Traffic enforcement | |
| CITIZEN/MOTORIST ASSIST | | |
| DUI | | |
| ILLEGAL PARKING | | |
| OUI BOAT | | |
| OVERLY AGGRESSIVE DRIVER | | |
| RECKLESS DRIVING | | |
| SPEEDERS | | |
| TRAFFIC CONTROL | | |
| TRAFFIC CONTROL - OFF DUTY | | |
| TRAFFIC HAZARD | | |
| TRAFFIC VIOLATION | | |

## TABLE 5-21: Noncall Activity Types, by Category

| Activity type | Category |
|---|---|
| admin | Administrative |
| gas | |
| meet | |
| shop | |
| train | |
| chow | Other |
| hq | |
| null | |
| pager | |
| pd | |
| phone | |
| 2513 | Report writing & other duty |
| 902w | |
| abd | |
| court | |
| jail | |
| st100 | Station |
| st400 | |
| st500 | |
| st600 | |